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INTRODUCTION '
As this issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal goes to press,
campaign finance reform at the federal level has emerged as a core
campaign issue for former Senator Bill Bradley and Senator John
McCain as they seek the Democratic and Republican nominations
for president. In fact, the front page of the "newspaper of record"
frequently carries stories that describe campaign finance scandals.'
The issue of campaign finance reform has occupied an increas-
ingly dominant place in American politics. Campaign finance re-
form legislation has languished at the federal level while states and
cities have enacted various laws intended to curtail the pernicious
effects of large political contributions and, in some jurisdictions, to
alleviate the demand for these contributions by providing public
funds to candidates. Nationwide, for example, more than thirty ju-
risdictions now have some program for providing public funds for
political campaigns.2 These field experiments in campaign finance
reform are invaluable sources of information and experience for
reformers and legislators who grapple with the complex issues of
electoral reform.
This information and experience, however, has been largely ig-
nored by those who have discussed campaign finance reform at the
federal level. Indeed, numerous well-intentioned proposals to
change the system, ranging from modest attempts to curtail the use
and flow of "soft money," to more far-reaching plans to require
one hundred percent public funding of campaigns, have often
lacked reference to the reform programs in the United States that
have enjoyed records of genuine success in the effort to control the
role of money in politics.
Accordingly, this issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal
presents the proceedings of a national conference on campaign fi-
nance reform held on November 9, 1998, and jointly sponsored by
the New York City Campaign Finance Board (the "Board") and
1. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, From High to Low, Hopefuls for 2000 Are Awash in
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1999, at Al; Alison Mitchell, Congress Chasing Campaign
Donors Early and Often, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1999, at Al; Jill Abramson, The Busi-
ness of Persuasion Thrives in Nation's Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at Al; Al-
bert R. Hunt, To the Campaign Contributors Go the Tax-Cut Spoils, WALL ST. J., Aug.
5, 1999, at A19; Phil Kuntz & Glenn R. Simpson, Flush Bush Undercuts Federal Fund-
ing of Campaigns, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1999, at A24; Albert R. Hunt, The Other Polit-
ical Scandal in Washington, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1998, at A22.
2. See EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAW 96: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK REFERENCE
CHARTS Chart 4 (1996) (listing states with special tax or public financing provisions).
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the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (the "Associa-
tion"). Entitled From the Ground Up: Local Lessons for National
Reform, the conference brought together practitioners of the field,
including a diverse group of journalists, elected officials and local
and national government administrators, to discuss what lessons
could be learned from nearly twenty-five years of local campaign
reform efforts. It attracted an audience from around the country
and was rebroadcast several times on C-SPAN. This conference
and the resulting materials, such as this publication, represent an
effort to bring knowledge gained from local experiments to the at-
tention of those involved in reform at the federal level.
The New York City Campaign Finance Program (the "Pro-
gram") is itself one such experiment. In 1988, then-Mayor Edward
I. Koch and City Council Majority Leader (and current Speaker)
Peter F. Vallone enacted New York City's first-ever program of
public financing. This comprehensive Program, known as the New
York City Campaign Finance Act, 3 regulates campaigns for candi-
dates for the offices of Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Bor-
ough President and City Council member. Candidates who join
the voluntary Program agree to limit their contributions and spend-
ing and provide detailed disclosure of their campaign finances. In
return, they can qualify to receive public matching funds for small
contributions from New York City residents.4
The Program has benefitted from continual refinement by the
legislature, guided by the Board's mandated post-election reports
that evaluate the effects of the Program and make recommenda-
tions for reform.' Since 1988, there have been numerous amend-
ments to the Program,6 including: (1) the imposition of a debate
requirement for candidates for citywide office;7 (2) further lower-
ing the contribution limits for each office;8 (3) changing the match-
ing formula for contributions from one-to-one in public funds for
contributions of up to one thousand dollars to four-to-one in public
3. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 701-715 (1998); N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 46,
§§ 1051-57 (N.Y. Legal Pub. Corp. 1989 & Supp. 1998).
4. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 701-715.
5. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., A DECADE OF REFORM, 1988-1998
(Sept. 1998); N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS (Sept. 1994); N.Y.C. CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE BD., WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND THE NEW CITY COUNCIL (July 1992); N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., DOLLARS
AND DISCLOSURE: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY (Sept. 1990).
6. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 701-715.
7. See id. § 709.5.
8. See id. §§ 703, 705.
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funds for contributions of up to $250;9 (4)" banning corporate con-
tributions for candidates in the Program;'0 and (5) subjecting tran-
sition and inaugural fundraising committees to the same
contribution limits and disclosure requirements as those for partici-
pating candidates."
Preliminary analysis by the Board of admittedly limited data
from three City Council special elections held in February 1999
suggests that the new matching formula will have a dramatic effect
on the way campaigns are conducted under the Program. For the
first time ever, public funds made up the majority of funds avail-
able to candidates in the February 1999 elections; the average con-
tribution size dropped by twenty percent from elections in 1997;
more contributors gave to campaigns than in 1997; and candidates
raised the vast majority of their funds from New York City resi-
dents.12 These results, and the respect accorded to the Program
over the past eleven years, testify to the vitality of campaign fi-
nance reform at the local level.' 3
As noted by the conference's first speaker, former New York
City Corporation Counsel and Charter Revision Commission
Chairman Fritz Schwarz, the framers of the Constitution envi-
sioned the states as "workshops of liberty," where experimentation
and diversity could flourish, providing valuable lessons for the fed-
eral government.' 4 Unlike many discussions of campaign finance
reform at the federal level, the focus of From the Ground Up was
not on what might happen if reform were to be enacted, but on
mining the lessons of local experiments to identify those reforms
that could be imported to the federal level.
9. See id. § 702(3). The Program originally matched every dollar raised from
New York City residents up to $500 per election, subject to a maximum amount in
public funds available for the office sought. See id. In 1990, the formula was changed
to one-to-one up to $1000. See id. In 1998, the matching rate was changed to four-to-
one up to $250. See id. § 705(2). Candidates must also raise a threshold dollar
amount in small contributions from a minimum number of City residents to qualify
for matching funds. See id. § 703(2)(a).
10. See N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 46, § 1052(a)(12).
11. See id. § 1052(a)(11).
12. See Jonathan Hicks, Term Law Could Aid Council's Newest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1999, at B4; N.Y.C. Campaign Finance Bd., Press Release, Feb. 17, 1999. See also
Bill Bradley, Address at the National Press Club (July 22, 1999).
13. See, e.g., Editorial, Time to Make a Good Law Better, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1998, at A26; Editorial, Campaign Reform: Made in New York, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2,
1998, at 30. See also N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., A DECADE OF REFORM, supra
note 5 (including a comprehensive review of the work of the New York City Cam-
paign Finance Board).
14. See infra p. 14.
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The timeliness of the conference was underscored not only by
nearly daily press coverage of scandal, but also by the forced with-
drawal of one featured speaker. Charles G. La Bella, then-U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of California and former Chief
of the Justice Department's campaign finance task force, had ac-
cepted an invitation to address the conference on the challenges of
law enforcement in the political arena. Mr. La Bella had investi-
gated allegations of scandal arising from the 1996 presidential cam-
paign. He recommended that Attorney General Janet Reno
appoint an independent counsel under the Independent Counsel
Statute to investigate further.'5 The Attorney General declined to
make such an appointment.' 6 Despite Mr. La Bella's stated inten-
tion to confine his remarks to "the law and published court deci-
sions," he was directed by the Justice Department not to
participate in the conference. 17 Although the Justice Department
maintained that its direction to Mr. La Bella not to participate was
not unusual, some observers suggested that the decision was a con-
sequence of his recommendation of an independent counsel.' 8 This
occurred at a time when unrelated scandals were being investigated
by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr (resulting later in the
adoption of two counts of impeachment against President Clinton).
From the Ground Up: Local Lessons for National Reform
should be considered the beginning, and not by any means the end,
of an examination of data and experience to assist the public in
evaluation of federal reform legislation. In particular, materials
created as part of the conference, including this transcript, will help
to inform the work of the Association's Special Commission on
Campaign Finance Reform, co-chaired by Robert M. Kaufman of
Proskauer Rose LLP, Fordham Law School Dean John D. Feerick
and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, as that Commission
15. See, e.g., Editorial, The Prosecutor Who Spoke Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998,
at A12; Editorial, Reno Cover-Up Continues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A20; Edito-
rial, Watching the Watchdog, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1999, at A22.
16. See, e.g., David Johnston, Reno Rejects Outside Inquiry On Clinton for Cam-
paign Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at Al; Editorial, Ms. Reno Undermines Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at A26.
17. Letter from Charles G. La Bella to Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J. (Oct. 13, 1998) (on
file at the Board). In August 1998, Mr. La Bella was passed over for permanent ap-
pointment as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, and
in February 1999 he was informed that he was to be replaced in that position. He
subsequently resigned from the Justice Department. See, e.g., Editorial, The Sword of
Justice, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1999, at A22.
18. See David Johnston, Ex-Head of Justice Dept. Inquiry Is Barred from Two
Talks on Topic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at A26.
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prepares a comprehensive report on recommendations for national
reform.
We hope that the transcript of this conference will help to inform
many others of the practical potential and the impediments to cam-
paign finance reform at the federal level.
Thanks are due to the New York Community Trust and the Joyce
Foundation, both of which provided grants for the conference.
Thanks are also due to Carole Campolo, Deputy Executive Direc-
tor; Ian Michaels, Press Secretary; and Christopher Odell, Deputy
Press Secretary of the Board staff for their extraordinary work in
putting this conference together. Thanks are similarly due to the
Association, Alan Rothstein, General Counsel; Nick Marricco,
Meeting Services Director; and Kristen Ruckdeschel, Public Rela-
tions Coordinator.
WELCOMING REMARKS
MR. COOPER: My name is Michael Cooper. I am the presi-
dent of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (the
"Association") and it is my pleasure to welcome you this morning
to this very important conference. It is fitting that a gathering on a
subject so basic to the fabric of our government as campaign fi-
nance reform should be held in this institution.
This Association was founded in 1870 to combat the corruption
in the city government, particularly in the courts, at that time and,
ever since its founding in 1870, this Association has been dedicated
to furthering government reform. All of us who care about fair and
responsive government have to be concerned with the abuses that
have been rampant in the financing of election campaigns. And
what a perfect moment in time to hold this conference. For we are
less than a week from elections in which millions of dollars were
spent and in the case of the Senatorial contest in the State of New
York, more than ten million dollars by each candidate.
There have been many conferences that have railed against the
excesses of money and politics. But today, this conference has a
different focus. A focus on what can be done and what has been
done to accomplish campaign finance reform. Around the country,
state and local governments have been putting into place systems
designed to level the playing field for candidates, to curb the undue
influence of money in government and to provide greater regula-
tion and disclosure of campaign financing.
One of the best examples is right here in the City of New York.
The New York City Campaign Finance Act,19 passed a decade ago,
is a national model. And the Campaign Finance Board (the
"Board") has been an outstanding example of a dedicated and ef-
fective public agency.
I am proud to have the opportunity to have the Association co-
sponsor this program with the Board, and I thank Father O'Hare,
the chair of the Board, and executive director Nicole Gordon and
the Board's fine staff for their efforts in putting this program
together.
To give you some idea of the regard that this Association has for
Nicole Gordon, she served until this past spring as a member of our
19. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 701-715 (1998); 52 R.C.N.Y. § 1-02 (1998)
(providing for the establishment of the Campaign Finance Board).
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Executive Committee, and is now chair of the Government Ethics
Committee of the Association.
Today's conference is part of the ongoing work of the Special
Commission on Campaign Finance Reform of this Association.
That commission, which is chaired by three former presidents of
the Association, Cyrus Vance, Bob Kaufman and John Feerick, is
developing a comprehensive approach to campaign finance reform
at the federal level. The commission plans to finish its report
sometime next year and its work will be greatly informed by to-
day's discussion.
We are quite fortunate to have assembled an excellent array of
speakers from different levels of government and varied exper-
iences and points of view. I hope you find the presentations and
the exchange of views to be informative and thought-provoking,
and that you will value highly your attendance at this conference
when you think of it in the future.
Now let me turn this over to Father O'Hare.
FATHER O'HARE: Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper. The
Board is, of course, very pleased that the Association joins us today
in sponsoring what we think will be a very useful and constructive
conference.
I want to thank all of you for coming today. Represented in the
room, we have people from across the nation, from many of the
states and even from Canada. As Michael Cooper suggested, the
theme of today's conference is to see if we can look at programs
that actually have worked on the municipal and state level and,
with that modesty that is characteristic of New York, see if it is
possible that some of the lessons on the local and municipal level
could actually be pertinent to the problems at the national and fed-
eral level.
As we have seen from watching the debate about our campaign
finance system on the federal level, even the most heroic reform
efforts have little chance of success as long as law makers continue
to see the campaign finance crisis in partisan terms.
We believe that one of the wise features created by the architects
of the Campaign Finance Program here in New York City was the
provision in the law for a non-partisan Board, and over the last ten
years, I think, we have been successful in developing a non-parti-
san culture on that Board. In contrast to that approach are elec-
tion commissions that are bi-partisan in nature, which seems often
to be a prescription for paralysis.
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Despite the famous Clinton-Gingrich handshake, no real pro-
gress has been made at the federal level on the issue of campaign
finance'reform and the resolution of this issue is crucial to a fair
decision-making process on every other subject that comes before
Congress.
Later today we will hear from at least two political figures, Ed
Koch, former Mayor of New York and now National Voice of Rea-
son, and Congressman Christopher Shays, who have in their ca-
reers managed to look beyond the trenches of partisan politics.
One of the signature trends of the 1990s has been the increased
prominence of states and cities in formulating new ideas about gov-
ernance. From reducing crime to reforming welfare and public ed-
ucation, states and cities have discovered through their
experimentation innovative solutions to the problems that have be-
deviled the national government. But while both Democrats and
Republicans have publicly embraced the idea of looking beyond
the Beltway for answers to national problems, little attention has
been given thus far to local innovations in campaign finance
reform.
Today's conference is part of an effort to address that situation.
Today we will hear from, among others, administrators of local and
state campaign finance reform programs, as well as from elected
officials and professionals who have run campaigns under these
systems.
In political campaigns, pundits sometimes speak of momentum.
If there is any hope for campaign reform at the national level, it
will need to capture the same sense of movement that propels a
candidate to victory. In last week's elections, momentum certainly
seemed to be on the side of reform. Voters in Arizona, Massachu-
setts and New York City all approved campaign finance reform
proposals. In Wisconsin, Senator Russell Feingold proved that a
candidate can take a tremendous risk, restrict his fundraising and
spending, and still win despite a massive influx of funds from out of
state.
Earlier this year, the New York City Council approved amend-
ments that will dramatically improve our city's Program, including
a provision for a four-to-one rate for public funds to match smaller
contributions from city residents. With the victory of the Shays-
Meehan bill2" in August, these signs indicate that voters are inter-
20. See H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. (1998). It was passed on August 6, 1998 by a vote
of 252-179. The companion Senate version, the "McCain-Feingold bill," S. 1219,
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ested in reform, notwithstanding the conventional political wisdom
to the contrary.
The purpose of today's conference, once again, is to look at the
experience of local campaign finance reform efforts and to identify
those reforms that could be translated to the federal level. Today
we will have four panel discussions. At the conclusion of each of
these panel discussions, the moderators will ask the panelists what,
if any, consensus they can reach on reforms that can work at the
federal level. And in organizing the conference and inviting people
to participate on the panels, we have tried to enlist as wide a spec-
trum of opinions on these issues as possible.
We have four panel discussions and three featured speakers. We
certainly anticipate having time for questions from the audience
after each panel and each speaker, but we have a considerable
number of issues to address today and we will have to adhere
strictly to our time limits.
Before introducing the first speaker of the day, I would like to
thank, once again, our co-sponsor, the Association, and also the
New York Community Trust and the Joyce Foundation, whose gen-
erous support has made this conference possible.
I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Board, Bill
Green and Martin Begun, both of whom are here, as well as Nicole
Gordon, the executive director who has enlisted over the last ten
years an extraordinary group of dedicated and competent public
servants on the staff of the Board.
Our first speaker today is Fritz Schwarz who served as New York
City Corporation Counsel in the Koch administration, and then as
chair of the Charter Revision Commission in 1989. In that capac-
ity, he helped recast the structure of New York City government.
He has also served in a number of other public service positions,
including as chief counsel to Senator Frank Church's 1975 Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities.
104th Cong. (1996), failed to override a Republican filibuster. See S. 25, 105th Cong.
(1998).
OPENING REMARKS: THE STATES AND CITIES AS
FEDERAL LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY*
MR. SCHWARZ: Thank you, Father, thank you Nicole, thank
you, Michael. I am indebted to Justice Brandeis for the title. It
was he who dissented to the 1932 case of New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann,21 charged his fellow justices with stymieing the potential
progress of the nation by striking down Oklahoma's licensing re-
quirement for sellers of ice. Defending the right of state govern-
ments to tailor legislation to local needs, Brandeis opined: "it is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou-
rageous state," or, we would add, city, "may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social, and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest the country, '22 and, we should add,
with potential benefit to the rest of the country.
Just such a happy experiment is the New York City Campaign
Finance Act (the "Act"). 23 Passed in the wake of grim findings by
the Sovern Commission on Integrity in Government of vast oppor-
tunities for abuse, influence peddling and other improprieties, the
law has, as Mayor Koch predicted in signing it, "achieved a more
equitable and open system of financing candidates who seek elec-
tive office in New York City."24
With its sensitivity to New York's unique concentration of
wealth and power, its increased accountability to the people
through disclosure and its creative voluntary incentive-creating
structure of participation, the Act embodies the best spirit of local
inventiveness.
* For a revised version of these remarks, see Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., States
and Cities as Laboratories of Democracy, 54 REc. Ass'N B. N.Y.C. 157-65 (Mar./Apr.
1999).
21. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). Specifically, Justice Brandeis stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibil-
ity. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. See supra note 3.
24. Hearing on Local Law No. 8 of 1988 (Feb. 29, 1988) (statement of then-Mayor
Edward I. Koch), cited in Jeffrey D. Friedlander et al., The New York City Campaign
Finance Act, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345, 345 n.2 (1988).
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In keeping with Justice Brandeis's wise assessment of the utility
of state experimentation, New York City's success has led the way
for reform in other localities - as it hopefully will do in the nation,
eventually.
Later panels today will examine the valuable lessons of our city's
law in depth. My project, by contrast, as the day's opening
speaker, is to give a more general overview of the role of state and
local governments in inspiring widespread change.
The purpose of my remarks today is first to trace some of the
substantial and invaluable contributions of states and cities to na-
tional policy throughout American history starting from the very
beginning and into the present day.
I recognize the critical part states historically have played, and
continue to play, in pioneering institutional process reforms - for
example, state constitutional amendments or campaign financing
- as well as their invaluable role as pioneers of substantive, social
or economic changes. Next, I examine some of the benefits of us-
ing localities as a proving ground for social experiments.
Finally, I raise the question of how such experimentation relates
to the values of federalism, generally, and, in particular, how this
experimentation relates to the place of minority interests.
I should begin my historical survey by noting that the critical
importance of state innovation to the well-being of the federation
was, of course, by no means a novel concept when Brandeis spoke
in 1932.25
De Tocqueville, an incredibly perceptive observer on this as on
many other subjects, observed a century earlier that, in large cen-
tralized nations, the law-giver is bound to give the laws a uniform
character which does not fit the diversity of places and of mores.26
In keeping with de Tocqueville's call for diversity, the history of
American federal law in every era has reflected the adoption of the
best - and occasionally the worst - of experiments first imple-
mented in the laboratory of the states.
From the Federal Constitution itself, to the victims' rights and
environmental reforms of recent decades, the federal government
frequently has followed in the footsteps of trailblazing states and
cities.
The laboratory model was much in evidence when the Federal
Constitution was drafted, as the founders availed themselves of the
25. See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311.
26. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1988).
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constitutions of the original states. In fact, the constitution of our
own state was particularly influential as a model for the Federal
Constitution.
Alexander Hamilton proudly pointed to the New York Constitu-
tion in his Federalist No. 1, where he assured New Yorkers, in seek-
ing their support, that the new Federal Constitution was "an
analogy to [our] own state constitution. '27
In the area of substantive rights, it is the states to whom the na-
tion owes many of those rights that define what it is to be an Amer-
ican in our Bill of Rights. Free exercise of religion, restrictions on
search and seizure, quartering of troops, freedom of the press and
safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment appeared in state
constitutions before their enactment in our national Bill of Rights.
Many states, particularly Massachusetts, Virginia and New York,
consider these rights so critical that only the promise of amend-
ment procured ratification of a Constitution without the Bill of
Rights. The early years of the American confederation witnessed
legislative state experiments, both for the good and for the terrible.
The legislature of Pennsylvania outlawed slavery in 1780 and our
own state followed suit in 1799.
Unlike many other states, as early as 1783, Massachusetts inter-
preted its constitution's guaranty that all men are born free and
equal to require the abolition of slavery.
By 1804, the last northern state had freed its slaves. And until
the passage of the regressive Federal Fugitive Slave Act in 1850,28
these same states further enacted new personal liberty laws to en-
force the rights of fleeing slaves.
During the last three decades of the 19th century, after the fed-
eral civil rights law had been declared invalid, virtually every
northern state, as well as a number of western states, prohibited
school segregation by statute. And state courts, when called upon,
enforced those statutes by requiring school integration, to some ex-
tent, at least.
Surely, the record on civil rights in the northern states was
hardly perfect, but at least it showed that one could have liberty in
states and that that worked and it was something to praise and fol-
low and not something to decry. Of course, the story was different
in the south, with a terrible cost to the union. As the northern
states had led the fight in expanding rights for people of color, state
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
28. 9 Stat. 462 (Sept. 18, 1850).
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legislatures, especially in the west and the north, set an example in
according women the vote.
Wyoming, for example, enacted women's suffrage in 1869, and
twenty-four states already had followed when the Nineteenth
Amendment passed in 1920. So, again, you have an example of
how state allowance of greater freedom led the way and served as
an example for the national government.
In the following decades, the states continued to change the
landscape of American rights. For example, New York passed the
nation's first worker's compensation law in 1910, and other states
soon followed. Massachusetts enacted the first minimum wage leg-
islation in 1912. Thirteen states had enacted minimum wage pro-
grams by the 1920s, whereas Congress did not follow suit until the
New Deal under Roosevelt.
However, during the early decades of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court's application of the now discredited doctrines of
substantive due process and freedom of contract struck down hun-
dreds of progressive state laws involving minimum wages and max-
imum hours. The best-known case, of course, was Lochner v. New
York 29 in 1905.
The frustration of state experimentation that began in the 1930s
took on a new dimension in 1942 with Supreme Court decisions
vastly expanding the preemptive power of federal legislation.
During the New Deal and the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, our national attention was focused on
national programs, opening doors to social security,. urban housing,
education, voting and other civil rights. And during that period,
the states did not do as much by way of experimentation, but they
continued in the area of rights. And again, New York City led the
way. New York City led the way on housing discrimination by
passing the first law governing discrimination in public housing in
the late 1930s. This law was constantly expanded in New York City
to cover all kinds of housing by 1951.
Similarly, in 1957, though the New York City Council was gener-
ally derided in those days and not as effective as it is today, it
passed the first law in the nation prohibiting discrimination in pri-
vately owned housing that did not receive public subsidies or tax
abatements.
29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding a New York statute establishing maximum hours
for bakery employees unconstitutional).
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At the same time came the southern defiance of Brown v. Board
of Education.3" Again our attention on the issue of rights was fo-
cused quite properly on the reforms which, eventually, after the
pressure that came from Martin Luther King, Jr. and other people
defying segregation, nationalized the rights of people of color not
to be discriminated against. But today, there is again a resurgence
of reform in states and localities. The importance of state innova-
tion has come to manifest itself increasingly in recent decades.
For example, with regard to vehicle emissions, California led the
way long before the federal statutes on laws that controlled air pol-
lution. National work on the environment is vital, but as an edito-
rial in today's New York Times showed, the states and cities are
again beginning to lead the way and pressing for environmental
improvements. 1
Again, the states were focusing on fundamental rights as well as
substantive matters in the field of women's rights. Many states
passed constitutional amendments and legislation protecting wo-
men against discrimination before the national government did so.
Still more recently, cities and states, again, particularly New York
City, have been standard bearers in the area of gay rights. In 1986,
New York City passed a landmark gay rights law32 under Mayor
Koch, and this past June the city passed a domestic partners law,33
which leads the way for seeing whether laws of that kind make
sense, work and are fair. As of 1998, ten states and the District of
Columbia have enacted civil rights protections for gay people. Of
course, that issue is one that is being experimented on in both
directions.
If you read the newspapers, you can see the experiments that are
seeking to suppress gay rights in some locations and the experi-
ments that are seeking to protect them in others. So, state and
local experimentation is not always in a great direction, but it often
is.
Similarly, the state courts, since Justice William Brennan's influ-
ential speech on state constitutions and the protections of individ-
ual rights,34 have done a great deal to protect individual rights even
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1998, at A25.
32. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1998).
33. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-108 (1998) ("The city ordinance requires that if
a finding of immediate family status can be made without regard to the formalities of
marriage, it must also be made without regard to sexual orientation.").
34. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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as the United States Supreme Court has begun to pull back from
the landmark decisions of the Warren era. And our own Chief
Judge Judith Kaye, speaking to the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York ("Association") in one of the Cardozo Lectures,
illustrated how the state courts can be trailblazers in protecting in-
dividual freedoms.35
Turning back to the contributions of states and localities in the
area of the institutional process of reform, this has been every bit
as invaluable to national progress. It is, for example, to the Massa-
chusetts Constitution that we owe separation of powers and our tri-
partite system of government.
In his Federalist No. 66, Hamilton, for example, refuted criticism
of certain aspects of the Constitution, including the Impeachment
Clause, by referring to how the New York State Constitution dealt
with that subject.36 In the early part of this century, the progressive
movement led the way in dealing with issues that are part of to-
day's discourse.
The many vital concepts of today's politics entered public dis-
course as the progressives sought to ensure the protection of the
public against special interests and boss-led machine politics. It is
the same movement that Michael was referring to that earlier led
to the creation of this Association, that was substantively
important.
Initiatives, referendums, recalls and term limits are all things that
are not necessarily always benign and sometimes are perverse, but
they are examples of where seeing how they work in a locality will
help the nation decide whether they are good or bad ideas.
The primaries, direct primaries and special prosecutors' experi-
ments, which have not always been benign, are things that came
also, if you look back into history, first from states and localities.
And popular sentiment of the early part of this century was then
embodied in the Seventeenth Amendment which led to the direct
election of Senators instead of the previous system of election by
the state legislatures.
As later panels today will discuss in more detail, today's head-
lines reflect a renewed commitment to democratic reform. A sec-
ond progressive era might be upon us. The people in states and
localities are concentrating (because they know they must) on deal-
ing with the failings of big government, the miring of the federal
35. See Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, in 3 BEN-
JAMIN N. CARDOZO MEMORIAL LECrURES 1401, 1415 (1995).
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
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government in gridlock and the overly dominant effect of big
money in our politics.
And as you know, in referenda held this year in Maine, Massa-
chusetts and Arizona, the public voted in favor of campaign fi-
nance reform. It is a movement which the local areas are pushing
for and we are going to see more and more experimentation that
will hopefully drive the federal legislators into believing they must
do the same thing.
Then there are other efforts to focus on: in Oregon, to conduct
elections by mail, and in Texas, to permit voting by computer. All
these experiments are part of this country's constant effort to per-
fect our democracy, and it is good and healthy that one can see
whether they work in localities and states before one tries to im-
pose them upon the nation as a whole. Of course, in addition to
electoral changes, the laboratories of the states and localities are
exciting experiments in conducting government efficiently.
If you read the wonderful book called Reinventing Government,
by David Osborne and Ted Gabler, you can come up with lots of
examples of where localities here in New York City, in Arizona, in
Wisconsin, have, in fact, undertaken experiments in making their
government more efficient. 7
Again, it is a test: you can see whether programs like the New
York City scorecard program which evaluates, for example, street
cleanliness, can have a beneficial effect on making the government
do better by informing the public where it has or has not done well.
Let us take the experiment of school vouchers. That is a very,
very controversial subject. One can argue powerfully against
school vouchers as being something that dilutes the public schools.
On the other hand, it is an idea, it seems to me, with sufficient
possible power to reform the public schools and the school system
in general, that it is worthwhile to see how, in fact, it works in some
localities so that one has the benefit of actual experiment instead of
pure rhetoric.
Therefore, one can say clearly there are practical and democratic
benefits of experimentation at the state and local levels. However,
inasmuch as Justice Brandeis postulated that states might experi-
ment without risk to the rest of the country, this discussion of his
idea would not be complete if I did not pause to recognize that it is
the rare experiment that is truly without danger. Institutional pro-
37. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GABLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Addison-
Wesley Pub. Co. 1992).
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cess reforms must always comply with the limits of the Constitu-
tion, especially those ensuring the value of every person's vote.
However, it is primarily with respect to substantive economic
and social changes that one must sound a note of caution about
whether one embraces experimentation as always being sensible.
Inherent in the new federalism is a belief in a distinct local identity.
But to what extent certain types of differences between localities
are a healthy side effect of experimentation is a matter for debate.
Caution warns against the over-localization of human rights, for
example, and against a retreat from established protections in the
name of experiment.
As Professor Charles Black reminds us: "[A]nything concerning
the equal protection of a child in Arkansas is just as legitimate a
concern of mine as it is of the citizen[s] of Little Rock .... The
matters of the Constitution - all of them, not just some of them -
are national matters."38 In this respect, you can focus on abortion,
and you can say that some of the experiments that are being sug-
gested which were defeated at the polls are ones which are danger-
ous to constitutional rights.
Related to these questions about the importance of national
safeguards is a concern about the effects of local experimentation
upon those in the local or regional minority. A longstanding body
of thought holds that the protection of minorities is best conducted
by unified government. So we have this dilemma. Sometimes we
have states and localities leading the way in the protection of mi-
norities. Yet we have to recognize that as a matter of theory and as
a matter of practice, you must have strong national standards for
the protection of minorities.
Going back to Federalist No. 10, James Madison pointed out that
a national government serving a diverse group of citizens can pro-
tect unpopular minority groups more effectively than can the gov-
ernment of a small homogeneous state.39
In revising the City Charter in 1989, for example, one of the con-
straints, we felt, of decentralizing land use to too great an extent
was the fear of giving insular groups too much power to exclude
people who do not look like them.
So it comes as no surprise that some of the experiments at the
state level recently have, in fact, been targeted at turning back the
38. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
A DEMOCRACY 142 (1960).
39. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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rights of those who have less voting power, the rights of minorities.
And you all know examples of what I am talking about.
When we speak of "experiments," we must bear in mind that, as
history is said to be written by the victors, so in some measure must
the success or failure of state experiments be determined
subjectively.
For example, bare statistics reflecting declining welfare rolls or
school performance may conceal individual misery and failure.
And though the theoretical advocates of ever greater state and lo-
cal experimentation point to the possibility of exit from the state,
the logistic and economic difficulties of moving from state to state
have potentially grave consequences for individuals who are poor
and individuals who do not have power. Now, of course some peo-
ple talk about a race to the bottom among governments competing
to do less for the disadvantaged, thus reducing taxes (at least for
the short term).
But in the area of campaign finance reform, one does not have to
worry about a race to the bottom, because the federal government
is already at the bottom. What is going on in campaign finance
reform is therefore not a race to the bottom, but an effort to aspire
to the top.
Certainly, we have to remember that not all state experiments
have been for the best in the light of history. For example, Henry
Steele Commager made this observation: "the Massachusetts legis-
lature imposed loyalty oaths on teachers; the Oregon legislature
outlawed private schools, and... the Tennessee legislature prohib-
ited the teaching of evolution . . . the list could be extended
indefinitely."4"
Fortunately, however, the laboratory of state experimentation is
not a sealed room. Laws passed at the state and local level remain
subject to the limits of state constitutional requirements as well as
of federal law and the Federal Constitution. As Justice Douglas
wrote in Monroe v. Pape,41 discussing the purpose of Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act,42 the federal government's obligation as a
complement to the states' obligation is: 1) to override certain
kinds of state laws; 2) to provide a remedy where state law is inade-
quate; and 3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, is not available in practice.
40. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 91-92 (1989).
41. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
42. 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999)).
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So the genius of "Our Federalism" lies not only in the creative
power of cities and states, but in the Constitution's guaranty of a
larger legislative and constitutional context for reform.
Those powers reserved to the states and local governments
should not be left to collect dust through disuse or excessive cau-
tion. Those who operate at the local level must implement changes
wisely, but our dual system of federalism demands that we do im-
plement them. We are duty bound to continue to search for better
solutions, which is what the rest of the day will be about. So we are
duty bound to continue to search for better solutions to the social
and political challenges of our day and to learn from the experi-
mentation of others. As I have tried to show, to do so can be in
keeping with the best of our nation's historical legacy and aspira-
tions as well as our civic mandate. And to do so in the area of
campaign finance reform confirms our city as a true laboratory in
the most honorable sense, engaged in an experiment of honest, in-
formed, creative - and long overdue - improvements in democ-
racy. Thank you.
DEMOCRACY AT A FAIR PRICE?
PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTIONS
Campaign reformers have sought to regulate both the supply and
demand sides of the campaign cash equation. On the supply side,
reform legislation in Congress and across the country has at-
tempted to impose limits on the size of political contributions and,
in certain cases, to replace all or part of candidates' funds with pub-
lic money. Contribution limits diminish the reality and appearance
of undue influence upon elected officials by well-financed special
interests or individuals. The effect of such limits varies, however,
because different jurisdictions regulate to a different extent contri-
butions from various sources, including individuals, PACs, political
committees, corporations, unions and lobbyists. Trevor Potter, an
election lawyer and former chairman of the Federal Election Com-
mission (the "FEC"), moderated this discussion of the role of con-
tribution limits and public financing.
FATHER O'HARE: Robert M. Kaufman was to have moder-
ated this next panel, but unfortunately he is in the hospital today,
so his place is going to be taken by Trevor Potter, former head of
the FEC. Mr. Potter, I think it is safe to say, is one of the more
highly respected people to have served in that position.
He served as vice chair in 1993 and as chairman in 1994. His
previous government service was at the Justice Department and as
assistant general counsel for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. Mr. Potter is an editor and author of various publications on
election law and campaign finance questions, and is a frequent vis-
iting expert on ABC nightly news, PBS, BBC and National Public
Radio.
MR. POTTER: Good morning, everybody.
The panel, as you know, is "Democracy at a Fair Price? Public
Financing of Elections," and we have with us this morning a distin-
guished group of panelists. They are, starting to my far right, Kath-
leen Czar, who is the executive director of the Minnesota
Democratic Farmer Labor Party. A title of a party that reminds us
that many things are different in Minnesota.
We also have Kevin Kennedy, the executive director of the Wis-
consin Elections Board, and he will be able to tell us some of the
recent developments in Wisconsin which, as you know, has both
public financing and some recent cases involving some of the
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problems with public financing, in particular, when issue advocacy
and spending outside of the limits join the rest of the system.
Next to me we have Harold Ickes, who is the former White
House Deputy Chief of Staff and is currently a principal of the
Ickes & Enright Group. He has had extensive experience in New
York City working for the Dinkins campaign, which was publicly-
financed, and more recently, of course, he was involved in the Clin-
ton-Gore reelection campaign. I checked with him and he tells me
it is fair to paraphrase some of his recent testimony on the subject
as, "I did not write the rules, I only play by them." So I think it will
be interesting to hear from him how he might indeed, with his in-
side experience, suggest revising some of them.
And finally, we have John Fund, the voice, indeed the shout, of
the Wall Street Journal editorial page who, I think, could be de-
scribed as a skeptic of complex regulatory structures, including
public financing.
So it is a very distinguished group of people who bring a wide
breadth of experiences to us.
We also have on this panel and on the other panels today, Rob-
ert M. Stern, who is the Co-Director of the Center for Governmen-
tal Studies in California. Bob, who is a distinguished expert and
scholar of the whole area of campaign finance, is going to bring a
particular state and local perspective to our panel discussions and
will be able to tell us a little bit about what states other than those
represented on the panel are up to and what they are proposing.
We meet at a time when there is a great deal of discussion and
action at the state level in the area of public, financing of elections.
We have just had the referenda in Arizona and Massachusetts. We
are across the river from New Jersey, which has a public financing
system. We are in New York City, which has a well-known, vigor-
ous public financing system and indeed has just authorized a four-
to-one matching program. And of course, up the coast further,
Maine is about to embark on a full public financing system for the
next election.
If I could posit it this way, the original deal for federal public
campaign financing was that we would replace or supplement pri-
vate money with public money. The notion was to either eliminate
or diminish the pressure to raise private funds and the influence of
private funds in return for what some would describe as "clean
money" and others as "taxpayer money," or "food stamps for poli-
ticians," depending on your perspective in that debate.
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The original deal was a change in financing. I think it is fair to
say, at least at the federal level, that we now have a revised deal
where we have both public funding and largely unlimited private
funding. In the last election a great deal of money was also raised
and spent by political parties and by other groups for issue
advocacy.
The question before us is really twofold: Is the revised deal a
good deal for the public? And as we look at the state examples
that we will be talking about this morning, how is public funding
actually working? Is it adequate to finance communication? Is
there a disadvantage for participants vis-h-vis self-funded candi-
dates? Are there improvements that some states can learn from
those examples in front of us?
Having said all that, what I would like to do is call on the panel-
ists for a short opening statement and then we will move into a
discussion amongst the panelists. We will start with Kathy Czar
from Minnesota.
MS. CZAR: Thank you very much. The Democratic Farmer La-
bor party, to allay any fears, is the Democratic Party in Minnesota.
We only look like a third party now that Ventura has emerged on
the scene.
Minnesota has a rather substantial history with public funding of
campaigns. After Watergate, the state passed a system of public
funding for the statewide and legislative candidates. In exchange
for the public subsidies, the candidates agreed to spending limits
allowing them access to public money in two ways. The first is a
direct subsidy, and that comes post-primary for major party candi-
dates and then another payment after the general elections.
They also can provide their contributors with access to refunds
from the state for small contributions. Those refunds are a hun-
dred percent refunded, not a tax credit or a tax deduction. They
are available for contributions of up to fifty dollars per person or a
hundred dollars per couple who file jointly. What we have seen in
Minnesota is, with the amount and the kinds of public funding
available, almost one hundred percent participation in the spend-
ing limits in both statewide and legislative races.
The contribution refund program has been extremely successful
in encouraging candidates and political parties to develop large ba-
ses of small donors to appeal to voters, rather than special inter-
ests, to finance a significant portion of their campaigns.
Candidates can also count on a substantial amount of money di-
rectly from the state, so that they can really cross that threshold
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and be competitive. They are then able to communicate, at least
marginally effectively, with the voters.
In the gubernatorial election this year, the spending limit was
about $2 million. The public subsidy available to the Democratic
and Republican candidates was about $600,000. Jesse Ventura, as a
Reform Party candidate, received about $350,000 in public
funding.43
The political parties also received money from a check-off on the
income tax. The amount of that this year for Democrats and
Republicans was about $60,000 each.
I think one of the big questions that people ask about public
funding for candidates in exchange for spending limits is, "What
happens to the private money?" The money does not leave the
political process. We have seen since the mid-seventies in Minne-
sota and, since 1993 when we substantially reduced contribution
limits again, that much of the money has gone to political parties
and the legislative caucuses. You can argue, I guess, on both sides
about whether that soft money is a corrosive influence or helps
parties effectively support their candidates.
I think I would argue that there is a role for soft money in cam-
paigns, that what the parties have provided is technical support,
voter files and political expertise.
We have not seen a lot of money in independent expenditures,
some this year from the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce and
the MEA, but most of the political discourse is between candidates
and between parties. So I think in that sense we have a public
financing system that provides, between the contribution refund
program and direct subsidies, about sixty percent of the money in
legislative races. We have seen very competitive elections. This
year, in 134 house races, only seven went uncontested. We have
seen the emergence of a viable third party in Minnesota, and,
again, about a hundred percent participation in the spending limits.
MR. POTTER: Thank you very much. Kevin Kennedy of
Wisconsin.
MR. KENNEDY: Thank you very much. One hundred and fifty
years ago, Wisconsin joined the Union as the thirtieth state.
Twenty years ago this fall Wisconsin conducted its first election us-
ing public funding for legislative and statewide candidates. Forty-
eight candidates for legislative office received public funding, along
with two for the statewide office.
43. Jesse Ventura is currently the Governor of Minnesota.
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By 1982, the number of legislative candidates had almost tripled
to 129 candidates. Five candidates for statewide office, including
both candidates for governor, accepted public funds. Included in
that group in 1982 was a young unknown lawyer who challenged a
long-serving Republican State Senator; that candidate, using public
funding, managed to win by thirty-one votes. Last week that candi-
date, Russ Feingold, was reelected to a second term as a U.S. Sena-
tor by 35,000 votes.
Candidate participation in Wisconsin's public funding peaked in
1986. That was the last year that we were able to give a full grant
to legislative candidates. It was also the year, for political reasons,
that the spending limits were frozen, as well as our contribution
limits. The source of funding, the taxpayer check-off, started to
decline and continued to drop.
The goals of Wisconsin's campaign fund were: 1) to establish
spending limits to control the cost of campaigns; 2) to decrease the
reliance of candidates on large individual contributors and on spe-
cial interest allies; and 3) to level the playing field, enabling chal-
lengers to conduct a viable campaign.
In Wisconsin, a grant is available in the general election to candi-
dates who win the primary, have an opponent and raise, in the case
of legislative candidates, ten percent of their spending limit or, for
statewide candidates, five percent of their spending limit in small
individual contributions.
The grant in Wisconsin works in conjunction with a cumulative
limit on special interest contributions. Ideally, it was designed so
that if you get a full grant it replaces the total amount of money
that a candidate may receive from political action committees or
other candidate committees.
Candidate participation dropped in Wisconsin significantly,
partly because the funding has dried up. The spending limits have
remained frozen at 1986 levels. We are now twelve years later.
Another factor is the growth in Wisconsin, as in the rest of the
country, of independent expenditures and issue advocacy
campaigns.
What I would suggest is that while there is a very good role for
public financing in the mixture of campaign money, as Minnesota
shows with its example, what is needed is to make sure that the
source of funding is consistent.
The drying-up of the funds probably is the biggest factor in Wis-
consin. Many of you are probably familiar with some of the recent
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New York Times articles that have talked about the erosion of Wis-
consin's progressive tradition in campaign finance.
I would trace that primarily to the lack of a commitment to pro-
viding the money. The funding is a dollar check-off on the tax re-
turns, unlike Minnesota where it increased significantly to five
dollars and the federal level, which was finally adjusted to three
dollars. That has limited the money available for campaign grants.
In 1996, following an election where we saw a large amount of
issue advocacy and significant independent expenditures, the gov-
ernor, Thomas Thompson, established a Blue Ribbon Commission
to study campaign finance and decided that as good as our system
was, it needed an overhaul.
The recommendation was to keep public funding, but also to
budget one dollar per-voter per-year to fund that system. That is
exactly, the amount that was used by our two U.S. Senate candi-
dates for their campaigns.
MR. POTTER: Thank you very much. Harold.
MR. ICKES: Thank you, Trevor. First, I want to congratulate
the New York City Campaign Finance Board (the "Board"), espe-
cially its chairman, Father O'Hare, and its extraordinarily effective
executive director - and I can speak with some experience having
been on the other side of her on more than one occasion - Nicole
Gordon, on completing a decade of a very serious effort in this city
in the very difficult, seemingly intractable area of financing our
electoral process. And I also want to thank them for sponsoring
this forum.
I have been an active participant in electoral politics since 1964
when I worked in Mississippi to help an elected integrated delega-
tion to the upcoming Democratic National Convention in Atlantic
City.
I have worked in campaigns as diverse as those for district leader
in a part of an assembly district in Manhattan to twelve different
presidential campaigns. I have worked for twelve different presi-
dential candidates.
As Trevor indicated, I was involved very deeply in the reelection
campaign of President Clinton and Vice President Gore.
I come to this debate viscerally in favor of public financing of
campaigns, but I must confess, based on the evidence today, I am
not sure why.
What are the goals, or what is the goal of providing public funds
to candidates for public office? Is it to level the playing field for
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those who do not have access to adequate funds? Is it to increase
competition, and if so, toward what end?
Is it to try to ensure a more vigorous and informed debate? Is it
to induce candidates to participate in the program and thereby, by
inference, agree to accept sometimes severe limits on contributions
and to abide by limits on spending? Is it to agree to debates, as I
know New Jersey has and I think now New York City has? Is it to
provide more detailed, accurate, timely and understandable disclo-
sure? Is to reduce the influence of the special interests? Is it to
create a political milieu in which elected officials are free from the
influence of any group or groups?
Even if some or all of these goals were advanced in a significant
way, as a result of providing public funding to candidates, what
effect, if any, would there be regarding the debate and ultimate
shape of public policy, which officials are elected to develop, enact
and administer?
I do not have the answers for any of these questions or for many
others that could be raised and will probably be raised today. It
does seems to me, however, that there is precious little concrete
evidence to support conclusions one way or the other. For exam-
ple, in his recently published paper comparing the public finance
funding systems of Wisconsin and Minnesota, Kenneth R. Mayer
states, and I quote, "the critical feature of any campaign finance
system and most important evaluative criteria is the degree to
which it fosters electoral competition."44
His central conclusion is that Minnesota's public financing sys-
tem has made legislative elections more competitive by providing
significant resources to challengers and creating incentives for can-
didates to abide by spending limits. He found that under Minne-
sota's system, "incumbents win by narrow margins and tend not to
dramatically outspend their opponents. 45
Assuming for a moment the correctness of his conclusions, Mr.
Mayer provides no discussion or evidence regarding the actual ef-
fect of this increased competition.
Did it result in more voter participation? What are the effects
on the formulating, enacting and administrating of public policy?
Has it reduced voter apathy and cynicism? Has it reduced the in-
44. Kenneth R. Mayer, Public Financing and Electoral Competition in Minnesota
and Wisconsin (Apr. 1998) <http://www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/CRF/RS/mayer.html#
EVALUATING-MINNESOTA'S-SYSTEM>.
45. Id. at <http://www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/CRF/RS/mayer.html#
CONCLUSION>.
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fluence of the "special interests" in the shaping of public policy, to
ask only four questions that could be asked in this regard?
In their very recent book, The Day After Reform: Sobering
Campaign Finance Lessons From the American States, Michael
Malbin and Thomas Gais reached the following conclusion regard-
ing the public finance programs of Wisconsin and Minnesota:
It is possible that public funding with enough money can serve
an important public policy goal by helping to encourage the
existence of some kind of debate in almost all districts, even if it
does not sufficiently override other politically relevant factors
that make most districts competitive.46
The main conclusion, however, is that there is no evidence to
support the claim that programs combining public funding with
spending limits have leveled the playing field, countered the effects
of the incumbency and made elections more competitive.
As noted by Father O'Hare in his foreword to the Executive
Summary of the Board's recent report, A Decade Of Reform, "if
considerable progress has been made in fulfilling the Board's man-
date of voter education, the Board recognizes that the progress
made in reducing the influence of money on campaigns has been
less decisive., 47
He goes on to point out that just fifteen percent of all contribu-
tors to the 1997 mayoral campaign gave seventy-five percent of all
of the money raised. This, despite the fact that in that general elec-
tion, Ruth Messinger, the challenger, received $1.78 million in pub-
lic funds, approximately thirty percent of her total funding, and the
incumbent Mayor Guiliani, received $1.21 million, approximately
eleven percent of his total funding.
According to that same report, during the 1997 elections for, I
think, over fifty members of the New York City Council, just one
incumbent was defeated. And that was a race in the 17th Council
District in which neither candidate accepted publicfunding.48
My remarks are not to be taken as a criticism of these programs.
Rather, my point is to illustrate the difficulty of showing in a con-
crete, understandable, persuasive way - at least to me - that
public funding of the electoral process has tangible, beneficial, de-
sirable and measurable results. And that is assuming that there is a
consensus on what constitutes, "beneficial and desirable."
46. MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 25, 137 (1998).
47. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., A DECADE OF REFORM, supra note 5, at 5.
48. See id.
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Absent such evidence, how can we expect to persuade the Amer-
ican public that spending public monies is in their best interest and
promotes the common welfare?
MR. POTTER: Thank you very much. John, from your per-
spective, what do you make of all this?
MR. FUND: Well, I suppose my role at this meeting is to be the
skunk at the picnic, but I will try not to stink up the place too
much.
I used to be a campaign finance reformer. I was on the staff of
the California State legislature. I think reformers are some of the
most sincere, dedicated people in politics. But I think what you are
after is sort of a search for the unicorn, which is a marvelous and
wonderful creature but it is not to be seen on this earth within our
lifetimes. I think that the crux of public financing is the desire to
limit overall political expenditures, and, if I may be so bold, overall
political speech. There may be some benefits from that, but there
are costs, and I do not think that people adequately understand
what those costs are.
Let us look at Wisconsin, where there are some requirements for
disclosure of issue advocacy ads and various other things, which I
think is an opening wedge in the door of further restrictions.
In 1996, a group called the Wisconsin Manufacturers and Com-
merce Association decided to put $40,000 of issue advocacy ads on
the air attacking various incumbents, but not using the express
words, "for" or "against." The State of Wisconsin marched into
court and exercised prior restraint because the group refused to
register and provide various details about its activities. They had
two judges in Madison and Milwaukee throw the ads off the air.
The state's election board also looked at this case. The state's
election board attorney suggested that the board not restrict the
activities of this group. In fact, what the board's attorney said is
that if a choice has to be made between First Amendment freedom
of speech and regulations, the First Amendment wins hands down.
The unregulated voice is not as dangerous to the republic as the
silenced voice.
The board overruled its own attorney and pursued the case,
eventually ruling the ads were express advocacy and were subject
to its regulation. Curiously, the board chose not to pursue the law-
suit against either the AFL-CIO or the Sierra Club over the same
type of ads that were used in that very same election.
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Well, various courts have overturned the board's decision. The
board deadlocked on a four-to-four vote about appealing those de-
cisions, and that case is now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
pursued by the attorney general, Jim Doyle.
I think that it should be of great concern to us that ads were
thrown off the air. An attorney general seems to be on a crusade
against this group. The ACLU has filed an amicus brief. There are
real costs involved in this. And let me just close by reminding you
of one thing. When you restrict political speech, when you restrict
campaign expenditures, you are enhancing some people's power at
the expense of other people.
Now, I speak as a self-interested party here. I write for the larg-
est newspaper in this country. I do not seek to exercise political
power and influence, but some people ascribe it to me. If you re-
strict political speech, if you restrict campaign expenditures, you
enhance my power and the power of my peers in the media.
Bill Gates has a lawsuit against the Justice Department. He is
being sued on antitrust grounds. Nothing that public financing or
limits on issue advocacy ads would do would limit his ability to go
out and spend a billion dollars, which is what I think he earns in,
probably, five hours, to go out and buy a television station and
broadcast his views, over and over again. And there is no way that
you are going to limit that.
He can run issue advocacy advertisements twenty-four hours a
day, all the time. You can say that television stations and newspa-
pers would not engage in that, but let me give an example. In Seat-
tle, there was an initiative on the ballot statewide to end quotas
and preference programs. The publisher of the Seattle Times ran
full-page ads attacking that initiative, in favor of affirmative action,
for seventeen days running in his own newspaper. This caused a
great deal of distress to the news employees who had to look at this
all day and realize that people were viewing their, coverage as bi-
ased in favor of it. No one could stop him from doing that, and no
one would stop him from doing that.
I will just conclude by saying, if you are going to have limits on
issue advocacy ads, you are going to enhance my power and the
power of the media.
There may be some benefits to public financing, but there are
also costs and you should look very, very carefully at those costs
because Richard Gephardt had the courage to introduce a constitu-
tional amendment to limit political speech, which I think was a
very bold and honest way of approaching it, given the Buckley v.
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Valeo49 decision. Richard Gephardt said on the House floor that
we have two important values in direct conflict: freedom of speech
and our desire for healthy campaigns and a healthy democracy.
You cannot have both. That is Richard Gephardt speaking hon-
estly. I submit you can have both and we have to find a way to do
that. Public financing is at best an incomplete and flawed
approach.
MR. POTTER: Thank you very much, John. Now that you have
presented your nonpartisan election views as the dominant voice,
that ought to wake up those panelists who were not already
concerned.
Let me, if I can, pose a question to each of the panelists and then
I am hoping they will question each other. Starting with Kathy and
the Minnesota experience, I am curious, in light of the panel's dis-
cussion whether or not public financing opens up elections and
makes it a more competitive battlefield. There has been some
press comment to the effect that Governor-elect Jesse Ventura was,
in fact, able to succeed because of public financing and that the
$350,000 he received gave him both credibility and enough of a
jump start. What is your view of that?
MS. CZAR: I think Jesse was able to succeed because of public
financing, and you can see that as a plus or a minus in the system.
But what we saw with the public funding we have is increased in-
terest in politics by people who had been outside the system
before.
Jesse was able to raise almost $200,000 in small contributions us-
ing the contribution refund program in the first months of his cam-
paign. He used that money to put together a fairly credible grass
roots campaign, and he was in the debates. But it was only in the
final weeks of the campaign, when he received $310,000 in public
funding, that he was able to go up on television.
Is that a bad thing? As a Democrat, I'd say we lost. Our candi-
date lost. Is it a bad thing, in terms of politics for this country? We
saw voter participation increase to sixty-three percent in an off-
year election, which is phenomenal. I think it is probably among
the highest turnouts in the country. We also saw 124,000 people
register on election day who had not been registered before.
About sixty percent of those people voted for Jesse, and these were
people who, the pundits would say, are not to be counted. They
are the people who were not polled. They are the people who
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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work for $30,000 or less, who only have a high school education.
They were engaged in the process because there was a candidate
there who was able to speak to them.
Ventura was elected without taking any special interest money
from lobbyists, so if he can govern, he will be the first leader in the
state who really owes nothing to anyone. And that has some sort
of interesting implications for public policy.
MR. POTTER: Kevin, how about the Wisconsin experience? In
your description of Wisconsin, you highlighted the frozen state of
funding, which must mean that there was a lack of support for in-
creasing funding at least until recently.
I am curious, what is the Wisconsin experience in terms of the
lack of either public or legislative, whichever it was, support for the
system? Maybe if you could also pick up on that Minnesota com-
ment, that one of the criticisms of public financing is that it will
fund so-called fringe candidates and the people will resent that or
not want their money to go to a candidate who they feel is not a
serious player.
Even with the Ventura example or perhaps because of it, how
does that play out in your Wisconsin system?
MR. KENNEDY: Well, in Wisconsin, you start with the fact that
it has essentially been frozen for the last twelve years. That has
been more a result of the legislature coming to the conclusion that
any change may benefit one or the other party.
There is no question, if you look at the participation levels, that
challengers get more grants than incumbents, because incumbents
have more access to special interest money because contributions
come to them before the campaign starts. So they will often start
with a fairly large war chest which will be funded by the special
interests. Given the way we set up our funding program, for each
dollar you receive from a special interest, that is one less dollar you
are able to take in terms of public funding. That is not true for all
candidates.
Also the public, in general, does not support public funding.
Wisconsin's system was originally created as an add-on, but be-
cause of some line-item vetoing by the governor in 1978, we ended
up with a tax check-off.
A check-off generates more money, but the participation level
has dropped significantly since 1979. Presently, it is less than half
of what it was at that point. The funding is not there, so the candi-
dates do not participate. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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It is very difficult for third-party candidates in Wisconsin to qual-
ify because they have to get a certain percentage of the vote in a
partisan primary to get a grant. We have had one third-party can-
didate in twenty years receive public funding. But, again, it is
mostly challengers, and candidate participation has dropped off be-
cause the amount of money that is available is very small.
Now, in this past election, we gave $200,000 to the Democratic
candidate for governor who limited his campaign spending. The
incumbent Republican spent over $6.5 million, whereas the Demo-
cratic candidate spent just about $1 million, about a fifth of which
came from public funding.
But we have never had enough money to fully fund a candidate.
At the time it was frozen in 1986, that grant, if we had been able to
give it, would have been $485,000. I think that would have been
increased by inflation.
That was one of the things that was recognized by the Blue-Rib-
bon Commission. It recommended spending limits that are
roughly equivalent to what Minnesota has now for their statewide
offices.
MR. POTTER: Harold, you had a number of good questions
about what the system is trying to do.
What should the system, in your view, be trying to do, and, in
particular, should we be looking at a system that is limiting spend-
ing or a system that is providing seed money? How does that play
into what has been referred to by two panelists as money from spe-
cial interests?
MR. ICKES: Well, the short answer is, I do not know. I raised
those issues because it strikes me that so much of the debate about
public funding has a set of built-in assumptions: that special inter-
ests dominate, that you do not want special interest money, that
money is, in fact, bad and that if you only had candidates who
could get out there and run having to rely only on voter support
and not on anybody's money we would end up with a better
system.
And my question is - and again, I do not know the answer to
this - to what end? Is it just so that we have more candidates out
there running and debating and holding debates that people may
or may not listen to? Or is it towards a larger end of affecting
public policy?
I think there is a. tacit assumption, at least in some people's
minds, and certainly in mine, that in this whole discussion about
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how we conduct our elections, the ultimate goal is the effect that
elected officials have on the designing, enacting and administering
of public policy. Presumably, people can disagree with me, but that
certainly seems to me the long-term goal on this.
And the problem that I have with all of the studies, all of the
talk, all of the systems is that there is nothing that I have seen that
gives any concrete measure that public policy and the shaping of
public policy would be any different with the funding of candidates.
If you just take the New York City Campaign Finance Program,
which is a vigorous program, has a terrific Board and that has some
serious dollars to play with - obviously Father O'Hare and Nicole
would like more, but it is some serious money - and yet you take
the New York City Council, where only one incumbent was de-
feated in 1997.
So was there more competition? Maybe. What is the quality of
that competition and toward what end is that competition? So
while I guess my short answer is, I am not convinced that we have
yet seen any great benefit, but it depends upon what the benefit is.
And the problem is, the debate is defined so that as long as we
have more candidates in, and even though they lose by narrower
margins, then it is a success.
Well, it is if that is the measure. But the ultimate measure is not
that, but the effect on the commonweal and public policy. And I
question whether there is any concrete evidence we have seen in
that regard.
MR. POTTER: It sounds as if you are equating the public good
with the defeat of large numbers of incumbents, a position I want
to hear more about.
John Fund, one recent election, going back a cycle, was the elec-
tion of Governor Christine Todd Whitman in New Jersey. I might
term her a favorite of the Wall Street Journal's editorial page.
MR. FUND: Not in all matters.
MR. POTTER: Not in all matters, but certainly at the time of
her first election as governor of New Jersey, she was widely ap-
plauded by your page, and, of course, she was not only publicly
financed, but some of the press coverage suggested that was, in
fact, the reason for her election. Essentially she had state money
and there was a spending limit so she could not be outspent by her
well-known opponent.
What is your view on that, and does that, perhaps, move you at
all towards suggesting an appropriate goal for public financing, as
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opposed to the notion :of simply restricting political speech, which
you defined as an inappropriate goal?
MR. FUND: Well, I agree with Harold Ickes in that I do not
think you could parse out the impact of public financing. Voters
vote for candidates for all kinds of reasons. I do not think we can
empirically determine that. One thing we can empirically deter-
mine though, is that incumbents want to be reelected and they will
do almost anything to get reelected. Ninety-nine percent of the
incumbents in the House of Representatives just got reelected and
I assure you that much of the problem that you are going to have in
passing public financing in non-initiative states, and certainly in
Congress, is that asking members of Congress to design a public
financing system which meets very many of the goals that Mr. Ickes
laid out as possible goals, asking them to have a level playing field
and open up a system to challenge, is like asking chickens to de-
liver themselves to Colonel Sanders. It will not happen.
And I will give you two examples of how the system can be
rigged. The spending limits that are often proposed per Congres-
sional district or per state legislative district often seem to settle in
the $600,000 to $700,000 range for Congress and the $100,000 to
$200,000 range for state legislative seats.
That happens to be a level at which most political scientists have
determined is to the incumbent's advantage, in terms of all of his
staff and his name recognition, which effectively makes it difficult
for a challenger to ever outspend an incumbent effectively and will
make it difficult to ever defeat an incumbent, as we have seen in
most states with public financing models.
That should give you an idea of how the game is going to be
rigged. I will further point out that it is curious that we index al-
most everything in public life. We index your tax deduction, we
index all kinds of things in the income tax code. We index almost
everything; inflation indexes are built into our life - except the
thousand dollar campaign contribution limit that was enacted in
1974. That has not gone up one dollar. Counting inflation, it is
now down to about $280. So while you could contribute a thou-
sand dollars in 1974, effectively you can only contribute $280 today.
I do not think public policy has been enhanced by that. I cer-
tainly think competitiveness in elections has not been enhanced by
that. Why is that thousand dollar limit there? Because it means
that, basically, candidates can only raise money under that system
if they are incumbents or if they have powerful special interests
behind them.
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Now, you can say public financing is an alternative to that model.
I do not think it works because the same games will be played with
that. You should be aware of it.
Now, in some of the initiative states, I think you might be able to
make more progress. And you will notice that most of you in local
areas have had the most success in initiative states. I would simply
just urge you to remember that incumbents do not have the com-
monweal at heart when it comes to their own reelection prospects.
They have their own interests at heart. They are self-interested
players. You cannot expect them to act differently because when
they get into the back rooms, and I have been in those back rooms,
the conversation is very pointed, very direct and very cynical.
Every year at Christmas time, I take out a group of Republican
congressmen to dinner and I take out a group of Democratic con-
gressmen to dinner. And I raise all kinds of reform ideas. The
reform agenda that I usually come up with to propose on the Wall
Street Journal editorial page is the reform agenda that they
blanched the most at.
For example, I proposed once that we have a "none-of-the-
above" option on the ballot. Actually, if "none-of-the-above" won,
you would have a special election and there would be new candi-
dates. The old candidates would not be able to run.
I will never forget an incumbent looked at me with absolute hor-
ror on his face and said, "I cannot believe you can propose that.
You are suggesting that I could lose to an empty chair." And I
said, "yes, but only if the chair was better."
I just tell you that all the proposals that I have heard about pub-
lic financing and expenditure limits are very interesting. Some of
them are actually appealing to me philosophically. But I defy you
to find a group of incumbents that won't be able to game the sys-
tem so that it ultimately leads to the kind of ninety-nine percent
incumbent retention rate we just saw one week ago.
MR. ICKES: I think John has really put his finger on it. There
are two big issues. One is the initial issue he raised about freedom
of speech. But there is also a decrying by the good government
groups - and I often join in that - that there is no public support
or serious public support or overwhelming public support, or
whatever kind of public support one needs for meaningful cam-
paign finance reform.
And I suggest to you two things. One, incumbents have to vote
it through, and that is our system, and if you do not like it, you've
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got to move to another country. Two, we have not yet made the
case that it is in the best interest of people.
We have not been able to show them that serious reform is going
to bring about the new millennium. And we talk in terms of how
many candidates we finance, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But as
other observers have noted, there are many other issues involved
in whether a candidate wins or loses.
And I do not know about the new governor-elect in Minnesota, I
do not know whether the public financing resulted in his being
elected. I suspect it is very hard to prove that, but we have not
made the case yet.
MR. POTTER: The great thing about the federal system is that
there are so many different approaches and, of course, you do not
actually have to move to another country; you merely have to
move to a state that has an initiative process, and then you can at
least try this at the local level.
I want to turn to Bob Stern, because he is in a state with an
initiative process that does not have public financing. Indeed, Cali-
fornia has sort of the antithesis of it, which is huge sums of private
financing, indeed intensely private financing, in the last election.
Two questions for you. What is going on in California, and why
has public financing not caught on there? Then to the extent, Bob,
you want to dive in to the other issues here, could you maybe ad-
dress where you think there is public support and where there is
not in the rest of the country?
MR. STERN: Thanks. It is nice to be back here. I was here
eleven years ago, actually, testifying before the Feerick Commis-
sion on the New York City campaign law and then before the New
York City Council, and I again want to congratulate New York
City, one of the few jurisdictions where the public officials actually
passed meaningful campaign reform.
And I was going to say to Harold, I am from the other country
where the initiative process does work and public financing is mak-
ing a comeback, thanks in part to the initiative process; also, some
organizations like Public Campaign have been supporting these
things throughout the country.
You have, in Maine; Arizona and Massachusetts, three states
that have passed public financing through the initiative process.
One state, Vermont, passed it through the legislative process. And
all those states are "clean money" states.
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 41
In California, Trevor, we actually have passed public financing,
and it is alive and well in Los Angeles, where in 1993, two incum-
bents out of, I believe, seven or eight, were defeated.
The challengers received public financing and the incumbents re-
ceived public financing. Really, in the first election since the pas-
sage of public financing in Los Angeles, incumbents were defeated.
In Long Beach, also this year, the voters reaffirmed their support
for public financing of campaigns, and California voters actually
passed public financing in 1988 through a statewide initiative. But
another measure which actually called for the repeal of public fi-
nancing got more votes.
It went into effect, it turns out, because of constitutional ques-
tions and also questions of which got more votes. So I think there
is a lot of activity throughout the states. Many jurisdictions, as
well, have public financing and the public has supported public fi-
nancing when it is put on the ballot. The problem, of course, is that
only half the states have the initiative process, and as both John
and Harold pointed out, it is very difficult to get the incumbents to
pass legislation that affects themselves. And in my mind public fi-
nancing does.
However, when Andy Rooney on 60 Minutes starts talking about
campaign financing, as he did last night, I think there is hope for all
of us.
MR. POTTER: Bob, let me just parse the term you just used
because I think it goes to a point that several panelists have made
about what the goal of public financing is intended to be.
You stated that Arizona, Maine and Massachusetts are now all
"clean money" states. It is an interestingly loaded phrase and I am
curious to know what you mean by it. What is in it and what is out
of it?
MR. STERN: Well, there is a major movement going on now to
adopt public financing in a different form.
In the past we have always had matching funds, where you had
to raise a certain number of contributions and then each contribu-
tion under $250 was matched.
In Maine, Arizona and Massachusetts they are taking a different
approach, saying, "if you collect enough five-dollar contributions,
then you get a chunk of money and you do not have to worry about
matching it anymore."
Now, while all those states have passed these measures, none has
gone into effect yet, and we won't be seeing what the results are
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until the year 2000. So the jury is really out on "clean money," but
it is a new approach to public financing, which I think has some
merit. I think both approaches have merit; we really have to see
how well it works.
In Los Angeles, as I said, the public financing has worked at the
City Council level, but it did not work at the mayoral level where
we had a rich candidate come in and blow away the opponents. I
think, in a sense, when the states, and most states other than Min-
nesota and Wisconsin generally focus on the statewide races, I
think the focus needs to be more on the legislature. But, again,
that is the toughest place because the legislators have to pass it.
So I think that "clean money" is an approach whose time will
come perhaps as we see the results of it. Matching funds has been
the traditional way in all states, however, maybe with the exception
of Arizona, New York City and also Los Angeles.
So passing it is one thing. In Massachusetts, for example, the
legislature now has to appropriate the money. The question will be
whether the legislature appropriates sufficient funding.
So in conclusion, the question, I guess, is if we have a ninety-nine
percent incumbent reelection rate in Congress, shouldn't we try
something that maybe reduces that to something less than ninety-
nine percent?
MR. POTTER: Thank you. Harold, there you have your an-
swer. California is, in fact, a different country. Bob has described
this miraculous new system of "clean money" where instead of us-
ing the traditional matching funds, we will have full public funding
of the election in return for no private funds being involved. You
will have no worries about matching funds.
It occurs to me that may have a peculiarly familiar ring to you
since that is the description often given of the funding system for
our presidential general elections. In the primaries, you have
matching funds, but in the general elections you are given $70 mil-
lion dollars of public funds in return for no private money in the
system.
Do you have any views as to whether this radical new idea is
going to, in fact, work?
MR. ICKES: Point one, I think it is worth trying. I mean, do not
get me wrong on that. I think it is certainly worth trying. Again, I
will beat my dead horse once again, what is the ultimate goal of the
electoral process?
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It seems to me that it is not just the amount of money we hand
out and the number of candidates that are waging battle in a partic-
ular district, but it is a larger goal. The real question, it seems to
me, which we won't be able to get any answer to for a considerable
period of time, is whether there is a measurable and beneficial ef-
fect on public policy. At least that is my test; people have different
tests.
Coming back to the question, however, there is full public fund-
ing. There was a debate within the Clinton campaign early on as to
whether or not the president should go under the Campaign Fi-
nance Act in the 1996 election. He was against it, I was in favor of
it; the president finally came down in favor of it. And I think that
the thing seemed to have worked out well. Whether it worked out
well because they went under it or not I do not know. You get, as
you point out, about $70 million, $60 million dollars in the general
election.
However, there is enormous spending outside the system and
that obviously can, not necessarily does, have an influence. And
this goes back to John's point about free speech.
I mean, what do you do about the First Amendment? What do
you do about Buckley and especially footnote 52?50 Do you revisit
that, and does the Supreme Court, after twenty or twenty-five
years' experience, come back and take another look at that?
It strikes me that if you look at the votes in the Colorado case,51
I am not sure I would want to send up any legislative initiatives to
this current Supreme Court and expect them to revise footnote 52
in terms of what many reformers would want.
But there is a lot of spending on the outside. There are very
large interest groups on both sides of the aisle. The AFL-CIO, as
well as others under our First Amendment system, has a right to
spend money, and I understand that there is always the question
about whether an expenditure is truly independent if it is an advo-
cacy expenditure. Those are very difficult lines from a factual point
50. See id. at 44. Footnote 52 refers to the Court's construction of certain provi-
sions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as "applying only to expenditures
for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office." Id. at 43. The footnote states that:
This construction would restrict the application of § 608 (e)(1) to communi-
cations containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as
"vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress,"
"vote against," "defeat," "reject."
Id. at 43 n.52.
51. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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of view. Then you have the whole issue that came before, in 1996,
about the issue ads which are not even covered by the statute.
So it is nice to have the money. We applauded it. It was trans-
ferred immediately, we put it to use. But there are other very big
financial factors that, at this point, seem uncontrollable.
MR. POTTER: Kathy, how does Minnesota deal with any of
this? Because Harold makes the point that in addition to having
public funding you will inevitably have private outside spending.
And I am not personalizing this at all because I think it has oc-
curred in the last election in both parties. But the outside spending
may well be in the national committee of one's own party, so it is
not very far outside.
How does Minnesota deal with that in terms of your public fi-
nancing system?
MS. CZAR: We have a statute that is currently being challenged
in federal court that says any spending by the political party on
behalf of its candidate is not an independent expenditure, but is, in
fact, a contribution. And the parties are limited in what they can
contribute to their candidate. The law has not been thrown ,out at
this point.
So through this election cycle, the parties were limited in what
they could do on behalf of their candidates.
MR. ICKES: How will the Colorado case intersect with that? It
strikes me that the Colorado case was squarely on point.5 That
was a spending case, not a contribution case. And it was a spend-
ing of hard money, as I understand it, by the Colorado Republican
Committee, who did not have a candidate at the time and who was
advertising against, I think, Tim Wirth for Senate.
But it strikes me, if you look at the Colorado case, that that
would basically run afoul of your rule about party spending, would
it not Kathy?
MS. CZAR: The argument that the attorney general is making
at this point is that the Colorado case speaks to a point at which
the party does not have a candidate on the ballot. Our law refers
to the time after which the ballot for the general election is set.
Also, we allow a greater coordination between the candidates
and the party in multi-candidate aspects of the campaign, which is
52. See id. (holding that Federal Election Campaign Act provision that imposed
limitation on Colorado Republican party's pre-primary election expenditures made to
oppose the Democratic incumbent in United States Senate campaign violated party's
rights under the First Amendment).
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not permitted under federal law. So we are making the case that it
is a different statute.
MR. FUND: If I might just add something. I think we have to
have a dose of cold, hard reality here about court decisions and
how hard it is to overturn them.
The Supreme Court practices stare decisis, which is great respect
for prior decisions. And I will note that in the early 1990s, there
was a majority on the Supreme Court that, after twenty years of
argument, decided that Roe v. Wade53 was probably flawed consti-
tutional law, came out of whole cloth, the "emanations of the
penumbras."
But partly because of how the public policy debate had moved
on and partly because they did not want to be in the habit of over-
turning prior decisions, they chose not to overturn Roe.
I will tell you right now that unless there is a dramatically differ-
ent Supreme Court, and I mean dramatically different, you are not,
I repeat, not going to overturn Buckley. In fact, if in this current
Court it were sent back up, you might see it expanded and fewer
restrictions allowed.
And I think that just as the anti-abortion movement has had to
learn to live with stare decisis in Roe, I think as a practical matter,
simply because I think your time is valuable, do not count too
much on Buckley being overturned. It has only happened a hand-
ful of times in all of American history that a major decision has
been overturned. Do not count on it.
MR. POTTER: Well, of course, John's right that it is rare to
overturn and completely repudiate a major decision. So litigants
are then left with, how does Buckley affect the decisions that
follow?
MR. FUND: Well, we have seen it in the district courts. The
FEC constantly loses. I have never seen a record like this outside
of the old Chicago Cubs. I mean every time, it is like they march
up the hill like Pickett's charge, and they get slaughtered at the
district court level.
So the district courts are pretty clear. Political money, political
contributions are related to political speech. And that happens
over and over again. And at some point you have to try a new
approach.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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MR. POTTER: If we are fortunate, when we turn in a few mo-
ments to the question and answer session we might hear more on
that from the general counsel of the FEC who is with us in the
audience this morning.
Kevin, how do you see this all from the Wisconsin perspective
where you have had some of these battles?
MR. KENNEDY: Well, we have had some battles with the
speech issue. We have a restriction on the political parties, which is
a little different from Minnesota's. If you want to engage in in-
dependent expenditures, you are welcome to do it. But we won't
treat you as a political party anymore. We will treat you as a polit-
ical action committee.
We are not going to restrict their speech, we just aren't going to
give them the additional benefits that we give to parties.
So the parties have looked at the issue and are playing around
the edges with spending. I think one of the things you have to
recognize in what is happening here is that all of this is trying to
test how far we can push or regulate the system.
What is going on in Wisconsin is simply, can Wisconsin's law be
extended to regulate issue advocacy? We will have an argument on
that in our Supreme Court in January.
The courts looked at issue advocacy before we had a lot of issue
advocacy spending in the 1998 campaigns, and ads were not
stopped before the election. Judges are probably better educated
this time around. Even our board took a different position on the
complaints that were filed this time around.
MR. POTTER: It strikes me that there is an interesting move-
ment of this discussion over to John Fund's playing field. Because
John started out by saying that what we are really talking about
here is whether we can restrict and limit campaign speech. The
discussion has been focusing on, is it constitutional to limit it?
What about the speech that escapes the limit?
The question that occurs to me is, if we did not accept John's
premise that it is the purpose of public financing to limit speech,
but rather that there is some other purpose, what would that other
purpose be?
MS. CZAR: Can I take a stab at it? I think that for me the best
impact of public funding is that the party can recruit good candi-
dates, good people to run for office.
And those people, if they're challengers, will have adequate re-
sources to get their message out to the voters. And I think there is
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 47
a huge difference between an incumbent who wins without a chal-
lenge or with a token challenge, and an incumbent who wins with a
two percent margin, whose record has been scrutinized by the
press, whose votes have been put up on TV, who has had to answer
for the money he has taken.
I think you get a different kind of legislature. I think you get a
different kind of public policy when you have vigorously contested
elections.
So in my job, I have to find people to run in seats where it is
unlikely that they will win. If I have to tell these people, as I do
with our Congressional candidates, "you will essentially be a fund-
raising machine for a media campaign that will get predominately
negative," they are not likely to run.
If I get to tell a candidate, "we can help you raise the seed
money through the contribution refund program, you will get sub-
stantial support from the state, you will not have to spend three
hours a day raising money. You will be able to talk and reach vot-
ers with your programs and your platforms." They will say, "I'll
take a chance." And sometimes they win.
But every campaign that those people are engaged in makes for
better policy down the line, I think.
MR. STERN: Trevor, you really hit the nub of it, I think, in the
sense that this is the dilemma that everybody has, and that is, you
just give public money without any restrictions, and no one has
tried that.
Political scientists have argued for that for years: let us give eve-
rybody a certain amount of money, but let us not put any restric-
tions on them.
Incumbents would not go for it, because incumbents would say
you are giving all my opponents public money and there are no
restrictions on them. And probably the public would not go for it
either.
The public has been passing public financing measures, but with
restrictions, and the public loves to limit spending. The public
hates these thirty second commercials and hates all this spending.
So if you took away all of the restrictions, probably the public
would not pass it either.
MR. POTTER: John, and then we are going to open it up.
MR. FUND: Again, I will point out that public financing is inex-
tricably linked to limits on all of these issue advocacy ads and other
independent expenditures that people do not like.
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It is true that in 1998 no court threw ads off the air a week before
the election. That was largely because it was up before the
Supreme Court. It could happen again. I know how judge-shop-
ping works.
I can name certain judges in certain states where if I wanted to
throw an ad off the air, under this system, I could go and find it and
have it thrown off the air a week before the election, as was done in
1996.
The attorney general of Wisconsin has shown up in court and
said that political speech standards "should be developed on a
case-by-case basis similar to obscenity standards."
He reasons that since courts are able to determine what is ob-
scene, so too should they be able to determine what constitutes
political speech. This is his quote: "there is no need for the new
rules to be defined with such God-like precision that the regulatory
power of the states is removed."
That is not the rule of law, that is the rule of man. That is called
discretion. And any time you are going to get judicial or regulatory
discretion in political speech, you are treading down a very danger-
ous path. Which is why the ACLU and other groups have entered
into this case. This is "discretion."
Discretion means gaming the system. Sometimes it will be
gamed in areas that you would like, and sometimes it will be a very
rude surprise and it will happen just a few days before an election.
MR. POTTER: So there you have it. The question is, "is polit-
ical speech obscene?" Questions from the audience. If you have a
question for a particular member, if you will identify that member
of the panel, otherwise throw it open and we will argue among
ourselves.
AUDIENCE: I am Elizabeth Lubetkin Lipton. I am president
of the Women's City Club. We have supported campaign finance
for many years.
Just a quick question to anyone on the panel, Harold Ickes, par-
ticularly. We talk about limiting campaign finance funding or ex-
penditures because we want not only wealthy candidates to win.
What about limiting the time that campaigning can go? I do be-
lieve in both England and France they do limit the amount of time,
and that is one way also to decrease funding or spending?
MR. ICKES: Elizabeth, your question is, what are the merits, in
my view, of limiting the time that people can campaign? Well, I am
all in favor of it. Having been through God knows how many pres-
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idential campaigns that seem to run at least four' years each, I
would be in favor of that.
Again, I do not know, I have not given any thought to the consti-
tutional implications of that. Certainly, it seems to me, it has very
serious constitutional implications if you are going to enact a fed-
eral law or a state law which says that the campaigns can only start
now and end then.
There may be some basis for that, but it seems to me that John
Fund might well have a problem on that, because it really does
tread all over the right to speak.
MR. STERN: The Los Angeles ethics law does limit the amount
of time that a candidate can raise funds. For a citywide candidate,
they can only raise funds in the last two years before the election.
For City Council races, it is only eighteen months before the elec-
tion. And that law has not been challenged.
AUDIENCE: Jonathan Gelman, an attorney here in the city.
The question, I guess, is for Mr. Fund. When you talked about how
the restrictions on spending could affect the power of certain
groups at the expense of others, I wonder if you might refine that
and say that, in a sense, what you are doing is shifting the balance a
bit, if you have spending limits, from more costly media, like televi-
sion and particularly negative ads, to less costly media, once you
have more limited means, like the print media, where there at least
is a bit more for readers to discriminate what is going on. And I
wonder if shifting the balance a bit might be beneficial?
MR. FUND: Well, you shift the balance a bit only if people read
newspapers. And I assure you, from circulation figures of the top
fifty newspapers around the country that were just released last
week, you can bring a horse to water but you cannot make it drink.
You cannot make people read something that they won't. We
have become an illiterate nation, and that is a whole other subject.
And I noticed that in Minnesota and Wisconsin there were lots of
campaign commercials, including in races where there was public
financing.
I do not think you are going to get around that. You may not
like television commercials, and voters may tell you that they do
not like them, but most voters get most of their information from
television, and exit polls will prove that over and over again.
So your argument may not be with the system and may be with
the electorate.
MR. POTTER: Here we go, the voters are wrong. Yes, sir.
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AUDIENCE: Paul Windels, also a lawyer in New York City. I
would like to direct a question either to Ms. Czar or Mr. Kennedy,
particularly picking up on something that Mr. Ickes said about the
advantages of incumbency.
In your public finance system, what restrictions do you have on
the amount that legislators can spend on staff that is devoted to
"constituent services," read "campaign outreach," and the amount
that they can spend on newsletters, which at least in the New York
experience are little more than glorified campaign flyers?
MS. CZAR: In Minnesota, we are on to them. The legislators
are allowed to send out one post-session newsletter. In the even
numbered years, the legislative session generally ends in April.
Half of that newsletter is counted as a campaign expenditure.
Any other constituent services they perform after that cut-off are
counted as campaign expenditures.
MR. KENNEDY: In Wisconsin, there is a restriction on elected
public officials at all levels of government. Within the period after
the campaign starts circulating nomination papers, they cannot dis-
tribute more than fifty items that are paid for at state expense.
It eliminates to a certain extent abusing the newsletters,
although they all come out before the deadline. But incumbents
will always have an advantage, because they have been in the of-
fice. A lot of attention is drawn to them over the period of time
they are in office. But it is one way of bringing it back. And they
constantly challenge it to determine how far they can push it.
MR. FUND: I just have one quick question. How do you value
a constituent service? How do you put a value on it; in other
words, if somebody gets a lost check restored to them from a gov-
ernment bureaucracy, how do you value that?
MS. CZAR: Not the individual constituent services but the cor-
respondence to or advertising by an incumbent that is about the
previous legislative session.
MR. FUND: What do you count against their limit, outside of
the newsletters?
MS. CZAR: Incumbents used to do congratulatory letters to all
of the high school graduates in the district, encouraging them to be
active and involved in the community.
MR. FUND: Well, if they give congratulatory speeches, I sup-
pose we could count that, too.
MR. POTTER: Next question.
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AUDIENCE: When you offer campaign finance, or in some
cases I might consider it free money, you might have more takers
who have no interest in actually winning an election.
Another way free speech might be called advertising. I am won-
dering whether or not you know of any cases in any other states
where candidates are promoting a business or are promoting other
issues rather than winning an election?
MR. FUND: I know the Reform Party people pretty well. And,
you know, there was a split in the Reform Party because the na-
tional organization had not helped Jesse Ventura at all in
Minnesota.
And I am told that many people were convinced that, win or
lose, Jesse Ventura was going to do just fine because if he had nar-
rowly lost, his radio talk show would have done very, very well.
But I do not think Jesse Ventura was running for that motiva-
tion, let me make that clear, but another person like a Jesse Ven-
tura in another state could certainly run to promote their radio talk
show or their law practice or almost anything else. It is
conceivable.
MR. STERN: I have not heard of that. I think because politi-
cians are in such low regard that it would be a disaster -
MR. FUND: So are radio talk show hosts.
MR. STERN: Disaster for a businessperson to try to benefit
from it.
MS. CZAR: I think that any public financing has to require a
candidate and/or a party to meet a threshold to be viable. In Min-
nesota, to be a major party, the party has to have a candidate for
statewide office who gets five percent in the previous general
election.
MR. POTTER: Of course the question presumes that the candi-
date will not be subject to such personal scrutiny that their reputa-
tion is ruined rather than expanded by their race.
AUDIENCE: I would like to address this to Mr. Fund, with a
request that his paper expose some of the things that go on in this
program here so people around the country will not make the same
mistakes.
I have here the public payment report for the 1997 primary elec-
tion. Sal Albanese gets $254,250 and Ruth Messinger gets
$1,281,407. Five times as much. Now they want to give four-to-one
matching funds, she would get twenty times as much.
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Mark Green, who they have not completed the audit of yet, got
$366,745 for running against a phantom opponent and he is going
to be one of the featured speakers here.
The program is full of holes and they do not want to hear any
criticism of it.
MR. POTTER: Let me put the question to the panel, if I can.
MR. FUND: This is one of the problems with public financing.
With public financing you get audited and sometimes the audit can
go in one of two directions. They can be overzealous and used to
trip up people and to try to get them indicted or embarrassed de-
pending on where their money has gone. Or the audits can basi-
cally gloss over a lot of problems.
I simply recall the advice of Ronald Reagan who was once asked
about public financing. He said beware of it: when you get into
bed with the government, you will never get a good night's sleep.
You know, $366,000, that is a lot of money. The public will de-
mand accountability. Just as the public is demanding accountabil-
ity for National Endowment for the Arts grants. And if Mr. Green
wants to send his money for an upstate Congressional campaign, I
am not going to argue against that. But there are some people in
the public who will say that is not the purpose of the money. And I
think you get into a whole other range of debates.
Scrutiny comes with public money. It is inevitable.
At least with the money that they raise privately, they can go
spend it on whatever they want, within limits, and I think disclo-
sure, which we are going to be discussing in another panel after-
wards, is at least a partial answer, because the Internet and modern
technology allow us to do things with disclosure that were never
contemplated twenty years ago, when we had this last debate on
campaign finance reform.
MR. POTTER: Bob Stern, what about gaming the system, do
you see that possibility on a nationwide basis?
MR. STERN: Political consultants are very creative people and
they can game any system. We have to point out, Ronald Reagan
did accept the public money in all the elections he ran in.
So I think, when I started writing legislation twenty-three years
ago, I was asked to write perfect legislation. And I wrote legisla-
tion. It became an initiative. I have learned that there is no such
thing as perfect legislation. But you can improve the system, and I
think that if it's gamed you can do something about.
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MR. POTTER: Next question from the gentleman there.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. My name is Micha Sifri, I am a senior
analyst for Public Campaign.
Since there was no campaign finance reform advocate on the
panel who tried to answer Harold Ickes' questions, I am just going
to briefly answer them and then throw a question back to Harold.
The goal, I think, of the "clean money" approach is not just to
get more competition, which I think is the only thing people really
talked about here. Nor is the goal to get money out of politics,
which is I think the phantom that John Fund is .boxing with.
But it is really just to break the direct dependence of candidates
on private special interest money to finance their campaigns, to
free candidates from the money chase so that they do not have to
spend all their time in "coffees" and on the telephone calling peo-
ple for money.
It is all to make it possible for good people to run who aren't
capable of calling up that little fraction of the population that can
write the thousand-dollar checks, and it is to dampen special inter-
est influence both on the electoral process as well as on the gov-
erning process.
So my question back is, right now we have a system where one
quarter of one percent of the population gives eighty percent of the
funds that go into federal campaigns. Eighty percent of those peo-
ple make more than one hundred thousand dollars a year, com-
pared to just five percent of the population.
Do you think that is a good status quo, that it is healthy for our
democracy to have our elections based on such a thin elite, when
most of the population - we have heard a lot of talk about free
speech - most of the population has no speech in the system?
MR. FUND: Since I am the one accused of shadowboxing here,
let me say that this is a question that is a very good one. And I
have worked with Micha on things like "none-of-the-above" ballot
initiatives, so we have some ground for agreement.
This is directly related to the size of our government. Let me be
blunt. A government this big, which can direct economic out-
comes, it can reward certain businesses, it can punish certain busi-
nesses, it can drag other businesses into antitrust litigation. A
government that big is going to have lots of money chasing it.
Money in politics is like a river: you can divert the flow, but you
will not be able to dry it up, so long as you have a government that
is this powerful. It takes - state, local and federal - about forty
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percent of the nation's gross national product. And this is a funda-
mental, philosophical question.
If you want less special interest money in politics, you can have a
smaller government; that is one way to get there. Now, many of
the people in this room might not want that: therefore, you are
going to get the special interest money, because it will find a way to
influence the system. Senator John McCain, who's a great fan of
campaign finance reform, admitted to me that there is a direct cor-
relation between the extent to which an industry is regulated by the
federal government and the extent to which it floods Washington
with lobbyists, special interest campaign contributions and PAC
dollars.
And the smaller and less regulated the industry, such as, until
recently, the computer industry, the less it is involved in politics
and the less special interest influence it exercises. The huge anti-
trust suit against Microsoft might wake them up, and you will no-
tice that Microsoft lobbyists used to number in the single digits, but
they now number in the triple digits. And that is a direct result of
government intervention.
So if you want a big government, you are going to get some bag-
gage with it, and if you want to reduce special interest contribu-
tions, you might want to rethink the extent to which you would
have the federal government intervene in these economic players'
behavior.
AUDIENCE: We can debate that, but I would appreciate hear-
ing Mr. Ickes' response.
MR. ICKES: I do not disagree even with any of the statistics
you cite. I, again, come back to the point, it is not clear to me that
public policy would be any different under a "Clean Money" Act,
where nobody has to do anything except hold their hand out and
get some money out of the government and then run for election.
There is an enormous bias against incumbents which Trevor raised
in making a point about my remarks.
Incumbents were not born. They got elected. And one can ar-
gue that you are really discounting the good sense of the American
people. I do not discount the importance that money has, and I
think there ought to be a leveling of the playing field.
I am not convinced that these systems have leveled the playing
fields, and I am certainly not convinced yet that even if you level
the playing field, there is going to be a material difference in public
policy. Putting that aside, however, I am all for going forward on
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it. But it strikes me that this whole issue of campaign finance, in
some measure, really is pejorative about the will of the people.
There is a bias, it seems to me, on the part of reformers against
incumbency, as if incumbency were bad. Incumbents were not
born, they got elected. And they get reelected sometimes because
people think that they have done a good job. Point one. Point two
is the fact that this election, I think, had the lowest turnout since
1944 of eligible voters, defined as those who could vote if they, in
fact, were registered.
Tell me whether "clean money" is going to affect that.
AUDIENCE: All I can say is in states that have progressive
campaign finance laws, we have seen greater voter participation,
not just more turnover but more participation. So, I think, yes,
maybe the jury is still out, but I do not think we can accept the
current status quo as the best of all worlds.
MR. POTTER: We have time for one last question.
AUDIENCE: My name is Alex Forger, a lawyer in New York.
My experience is formulated by three years in Washington as presi-
dent of the Legal Services Corporation with the 104th and 105th
Congress.
I wonder, particularly from Mr. Ickes, whether the full public
funding will do anything in respect to the impact that money has in
formulating policies on the legislative halls, having witnessed the
Legal Services funding being slashed by one third and saddled with
every kind of restriction Congress could think of, and watching the
growers manage to influence the vote, vis-A-vis the migrant work-
ers; the housing industry against the tenants; and the Christian Co-
alition religious right having enormous influence on the actual
votes in committees. Whereas the thirty-eight million poor people
for whom Legal Services was created had no PAC or lobby and do
not influence through contributions.
Am I naive in thinking that campaign 'reform in the financial
area will make any difference in that, or will influence be exerted,
in any event, on programs that affect people who have no particu-
lar standing in the country?
MR. ICKES: Again, we do not know, and that is what the inter-
esting part about this debate is, we do not know and there are peo-
ple who advocate stoutly that public policy will, in fact,
immeasurably change.
I question that. I think that the special interests are going to
figure out how to influence the legislative process, whether there is
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money or whether there is some other way of doing it. I agree with
John. Influence is going to flow in some way.
Right now a lot of influence is waged by money, I do not deny
that in any way, shape or form. But I am not at all convinced and I
certainly do not think the American people are convinced that the
common welfare is going to be improved substantially.
I am not saying it won't be, we just do not know.
AUDIENCE: But incrementally it might help?
MR. ICKES: It may.
MR. POTTER: We are drawing to the close of this session. My
program says that at this stage we should identify the consensus of
the panel. I would like to just have a chance starting with Kathy
and running down, to ask the question reflecting on this, with your
background and having heard the discussion this morning, can you
identify what you think the goal of public financing realistically
should be? If there is to be public financing, what should it set out
to accomplish?
MS. CZAR: I think in his opening remarks Mr. Ickes ran
through a fairly comprehensive list. I think you want to have com-
petitive elections. I think you want to have candidates with the
ability to be heard by the electorate. I think you want to have a
limit to the influence of special interests.
I think, realistically, you want to make sure that there is a place
for the money to go. That river that you cannot dam up. And for
money that is going outside of the direct campaign system, you
want to make sure that there is some kind of disclosure, some kind
of enforcement for people who break the campaign finance laws.
I think, ultimately, the goal is to restore faith in the government,
in the people that we elect. And, I think that there is not a silver
bullet. I think it has to be incremental. I am encouraged by the
votes on initiatives in this last cycle, and I hope that the people in
Washington are paying attention.
Because I think that with a balanced system of public funding for
candidates and some other reforms that are going to be talked
about today, we really can engage people in a different kind of
political debate and maybe we will move away from thirty-five per-
cent participation in an off-year election and see sixty, seventy or
eighty percent of the people, who can vote, voting.
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MR. POTTER: John, you have pointed out some of the down
sides of all of this. Do you see an area that you think is worth
focusing on?
MR. FUND: Well, we had our own Supreme Court disappoint-
ment when, by five-to-four, the Supreme Court voted that term
limits could not be imposed on the state level on federal officials
and that put a severe crimp in the term limits movement.
I still think that term limits are a good idea, and I will make a
prediction that in the New York City Council, where I do not think
you have had significant change on the basis of public financing,
you are going to see open seats, competitive elections and new
blood, one way or another, very soon. Because twice the voters in
New York City have said that they do want term limits.
That is another interesting experiment. Let me end on a note of
agreement with the other panelists. Louis Brandeis talked about
the laboratories of democracy. Our federal system is wonderful in
that it allows the states to experiment, within parameters. I am in
favor of that. I think that some of the laws in Maine, Massachu-
setts and Vermont are going to be overturned by the courts. Some
of it will probably remain and we will see how it works. I will just
remind you about the initiative states, though. It is not a slam
dunk that they will pass. Arizona was fifty-one to forty-nine, with
no appreciable campaign waged against it.
You can cite polls all that you want, but there is some message in
the fact that both in Wisconsin and in the national presidential
campaign system that Mr. Ickes participated in, the percentage of
people that checked that three-dollar box without any extra tax
liability, the three dollars that goes to the presidential campaign
fund, has declined from twenty-one percent in the 1970s to thirteen
percent today. And is it continuing to decline.
So regardless of public expression of support for campaign fi-
nance reform, in general, the current version of it does not have
public confidence and has lower participation where it counts: the
check-off box on the IRS form every year.
MR. POTTER: John, since you have the opportunity to write
more on this in other public fora, I am quickly going to let Kevin
dive in and see if he has a thought on it and then we will end up
with Harold.
MR. KENNEDY: I will just say that the goals that people have
talked about for public funding have been identified by just about
everyone, and they are not exclusive just to public funding, in
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terms of wanting competitive elections, wanting to involve the elec-
torate and wanting to limit spending.
But public funding is one factor and I do not think that we can
overlook it. I think there are some difficulties in measuring it, as
Mr. Ickes pointed out, but it is clearly one source of funding that is
available, and there are many cases where you can point out where
it did work. You can point to the case of the Senator in Wisconsin
in 1982 who ousted an incumbent and has now moved on to the
U.S. Senate.
MR. STERN: When we are looking at reforms, we look at the
impact on the governmental process, and we look at the impact on
the electoral process. I think you need to separate those. Obvi-
ously, in terms of the electoral process, we are talking about more
competition and more voter participation.
When you look at the governmental process, you are looking at
less influence on the government by special interests. However, I
have to end on sort of a depressing note. I have been doing this for
about twenty-seven years now, and my wife came to me and said
you have been doing this for twenty-seven years, what have you
accomplished? Have you increased public confidence in govern-
ment, have you made for more participation? And if my answer is
not quite what I would like it to be at this point, hopefully, in the
future it will be better.
MR. POTTER: Any last thoughts, Harold?
MR. ICKES: No. I end where I began. I think that many of the
things that have been articulated today and articulated in this de-
bate as goals are merely means. And it seems to me that the ulti-
mate goal, and in my view only, is that what we are talking about
when we talk about campaign finance is the election of public offi-
cials. And why are we concerned about that? Is it because of the
effect they have on public policy? And so I come back to where I
opened up.
Are we convinced that public policy is going to be materially
changed if we have "clean money," if we have no incumbents, if we
have whatever you are talking about? All the other things that
have been articulated, it seems to me, in large measure, are merely
means to those goals.
I am applauding the experimentation that is taking place in the
states. I think we ought to move forward on it. I share some of his
reservations on the free speech area, but the system is going to
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change whether we want it or not. And we ought to have more
experimentation, we need more data.
MR. POTTER: We end where we will start. We are going to
take a short break and the next panel will be "Local Innovations
and Practical Answers to Campaign Costs." So we will have a
chance to talk about those laboratories. Thank you, panelists, very
much.
LOCAL INNOVATIONS AND PRACTICAL
ANSWERS TO CAMPAIGN COSTS
Limiting the demand side of the campaign cash equation has
been the most difficult challenge for reformers. The Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 established mandatory
spending limits for all federal candidates. The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Buckley v. Valeo,54 however, overturned the expenditure
limits on First Amendment grounds. At the same time, the Court
ruled that voluntary limits on campaign expenditures may be im-
posed as the price of receiving a government benefit, such as public
matching funds. The Buckley decision has led to a bifurcated fed-
eral system in which presidential candidates may voluntarily sub-
ject themselves to the spending limits of the public financing
program, 55 while House and Senate candidates (for whom no sub-
sidy program exists) can spend unlimited amounts on their cam-
paigns. Many state and local governments have devised their own
programs of public campaign subsidies, which are often employed
as inducements to candidates not only to limit their spending, but
to provide greater disclosure; restrict contribution amounts; and, in
some places, mandate participation in debates. Reformers have
also sought to alleviate some of the demand for campaign cash, in
the form of free television time, nonpartisan voter guides and other
free media for campaign information to reach the voters. Former
Congressman Bill Green, a member of the New York City Cam-
paign Finance Board (the "Board"), moderated this panel.
MR. B. GREEN: Let me welcome you all to the panel on "Lo-
cal Innovations and Practical Answers to Campaign Costs."
My name is Bill Green. I am a former member of Congress and
currently serve as a member of the Board.
We have a very distinguished panel discussing this subject. Let
me go from my far right.
Joel Gora is associate dean of the Brooklyn Law School and gen-
eral counsel of the New York Civil Liberties Union. He has had
long experience in this field going back to his service as national
staff counsel and associate legal director for the American Civil
Liberties Union, in which capacity, I gather, he served as co-coun-
54. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
55. As this volume goes to press, George W. Bush, the front-runner in the quest
for the Republican nomination for President, has announced that he will forego fed-
eral public financing, having raised nearly $50 million for his campaign over a year
before the election in 2000.
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sel for the plaintiff in Buckley. He has also been an author of a
number of books on legal and civil rights.
Next to him is Mark Green, who probably has had the most va-
ried experience in dealing with campaign finance reform issues.
That started with his experience as Ralph Nader's right-hand man
and as head of Congress Watch for the Nader organization in the
1970s, and continued as a candidate for federal office, most re-
cently, for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate.
He has twice been elected Public Advocate of New York City, in
which capacity, of course, he has been dealing with the city cam-
paign finance laws as a participant. And in his role as Public Advo-
cate, he has also been very concerned with those laws from a
legislative point of view.
The Public Advocate position in New York City is perhaps an
unusual one. In addition to its ombudsman function, the Public
Advocate also has the right to file legislation with the City Council,
and campaign finance happens to be one of the areas where Mark
Green has been most interested.
To my immediate left, we have Joseph Mercurio, who is a polit-
ical consultant with a quarter of a century's experience involved
primarily in polling, direct mail and electronic media services. He
has worked for nearly five hundred campaign and ballot initiatives.
Next to him we have Paul Taylor, who is executive director of
the Alliance for Better Campaigns. His original career was in jour-
nalism, where he was a reporter for twenty-five years, the last four-
teen of them with the Washington Post.
Most interestingly, from 1992 to 1995 he was with the Post's,
South African Bureau, as its chief, reporting on the transition from
apartheid to democracy. And then in 1996 he started the Free TV
for Straight Talk Coalition. They launched the Alliance in January
1998.
We have Robert M. Stern as another resource for the panel on
state and local government initiatives around the country. Mr.
Stern is Co-Director of the Center for Governmental Studies,
based in Los Angeles, and past General Counsel of the California
Fair Political Practices Commission.
Let me just make some very brief opening remarks. I was partic-
ularly interested in the first panel because, while these kinds of
fora tend to focus on spending and contribution issues and the size
thereof, there was more emphasis than I had anticipated on the
role of public financing as a means of access to candidacy.
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On reflection, I decided I shouldn't have been so surprised, be-
cause when the Board held its post-election hearings in January of
this year, a fair number of the people who testified before us testi-
fied to the importance of the program in terms of enabling them to
make a start in political activity and candidacy where, otherwise,
they felt they would not have had the resources to do it.
Now, I must confess that those who so testified were mostly can-
didates in primaries for the City Council. And despite campaign
finance reform, most of our Council races are still essentially one-
party races decided in the primaries.
So it may be that the access given to those involved in races at
the entry-level position for local political activity may not be rele-
vant in terms of access to the political process for others around
the country, and other more expensive kinds of races.
I leave it to my colleagues on this panel whether they want to
discuss that or whatever else is on their minds.
Again, as I indicated, Mark Green has had the greatest variety of
experience, both as a critic of Congress and as a candidate involved
in both the city and the federal systems, and then as a public offi-
cial with election reform very much within his jurisdiction.
So I ask Mark Green, New York City's Public Advocate, to start
us off.
MR. M. GREEN: Thank you, Bill Green, and thank you Bill
and Nicole for the invitation, because I have long regarded the
New York City Campaign Finance Act and Board as the exemplars
in the country, the pioneers for what other cities and states in the
federal government should be pursuing.
Let me pick up, at the risk of sounding personal, on Bill's com-
ment that I have the most varied experience.
In 1972, I wrote a book with Ralph Nader, Who Runs Con-
gress?56 Its thesis: money talks, and other than incumbency, the
most decisive variable in predicting who wins elections is the size of
a bank account.
I then ended up running for the U.S. Senate in New York in
1986, against the then-incumbent, Al D'Amato, who spent the
then-record $13 million in a general election. And two months
ago, I came out of a primary for the U.S. Senate, running against a
Democrat, who won and, of course, who spent the most money in
American history in a primary.
56. MARK J. GREEN ET AL., WHO RUNS CONGRESS? (1972).
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And I realized either my book was wrong or my candidacy was
wrong. It turns out I was a better author than candidate.
I was wrong only in that money did not just talk, money shouted.
The most important and most difficult issue facing legislators, in
my view, most important because it is really tough to reform or
affect so many other issues areas: the environment, defense spend-
ing, so long as companies that pollute and defense contractors have
their thumb on the electoral scale.
Every incumbent by definition is an expert in campaign finance
laws, because they used them and got there and are not all that
happy to change the system that has enabled them to politically
prosper.
In my view, big, tainted, legislatively-interested money is poison-
ing our democracy, and I say this as a student of and participant in
the process. It leaves, as Senator Bob Byrd once aptly said, the
two legislatures of part-time legislators and full-time fund raisers.
When Bill Bradley acknowledges in his autobiography that he
spent forty percent of his first term raising money, you can see the
level of the problem.
Second, this process, even before people run and win or lose,
prices out good women and men who think they cannot afford the
ticket of entry. When I was a little-known candidate for the U.S.
Senate in 1986, I remember the Democratic State Chairman saying:
"Senator Mark Green, you're a very nice fellow, where is your $5
million start-up money?" In our first meeting! And I replied, "I
had it when I left the office."
He had been picked by then-Governor Mario Cuomo, and I
pointed out that if candidate Mario Cuomo in 1982, when he
seemed an unlikely winner, had been asked such a question, he
would not be the governor and this Democratic State Chair would
not be the chair.
Third, clearly many candidates enter office with strings attached.
And if you do not think that big interests who give big monies do
not occasionally pull the strings, I suggest you try running for office
with integrity and then getting phone calls from people who ena-
bled you to hold the office.
And finally, as I mentioned, other than incumbency, the variable
of money is the best predictor of who wins, and I wonder if that is
what the founding fathers had in mind for the New York State leg-
islature. This year, we set the record. One hundred percent of in-
cumbents who ran, won.
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The solution is a lower ceiling on what people can spend by plac-
ing a cap on spending by candidates, or on soft money. And raising
the floor under what candidates can spend by public subsidies such
as matching public funds or, a form of public subsidy, free or subsi-
dized radio or TV time.
And I am a strong believer in higher floors, which is what hap-
pens in the campaign finance system in New York City. And I
would argue that if matching funds is a good enough process to run
for mayor of New York City and president of the United States,
maybe it would not be such a bad idea to apply it for statewide
office in our state and other states and for Congressional and Sen-
ate offices as well.
We just came off a gubernatorial race - and again this is not a
partisan comment - what counts is not the money you raise, what
counts is the net money at the end to spend on voter contact, by
radio, television or persuasion mail.
And irrespective of your party, it is just uneven, unhealthy and
unfair that at the end of the gubernatorial race, the incumbent had
nine million dollars available and the Democratic nominee and
challenger had $250,000 available.
When you are outspent two-to-one, you can win. Let me say,
when you are outspent thirty-six-to-one, you can have Lyndon
LaRouche at thirty-six and Franklin Roosevelt at one, and I would
bet on the person who had the thirty-six-to-one ratio.
Finally, an expenditure cap is important, because it means that
nobody can, in a sense, buy the election by inundation. And let me
just conclude with two final points.
It is very interesting when you run for office and your opponent,
as just happened to me, outspends you twelve-to-one in voter con-
tact in the last month. What it means is you cannot watch TV with
your family, which I regard as a loss of my free speech or free view-
ing rights.
Finally, in New York City we are in an interesting moment. The
Vallone-Green bill,57 which I proudly gaveled into law when we
overrode the mayor's veto forty-four-to-four, says that if you opt
out of taking corporate money, as no federal candidate is allowed
to take, then any gift up to $250 is matched four-to-one by the pub-
lic treasury and the maximum gift has been cut from $8500 to
$4500.
57. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 708-710(1), 801 (1998); see also New York
City Council, New York City Local Law 39 of 1998 (visited May 1, 1999) <http://
leah.council.nyc.ny.uslaw98/intO345a.htm>.
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What that means is clean public money. The. taxpayer who
passes me in the street cannot claim to own me if I use public
money. Clean public money supplants, if not preempts, interested
money, money with strings attached. The mayor has gotten a refer-
endum enacted that bans all corporate gifts, which, I believe, now
is complementary to the bill that we have enacted. Because what it
says now is, you cannot opt for gifts from corporate treasuries.
Now everybody is in a situation where we have races that have
an equal playing field, where merit more than money is the best
predictor of success. Thank you very much.
MR. B. GREEN: Next we will hear from Joel Gora of the New
York Civil Liberties Union. As we have heard here today, obvi-
ously First Amendment considerations and Buckley have been
looming over us, so I think it is quite appropriate that we now hear
from Joel Gora.
MR. GORA: Thank you, Congressman Green and Mark Green.
It is an honor for me to be here today. Those of you who looked at
your printed programs see that I am substituting for Nadine Stros-
sen and I am a very poor substitute, because she is terrific as presi-
dent of the ACLU. What I lack in her skills and talents, I make up
for at least in longevity, because I have been dealing with campaign
finance issues for ten years longer than Mark Green has, since
1962. And I have learned a number of lessons, which I will try to
briefly share. But I would like to make it clear at the outset, the
ACLU, with which I have worked on these issues for almost thirty
years, is fully in favor of campaign finance reform.
I am going to propose a three-part program of reform that I
think will agree with a lot of what Mark Green has said and will
solve a lot of the problems he has mentioned that he has had as a
candidate, and then after that is done, if he cannot get elected, it
will only be his fault and not the fault of campaign finance.
Here are the three things I think you have to think about.
Number one, stop the preoccupation with limiting campaign
spending, because that is limiting free speech. If that is too esoteric
a First Amendment issue for you, it does not work. If there is any-
thing we have learned from thirty years of campaign funding con-
trols, it is that limits do not work.
We limited contributions at the federal level and we have seen
the rise of PACs, the rise of issue advocacy, the rise of soft money
spending by parties, to fill the vacuum.
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By the way, speaking of issue advocacy and special interests, you
would be interested to know, based on a wonderful article in the
New York Times, that the Sierra Club spent $6 million in the last
year or so targeting the defeat of fifteen members of the House
and eight Senators with whom they disagreed on environmental
issues.
Abortion rights groups targeted former Senator Al D'Amato in
radio ads and television ads condemning his position on abortion.
To me, those ads are the essence of democracy. Others call those
ads "phony" issue ads or special interest ads. But they are wrong.
So the effort to limit political funding just won't work practically,
not to mention constitutionally. So that is a dead end.
What we should do is try to find ways to enable candidates to
raise funds rather than limit their ability to do so.
Number two, full and effective and meaningful disclosure, so that
I, as a voter, can decide who has got too much influence, who is a
special interest, who is in league with whom.
Full and effective disclosure, which we have in New York City,
which I think is very important, which we have late and untimely at
the federal level and which we have nonexistent at the state level
would be the second part of my program of campaign finance re-
form, and the ACLU supports that as well. I think that is ade-
quate, but not sufficient.
The final thing you need is the positive aspect, the third way of
campaign finance reform. And that is serious and varied methods
of public resources to support political candidacy.
I do not just mean matching funds, although I think that is a
good idea. And I do not just mean direct grants, or public seed
money to all candidates, not just those that meet a threshold,
although I think that is a good idea.
I also mean the free "frank"58 once, twice, three, four times in an
election year. Public officials get it, and many of them use it during
a campaign season to send out mailings saying what a wonderful
job they do, and then they talk about "leveling the playing field."
Well, they did not appropriate money for their opponents to
spend. One answer I heard in the earlier panel this morning is, let
us limit the amount of franked mail that representatives and
councilmembers can send out, so that way we sort of level the play-
ing field.
58. "Frank" is a reference to the use of free congressional mailings available to
incumbents. In the United States Congress, members are provided "franked" enve-
lopes that contain a pre-printed signature of the member.
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In my mind, that is lowering the playing field. I want to raise it.
I want to allow my representatives to communicate with me in a
reasonable fashion and a reasonable number of times. But I also
want to provide resources and funds, public and private, for the
opponent of that representative to communicate to me.
Because what I want in the two months before an election is not,
as flawed bills like McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan 59 would
do, to shut everybody up. I want to get everybody to speak up, and
I want to provide them with a variety of resources and public and
private benefits to enable them to get their message out.
I think the value of that third way is that it is really the first way.
It is the First Amendment way: the government, Congress and
otherwise, shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.
Thank you very much.
MR. B. GREEN: Thank you. And now for a somewhat differ-
ent perspective, that of one who advises candidates and people put-
ting propositions on the ballot about how to spend the money,
Joseph Mercurio.
MR. MERCURIO: Yes, I am one of those people. In the last
couple of federal cycles, I have, in addition to doing campaigns and
acting as a consultant to other consultants, spent a lot of time train-
ing foreign candidates in their own elections and training foreign
consultants in operating elections. And it is interesting to see their
perspective on our elections.
It is a pretty dismal report. We do not have a lot of the electo-
rate involved in elections. And we do not have a lot of elections
that are actually contested.
In New York City, here where we are, there are hardly ever any
contested elections. Some of the statewide and citywide elections
are contested, but at the assembly, congressional, state legislative
and City Council levels, there are virtually no contested elections.
We do not even have it in the primaries here any longer.
Part of the problem is that we have systems that are fairly anti-
democratic, whether it is the Board of Elections and how they
structure access to voter lists or the ceilings placed on campaign
spending or the difficulty new candidates have in finding money to
start with.
I think the Board here in New York City is one of the best
around, and it is a very good start in getting at campaign financing.
But we really cannot limit discourse. I think we have to trust the
59. See supra note 20.
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electorate and we have to trust them because discussions of issues
and performance in office are the two singular things that I disa-
gree with Mark about.
Those are the things that determine outcomes. The only thing
you have when you have money in a campaign is the ability to in-
form voters about that.
And I think it is dangerous to have limits on spending because
you set up a situation where independent groups could, in effect,
dominate the process and, in specific elections, throw people out or
dominate the public policy discussion without candidates being
able to compete or defend themselves.
In New York, it was mentioned that we had an election for the
Senate in which there were advocacy commercials designed to de-
feat the incumbent Senator.
He had a position on a very important public policy issue:
choice. He was endorsed by the Right to Life party in the state.
He held that position in his voting throughout his career. I did
some of the commercials on the other side of that candidate. I did
the Liberal Party pro-choice commercials. There were other Lib-
eral Party commercials another producer had.
That was an important piece of the public policy discussion in
this election. It increased turnout, it increased public participation
and, I think, it was a very useful thing to have.
But you really cannot have that happen if the candidate has a
cap on his spending. It really is not fair in the public policy debate
to only have third parties doing that kind of issue advertising.
There are all sorts of conversations about what the public likes
or dislikes in television advertising, and whether we should allow
such lavish spending on television.
A lot of people get their information from television advertising.
And the system does not work effectively for print advertising, di-
rect mail advertising and literature in campaigns.
You get a lot of people who say they are heavily involved with
the issues in campaigns and they do not follow the television de-
bate. But then when you talk to them at a cocktail party and they
tell you that, they start using phrases out of the commercials as the
way they talk about the campaign.
If you wanted to take the influence of big money out of cam-
paigns, you could do something very simple. As you saw in the
Senate race, the Liberal Party did a direct mail campaign and they
sent out 900,000 pieces of mail.
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They are a political party, so they get to mail stuff at a substan-
tially lower rate than a candidate does. They get the nonprofit rate
when they mail stuff. Most campaigns and most political spending
is by candidates who aren't involved in large enough elections to
use large amounts of television.
If the federal government was serious about campaign finance
reform, they could do a lot by simply changing the postage rate
that candidates pay from the bulk rate that commercial advertisers
get for the charitable rate that nonprofits get. That would go a
long way to changing the system and lowering the cost to
campaigns.
MR. B. GREEN: Thank you, Joe. Finally, Paul Taylor, execu-
tive director of the Alliance for Better Campaigns.
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Congressman. Thank you for hav-
ing me.
As we meet here this morning, there is a meeting going on in
Washington, D.C. of a group entitled "Advisory Committee on
Public Interest Obligations of Digital Broadcasters." I think this
group is onto something that is a small, tangible, practical fix to
some of the problems we have been discussing this morning.
A fix that, because it is small and tangible, has a chance of actu-
ally being achievable, and it does not run afoul of the concerns that
Joel Gora and others have raised about the First Amendment.
It was a group that was appointed by President Clinton about a
year and a half ago. It was made up of public interest advocates
and leaders in the broadcast industry.
It was appointed shortly after the nation's 1600 television sta-
tions were awarded additional space on the nation's air waves in
order to facilitate their transition to digital technology, a transition
that is beginning even as we speak.
The question was, should the public get something back in return
for this award of extra spectrum space? Other users of the spec-
trum, cell phones, et cetera, are paying billions of dollars to the
government, but the broadcasters got the new space for free, con-
tinuing a tradition that started in 1934 with radio.
Our model for broadcasting has been: we the people give you
the broadcasters exclusive monopoly rights to use our air waves,
but in return we expect you to be public trustees to serve the public
interest, convenience and necessity. And one question before the
advisory group was: should the award of air time during the cam-
paign season be part of that public interest obligation?
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To pick up on Mr. Mercurio's theme, that is the case in virtually
every country around the world. That is just the way it is done.
Candidates and/or parties get time to go on the air to deliver their
messages.
We do not do it this way, and there are two reasons we do not.
One is the broadcast industry. It has a lot of clout in Washington
and it does not want to give up its air time. And the other, of
course, is incumbents who understand that such a system would, on
balance, be better for challengers, because it would tend to level
the playing field.
A total of 163 bills calling for free air time have been introduced
in Congress since 1960, and every one of them has gone down in
flames. This advisory group was created by President Clinton in
the hopes it would come forward with a recommendation on free
air time.
Indeed, in Clinton and Gore, you have two national leaders who
are committed to this and you have a Federal Communications
Commission for the first time, so far as I know, that has three of
the five members committed to this.
Still this body that is meeting today is only an advisory body; it is
not going to recommend a mandatory system of free air time be-
cause it recognizes that political realities will prevent it.
But it is going to recommend something that I think is highly
attractive and may provide a way to a better system, a way to im-
prove the culture of campaigns, the discourse of campaigns, and
reduce some of the problems with big spending and lack of
competitiveness.
What it will recommend is a voluntary industry standard that ap-
plies to every television station in the country, and it should be
expanded to radio and: cable as well, but we will start with the tele-
vision stations. In the final thirty days before every election, televi-
sion stations must devote five minutes a night in prime time to
what is called "candidate-centered discourse."
That means debates, mini-debates, issue presentations and ex-
tended interviews. This is not government mandated, obviously,
for government cannot get in the business of telling a journalistic
enterprise what it should do with its time.
This is saying that the industry ought to set this as a standard for
its members. And if we create a world in which night after night
for the last thirty days before an election when you turn on your
television set and watch the local news, you are getting Schumer
and D'Amato discussing issues, rather than what you get now,
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which is Schumer and D'Amato's thirty-second spot. I think that is
a better world. And if every station does it, I think it has the power
and the reach to go where the audience is, to go where the
nonvoters are, quite frankly, and deliver those voters information
in a more attractive, more nourishing package than they get from
the thirty-second spot.
Somebody did a survey of local television stations, which, unlike
newspapers that are losing readers, are hanging onto their audi-
ence. They have high credibility with their audience, and someone
did a survey in the past election in about twenty-five states, a sur-
vey of more than one hundred local stations, and discovered that if
you watch that ten o'clock or eleven o'clock news show, you watch
that half hour, you will see four times more political ads in the
course of that half hour than you will see political stories about the
campaign.
I say this as a former journalist. I think, to some degree, print
and broadcast journalists have abdicated their responsibilities to
cover these campaigns and to deliver meaningful information to
citizens. I think we are left with campaigns, when they become
high profile campaigns, such as New York has just experienced,
where it is a gouge-your-eyes-out exercise of negative ads. I think it
is heavily implicated in the forty-year decline in turn-out and pub-
lic confidence. And this system is entirely voluntary, it promotes
good discourse and may alleviate some of the problems of cam-
paign finance. I think it is worth a shot. Thank you very much.
MR. B. GREEN: Does any member of the panel want a second
go to question what someone else has said?
MR. M. GREEN: Sure. First, Joe Mercurio said that if you limit
discourse, it is dangerous and unfair. Indeed, if you set an expendi-
ture cap too low, it could be dangerous and unfair. Say nobody can
spend more than one hundred dollars to run for City Council. That
would be a pro-incumbent law because incumbency has its advan-
tages and challengers have to have enough money to be able to
speak.
Basically, the system we have now, Joe, is unbelievably unfair.
It's as if one candidate has a bull horn and the other is limited to a
whisper. That is the real world result of the current system we
have now. I am reminded of Sam Rayburn's comment that when
he hears a reformer speak, he wishes one of them would once run
for sheriff.
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If you have run for office, you know the issue is not whether it is
unfair if we go to expenditure caps. The current system is unfair.
Second, expenditure caps work. We have had it presidentially,
we have had it municipally. Nixon outspends McGovern $60 to
$20 million. In 1976 and in 1980, the two incumbent presidents
spend equal to the challengers and both incumbent presidents,
Ford and then Carter, lose.
I am not saying they should or shouldn't have lost. But clearly, it
was more competitive because of the expenditure cap which was
constitutional under Buckley, because it was part of a voluntary
system of matching funds.
In New York City, Koch outspends Bellamy in a primary in 1985
approximately ten to one. It wasn't competitive. Of course, to
change that would be unfair and dangerous, Joe.
Well, the city did change it and in 1989 and in 1993, municipally,
the incumbents lost. Koch in 1989 and then Dinkins in 1993.
Again, when you pay your money you take your choice, but that
system of expenditure caps above and a floor below work to make
elections more competitive. And I would say under strict scrutiny
tests, to have elections that are competitive is a compelling state
interest as opposed to having Kremlin-like elections.
Finally, the statement is made by the Court, because of your
good arguments, Joel, that money is speech. I will never be a Jus-
tice, but I will respectfully dissent.
If money is speech, why do we have laws against bribery? Why
do we have laws against deceptive advertising? For years, I en-
forced laws against deceptive advertising.
The real world result of opposing expenditure caps is thousands
of candidates spending millions of hours raising billions of dollars
instead of legislating. And oppressing donors who get dozens and
hundreds of calls from people around the country because they end
up on lists, in a dance of mutual legal corruption.
The donors do not like it, the candidates do not like it, but if they
do not call and raise, and if donors do not give, everybody is afraid
they won't get reelected and their economic interests won't be lis-
tened to.
I think that is corrupt, it is unfair, and what is dangerous is the
status quo, not the reforms that have been proven to work.
MR. B. GREEN: Joel, let me give you a chance to respond.
MR. GORA: Number one, I agree with Mark Green: incum-
bents cannot be trusted to decide what the rules about political
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finance ought to be because they are always going to set them in a
way most favorable to them. If they are deciding how much is
enough speech to campaign on, you know what they are going to
decide.
Number two, I think a Soviet-style system that Mark referred to
is one where the government decides how much speech you can
have. That is what I am trying to argue against.
Number three, one can argue about why different elections came
out the way they did, whether the fact that incumbents were
knocked out in mayoral races was a result of campaign funding
rules or was a result of grievances accumulated against incumbents
or whatever it might be.
But if you want a poster child for the failure of campaign funding
that is limits driven, take a look at the 1996 presidential campaign.
In 1995, the president of the United States realized after the elec-
tion of a Republican Congress for the first time and the Contract
with America and Harry and Louise, that the only way that he was
going to rebound as he masterfully did was to get out his message
that the Democrats were the good guys, the Republicans were the
bad guys and the Republicans were going to take away your Social
Security.
And that is what generated the multimillion-dollar fundraising in
the White House. And that is what generated the multimillion-
dollar image and issue advertising by the Democratic National
Committee, and all of that happened before the presidential cam-
paign and presidential funding got started.
So I think if you want to look for a model of how the system of
public funding based on limits does not work, take a look at the last
presidential election.
MR. B. GREEN: Could I ask a question of all of the partici-
pants? And I want to get back to Harold Ickes' point. What differ-
ence does campaign finance reform make if, as he pointed out, only
one incumbent who ran for reelection to the City Council lost in
New York City, which is generally regarded as having one of the
most effective campaign finance reform laws in the country.
As he pointed out by way of comparison, in New York State,
which has one of the weakest campaign laws at the state level,
there is the same result. Virtually no turnover in the state legisla-
ture. Federally, we have sort of a mixed bag - low contribution
limits, no spending limits - and the same result in the House, very
few incumbents beaten. What is the difference?
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MR. MERCURIO: Well, that is a partial answer also to Mark's
comments. You had an election here for Congress in Brooklyn re-
placing Chuck Schumer when he left to work for the Senate. In the
primary you had four candidates running. One of them, Noach
Dear, spent more than all the other candidates. And he did not
win.
The truth is that in politics, the best way to kill off bad candi-
dates is to advertise them heavily. I can say that, knowing Mark
won most of his elections. It is not true that money simply wins
elections. You have to have content in the media.
It is also true that if you have got the best candidate with the
best viewpoints to match up very well with his electorate, he can-
not win unless he can communicate. And the only way you can
communicate in our society is by spending some money. The book
Mark spoke of costs money to print, and it probably costs money to
buy.
You cannot have discourse in this country without spending
some money. And in terms of television advertising, it is very diffi-
cult to deal with television and radio in our system. Everybody
talks about "free airwaves."
Stations must already charge candidates the lowest unit rate
charged to the most favored commercial client for the same adver-
tisement program.
And you have got differences in the way the geography is set up.
Not all states and not all Congressional districts are created equally
in terms of television. That is one of the problems that suppresses
democracy and democratic participation in New York City. We
have a media market that makes it impossible for candidates to get
covered in electronic media. They do not even get covered in the
daily newspapers.
In most places candidates regularly debate on the news in the
local newspapers. You do not have that here, and that is one of the
reasons why we have so few contested elections in New York City
and why you need a higher ceiling built on spending. So that you
could actually have discourse.
MR. B. GREEN: Let me give Paul Taylor a shot.
MR. TAYLOR: I think the statistic is the winning candidate has
more money in something like ninety-five percent or more of the
cases. How much of that is cause and how much is effect? I think
a little bit of both.
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I think the biggest reason incumbents do so well is that the dis-
trict is gerrymandered. They have all the advantages of the incum-
bency that we have discussed earlier. And in 1998 life is good for
the great majority of Americans, so they are not going to rock the
boat.
So I would be careful about tidy assumptions. I would also ac-
cept the premise, that there is no question money plays big time in
politics. It always has, always will, and my sense is let us try to
manage that rather than think we can eliminate that nexus. It is
going to always be with us.
MR. B. GREEN: Bob Stern has been signaling me that he has a
contribution to make at this point.
MR. STERN: Well, I do not think we can blame the campaign
finance laws for the all the evils or benefits. There are many other
factors obviously.
The question really is, do campaign finance laws improve a bad
situation? I think some do and some do not. What if you repeal
the presidential campaign finance law? What if you repeal the
New York City campaign finance law, what kind of system would
you have then?
Also, I think you need to take into account that the federal cam-
paign finance law really hasn't changed in twenty-four years. Cam-
paign consultants and also presidents are going to game the system.
I think that you need to see if you can change the laws to keep
up with the modern technology. The problem then, of course, is
that you have incumbents trying to change the laws or not trying to
change the laws, and that would be very difficult.
Finally, we have not really talked about the new technology, and
I think that we really need to explore that to some degree. We
have something called the Democracy Network here in New York
City, where voters could actually see debates by the candidates
over the Internet. In the future, I think, with the Internet getting
faster and faster, we may be seeing debates by candidates over the
Internet, where voters can actually pick a candidate, pick an issue
and see the candidate talk about that issue.
And for active voters, who are the minority, obviously, and even
for some passive voters, this will be the opportunity for them to see
the candidates, free of charge, in the sense that it will be free to the
voters and free to the candidates to debate each other over
television.
76 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
MR. B. GREEN: Could I ask those that want to ask questions
to start lining up at the microphone, but I know Mark Green wants
one final shot at things.
MR. M. GREEN: I too would like to involve the public. We
have seen how elite opinion on the impeachment of Bill Clinton is
so out of step with public opinion on impeachment and Bill Clin-
ton. On campaign finance issues, let me just stipulate that when
the public can get to vote on it, as they have in Massachusetts and
Arizona last week, there is overwhelming support for the position
that is contrary to that of the ACLU and Joe Mercurio.
I would just ask Joe a question that in a sense comes out of what
Paul said. It is easy to always find an example of anything. A big
money spender who lost, a little money spender who won, as with
your Noach Dear example on the race to succeed Schumer.
But since eighty-nine percent of the people who spent the most
money for House races won in 1992, ninety-two percent who spent
the most won in 1996, and ninety-five percent who spent the most
in house races won in 1998, do you not think that the Noach Dear
example is aberrational and that by and large money correlates
with success. So you cannot just say that it is not significant.
Let me ask a question of Joel, since we have both invoked Krem-
lin-like analogies. It is unarguable now that it is more democratic
to run for the Russian legislature, more competitive, open and
democratic to seek office in the Russian legislature, than the
American legislature. And that is deplorable.
MR. B. GREEN: Let me hold the responses by the panelists
until the wrap-up so that we have a chance to have the people who
are waiting patiently at the microphone have their turn. And if you
could identify the panelists to whom your questions are addressed,
I would appreciate it.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. My name is John Bonifaz. I am the
director of the Boston-based Voting Rights Institute which special-
izes in campaign finance litigation. Among our current cases is
Kruse v. City of Cincinnati,60 which is the first test case in twenty-
two years to directly revisit the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley,
a case in which a petition for certiorari is now pending before the
Court.
I would like to thank Mark Green for his comments and for his
longstanding leadership on this issue. My question is directed to
60. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Joel Gora who, I understand, is sitting in for Nadine Strossen but
nevertheless is here representing the ACLU. I, too, am an ACLU
member, a dues-paying member, but I happen to disagree vehe-
mently with the ACLU's national office position on this issue. And
in the interest of full disclosure, I think there are some things this
audience ought to know that Joel did not tell you.
The first is that the official position of the national office of the
ACLU on the issue of campaign financing is that both expenditure
and contribution limits should be removed. There should be no
limits whatsoever in the campaign finance system.
Second, the national office of the ACLU is very much involved
in suing the State of Maine. It filed suit through the Maine Civil
Liberties Union on Wednesday of last week, challenging the public
financing system that is in place there, a voluntary system.
Third, the northern California and southern California ACLUs
remained neutral in 1996 on the campaign finance reform initia-
tives there, despite the national office's position. The State of Mas-
sachusetts, the ACLU there, remained neutral on the
Massachusetts clean money campaign reform.
In Arizona, the ACLU is part of the coalition that helped get
"clean money" passed. And in Ohio and in New Mexico, both of
those ACLU chapters have remained neutral in the case of the City
of Cincinnati's case and in Albuquerque, which has had campaign
spending limits successfully on the books for twenty-four years in
its local elections.
And finally, nine past presidents and legal directors of the
ACLU have recently come out calling for the reversal of the
ACLU's position and the reversal of Buckley.
So my question is, Joel, are you really sure, are you really sure in
1998, that the position that you and the national office of the
ACLU advocate on the question of campaign financing is sup-
ported by the rank and file membership of the ACLU?
MR. GORA: Let me just respond to the last question. John
Bonifaz and I go across the country committing free speech against
each other, and that is a good example of it.
In response to the last question, the ACLU is a very democratic
organization. It has a national board of directors selected nation-
ally and through its affiliates. The issue of campaign finance or the
ACLU's policy on it has been before that board in the last twenty-
five years more than almost any other issue.
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Every time it is before that board, the policy that I articulated
has been reaffirmed with only minor dissents, because the ACLU
knows what the First Amendment is all about.
Number two, public funding issues are ones where the ACLU
and I and Mark Green and many others are in favor of generous
kinds of public funding. So the notion of quarreling with certain
public funding arrangements is one that you have to approach very
carefully. What I would say on the specifics is that bills like the
one in Maine which John supports are bills that, although they pro-
vide public funding, they have some serious First Amendment
flaws.
Number one, they so lowered the ability of a candidate to raise
money privately by lowering private contribution limits that they,
basically, coerced people or tried to coerce people into the public
funding system.
In my view, the public funding system should be a valid alterna-
tive choice that a candidate has. Not something that is compelled
by the fact that we gerryrig all the other rules.
Number two, and of particular concern in Maine, is a device
whereby if you go out and spend money independently to support
a publicly-funded candidate, that does not count against that candi-
date's limit.
If you go out and write an ad against that funded candidate or in
favor of a nonpublicly-funded opponent, the government gives the
funded candidate more money to respond to the ad.
So that does not level the playing field. That tilts the playing
field in favor of the publicly-funded candidate to create another
coercive pressure to force people into accepting the limits-driven
basis of public funding.
So, yes, there may be some public funding schemes that have
some merit. There are others that are deeply flawed, and groups
like the ACLU will try to assess each case on the merits. But the
basic point is, why spend all your time with public funding that is
driven by limits, when you could remove many of those limits and
allow candidates to get their messages out better?
I am speaking about limits. If I were to decide to challenge
Mark Green for the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat in
the year 2000, and if you put an overall expenditure limit in, that
would not mean a thing to me. Because my problem is getting a
message out so that I could counteract the years and years of valid
public service that has given Mark Green the greatest voter identi-
fication and name recognition of any candidate in the field.
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I do not care if he is limited or I am limited. What I need is
money. I need it through private sources. I would like to be able
to call up some of my law school pals and ask them for a contribu-
tion, but I am limited in what I could do for that. That is all the
federal system gives me, period: a thousand dollar cap on contri-
butions, then it's "go out and raise as much as I can."
I would like to get out of that box and provide ways to give me,
as a person who is not well-known, but maybe has some good
ideas, a chance to take on somebody like Mark Green. Give me
various public and private resources, let people who contribute to
me get up to a one hundred dollar tax credit. Give me a free mail-
ing every three months, if I am a valid candidate and can get on the
ballot. There are all kinds of things you can do. I think the problem
is the people who call themselves reformers, who are the ones that
are linked to the old fashioned, limits-driven, government handout
method of public funding.
I am going to get out of that box. I am going to provide people
with a banquet of benefits, government-provided and privately-
provided, to have democratic funding of political campaigns, not
government funding of campaigns.
MR. B. GREEN: If we can keep the questions a little shorter,
the answers a little shorter, maybe more of the people on that line
will have a chance.
AUDIENCE: My name is Larry Noble. I am general counsel of
the Federal Election Commission (the "FEC"). I'm not here to
gang up on Joel; I have a question for Joel. I was pleased to see
that you said the ACLU is in favor of disclosure.
Can you define for us who the ACLU is in favor of having dis-
closed? Is it everybody, people who put out issue ads, or is it just
people who expressly advocate the election?
MR. GORA: That, I think, is partly a rhetorical question be-
cause you know the position. The position is - I am proud to say,
I have been a part of twenty-five years of creating First Amend-
ment doctrine - that there has to be a bright line between cam-
paign speech and issue speech. The bright line is based on express
advocacy of an electoral outcome. And by virtue of that bright
line, people who engage in issue discussion, even if it comes close
to the line, are free to do so.
The Supreme Court has said that, and ten federal courts, dis-
agreeing with the positions of the FEC that Larry so ably is general
counsel of, have agreed, following the Supreme Court.
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And so, yes, my position is that if you want to go out and raise an
issue, even though it involves a candidate, you do not have to dis-
close, file your name with the government, and you certainly
should not be subjected to the regime of controls and limits that
candidates and their committees are subjected to because of the
concerns identified in Buckley with respect to corruption. So that
is number one.
Number two, in terms of disclosure, people who do give money
to campaigns and to political candidates, my position is that disclo-
sure of large sources of funding is a valid way to enable voters to
decide who has got too much influence.
The problem is, I think, just as a matter of personal privacy, the
FEC requires disclosure of any contribution, I think, in excess of
two hundred dollars.
So if I give what is really a modest contribution by many stan-
dards, my boss finds out to whom I have given money. So I think
that disclosure is important but only when it focuses at the level of
contribution that could raise concerns about the potential of cor-
ruption in the long run.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. I thought that would be your answer.
MR. B. GREEN: Yes.
AUDIENCE: Hi. I am Susan Anderson, legislative director for
Public Campaign. I want to thank you. I thought your opening
comments were quite eloquent about the peril. I just want to offer
a friendly amendment and question about the New York system
that you hold up as a model. Here are three stats from the last
mayoral election, one being that eight percent of Giuliani's and
Messinger's money came in non-matchable amounts of one thou-
sand dollars or more, that more money came from outside the City,
also not matched, than from the four outer boroughs and that two-
tenths of one percent of the population gave half the total funds
raised. The revised system that you mentioned, I think, will defi-
nitely ameliorate the situation.
I think it is still going to force candidates to spend a significant
time raising money from private sources. It is going to place a pre-
mium on the $250 contributor, which is pretty much beyond the
means of the majority of the poor and working population of the
city, and there is also going to still be a huge role for the $4500
contributor who is not matched.
So, therefore, do you think that New York City has arrived at
reform, at real reform as you talked about it earlier, or do you
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think that New York and other local jurisdictions need to consider
a next stage in terms of a more full system for funding candidates,
one that would not have them having to look for the $250 contribu-
tor for those campaigns given those stats.
MR. M. GREEN: I think you have to walk before you can run.
And I think the Vallone-Green bill61 does improve the law signifi-
cantly, although I do not doubt that the clean money/clean elec-
tions group may have had an even better idea but which could not
have gotten enacted.
Now, you made a small mistake when you said it still forces can-
didates or motivates candidates to seek $250 gifts. The four-to-one
match is of gifts up to $250. And that is a big difference. Because
when you are running, if you have a direct mail campaign and you
get thousands of people to give twenty-five dollars, you multiply
that by four, suddenly direct mail and thousands of people who
give you money that is not legislatively interested is as important as
the next Regency breakfast you might have.
The law says that up to fifty-five percent of the money that you
spend can be public money. Personally, I would have liked it to
have gone up to seventy or eighty percent. But politically, we
could not get that enacted.
Again, allow me to get personal, but then Bill started by saying I
have this varied experience. Someone like me could seek federal
office again or municipal office again.
Let me assure you that when you think about running in a sys-
tem where you have to raise $10 to $20 million in thousand dollar
increments without public funds, it affects your judgment as com-
pared to a system where there is half the money in public funds and
you do not quite have to be forced to sell yourself to economic
interests.
And let me say that when Joel eloquently answered the question
about disclosure, I am for disclosure. Putting aside disclosure of
soft money contributions, disclosure of direct contributions is desir-
able, necessary, but not sufficient by a long shot.
The tire industry in Ohio - or the oil industry in Dallas or the
real estate industry in New York - more likely than not gives a lot
of money to all competitive candidates. So even if you disclose
contributions, desirable as that is, it does not adequately remove
the potential for corruption.
61. See supra note 57.
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Because if two candidates are both getting maximum amounts
from the most dominant local industry, it does not really tell you
enough, and that is independent, of course, of whether or not you
have a thirty-six-to-one ratio of one candidate outspending an-
other, which is the system we have in the state because we do not
have expenditure limits.
MR. B. GREEN: I should mention that we shall be having a
panel this afternoon on "Is Sunlight Enough?" So I hope we can
have questions more directed towards this panel's issues.
AUDIENCE: I think I have an idea which would solve half the
problem.
In citywide, statewide or nationwide elections, candidates need
money for one thing and that is TV. How do you make TV less
attractive to candidates without infringing on their freedom of
speech? What if the FEC or Congress passed a law that said any-
one using the public resource, such as television, to promote them-
selves for the political campaign, that person must be the only
person appearing or speaking in the ad either on radio or TV? For
a radio ad, the candidate must speak, on TV ads you have a little
picture.
I think it would be supportable under the Constitution because
you are not saying what they can say, just who can say it. And in
the Senate or in the Congress, when a person is elected, they can-
not have a substitute or an actor say their lines for them, they have
to speak for themselves.
Wouldn't you hit the saturation point for TV much quicker?
How many times did D'Amato or Schumer want to put his own
face and his own voice on the TV? Therefore, there would be
fewer ads, the ads would not be as murderous, and the candidates
would not have to raise as much money.
The only thing it does not deal with is issue advocacy and people
attacking the candidate.
MR. B. GREEN: One clarification. My campaign advertising
buyers told me I had to appear in the ad or have my voice in the ad
to get the best rate, but Joe Mercurio was describing that it is not a
requirement. Otherwise, if you are willing to pay more -
MR. MERCURIO: I am not sure you would say that if you sat
through thirty takes of a candidate trying to do a commercial.
AUDIENCE: We are not electing actors and spokesmen, we are
electing -
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MR. MERCURIO: It is still words and ideas.
MR. STERN: This is an idea that Senator Danforth of Missouri
had and actually introduced it as legislation, saying, basically, if you
want to get the lowest rate from television, then you have to ap-
pear in the ad.
The legislation went nowhere. I think the incumbents were
against it because they felt they were not that telegenic. I think the
TV industry was against it. You have to remember that television
right now is, if not the most powerful lobby, one of the most pow-
erful lobbies in Washington, and they have been opposing any sort
of restrictions.
It used to be, for example, that in initiative campaigns if one side
had more money than the other and spent $10 million on initiative
campaigns, the other side was given one quarter of the amount of
money spent by the TV stations and radio stations. That was a
requirement of the Federal Communication Commission.
In 1992, the television industry took care of that and that has
been repealed. So you get one-sided TV now. But it is an interest-
ing idea, one that has been proposed before. It has just not gone
anywhere.
MR. TAYLOR: There is even a name for it. There is a bill in
North Carolina along these lines called "Stand By Your Ad." It
did not make it out of the North Carolina legislature, has never
made it anywhere close to in or out of the committee in Congress.
I think it is a good idea, in a political and civic sense. The polit-
ical realities are, it will go nowhere and whether or not there are
constitutional difficulties in prescribing how a candidate can com-
municate is something I will leave to higher authorities.
It seems to me at the very least it is an awfully close question.
MR. B. GREEN: We are going to have time for only one more
question, I am sorry to say, because we do have to finish.
AUDIENCE: I am going to ask you to comment on my plan
which is under serious consideration from the mayor's charter revi-
sion commission and which has been praised by Robert Wagner,
Jr., former head of Citizen's Union, and Sam Roberts when he
wrote a column, and it could begin in the year 2000, one year
before the mayoral campaign and it will give you a.chance to see
how it works. If it works it will save the taxpayers innumerable
money because it will only cost two million dollars. It involves us-
ing public funds for one purpose, to inform the public about the
candidates, not give the money to politicians or consultants and
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lawyers and everybody else who will get the money. The money
will go straight to informing the public equitably about the candi-
dates. It involves the use of public TV and it involves the use of an
enhanced voters' directory.
Now, you know the plan because you have heard it many times.
MR. B. GREEN: Is this question directed at me?
AUDIENCE: No. Father O'Hare has heard it many times for
many years. And Nicole Gordon has heard it many times. If it
works, it will save the public immeasurable money in the year 2001
because Ruth Messinger would be getting $5 million, not $1.2
million.
MR. B. GREEN: That is a misconception. Because while it is a
four-to-one match, the amount that is matched is reduced from a
thousand dollars to $250. That undoubtedly increases the total
amount of public funding but it does not quadruple it.
AUDIENCE: But if it is tried in the year 2000, you are going to
have a chance to see. I hope, Father O'Hare, that you will give it
more serious consideration.
MR. B. GREEN: I am being told that it is time for the wrap up.
I am afraid I am going to have to halt this discussion at that point.
Is there any consensus here that anyone has found? Maybe I
should ask Bob Stern to see if he has been able to find a consensus
on the panel. I noticed he has been taking notes very assiduously.
Maybe I will turn to him for that consensus.
MR. STERN: Well, I was hoping that maybe disclosure was the
consensus. But then we found out from Joel that full and effective
disclosure really is not full and effective disclosure, but partial
disclosure.
I guess the consensus that we all have is that there are some
problems that are not going to be resolved by any of us up here,
but will have to be resolved in the legislatures by the FEC and also
passed by the initiative process.
MR. B. GREEN: With that, I think I shall call this panel to an
end and thank all the panelists for what has been a very lively sec-
ond half of the morning.
ADDRESS: THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE:
LESSONS FOR A NATIONAL FUTURE
FATHER O'HARE: We began this morning with an address
from Fritz Schwarz, who served as Corporation Counsel during the
Koch Administration here in New York City. Our speaker now to
begin this afternoon is Mayor Koch himself. It is a great pleasure
to introduce him.
I should say this. Several times in the course of the morning,
different speakers, from a range of different points of view on the
ideological spectrum, all seem to agree that you can never expect
incumbents to pass campaign finance reform legislation.
The argument being, and it makes good conventional sense, that
those who have been elected to office in a given system are not
going to vote to change the system that has been the matrix of their
success. But here in New York City in 1988, that conventional wis-
dom was turned on its head when Mayor Ed Koch, working with
then-Majority Leader of the City Council, now Speaker of the City
Council, Peter Vallone, passed the Campaign Finance Program
(the "Program") in February of 1988. And truth to tell, in the first
campaign in which the Program was in operation, the municipal
campaign of 1989, to the surprise of many pundits, Ed Koch was
defeated in the Democratic primary. So he was one of the archi-
tects of the legislation and he also suffered some of the
consequences.
I should also say something that is not well known: that Ed
Koch was the first of three incumbent mayors to be fined by the
Program. He is the only one of the three who did not make a big
fuss about it, though.
It is a great pleasure for me to introduce the former mayor of
New York City, and voice of reason for the United States, Edward
I. Koch.
MR. KOCH: I was not defeated because of campaign financing,
I was defeated because of longevity, and I look back on the Pro-
gram as one of the most important things that I participated in.
So, first I want to say to Father O'Hare and Nicole Gordon who
were there at the beginning and are still with us conducting the
affairs of the New York City Campaign Finance Board (the
"Board"), that the two of you, if I had the authority, would be de-
clared national treasures. I have said this on prior occasions. I
want to repeat it for this audience. We do not have that designa-
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tion. It exists in Japan. But if I were so authorized, the two of you
would receive that award for what you have done.
Campaign finance reform requires courageous leadership, and
appointments to any commission charged with overseeing the ad-
ministration of laws must be people of the highest caliber.
Many of you may recall that, in addition to Father O'Hare, the
original Board included a former president of the City Bar Associ-
ation, Bob McKay, a former public schools chancellor, Frank Mac-
chiarola, and an attorney who is now a federal circuit court judge,
Sonia Sotomayor.
Father O'Hare is the only chairman the Board has ever had. I
should say, "almost," because the story behind that "almost" began
in April of 1993 when Father O'Hare's first term as chairman came
to an end and Mayor Dinkins did not reappoint him or appoint a
successor.
Therefore, during the 1993 elections, Father O'Hare was a hold-
over chairman. And that meant, in effect, that Father O'Hare was
serving at the pleasure of Mayor Dinkins, who, at the time, was
also a candidate for reelection participating in the Program. Dur-
ing the fall election, the Board was presented with several ques-
tions about whether the Dinkins campaign was in compliance with
the campaign finance laws. And in one case, the Dinkins campaign
agreed to reimburse the Democratic State Committee for over
$200,000 in radio and print advertising, while the Board was con-
sidering whether those advertisements were independent and
whether they should be counted against the campaign's spending
limit.
In another case, the Board acted before the general election to
assess a civil penalty for the Dinkins campaign's violation of the
primary election spending limit.
Mayor Dinkins' campaign committee was fined $320,000 for the
1993 race, and, as Father O'Hare pointed out, my own campaign
committee was fined $35,000 for the 1989 campaign, my last year as
mayor. Similarly, Mayor Giuliani's campaign committee was fined
almost a quarter of a million dollars in the 1997 race.
I must tell you that fines of that nature are painful. Not just
because of the amounts - the costs do not come out of your
pocket, they come out of the campaign funds that you have raised
- but because it means that someone you relied on did not do
their job of making sure everything was done in accordance with
the applicable laws or the rules and therefore you, the candidate,
look stupid. And some say "venal," even though few, if any, candi-
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dates exercise control over the spending or the raising of campaign
monies and certainly no control over the bookkeeping involved.
That is delegated.
Even when you and your campaign take some lumps as a conse-
quence of these laws, the main thing is that you get over it and
continue to do your best for the city.
Unfortunately, that is not what happened. On the last working
day of Mayor Dinkins' term, December 30, 1993, the Board's of-
fices received an unanticipated fax from the office of the mayor.
Surprise, Father O'Hare: you are out and a new chairman, Thomas
J. Schwarz, had been appointed.
Well, this became the biggest appointment controversy since
Marbury v. Madison.62 No one questioned the new appointee's
credentials, but it was clear to everyone that Father O'Hare's mid-
night replacement had been political retribution for the strong and
proper actions the Board had taken during the election.
Because it was the week between Christmas and New Year's, the
city was asleep, particularly the press. So Peter Powers and I (he
was to be the first deputy mayor under Mayor Giuliani) called
every editorial board and every opinion maker in the city, and
they, in turn, called upon the new appointee to resign.
Then I stood with Mayor Giuliani at a press conference with
leaders of the various civic groups and the other Board members,
calling for the new chairman's immediate resignation.
Mayor Giuliani stated at the press conference that he intended
to reappoint Father O'Hare. The Dinkins appointee buckled, for-
tunately, and resigned. And one of Mayor Giuliani's first acts in
office was to reappoint Father O'Hare on January 10, 1994.
Bizarrely, Mayor Rudy Giuliani did something comparable to
David Dinkins' action, in an appointment that was, in retrospect,
equally abhorrent. A vacancy occurred in his administration at the
time the Board was considering whether to fine the Giuliani cam-
paign committee for violations, and allow me to quote the Board's
most recent report which describes the events:
The manner of former Board member Erazo's appointment in
September 1997 was a subject of some controversy. Mr. Erazo
arrived unexpectedly to take his seat on the Board near the end
of a public meeting on September 18th, during which the Board
was hearing arguments regarding over-the-limit contributions
received by the Giuliani campaign.
62. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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Although the Board had been notified in a letter from the
Mayor dated August 13, 1997, that Mr. Erazo was appointed to
the Board "pending the successful completion of [his] Depart-
ment of Investigation background check," the Board had not re-
ceived notice of the completion of the background check by the
time of the September 18th meeting.
... [T]he Department of Investigation... confirmed by tele-
phone that morning that Mr. Erazo's background check had not
yet been completed. Accordingly, Chairman O'Hare declined
to seat Mr. Erazo in Mr. Williams' place on the Board for the
public meeting and vote. (Later that afternoon, a letter was
transmitted to the Board confirming completion of the Depart-
ment of Investigation's background check and Mr. Erazo took
his place on the Board.)
Several civic groups and editorial boards protested the cir-
cumstances of the appointment.
63
Joe Erazo - who I know, a nice man, a devoted stalwart in the
Giuliani Administration - ultimately resigned from the Board in
June of 1998 when he became the executive director of Correc-
tional Health Services at the Health and Hospitals Corporation.
He did not lose Giuliani favor. He has yet to be replaced. Mr.
Erazo did not vote, to his credit, on the Board's decision to fine the
Giuliani campaign $242,000, which was the amount assessed by the
Board.
A regulatory agency can only be as good as its leadership. I can-
not overstate the importance of appointing quality people to this
kind of Board and making those appointments in a manner that is
consistent with the agency's non-partisan mission.
We must be ever-vigilant to make sure that elected officials are
following the better angels of their nature when they make these
kinds of appointments.
To go back to the beginning, I must say that the opportunity for
campaign reform in New York City arose in circumstances that
were painful to me.
Queens Borough President Donald Manes' suicide led to revela-
tions of corruption among political party leaders and some officials
in my administration. Betrayals diminished my own effectiveness
in my third term as Mayor and caused me enormous personal pain.
But it also created a climate for reform, leading to the enactment
of a number of remedial measures.
63. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., A DECADE OF REFORM, supra note 5, at 115.
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The New York City Campaign Finance Act6 4 was the most signif-
icant and far-reaching of the many measures that we took. For
years, the State Assembly had attempted to bring about meaning-
ful contribution and expenditure limits and public campaign fi-
nancing through state legislation.
These proposals received new impetus in the spring of 1986 from
the recommendations of a commission jointly appointed by then-
Governor Cuomo, and myself as mayor, and chaired by Michael
Sovern, then the president of Columbia University.
The Sovern Commission made many recommendations, includ-
ing limits on campaign contributions, public campaign financing,
merit-based selection of judges, greater uniformity and clarity in
the rules for public contractors, prohibitions on party leaders and
legislators practicing before state agencies, and the establishment
of a state ethics commission to enforce stronger disclosure laws.
Through the spring of 1987, we pushed hard, first for campaign
reform through state legislation for both the city and for state elec-
tions, and then for city elections alone when it became clear that
the state legislature would never pass legislation that would apply
to state elections.
When it became clear that the state legislature was unwilling to
enact needed reforms, I directed my then-Corporation Counsel Pe-
ter Zimroth to undertake an exhaustive legal analysis of the sub-
ject. He concluded that the City Council did have the authority to
enact a voluntary public financing program for candidates for the
five city offices: Mayor, Comptroller, Public Advocate (formerly
known as the City Council President), Borough President and City
Council members.
The Corporation Counsel's Office prepared a comprehensive re-
form bill. I announced at a press conference the bill's introduction
in the City Council in the fall of 1987.
The New York City campaign finance bill, known as Local Law 8
of 1988,65 created a voluntary program in which candidates choos-
ing to join must abide by contribution limits, which were much
lower than the state law, and spending limits, which do not exist
under the state law, and public disclosure requirements, which are
not very detailed under the state law, but are under the city law.
Candidates were also subject to an audit for compliance, in re-
turn for the opportunity to qualify for public funds that match con-
tributions from individuals living in New York City, once the
64. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 701-715 (1998).
65. 1988 N.Y.C. Local Law 8.
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candidate has demonstrated a threshold of support from New York
City residents. Under the current Program, contributions are lim-
ited to $8500 in a mayoral campaign.66 Spending in mayoral races
is also limited to $5.5 million in the primary in the aggregate and
$5.25 million in the general election, in the aggregate.
Changes enacted by the City Council last month and by the vot-
ers last Tuesday have together resulted in an even better campaign
law in New York City - perhaps the most progressive in the
country.
The Board believes that the new Charter proposal overrides the
Council law by eliminating the candidate's second choice. In other
words, leaving in place a voluntary program with a corporate con-
tribution ban and a four-to-one matching rate.
I understand that the Board's conclusion has been disputed by
Mayor Giuliani, and now, as it works its way through the courts, we
will see what happens. Based on past performance, if the court
rules in favor of the Board, the mayor will denounce the courts as
political hacks, as he has in the past.
Ten years after I signed the reform bill into law, the state has still
done virtually nothing in this area. We need campaign reforms at
all levels of government: federal, state and local. There is no other
way to reduce the pernicious perception that, in politics and in gov-
ernment, money talks.
There are a few who suggest that there is outright bribery, but I
do not, frankly, think there is. There could be an occasional crook,
but I do not believe that is the coin of the realm; but they are cor-
rect when they suggest that campaign money brings more access
and more impact than it ought.
I speak from a lifetime of experience at all levels of the political
structure. I speak as a district leader who defeated Carmine
DeSapio back in 1963, he then being the "boss of bosses," as we
referred to him.
I was a City Councilman for two years. I was a candidate for
governor, defeated quite correctly by Mario Cuomo. He was
happy there, I would have been very unhappy there. I was a con-
gressman and a three-term mayor.
Now, we all know what the problems are in the endless money
chase during the campaign season, which demeans many good can-
didates who hate their own involvement in money raising, and I
66. The contribution limit for Mayoral candidates has since been lowered to
$4500. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 703(1)(f).
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speak from experience. It is terrible, it is just terrible. And they
have no alternative if they are to have a chance of winning.
Now to the problem of so-called soft money donations given not
to candidates but to political parties.
In 1998, the soft money raised included $44 million by the Dem-
ocrats and $53 million by the Republicans. I wasn't sure of these
figures because I had seen larger ones, but the larger ones are for a
two-year cycle, I am told, so these are correct.
These hefty sums pay for issue ads, which are thinly disguised
campaign commercials attacking an opposing candidate's record.
But in Wisconsin, Senator Russell Feingold's recent successful race
for reelection showed that a totally candid, honest, courageous can-
didate can, even when he disarms unilaterally, win, against all ex-
pectations and against expenditures by an opponent with tons of
money. That opponent would not agree to forgo the benefits of
soft money which was spent in large amounts on his behalf.
The McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan bills67 would have lim-
ited campaign spending and prevented the recurrence of recent
federal campaign abuses.
The House bill, Shays-Meehan, passed in August by a vote of 252
to 179. In the Senate, the McCain-Feingold bill was pulled from
the floor by majority leader Trent Lott, who feared that the Senate
might just adopt it.
Now, I have a few suggestions for Senators McCain and Feingold
to consider. One, I believe that you can limit soft money contribu-
tions per person to the same one thousand dollar limit that applies
to hard money. There is no restriction that says soft money cannot
be limited.
Two, I was on the House Administration Subcommittee in 1973
which approved the current one thousand dollar federal contribu-
tion limit. My committee is the one that came in with campaign
financing at that time.
But the mistake we made - and it never came up, it boggles my
mind - was that we failed to provide for inflation. I mean, a thou-
sand dollars today would, in true dollars, be $3200. And there
should be an inflator placed in the law.
I believe public financing should be available for congressional
candidates. I remember the discussion very well. At that time,
there were only two people on the committee who supported that,
and that was John Brademas and me. Everybody else said, "well,
67. See supra note 20.
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I'll give them four dollars because, they were all congressmen, and
they did not want anybody running against them who would be
well financed." So there was absolutely no support for that.
I think it is changed. I think today people understand that it is
irresponsible to go on the way we have gone on. I believe public
financing should be available for congressional candidates, and in
addition, instead of, the current sham check-off for public financing
for the presidential elections where you mark a box that says take a
dollar or whatever the amount is out of the general treasury, we
should add additional monies from the Treasury for that purpose.
Elections should, in all cases, make public financing available
through a straight-forward budget appropriation. I believe that is
sensible rational and the best approach. It has worked in New
York City. The unrestricted spending now permitted in congres-
sional races, in particular the Senate, is best illustrated by the ob-
scene amounts spent in New York's recent Senatorial race between
D'Amato and Schumer, with D'Amato spending $18 million and
Schumer $11 million.
I also believe that, at every governmental level, contributions by
corporations and labor unions should be subject to the same limita-
tions, whether by law or by constitutional amendment, whatever it
takes. There are differences in the three different levels of govern-
ment as to what each of them can do.
The city law can also be improved. The strict but reasonable
contribution limits and extensive disclosure requirements should
apply to every candidate for city office, not just those who seek
public financing. Everybody.
There should be no "out" allowing the use of your private
wealth. And when people talk about the constitutional protection,
there is also something called the constitutional amendment.
The campaign season should be restricted to a limited time pe-
riod, and free or very low-cost television time should be provided
to candidates by FCC rules imposed on TV licensees to mirror
what has been done in Great Britain.
Again, I want to reiterate that I support, where necessary, a con-
stitutional amendment to achieve all of these proposals, including
the removal of the current right of candidates to avoid campaign
limitations by using their own wealth and refusing to accept public
financing as provided for under the U.S. Supreme Court decision
of Buckley v. Valeo.68
68. 424 U.S. 1 (1974).
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 93
A few years ago, President Clinton and Speaker Gingrich shook
hands and agreed to create a commission to study and make rec-
ommendations on campaign finance reform. This spoken commit-
ment proved to be totally false. It should come as no shock that
they were both capable of that. No commission to date has been
appointed.
A new day has been born, however, with the announcement of
Speaker Gingrich's resignation. Perhaps the new Speaker, along
with the current Senate Majority Leader and the president, will
feel compelled as a result of public pressures to commit to taking
the measures needed to sweep the Augean stables clean.
Will elected officials find the courage to put public interest
above self interest? We did it in New York City. The challenge to
every elected official is, "will you help provide a more level playing
field in the interest of improving democracy and elective
government?"
Won't the members of the New York State legislature agree that
there is something radically wrong in our state when, as recently
occurred, every member of the state legislature - one hundred
percent - was reelected. That is an outrage. And on prior occa-
sions, while it may not have been one hundred percent, this may
have been just really something unique, it is generally ninety-eight
percent.
It is outrageous in these elections, because of the lack of cam-
paign financing, and the outrageous spending that exists under
state law, that people running for office for the first time rarely
have an opportunity to win.
There is more to a successful career than getting reelected, as
important as that is. And I can tell you, personally, that the re-
wards of a forced retirement from government can often be quite
wonderful. Thank you.
Is "SUNLIGHT" ENOUGH?
THE LIMITATIONS OF DISCLOSURE
Although politicians and reform advocates continue to disagree
about contribution limits, public financing and other substantive ef-
forts to reform the campaign finance system, most political observ-
ers and practitioners agree on the need for full and effective
disclosure of campaign finances. Many opponents of public financ-
ing and spending limits argue that full disclosure is the only desira-
ble reform, as it allows the voters to see who supports candidates,
and to make that a factor when deciding for whom to vote. Timely
disclosure of campaign finances is essential to enforcing regulations
and has become a mainstay of political reporting. Disclosure issues
have become increasingly important with the explosion of "issue
advocacy" advertisements during the 1996 presidential campaign.
These advertisements, which may mention candidates or issues by
name, fall outside federal regulations because they do not "ex-
pressly advocate" the election of a particular candidate. Under ex-
isting law, the sponsors of these advertisements are not required to
disclose any information about their sources of funding. John D.
Feerick, Dean of Fordham University School of Law, co-chair of
the Special Commission on Campaign Finance Reform of the As-
sociation of the Bar of New York City (the "Association") and for-
mer chairman of the New York State Commission on Government
Integrity, moderated this discussion of what effective disclosure can
and cannot accomplish.
MR. FEERICK: Good afternoon. My name is John Feerick,
one of the three co-chairs of this Association's Special Commission
on Campaign Finance Reform. Our panel will follow the general
format of the previous two panels.
And with that let me introduce the members of this panel and
then I will have a comment or two about the subject, "Is Sunlight
Enough? The Limitations of Disclosure." Each of the panelists
will speak for three to five minutes, following which, each of the
panelists will have an opportunity to comment on what they have
heard.
I will have a few questions for the panel, and following that there
will be an opportunity for those of you in the audience to put ques-
tions to the panelists. And then we will wrap up and see if we can
draw any consensus on anything to pass along to the organizers of
the program.
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To my far right is Jill Abramson, who is the enterprise editor in
the Washington Bureau of the New York Times. She is a most dis-
tinguished investigative reporter who has covered money and poli-
tics and many other areas in Washington. She also served as the
deputy bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal.
Next to her is Matthew Carolan, executive editor of the National
Review. He also writes a column for Newsday with Raymond
Keating and also has written for the New York Times and the
Washington Times, among others.
Before working for National Review, I should indicate that Matt
taught philosophy at several New York-area colleges and twice ran
for elective office as a third-party candidate.
Sitting next to me is Dr. Frederick M. Herrmann, who has been
Executive Director of the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement
Commission for over a decade.
He is the author of many publications about history and govern-
ment and is a past president of the Council on Governmental Eth-
ics Laws, an international organization, and also has served as the
chairperson of the Northeastern Regional Conference on
Lobbying.
In 1993, he was the recipient of the annual award of the Council
on Governmental Ethics Laws for his continued efforts to promote
the highest level of ethical conduct among government officials and
candidates for public office in the international arena.
To my immediate left is Larry Makinson, who serves as executive
director of the Center for Responsive Politics (the "Center"). The
Center, located in Washington, D.C., is a nonpartisan, nonprofit
research group that specializes in the study of Congress and, partic-
ularly, the role that money plays in its elections and actions.
He is a pioneer of computer-assisted research into money and
politics and has written many books and numerous reports tracking
the pattern on money and politics, primarily at the federal level.
To his left is a most distinguished member of Congress, Con-
gressman John T. Doolittle from California. He has been a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives since 1990, and he has been a
particular leader in areas having to do with ethics and government
reform.
He is the sponsor of the Citizen Legislature and Political Free-
dom Act, a leading bi-partisan campaign finance bill in the House
which would repeal the current failed regulations and require full
and frequent disclosure of all campaign contributions.
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He is also the author of the "Truth-in-Testimony" rule which re-
quires all witnesses testifying before House committees to disclose
all federal grants and contracts. In addition, he has been one of the
members of Congress who took a leadership role in exposing the
House check-bouncing scandal, pressing for full disclosure of all
overdrafts and bringing national attention to the issue of congres-
sional reform. We certainly are appreciative of his coming here to
be part of this program today.
And no panel in this program will be complete without the ex-
pertise of Bob Stern.
On the subject of sunshine, let me start by saying that disclosure
requirements are designed to reveal the financial supporters of
candidates and enable voters to assess candidates more intelli-
gently. Justice Brandeis has stated, "publicity is justly commended
as a remedy for social industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants, electric light the most efficient policeman. 69
What kind of disclosure is taking place?
With respect to the national level, candidates for the presidency,
vice presidency and Congress must make detailed disclosure to the
Federal Election Commission (the "FEC") of all contributions
over two hundred dollars. This disclosure includes the donor's
name, address, occupation and employer. The FEC does not re-
quire disclosure of the identities of bundlers or intermediaries who
collect contributions from others and give them to the campaign.
Candidates for the presidential election in the year 2000 will be
required to file their disclosure reports electronically.
Generally, there is a big lag, I believe, at the federal level from
filing to posting and then on to the Internet. Even though the FEC
requires detailed disclosure, it has only limited auditing powers.
New York State, as has been indicated by previous speakers, and
also by a commission I chaired on government integrity, quite
frankly lags in the area of disclosure, and that is a mild statement.
It does not require disclosure of the donor's employer, it does not
require identities of bundlers, and up to now, there has been no
ability for candidates to file electronically, although I understand
that electronic filing is in the future of the New York State law, I
believe, in the next general elections here in the state.
New York City, as indicated by prior panels, has a very full dis-
closure law. New York City requires the disclosure of campaign
contributors' employment information and the voluntary program
69. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
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here in New York even extends to disclosure with respect to the
identities of bundlers.7° New York City requires electronic disclo-
sure and allows public access to its electronic databases.71
And if you missed it, out in the lobby is a computer terminal that
will give you some idea as to what you can access with respect to
the New York City campaign finance system.
So let me now go to our panel for their perspectives on the sub-
ject of this program, "Is Sunlight Enough? The Limitations of Dis-
closure." Jill?
MS. ABRAMSON: Well, I am going to begin by saying that
sunlight certainly is not everything, but it sure beats darkness. I
have been covering money and politics as a journalist for more
than ten years now. And for all of those years, I have kept a folder
on my desk that is called "Rosemary's baby."
That folder is a list that President Nixon's secretary Rosemary
Woods kept in her top left desk drawer, and it was a secret list for
the 1972 election of the President's top contributors.
And I keep the list around. It is just interesting to see the names
and look at it every now and then. It did not become public until
right before the 1972 election, when Common Cause litigated.
That was in essence the first modern public disclosure at the fed-
eral level that we had, when "Rosemary's baby" became public.
I really do think that the kind of disclosure that we have at the
federal level is something to be grateful for. It is a guidepost for
journalists and it is a guidepost for the public.
We do know where most of the money is coming from, even if
we do not know what it is after. After the 1988 elections, there was
another really important disclosure requirement which was the re-
quirement that the two political parties disclose their soft money
contributors.
President Bush's Team One Hundred and the copycat group that
was quickly organized by the Democratic nominee, Michael
Dukakis, was the first time we saw groups of $100,000 donors.
But in 1988, the parties did not have to disclose where the money
was coming from. And when they were forced to, the public and
journalists like me were able to see who was giving these big party
donations.
But sunlight really is not enough, as I certainly learned covering
the 1996 elections, where at the Wall Street Journal, I co-wrote the
70. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 703(6).
71. See N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 47, § 1062 (1998).
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first major story about contributions that were linked to an off-
shore company called the Lippo Group. Mind you, this was 1996
and names like James Riady were new to the public and new to
reporters.
But what we did not know was that in 1992, four years earlier,
James Riady and his wife had given more than $1 million to various
state parties, where the money was not discovered until the
Thompson Committee began scrubbing state disclosures for contri-
butions and found all this money.
We were all shocked back in 1972 that there were people secretly
giving million dollar contributions to President Nixon. This was a
million dollars of money that was effectively buried and forgotten
for more than four years.
And so, what we have seen gradually is that there are so many
disclosure loopholes now that it really is easy for big interests to
hide and disguise huge donations. That was true in 1996 for casino
and tobacco interests. Money is also hidden away in nonprofit
groups; on the Republican side, there is something called Triad
Management and, on the Democratic side, millions of dollars are
given to minority voter turnout groups.
This year we saw money hidden away in those ads that People
for the American Way ran to counter Republican issue ads. Again,
the process of finding these donations is difficult. You have to go
state by state where disclosure requirements are spotty. They vary
from state to state, and in a place like South Carolina where we
know a lot of gambling money was in play, we may never know
because that state has such weak disclosure laws.
MR. FEERICK: Thank you very much. Matthew Carolan, ex-
ecutive editor of the National Review.
MR. CAROLAN: Thank you very much for inviting me to this
discussion. I bring, I would say, a more mundane perspective than
Ms. Abramson, who has a distinguished career in this field.
From my own experience as a third-party candidate before I be-
came engaged in journalism, I remember the experience of filling
out campaign finance forms for New York State when I ran for
statewide offices as a third-party candidate. And it was at the same
time that I was teaching a course in philosophy, and I, during that
campaign season, had assigned term papers for the undergradu-
ates. I do not know how many of you have read undergraduate
term papers, but I had a choice at the time to either mark a stack of
undergraduate term papers or fill out the campaign finance state-
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ments. I could say those term papers looked extremely interesting
at the time.
I also believe very much in disclosure. I think it is very impor-
tant and I bring a perspective from a conservative or libertarian
side to this discussion.
One of the philosophical points that animates my interest in poli-
tics is something called "rational ignorance," that is, the public
practice of rational ignorance. People do not take a lot of interest
in politics because it is expensive, for example, to find out who is
taking your tax money. And for the few cents that come out of
your pay check, it is not necessarily worth your time to fight it.
Yet, if you are on the other end of the pipeline, whether it be in
Washington or in New York City, it is certainly worth the time and
effort to be on the receiving end of everyone's tax money. That is
an old economic theory called rational ignorance.
If that applies to the political process, it seems to me it is also
going to apply to a subject like disclosure.
It was certainly boring for me to fill out the forms, and I cannot
imagine that it would be very exciting for the public to go through
the minutiae and find out who is funding whom.
It does upset people when the press does its job, but I will also
point this out: the press itself engages in what could be called civic
journalism. I do not mean to sound cynical, but I think we could
say that the press has a certain interest, the editorial boards have
interests in their own candidates, and disclosure of campaign fi-
nance is sometimes a weapon to be used against another party. So
you are facing tremendous obstacles.
I think a more important point to remember is to reflect on the
proper purposes of government, and the perspective that I will
bring to this is that government engages in tremendous amounts of
redistribution of wealth, corporate welfare, individual welfare,
taxes, regulations, et cetera.
There is a tremendous vested interest which is extremely difficult
to overcome, even with all sorts of procedural mechanisms to pre-
vent that from happening. Money will be spent, and if it is not in
legitimate checks, it will be in suitcases full of cash.
I think the most important thing is to reflect on the purposes of
government and what government should be about.
MR. FEERICK: Thank you very much. Our next speaker is
Frederick M. Herrmann, who is the Executive Director of the New
Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission.
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DR. HERRMANN: Thank you. I guess it gets even more mun-
dane still as the director of a state elections agency.
Before I address "Is Sunshine Enough," I would like to make a
few comments about whether or not there is enough sunshine. Up
until a few years ago, I think the answer in the United States was,
no, there is not enough.
The Center did an excellent study a few years ago in which they
said that in most agencies, disclosure was nothing more than a fil-
ing cabinet, a table and a chair.
And I do not think we really had disclosure in this country, if we
expected the average citizen to take a day off from work and travel
to the state capitol or wherever the state ethics agency was, and sit
at this table and go through piles and piles of paper reports.
But the good news is things have changed drastically just in the
past few years and according to a study by the nonpartisan legisla-
tive staff in the State of New Jersey, today thirty states and the
federal government are in the process of developing or actually do
have computerized disclosure.
And I am happy to say that because of an initiative by Governor
Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey and the support of the New
Jersey legislature, my agency was given $1 million for this fiscal
year to recomputerize our operation. So we are in the process
right now of working on scanning and imaging technology which
will allow us to take our 25,000 reports and put those on our Web
site so that any citizen can take a look at that Web site and click on
the candidates running and take a look at who gave the money and
how the money was spent.
We are also working on searchable databases, which will also be
on our Web site and which will allow citizens to search for such
things as contributors and the candidates whom they gave to. And
we also will be developing electronic filing which we hope to have
ready for the general assembly races in 1997, which will allow can-
didates for our lower house to file with us electronically.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Father O'Hare and
Nicole Gordon and the New York City Campaign Finance Board
for their kindness, their time, and their expertise in helping us with
this project.
So, in the future, in New Jersey, and also in many jurisdictions
throughout the United States, citizens will be able to go to a public
library, a community center, an educational institution or even
their own home and take a look at these reports, and this is true
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disclosure. So now let me turn to the major question, "Is disclo-
sure enough?"
Many states and localities do not think that it is. I just want to
review briefly some of the provisions of state and local law across
the country that go beyond disclosure.
Contribution limits are probably the second most popular re-
form in this area after disclosure. A contribution limit system that
sets those limits low enough to keep out undue influence, yet high
enough to allow candidates to raise enough money to get a
message out, is a system that has been shown in this country to
work.
The disclosure of occupation and employer information is very
important for candidates - not just giving names and home ad-
dresses, which was the case in many jurisdictions prior to the
nineties.
If you take a look at a typical candidate's report in the past, you
will see a list of names - fifty names, fifty different addresses.
None of the names and the addresses would be the same, and you
might conclude, well, we have adequate disclosure.
But if you add another couple of columns and say, give us the
occupation and employer information and you find out that ninety-
five percent of these contributors are vice presidents of the same
corporation, you have a different picture.
Many localities and most of the states in the nation now ban di-
rect corporate contributions and direct contributions from unions.
There has been experimentation with limiting vendor contributions
and lobbyist contributions.
A number of states have PAC registration. We have it in New
Jersey. This is important because, although PACs do report their
contributors and their expenditures, many times we do not know
who they are.
So it is important to get information about who controls and ini-
tiates these committees or entities and also to have a statement of
objectives about them.
Amazingly, sixty percent of the states in the nation do not ban
personal use of campaign money, which is quite incredible because
this is probably the one thing we would expect most of them would
do.
Having one candidate per committee is important for disclosure.
So, too, is continuous reporting, not just reporting a couple of
times before and after an election, but throughout a person's term
in office.
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Also, I think we have talked about this a little bit, issue advocacy
- suggesting instead of directly stating something - that should
be regulated.
So, perhaps simple sunshine is not enough. There are other reg-
ulatory provisions which have been used and work. And I believe
that thinking that you do not need anything more than disclosure is
sort of like going to a football game - having no rules and no
referees and thinking that the fact that the fans are watching the
game will keep the players playing fairly. And I submit that in that
kind of situation you are going to have something more akin to a
group mugging than to organized sport.
MR. FEERICK: Thank you very much. The next speaker to my
immediate left is Larry Makinson who serves as the Executive Di-
rector of the Center, particularly studying money in elections and
congressional actions.
MR. MAKINSON: I can also mention that we do not take posi-
tions on issues. We do not lobby, we are not that kind of a group.
What we do is provide information, and I want to provide a little
bit of information here, just to give you some kind of a sense of
what we do.
First of all, the importance of money. It has been said before
that money is a pretty good predictor of elections. In fact, in the
recently finished Congressional elections, ninety-four percent of
the people in the Senate, Al D'Amato not being among them, who
spent the most won. And in the House of Representatives, ninety-
five percent of the people that had the most money won.
The reelection rate for incumbents was ninety percent in the
Senate and 98.3 percent in the House. If you went to election day
and there was a roughly equal amount of money between both can-
didates for a House of Representatives seat, you were in a very
exceptional place.
In fact, in about sixty percent of the races in the country, one
candidate had ten times more than the other candidate. That was
the average. You talk about not getting your message out. The
people who did win in close races were almost always within a two-
to-one margin. It is impossible without that.
Having said some of that, is disclosure enough? No, there are a
few more things you need to do. But I also would like to talk
about sunshine, because I do not think we have sunshine now. I do
not think it is even as good as Fred has talked about, and I am
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working at the federal level, which has probably the best disclosure
next to New York City, which also has electronic filing.
The reality is, you want to find out the biggest source of money.
If you look at what people put down on their occupations and em-
ployers at the federal level, you find out that the two biggest
sources of money in this country are homemakers and retirees.
That does not tell you a lot. You need to know more than just
that information. Also, another thing you find out, a lot of people
put down "executive." A lot of people put down "self-employed."
Some people put "information requested," which just says, "we do
not know what this guy does, we just put 'information requested'
so there is something on the report instead of a blank space."
We did find that members of Congress actually are pretty good.
Candidates overall identified about ninety-one percent of their do-
nors with some kind of occupation and employer. But that is still
not great. It could be a lot better.
What happens if they do fill everything out? Well, if you looked
at Al D'Amato and Chuck Schumer, for example, I think one of
the most interesting things about them is what is not on the reports.
One of the things that we do at the Center is standardize the
occupations and employers and also categorize them by industry.
The contribution limit is one thousand dollars per election or one
thousand dollars for the general and one thousand dollars for the
primary. If you think that just two thousand dollars is all one inter-
est can give to a member of Congress, you are mistaken.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company gave $50,400 to Al
D'Amato. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company ranked elev-
enth on the list of D'Amato's contributors.
The State of New York, which includes people who work for the
City of New York, was just ahead of it with $50,600. Further ahead
was Ernst and Young, Bell Atlantic, Paine Webber, the Equitable
Companies, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and the big-
gest of all, MBNA America Bank, giving a grand total of $240,670.
This is with a thousand dollar per election contribution limit. If
we do not see this kind of information together, what good is it?
What is it but a bunch of names with addresses? If they put down
"investment banker," what are you learning? Al D'Amato is the
head of the banking committee; I would like to know what sorts of
things he did for MBNA America Bank.
So I think one of the things we should disabuse ourselves of is
that disclosure is something that only takes place during elections.
I think there ought to be disclosure when people are voting on
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things. I think we ought to know more about who is really giving
the money.
If you want my idea of what real sunshine is, it is when you are
looking at C-SPAN and someone says something about the real-
tors, and on screen pops up, "Realtor's Association, $851,000" or
something like that.
That is disclosure. That is the kind of disclosure that we ought to
have, if you really want to have a sense of who is getting what from
whom.
I would say that the system we have right now is partly cloudy at
best and there is a lot of smog in the air. And yet, even if we had
the greatest disclosure, it would not be everything. I think we also
need a few other things. I am not going to get into a whole bunch
of them, because, again, we do not lobby, and also my time is run-
ning out.
I might say that soft money is one of the ones that is pretty diffi-
cult to justify. The idea of the justification for soft money is that it
is supposed to help state and local officials. Well, okay, if that is the
case, then allow soft money to the national parties, but tell me
what the rationale is for the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the
National Republican Congressional Campaign and the National
Republican Senatorial Committee.
These four committees are aimed at only one thing: electing
members of their party to the House or the Senate. They have all
got soft money accounts, they are collecting tons of money, and I
have a list, if anyone wants it, of the people giving to them. Philip
Morris is at the top of the list, giving $687,000 to those four
committees.
Now, the point is that we have gotten to a system where it is not
a matter of what you can give, it is a matter of who do you write
the check out to, because if there is a will, there is a way to give it,
and it's taking place.
MR. FEERICK: Thank you very much. Our next speaker is
Congressman John Doolittle, a member of the United States
House of Representatives from California who also serves as a Re-
publican Deputy Whip.
MR. DOOLITTLE: I will be the skunk this afternoon. It is dif-
ficult in the time that we have to know really how to communicate
what needs to be said. But let me just say that I believe deeply in
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campaign reform, but not in the kind that many of our speakers up
here seem to promote.
We have a problem with this system. It is a terrible problem. In
fact, I do not really know anybody who thinks it is a very good
system. But this situation reminds me of the sick patient who goes
to the doctor and he gets a diagnosis and the course of treatment is
begun. And the patient, rather than getting better, continues to
remain sick, and then the doctor is called back and increases the
dosage. And the more medicine that is given, the sicker the patient
gets.
This patient has been misdiagnosed. All things that we hear crit-
icized today, the main things, whether it is the terrible influence of
soft money in our elections, the issue advocacy ads that are becom-
ing so prevalent today or the criticism of independent expendi-
tures, all of these things are direct creations and direct
consequences of the very regulations that were put in place, at least
at the federal level, some twenty-four years ago.
What I find fascinating is that a couple of elections ago the great
evil was PACs. What happened? You do not hear that much about
PACs any more. We have moved on to soft money. Nothing
changed about PACs, of course.
Also, when PACs were the great evil, you could note that those
too are the direct result of the so-called campaign reform that we
have in present law. Why? Because PACs can give five times as
much as individuals.
I have taken this approach - believe me, when I did this, I did
not particularly want to do it, but I needed to call to your attention
something I read that George Will wrote in one of his columns. He
said that the First Amendment is under greater threat today than at
any time since the 18th century. And that is because it is a bi-
partisan threat. It is not just Democrats, it is also some
Republicans.
And there is a great sentiment that is being expressed. There
always is more regulation. I find that fascinating. We know what
the answer is, it is more regulation. Now, what's the question?
That is not my answer.
Regulation has caused the mess that we see in the campaign re-
form system right now, and as this patient gets sicker and sicker we
are heaping more and more of the same medicine on it. The direct
and natural flow of money is from the contributor to the candidate.
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When you block the natural flow of money, it will flow in other
directions. And it is now flowing heavily in this area of issue
advocacy.
Now, people have refused to rediagnose this, but want to pile on
more of the same old medicine, and when you restrict that enough,
you will see a profusion of independent expenditures, which,
clearly, the Supreme Court has ruled cannot be regulated. Why do
we want to encourage the least responsible form of political speech
in the society? Why do we not tear down these barriers, let the
money flow directly from the contributor to the candidate, in any
amount, to the nth degree and simply have full disclosure?
Let the electorate decide whether $100,000 from one source is
undesirable. If they do not deem that to be undesirable, we ought
to content ourselves to live in a free republic where freedom of
speech reigns.
If it is thought to be undesirable, the candidate will be defeated
in the election. I think it is clear that the founders wanted to keep
government out of the business of campaigns. I think it is clear the
founders really meant it when they wrote in the First Amendment,
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech."
Most of our campaign reformers work day and night trying to
figure out how to abridge the freedom of speech while calling it
something else. That is wrong. Furthermore, it does not work.
If this approach worked, would we have the mess that we pres-
ently have in this system?
MR. FEERICK: Thank you, Congressman. Robert Stern.
MR. STERN: Thank you very much. I think in response to
what John said, I would point out a situation in California quite a
few years ago. I did a study of the campaign disclosure statements
of the California Medical Association. I noted that they had given,
to every single incumbent but one, at least $500.
They had given to the most conservative of the Republicans, and
the most liberal of the Democrats, so I called them up and said,
"Gee, I noticed you have given to every incumbent but one," and
they said, "Which one?" I gave the name, you probably know him,
Rich Rosenthal, and they said, "Oh, we better go give to him."
I said, "Why are you giving to every single incumbent, why are
you giving in some situations to both sides?" And the answer was
four words: losers do not legislate. And what happened, of course,
was that the interests had given to both sides.
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So, John, what happens when the tobacco industry gives
$100,000 to both sides? What is the voter supposed to do when
the California Medical Association gives to both sides or gives to
all incumbents?
The problem is that even if you have full disclosure, the public
may still not know what to do. We also had the situation where a
legislative candidate running for the state assembly received
$125,000 from a tobacco company three days before the election.
There was no disclosure because nobody could get it out in time,
even though there were late contribution filings.
Now, the good thing, though, I have to say, is that electronic
filing is really going to help, and the states and federal government
are moving much, much faster than I had ever imagined. I thought,
frankly, that the legislators would resist this, and some of them are.
But in state after state, we are seeing electronic filing passed, and
we will see, I think, within four to six years, the opportunity for
voters actually to get the information over the Internet very
quickly. That will be a big help.
The other thing that is very important in terms of disclosure is
the occupation and employer information. Many candidates do
not list occupation and employer. We passed a measure out in Cal-
ifornia - and several jurisdictions also have this - that says, if
you do not list the occupation and employer information when you
receive the check, you cannot cash the check.
That means a hundred percent compliance in those jurisdictions,
because the candidates want to cash the check. Occupation and
employer information is very important, as other speakers have
pointed out, in order to track down who is really giving.
Finally, I am happy to disagree with Matthew. I do not think we
will see or have seen recently suitcases full of cash. No matter
what the law would be, I have more confidence and more faith in
the candidates. I think they will disclose as little as they have to
disclose. I do not think they will take the cash, and I think that
most people are trying to comply with the laws even if the laws do
not necessarily give us all the information we need.
MR. FEERICK: Thank you very much. I indicated I would give
each of the panelists a brief opportunity to respond to anything
they heard from the other panelists. Anybody want to take advan-
tage of that?
DR. HERRMANN: I think it was Mark Twain who once wrote
that the only problem with organized religion was that nobody ever
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tried it, and I think this might be said of campaign finance reform
in this country.
When we have things like soft money, issue advocacy and ethics
agencies that are underfunded; when we do not have adequate en-
forcement power, and are not adequately independent, it is little
wonder that the system does not work.
I do not really think we have made enough of an effort, and so I
would have to respectfully disagree with the Congressman. I do
not think we have tried enough, and that is the problem, not that
we have not tried at all.
MR. MAKINSON: I would like to say something, too. On the
question of what do you do if both sides give. When I was reading
the list of Al D'Amato's contributions, one of the more interesting
things I find about Al D'Amato and Chuck Schumer is that of the
top twenty donors, seven of them are exactly the same.
So you do have a little problem of how do you make a decision.
Also, I agree with Congressman Doolittle that the electronic filing
is really important. One of the big frustrations that we have at the
Center is the fact that it is going to be four to six weeks until we see
what was filed with the FEC.
Now, people use computers in all these big campaigns to gener-
ate pieces of paper, which they then give to the FEC. The FEC
then hires inputters to take this paper and put it back into a
computer.
Not only is that a completely ridiculous waste of taxpayers'
funds, which is something else that should be dear to the Congress-
man, but it also makes it impossible to find out where the money is
coming from until after it is too late.
MS. ABRAMSON: As a journalist, I do not come to this subject
as an advocate for any particular set of reforms, and I do not really
see an interest like tobacco giving to both sides as a problem. I see
it as a story.
Many industries in this country give pragmatically to both sides.
That is not new. What is a problem to me is someone who wants to
chronicle that very pragmatism on a national scale, i.e. look at the
federal contributions as well as the state.
And I know that because this past year the New York Times in-
vested in hiring extra researchers on gambling and tobacco inter-
ests to try and look at the money on a fifty-state basis. And what
we came up with at the end of the day was an incomplete picture,
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where really in terms of what is available right now on-line, real
time, is four states.
Everything else you still have to go to the state capitol and start
sifting through disclosures. So while I share your optimism and
applaud your state for trying to be on-line and up to date, it is still
as cumbersome as anything to try to get the big picture.
MR. CAROLAN: Just going back to the suitcases full of cash
remark: I am not saying that is taking place right now. What I am
saying, though, is that I agree with the congressman. That is, there
is a tremendous amount of populist distrust of large corporations.
We have seen it throughout the elections when contributors were
giving - and I do not think it is fair, by the way, to use Al
D'Amato as the quintessential example here. I grew up in Al
D'Amato's political territory. I would like to think he's something
of an anomaly when it comes to these things.
But the fact is that you cannot just throw your hands up and say,
"My gosh, they all give money to the same people, they are all
throwing money around, it is a terrible evil thing," without asking
yourself, why are they giving all this money, and why do so many
people give so much money to the government whether it be in the
tobacco industry, or any industry?
And it is because of the enormous clout that they wield from the
regulatory point of view, from the redistributive point of view.
And to suggest, I think the congressman is right. Money flows like
water, it flows downhill. Think of it from a common sense point of
view.
If someone is trying to take money out of your pocket, you are
going to try to stop them. And if you are in a tightly contested
business climate and your opponent has gained a leg up, you are
going to either try and gain your own leg up or you are going to try
and stop your opponent.
It is common sense but you have to ask why does that happen?
It happens because of the power of government to control so many
aspects of life. And you cannot just have a populist revulsion at
the size and scope of money. It is unthinking. I think it does not
get back to first principles of government, and the way that govern-
ment power operates.
I think that the public is generally disgusted with the huge
amounts of campaign cash. But I do not think the public really
reflects a great deal on the power of government. I think that the
public has great expectations as to what government is going to do
for them.
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As I think George Will once said, individuals are usually philo-
sophically conservative but operationally liberal. They do not like
paying tax money but they like receiving all the benefits. We have
to have a more serious reflection about the power of government
and what it does to people and how it intrudes on their lives.
MR. FEERICK: Can I just ask the panel to go back to the sub-
ject of disclosure and what I've heard on the program so far today.
Before this panel, one speaker thought that requiring disclosure of
gifts at two hundred dollars or more, perhaps, should be rethought.
I also heard some commentary about the absence of information
with respect to those behind a lot of the independent expenditures
and I took from some of that discussion perhaps the question that
there should be greater disclosure with respect to people involved
in special advocacy associated with election campaigns.
I also noted that people who play the role of getting others to
give, except perhaps in the New York City Program and maybe
some other municipal programs, are not an element of the disclo-
sure either at the state or federal level.
What I would like to focus the panel on, then, is how might we
change and improve the existing disclosure laws aside from what
has been suggested with respect to electronic filing.
MR. DOOLITTLE: Well, I might jump in on that. The bill that
I did introduce and will introduce again, amongst other things, is
something that Bob was talking about. We did not allow the FEC's
"best efforts" rules, which is in present law, where if the campaign
"makes the best efforts" to obtain this information and cannot pro-
duce the information based on the exertion of best efforts, they can
just keep the money anyway.
We banned the acceptance of such contributions under the law,
- this is our own personal practice, to return those where we can-
not substantiate who gave the money. That would be one thing
and I think there would be some improvement.
And, I think, the amazing ability to have all this on the Internet
is a very significant development when we finally can get to the
point where that can happen. I think that would transform the way
campaigns work because some of these big contributions come at
the last minute and it is too late to react at that point.
With the Internet, you could be right there, day by day, knowing
what happened.
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MR. MAKINSON: That is taking place right now in the FEC
which is listing, this year, the late contributions within, I think,
twenty-four or forty-eight hours.
One of the important things to recognize is that we are supposed
to talk about something pragmatic here about disclosures. The bet-
ter the disclosure you have, the greater the impetus for people who
do not want disclosure to find ways of hiding.
One of the very troubling things that I have seen, and I think,
maybe I am wrong, that Congressman Doolittle's bill addresses this
to some extent, is the money that goes from the federal system to
the state level.
There is a lot of money hidden at the state level. I read in a
terrifying article in the Legal Times a couple of weeks ago that half
of the leadership PACs of Congress - these are PACs operated by
members who give money to other members - are actually func-
tioning with soft money accounts at the state level that have never
been reported nationally, on the rationale that it is not affecting
federal elections. The better disclosure gets, the more you are go-
ing to see people finding the loopholes hiding money in the state
level. It is happening a lot right now. We know some of the
money. I think the disclosure we have is great but it is only the tip
of the iceberg.
MR. FEERICK: Does that suggest that we have, perhaps, a
problem in the whole disclosure system depending on the state?
Having chaired a commission that focused on New York State, I
know we have some representatives of the Election Board here,
and I applaud the initiatives you are taking.
My sense is that the disclosure at the state level in New York
amounts to a national embarrassment. There is so little.
MR. MAKINSON: I agree. There is a lot of money in New
York, more than anywhere else. And yet, what does anyone in
New York or anyone in this room know about who paid for the
election that reelected one hundred percent of the incumbents? It
is a travesty that you cannot answer the question.
I might also mention that candidates know this. You also have
to understand that enforcement is necessary. The best analogy I
can think of for the campaign consultants and the candidates is that
they are like sixteen-year-old kids in the back seat of a car with
their girlfriend. They will go as far as they possibly can until some-
one slaps them in the face.
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And one of the things that we are seeing already about taking
advantage of the weak laws, and I am speaking from past experi-
ence here, are a number of candidates for president who have set
up PACs in the State of Virginia, which has no limits on who can
give. Corporations can give, unions can give - there are no limits
on how much they can give.
The State of Virginia is turning into the Cayman Islands of cam-
paign contributions. And it is going to continue. They are always
looking for the loopholes, and they are great at finding them.
MR. STERN: I think one thing we have not talked about is who
is behind the ads, not the candidate ads, because we know who is
behind the candidate ads, but who is behind the issue ads, who is
behind the independent expenditure ads.
In California, we did pass an initiative, actually now twice, re-
quiring the top two donors to any independent group to be listed in
the television ad or listed in the radio ad, and that way the voters
know who is paying for those ads.
I think that is very important. Whether it be independent ex-
penditures, whether it be issue ads or whatever, we need to know
who is behind the ads through disclosure, not on the documents,
but in the ads themselves.
MR. FEERICK: Maybe this is more for the lawyers of the Bar
Association. Do you see any constitutional limitations to the ex-
tent that you have studied that subject?
MR. STERN: I am sure Joel Gora will find a lot of problems
with it.
MS. ABRAMSON: At the federal level there are already con-
stitutional issues that have been raised and a lot of the nonprofit
groups that run these ads have so far they have succeeded in saying
that they should not have to disclose their membership lists to the
public. Which is, essentially, what you would have to do if you
want to know who is behind all the ads.
MR. STERN: I am not saying a membership list, I am just say-
ing, the top two donors or at least a group. If it is "Citizens for
Good Government" what have we learned? Let us find out if "Cit-
izens for Good Government" are a committee sponsored by the
Sierra Club.
MR. DOOLITTLE: I know this is supposed to be on disclosure,
but that is why I got into this issue of repealing much of the ex-
isting regulations. Because the one relates to the other.
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And unlike the sixteen-year-olds in the back seat trying to vio-
late the law of chastity without really doing it, when it comes to
campaigning, that is our God given freedom of speech. That
should be encouraged. We shouldn't be sitting around here in a
room thinking up new ways to regulate this and control it.
I agree with the ACLU man who spoke here. They are defend-
ing the Constitution. There are tremendous constitutional
problems with trying to force disclosure on independent
expenditures.
I mean, the Supreme Court already threw out attempts to regu-
late issue advocacy back in Buckley v. Valeo,72 a case which has
been repeatedly validated.
So we shouldn't be thinking of how we are going to convince
them to change their minds. Why do we not live by the law, not
only its letter, but its spirit, deregulate and do something that
works?
Disclosure works. Deregulate, let people see where the money
flows. Do not re-regulate and give rise to these little boxes of soft
money and more independent expenditures and more PAC money.
You know Virginia has a great transparent system. So does Cali-
fornia before the next initiative bollixes it up.
MR. FEERICK: I do not hear anybody on the panel, and maybe
my hearing is gone, object to any of the disclosure advances as they
are in the law right now. What I am talking about is the federal law
and some of the other developments with reference to electronic
filing. I do not hear anybody on the panel say that is not a direc-
tion we should continue to go in. Is that fair?
MR. CAROLAN: I would just make an observation and that is
there is also an assumption that disclosure is a kind of panacea
because it will tell us all the bad people that are out there trying to
influence the elections.
We could ask ourselves another question which is, is there a le-
gitimate reason why someone might want to hide a contribution to
a candidate? Take for example a businessman who is a practicing
homosexual, but does not want anyone to know that, and that indi-
vidual wants to make a contribution to a group that has been advo-
cating a candidate's call for more AIDS funding or something like
that.
Again, there is a sort of mad populist distrust of money in gov-
ernment that suggests that anyone who is hiding from public scru-
72. 424 U.S. 1 (1974).
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tiny is therefore a bad person, and we forget that there is power of
government and there are things that people do not want other
people to know about themselves. But they still want to exercise
their right to influence the electoral process.
To say we have to rout them out in order to find all the sources
of corruption in our society, is, I think, unnuanced. And I think
disclosure, for all the good things that might happen with disclo-
sure, there will be unintended consequences like there are in every
law that tries to rout out human corruption through a purely proce-
dural manner. A society is only as good as its citizens, not its laws.
MR. FEERICK: Matt, I do not interpret you to say, correct me
if I have drawn an improper inference, that we should change
where we are in terms of our federal disclosure law, in terms of
elections to Congress and national office.
MR. CAROLAN: I think that when you see people trying to
change laws about issue advocacy, for example, trying to say we
want to know who is contributing to these issue advocacy ads, that
is a place where people's privacy should be respected, and the
courts have spoken on that.
I agree with disclosure, but I also have some problems with it,
and that is, I think that there is again an assumption that we must
rout out everyone who contributes to the political process. And I
think that the right to contribute to the political process is what the
founders were going for.
They were not going for the right of everyone to know everyone
else - it is an impossible task. As I say, I think rationally a lot of
people are not going to pay attention. They are not really inter-
ested that much because they see the end result. They see the poli-
cies and they know that those policies are affecting their lives and
they have thrown up their hands toward these policies and toward
the power of government and they do not think they can change
government, in general.
It is not about Philip Morris or about Anheuser Busch or some
other group. I think that in days to come Anheuser Busch will
suddenly be running for the tall grass. Philip Morris is running for
the tall grass now.
When we demonize alcohol, when we talk about how beer com-
panies are trying to target children, for example, they will be run-
ning for the tall grass, and they will try to hide their contributions.
It is a matter of who government demonizes at the present time.
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 115
DR. HERRMANN: Just briefly I want to say, the First Amend-
ment is not an absolute right, and the government does have a right
under the Buckley decision, as the Court ruled, to balance free
speech, which is core democracy, against the right of the govern-
ment to protect itself against corruption.
So I think, clearly, we do have to regulate this to a certain extent
and we have to do it carefully because of the First Amendment.
The main point I want to make, though, in terms of disclosure is
that it is absolutely essential that we adequately fund ethics agen-
cies in this country, which we have not done.
Most of the ethics agencies in this country do not have enough
money to do the job, many of them do not have the enforcement
powers to do the job. They cannot issue penalties of substantial
amounts to dissuade people from breaking the law. Many of them
cannot investigate, many of them cannot make criminal referrals if
they find criminal activity. It is a real problem.
The New York Times did a story about my agency a number of
years ago and they had a picture of our entire enforcement staff,
which was one person holding a box.
This does not work, so it is absolutely essential to have agencies
have the power to do audits, because the reports that we get can be
entirely made up if we do not do the audit. I mean, we are not
seeing the actual records, so there has to be an effective audit pro-
cess in place so that you can actually check this material. And if
you do not, even if you disclose it - I think everybody here agrees
with disclosure - what are you disclosing?
It could be the classic garbage in, garbage out situation, if the
information that we are putting up on the Internet is incorrect. So
there has got to be staff to review these reports, and to penalize
those people that do not obey the law.
MR. MAKINSON: I certainly agree with that. I also agree that
every agency I have run across is understaffed, underfunded and
also under fire by the people that are supposed to be regulated.
On the question of disclosure and what you do if you are giving
to a gay rights group or something like that, the limit is $200. If
you give more than $200, it's going to appear, and I do not disagree
completely with where you are coming from with that argument. I
think there is a level of privacy that needs to be respected.
We had a policy at the Center of using organization names as
opposed to individual names and that is largely because I do agree
with that. Although lately we are now doing what everyone else is
doing which is that they give and you look it up.
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But we have had requests in the past, in one case from an Arab
group wanting the names of all our pro-Israel donors, that we have
not granted. I might also mention that what you see from most
members of Congress in their campaign contributions is a mixture
of two main sources.
Number one, their committee assignment is in Washington,
which largely affects the PAC contributions but sometimes also lob-
byists' contributions and bundled individual contributions. The
second source is basically the economic elite of where they come
from.
If they come from Texas, there will be a lot of oil money, if they
come from New York, there is going to be a lot of financial money.
A lot of that money is background noise. That is to me not as
interesting.
The reality about the reason that members of Congress have so
much money coming from the industries that they regulate is be-
cause that is the first place they go when it is reelection time. That
is the kind of disclosure that the voters really need to know about.
If you are in Indiana and you are getting money from the oil
industry, I want to know about it. It is probably not because of the
district profile.
So I think there are some problems with privacy that are sensi-
tive and need to be taken care of. We have a two hundred dollar
limit at the federal level to do that. If I can tip the scales, the over-
whelming thing we ought to see is where are the conflicts of inter-
est and only through disclosure are we going to find that
information.
MR. FEERICK: Let me suggest this might be a good time to
receive some questions from the audience and then we can come
back and wrap it up. I would ask each member of the audience
who speaks to identify themselves to the extent that they feel com-
fortable with that.
AUDIENCE: I am Rachel Leon. I am the executive director of
Common Cause-New York and I just want to make a brief com-
ment and ask a question particularly of Larry and Robert.
In New York, where we finally did at least get state level elec-
tions to be electronically filed, which will happen next year, I think
one of the main reasons that happened was because our governor
was widely criticized for alphabetizing his donors by first name.
As always, it tended to be a scandal that actually moved us a
little bit forward. But we have been really stuck trying to get local
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computerization. We have New York City, we now have state level
races, but we really need to get county information and local infor-
mation. So I would like to ask the two panelists, particularly Larry
and Robert, for national information on what is happening in other
cities and smaller districts, because I think that is really key.
MR. STERN: Well, I want to be a little careful in terms of re-
quiring every candidate to file electronic information, because I do
not think that somebody who is raising or spending five, ten or
fifteen thousand dollars should buy a computer.
I think there should be some minimal threshold, $50,000 or
something like that, at least until everybody gets a computer, and
only about forty percent of us have computers.
In terms of what works, San Francisco is very active, Seattle is
very active, Los Angeles is very active. A lot of the larger commu-
nities are getting heavily involved in electronic filing, as are many
state jurisdictions. So it is very encouraging. We have a long way
to go. I think we go through in fits and starts with it, because this is
very complicated information and it is all coming in around the
same time.
So I do not think everything has to be perfectly done. But I am
very encouraged by it, much more than I was last year and I hope
that by next year, we will even be further along the road.
MR. MAKINSON: I agree with what Bob said that we do not
want to have the threshold so low that someone has to buy a com-
puter to run for office. But most people do have computers who
run for office anyway.
I think one of the interesting things I would like to point out is
that in my research, which really has been mostly at the federal
level but also at the state level in Alaska and sometimes at the
municipal level, the lower you get to the municipal level, the more
direct the quid pro quo's between campaign contributions.
I would love to see on a ballot who the top donors were. Be-
cause these are people going in for zoning changes. These are gov-
ernment contractors.
One of the things that I have seen - and a couple of the states
have required it; possibly Connecticut is one of these - is that if
you are a registered lobbyist, you have to declare that, if you have
a government contract, you have to declare that. I think that is a
very good reform at the local level.
There ought to be a standard that we have at every level of gov-
ernment where people can really see who is paying for the cam-
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paigns of these people because they are going to find some very
interesting stuff that will definitely help in the voter group.
MR. CAROLAN: I would like to point out that the newspapers
ran for the first time in the State of New York a whole series on
contributors. A number of the newspapers formed a consortium to
investigate who contributed what in New York State. I did not see
much of a difference in this election. I did not see great public
outrage. I think that despite all of that information that was pro-
vided for the first time, we did not see parades down the streets
saying "Throw the bums out." The governor was elected, we had
discussions about what the governor's quid pro quo was. The gov-
ernor was reelected by twenty-some odd points.
I think people see that, and I can say my own experience with
people on the local level is that they throw their hands up and say,
"What can we do about it?" And the fact that the information is
there, does not necessarily make a lot of people feel very confident
that something is going to change.
Newspapers go on campaigns against particular candidates, but,
again, I think the public, generally, is cynical because of the degree
of power that the government wields. And the government is go-
ing to give out its contracts to whomever and the money is going to
flow to those people.
I think we need to get back to first principles about what the
government does.
MS. ABRAMSON: I think your assumption is somewhat mis-
taken that the goal of putting the information out there is to incite
outrage. I see my job as just putting the information out there in
pieces. I am not trying to get rebellion in the streets, but if the
information is available and you can provide it to the public, I see
no reason not to.
MR. MAKINSON: I would also say that the outrage is over the
fact that special interests, whoever they may be, are really the ones
who control. If you do not have a lot of money you cannot play
with those guys.
I lived in Washington for four wonderful years and lived on the
Oregon coast and none of my neighbors were interested in politics
and all of them were convinced that the best you can expect from a
politician is a relatively benign crook, but a crook nonetheless.
MR. STERN: Just one quick point. Almost any time a measure
is on the ballot dealing with campaign finance reform, the outrage
is sufficient enough that it passes.
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AUDIENCE: This question is directed to Congressman Doolit-
tie, and as I understand your presentation, you believe that disclo-
sure is sufficient. You feel that the principle of freedom of speech
is so strong that we shouldn't be overregulated. I think that is the
essence of what I got from your remarks.
I will identify myself as directing this to you as a Republican
State Senator from New Jersey, and I give that because I am some-
what on the same plane as you, as a state-elected official, as you
are in Congress.
Now, the case has been made by a lot of the people at the table
here for disclosure and the nuances and the perfecting of disclo-
sure, and this is an admirable objective. But when you say that this
is the only thing we should do and that we should not apply limits, I
think that misses the entire point of corruption. And I think any-
body that has served in office where you have a constituency of
more than 100,000, you realize that campaign contributions do
corrupt.
Mr. Makinson said in his analysis that sixty percent of the mem-
bers of Congress had a ten-to-one ratio in campaign contributions.
Does that not mean that these people are getting contributions
while they are in office to build up war chests to so great an extent
as to discourage opponents to shut out people who might be run-
ning against them?
So my basic question is, how can you just be for disclosure, with-
out providing limits and certain regulations to cut down on the cor-
rupting influences of campaign contributions?
MR. DOOLITTLE: Because I do not buy into the fact that
campaign contributions are corrupting. If I did, I might feel differ-
ently. But repeated studies show - and you yourself know that
you pay more attention as a state Senator m- what your constitu-
ents' interests are, to what your own philosophy is and maybe what
the party's position is, than you do to who is contributing to you. I
mean, I am sure you have, as I have, people who disagree who both
contribute to you. As a Republican, I do not believe in big govern-
ment, I do not believe in regulations.
I am not saying that at some points it might not be necessary, but
my first instinct is not to regulate. And that is what I am constantly
hearing increasingly even from our Republicans. The more they
regulate in this area, the worse it gets.
We start then complaining about symptoms of the regulations,
treating them as if they were the problem, like soft money. Now
we are going to order disclosure of the donors. That is completely
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the wrong way to go. Remove the existing regulation, let the
money flow in its natural course and disclose it in a timely and
complete basis.
AUDIENCE: Respectfully, Congressman, you and I have a ba-
sic disagreement and I would only counter with this: why do they
keep giving increasing amounts in campaign contributions unless
they produce results?
MR. DOOLITTLE: They keep giving increasing amounts be-
cause campaigns keep increasing in cost, which is largely a function
of the price of advertising. It is very basic.
MR. FEERICK: Senator, would you just identify yourself.
AUDIENCE: I am Senator Bill Schluter from the State of New
Jersey and I have been there a long time. I even voted as a dele-
gate for Goldwater back in 1964.
MR. FEERICK: We appreciate your participation. Next.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. Charles D'Arcy, Kings County Re-
publican Committee. Could we turn it backwards and look at a
situation? We have been concentrating on possible evil contribu-
tions from corporations and various issues that have come up re-
garding soft money, discovery and disclosure.
What about elected officials in the campaign season who take
the discretionary money, the $50,000 Assembly allotment or the
$100,000 state Senate allotment, and distribute it to interest groups
within that community for the sole purpose of, may I use the ex-
pression, "buying votes?" Equally, the end of not-for-profit agen-
cies who are in receipt of congressional largess - such as the
Sierra Club.
So I would be interested in knowing if there are any views on the
other side of the tapestry with regard to elected officials distribut-
ing monies so graciously given to them, either as a not-for-profit
grant, or for services in their community or as a direct discretionary
grant within that community?
MR. FEERICK: You have obviously expressed yourself on that
subject. I do not know if that is a subject that any member of the
panel that is here on the disclosure issue would like to speak to.
MR. DOOLITTLE: I am not as familiar with what goes on in
New York. I would just observe that there are real advantages to
incumbency and while I personally oppose taxpayer financing of
campaigns, for those who support it, at least you can argue, it levels
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the playing field. But the major types of campaign finance reforms
we've had in Congress this year have excluded that.
So, both the Shays-Meehan and McCain-Feingold bills73 have
had this heavy hand to regulation, doing things that are clearly un-
constitutional and that have been struck down before by the courts
and will be struck down again if they ever become law, and doing
things that are undesirable and producing a result that is unwork-
able and locking in the advantage of incumbency.
Out of pure self-interest as an incumbent, I should vote for the
cockeyed proposals. Because it would guarantee that I would re-
main in office as long as I chose. Because I have a taxpayer-fi-
nanced staff, I have the right to communicate with my constituents
in an almost unlimited degree, directly via the mail or through
other means. I have huge name identification, and contrasting that,
when I first ran for office, I never held any office. Nobody knew
me, so I could not go out and do some sort of a mailer and get a lot
of people to respond like I can now, because they did not know me
or who I was or anything else.
But I could get large contributions, which I did get, a handful of
them, and I was able to run my campaign, a very low budget cam-
paign, and knock out the dean of the state Senate in 1980 for about
$100,000, which was the total cost of my campaign. If McCain-
Feingold or that type of law had been in effect, I never would have
made it. That is what I find so insulting about this campaign re-
form. It is an incumbency protection act. The inference here is
that somehow to oppose Shays-Meehan is to take the position of
the incumbents. Just the reverse is true: the incumbent has got all
his advantages. Shays-Meehan locks them all in, and locks in the
advantage of the incumbency.
So I think you are raising incumbent advantages that already ex-
ist, in one form or another will always exist, unless you have public
financing as part of the equation, and I do not think it will be part
of the equation in the near future.
AUDIENCE: My name is Theresa Wang and I am a graduate
student particularly interested in public affairs.
My question is for the congressman and this is really kind of a
theoretical, philosophical question. As I understand what you are
saying, you are for full disclosure, but you feel that there is no need
for any regulation or limits, especially on contributions.
73. See supra note 20.
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My question is this: when this country was founded, voting was
based on property rights. Congressman Doolittle, it appears to me
that you're accepting of a political process that would, in effect,
have come full circle and that, once again, one's political voice is
based on one's wealth. Can you just comment?
MR. DOOLITTLE: One's influence in society depends upon a
number of things. Wealth certainly has something to do with one's
influence. That has always been the case, is the case now, and
probably always will be the case, except in a perfect world which
we do not have.
AUDIENCE: My name is Amy Paulin and I am an advocate in
Westchester County, which is a little north of New York City for
those of you who are unfamiliar.
What is frustrating to me is I worked very hard on a bill in West-
chester County, and we saw it defeated twice - not just once, but
twice. At this point, I feel discouraged, although perhaps a little
encouraged by coming today, and again moving forward on that
initiative.
What is frustrating is that I see all of the issues and all of the
problems lumped into one pot and somehow this one solution is
going to be our answer to everything and it varies so.
In Westchester, we have seen some undue influences, certainly
government contracts are direct results of contributions, but county
legislative races are much more low scale and we see average peo-
ple with little money actually running, although that is changing.
So we have issues in Westchester and I am sure in New Jersey.
In Congress, as we all know, there are different issues in different
states, but we are packaging one thing. And what I was disap-
pointed with was not hearing some other initiatives or other ideas,
that now I can go back to Westchester and say, okay, we are not
going to do public financing because they do not think that there is
enough public momentum or public support to do that and that is
why our county executives are opposing it.
But there are other things that we can do to move toward the
same goals, toward increasing average people's ability to run
against incumbents, toward limiting campaign contributions.
What else is out there? Is there nothing out there for me to
bring back? That is what I want to know. If there is something out
there, then perhaps you can share it with me so that I can go back
home and try to adopt some things that may be doable?
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MR. FEERICK: I know that Bob Stern has a comment and as
you know, Nicole Gordon, who is at the center of what is going on
in this country, is there for those in Westchester as she has been,
and I have been a participant as well in your process.
MR. STERN: I think the important thing to remember is there
is not just one solution to any of these problems. In California,
when we drafted the reform act in 1974, we recognized that and
said that the cities and counties would adopt their own laws, and
they have.
We have eighty cities and counties adopting different laws in
California with different thresholds, different disclosure require-
ments, different contribution limits, sometimes a ban on contrac-
tors who are making campaign contributions, prohibiting them if
they are seeking contracts. We have public financing.
So throughout the states, I think that they are really experi-
menting with a lot of different solutions and I think what is nice
about it is, you can look at all these jurisdictions, pick what you
think is the best from each of these jurisdictions, and then go with
your best approach.
MR. FEERICK: We are almost down to the last two or three
minutes. Do we have consensus, Jill?
MS. ABRAMSON: I do not think this panel has a consensus. I
would like to close just by saying we have really focused this whole
time on problems and what does not work. But as someone who
has covered this subject for ten years, when I began, I was going
down to the FEC and looking at the names of political action com-
mittees that were things like the "Good Citizens for Good Govern-
ment." And I had no idea what interests they were attached to.
Back then there wasn't a Center, and the FEC had less money than
it does now.
Sometimes you have to say the glass is half full. I think in terms
of disclosure, our glass at the federal level is more than half full
and it amazes me that people, not reporters, but any citizen with
access to the Internet can go to the Center Web site. The FEC,
much maligned by everybody, including journalists, has, in terms of
its disclosure and career staff, the most helpful, user-friendly
agency in the federal government from where I sit as a reporter,
and you can find out an amazing amount of stuff that five years
ago, you could not.
MR. CAROLAN: Very quickly. I would just like to say again
how much I enjoyed being here. In talking to the people here, I
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find that people are on tremendous intellectual journeys about
what is the proper way to arrive at clean campaigns and good gov-
ernment and so forth. And, obviously, I have had my own drum
beat about reducing the power of the government.
If I could just make a suggestion for those of you who are inter-
ested. The Cato Institute has done some very well-researched,
thoughtful studies on the subject of campaign finance regulation
and addresses some of the concerns of the lady who had the ques-
tion before and that the congressman has discussed - which is that
there are pernicious ways in which well-intentioned laws to regu-
late the money in the political process actually shut out diverse
viewpoints, such as those of third-party candidates with unique
ideas, and give us a kind of plain vanilla mediocre candidate who
will mouth generalities as a way of, for example, collecting as many
one thousand dollar contributions as they can rather than saying
something bold with the assistance of maybe one $250,000
contribution.
So I would recommend that you look to the Cato Institute. I
think they bring a very fair, strong and interesting dimension to the
discussions. I would recommend that to any of you who are
searching this question through.
DR. HERRMANN: I think we just have to find a way to bal-
ance the core principle of democracy, which is the First Amend-
ment, with protecting the government from corruption. I think in
finding that balance, we will find the correct way to regulate cam-
paign financing.
MR. MAKINSON: I would say we do not have to wait. It does
not take an act of Congress for this system to be cleaned up. It
takes interest by people out there to do it themselves. Our motto
at our Web site7 1 is, do not wait for Congress to investigate, do it
yourself. If you are complaining about the choices on the ballot
that you see in November, do not wait until November to be heard.
One of the things we have on the Web site is the e-mail address of
every member of Congress. Send them a message. You can look at
their campaign profiles on the Web. If you see something you do
not like, tell them. If you see something you do like, tell them. But
the most important thing you can do is tell them you are watching.
That is all it takes. Do not underestimate the power of voters
watching their elected representatives. It can go a long way.
74. <http://www.opensecrets.com>.
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MR. DOOLITTLE: Freedom works, and we should encourage
more political speech, not less. That is why I offer the proposal
that I do. We want to invite people to be able to access the system,
to be able to run as candidates. If they are not of wealthy means
themselves, they ought to be able to go out and get some large
contributions from people who back their ideas, so they can dis-
seminate their views and then stand before the electorate and see if
they meet the test.
The system we presently have discourages challengers. I would
like to see that changed, and that is why I offer a new diagnosis,
and new prescriptions for the problem.
MR. STERN: In terms of consensus, I think John and I would
agree and the rest of the panel would agree on two things. First,
electronic filing is very important and would be very useful. And
second, at least candidates should file full disclosure.
MR FEERICK: I want to thank everyone here. We are going to
be available to chat with you informally. Thank you.
POLICING THE POLITICIANS:
MODELS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Without effective enforcement, even the most comprehensive
campaign regulations will fail to achieve desired results. Enforcing
regulations on political activity, however, has proven to be one of
the most difficult challenges of campaign finance reform, as agen-
cies that police officeholders' activities are also subject to the
officeholders' oversight, receive budgets determined by the office-
holders and often carry out mandates created by (and subject to
amendment by) those officeholders. Without fairly administered
enforcement powers, and the resources to carry them out, no
agency in this field can operate effectively. This discussion of the
necessary elements for effective enforcement of campaign finance
regulations was moderated by Nicole A. Gordon, Executive Direc-
tor of the New York City Campaign Finance Board (the "Board")
and chair of the Government Ethics Committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.
MS. GORDON: I would like to ask you all to please sit down.
We are going to start on the last panel discussion.
I will first introduce the people on the panel and then offer a few
comments of my own on the subject, if I may.
To my right is Rebecca Avila. She is the Executive Director of
the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission, which is known among
campaign finance regulatory agencies as one of the very best. Her
agency directs a program of public matching funds, lobbyist regis-
tration and governmental ethics. Before joining the Ethics Com-
mission she was an associate director of Common Cause and an
executive policy analyst on the staff of Governor Booth Gardner in
Washington State.
Next is Ken Gross. He is a partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom in the Washington, D.C. office. He was formerly
head of enforcement at the Federal Election Commission (the
"FEC"). So he comes here to bring expertise in, I would say, three
areas: one as having enforced the federal laws and another as hav-
ing represented candidates before the FEC, and also in other juris-
dictions as well.
Next is Larry Noble. He is the general counsel for the FEC. He
has also served as president of the Council on Governmental Eth-
ics Laws, and most recently has been targeted for ouster by Con-
gress and perhaps we will have some more to say about that.
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Then to my left is Trevor Potter, who was introduced to you ear-
lier. I won't repeat anything about him except to remind you that
he did serve as chair of the FEC and is widely regarded as one of
the finest members of the FEC ever to have served.
And then Bob Stern, who, I think, by now certainly needs no
repeat introduction but whose presence has been really invaluable
today. And I want to thank him especially for his participation.
So in that same order, I am just going to ask the participants
here to speak, but before I do that, I want to mention just a few
things about New York City and our experience here.
The first is that on the subject of models for effective enforce-
ment, of course, questions are raised about adequate independence
for the agencies: adequate budgets for agencies, and, in general,
what the posture is of the agency and whether it takes an aggres-
sive posture with respect to enforcement.
And on one of those earlier points, I would like to say that we
have a mantra at the Board, which is that we think a nonpartisan
agency as opposed to a bipartisan agency is the way to structure
enforcement of campaign finance laws. Our Board, we are pleased
to say, has a history of a nonpartisan culture that began at its very
inception in 1988 and has been maintained through the years.
Our law does provide that there are five members of the Board.
TWo are appointed by the mayor, two by the City Council Speaker
and the chair is appointed by the mayor after consultation with the
Speaker.
The two members who are appointed by the mayor without con-
sultation and the two members appointed by the Speaker must be
of different political parties, and that is in the statute, the same way
that many bipartisan commissions are set up.
But the difference is that our law provides that our Board must
operate in a nonpartisan manner. So there is a direction there that
puts a very different emphasis on the work of the Board from what
you see in a lot of election enforcement agencies.
Another item that I think is of immediate interest is that the City
Charter in 1989 was amended to provide that there be special pro-
tection for the money that is paid out to candidates under the New
York City program. Our Board has the extraordinary power to di-
rect the Commissioner of Finance to replenish the public fund from
which candidates' matching funds come, if there is a shortfall.
It is an extraordinary power. I do not anticipate invoking it, and
I certainly hope that it will never be necessary. But that is a very
important protection for our budget. And just recently, in the new
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Charter revision that was passed just a few days ago in New York
City, two additional protections have been built into our City
Charter.
One is the provision that requires the mayor to include the
Board's own estimate of its requirements for the coming fiscal year
in the executive budget that is submitted to the City Council. That
means that the Board is the only agency that has that power to
have its own number put into the budget in the first round. It does
not mean that the number will ultimately be the number that
emerges from the budget process for the Board, but it is a very
different approach from what one sees elsewhere.
Another important protection was built in because we had a his-
tory of vacancies on the Board. After a certain period, if the
mayor or the Speaker fails to fill a vacancy, then the Board has the
power to appoint members to fill those vacancies.
Finally, on the subject of enforcement, we have had a history of
going forward with enforcement during the period of the election
campaign, which is, of course, a difficult thing to do and sometimes
a controversial thing to do. But in the view of the Board, very
often justice delayed is justice denied in the case of campaign fi-
nance complaints.
So, with that little introduction about New York City, I would
like to turn to Becky Avila.
MS. AVILA: Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here again.
I want to thank Nicole, not only for the invitation to be here today
but also for the extraordinary support she has provided to our
agency since our inception in 1991.
We are about three years behind New York City and so we have
the tremendous benefit of being able to draw on them, and on their
experience.
Let me begin first by giving you just a brief description of our
agency and the structure that was written into place, actually, by
Bob Stern, based on his observations of our state agency and I
think on his observations at the federal level as well.
We have a five-member commission. They are part-time volun-
teers. Each is appointed by a different elected official. In the City
of Los Angeles we have nonpartisan elections. So the issue of par-
tisanship is not one that we have had to face in our jurisdiction.
But each of the commissioners is appointed by a different elected
official with the notion being that no single elected official, there-
fore, could control the decisions of the Ethics Commission.
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So the Mayor, the City Attorney, the Controller, the Council
President and the Council President pro tern, each have an appoint-
ment to our Ethics Commission, and must all be confirmed by the
City Council.
They each serve a five-year term. They cannot serve more than
one full five-year term. They have the authority to hire and fire the
executive director. The executive director is also subject to a term
limit of ten years. And the executive director has the authority to
hire and fire his staff.
We have twenty-one members on our staff. In addition to cam-
paign finance laws, as Nicole mentioned, we also have ethics and
lobbying within our jurisdiction.
With regard to enforcement specifically, our commission has the
authority to levy administrative penalties. The monetary fines are
established in the law. They are five thousand dollars per count or
three times the amount of the violation, whichever is greater.
The commission, as a body, after a public hearing, must deter-
mine whether a violation has occurred, and determine the amount
of the penalty. Because it acts as the judge in our process, the role
of prosecutor and the duty to investigate is therefore delegated to
the staff.
According to our charter, our investigations are conducted confi-
dentially. Any member of the staff can be terminated for revealing
any information related to an investigation, and it is also cause for
removal of a member of the commission if she or he becomes
aware of any confidential information and releases that.
We have the authority to issue subpoenas and to put people
under oath and to compel their testimony, two very important tools
I am sure you can appreciate for any investigative agency.
We also have the duty to conduct audits. We conduct mandatory
audits of campaigns that spend over $100,000 and then a random
sample of twenty percent of those that spend less. We also are re-
quired to conduct audits of anybody who received public matching
funds. That threshold results in auditing virtually every candidate
in each competitive election.
The investigations that are initiated by the staff can be initiated
for a variety of reasons, either because of the complaint received
by our agency or because the staff, through review of disclosure
statements or through the audits, has seen something that we think
merits review.
We do not have to seek the approval of our commission in order
to initiate an investigation or to begin an audit. I think that is a
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very important part of our process. We are, as I mentioned before,
relatively new. We have only been in place for seven years, and in
that seven years we have had fifty-four enforcement actions, and
we have levied a total of $825,000 in fines.
The fines have ranged from fifty dollars for the smallest to
$447,000, which was half of a total fine of $895,000 that we split
with the state agency. It was in a money laundering case.
I think, to a large extent, the jury is still out. We have strong
enforcement mechanisms, but we are still a very young agency. Up
until this point, the vast majority of our cases have involved cam-
paign finance violations, but primarily they have involved contribu-
tors: cases involving laundering of campaign contributions or
failure to disclose the true source of the contributions.
We are embarking on a new era, however, of investigating and
enforcing violations that involve the results of audits, and so we are
dealing directly with elected officials.
We have had two cases involving elected officials and with re-
gard to our budget, we have not seen any attempts to attack the
agency's funding because of our enforcement actions. But I think
that is in part because we are young, and because we still enjoy a
widespread amount of public and local media support. The Los
Angeles Times, particularly, has been very supportive of our agency
and I think even more importantly, our City Council and the other
elected officials all view us as having widespread public'support.
So as we grow older and the Ethics Commission becomes a more
established part of city government, it will be interesting to see
whether or not there will be greater attempts to attack the funding
of the agency.
MR. GROSS: Over the last twenty plus years, since Watergate
and Buckley v. Valeo,75 we have not had comprehensive campaign
finance reform at the federal level.
There is no question that there has been a serious erosion. The
reform movement reasserted a corporate and labor prohibition
which had been in the law for most of the century. Yet what we
have now is the situation where if a client comes to me and says, I
want to contribute a million dollars to the political process, the
only question is whether they want it disclosed or not.
There are simple ways around the restrictions in the law. I had a
case recently where someone was standing in the United States
federal district court being sentenced for making illegal political
75. 424 U.S. 1 (1974).
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contributions, and I felt like saying that I have an iron clad defense
here, because anybody who violates the law has the built-in de-
fense that they do not understand the law and could not have will-
fully violated it because if they had come to me first, we could have
figured out a way for them to do this perfectly legally, in ten times
the amount of money that was contributed. Instead of sitting next
to them in court, I would be sitting next to them at a swearing-in to
a Caribbean ambassadorship.
But the progress of the erosion had been somewhat slow in the
1980s. The PACs were the devils, and the presidential candidates
set up these little committees before they ran for office that al-
lowed them to take an extra $5000 in contributions, and everybody
was wringing their hands about it.
And then soft money came along in the 1990s and the national
party committees figured out a way to spend money on getting out
the vote and administrative expenses, and that is when the corpora-
tions and labor unions started writing checks for a million dollars
to the national party committees.
And then in 1996, thanks to court decisions, came the issue advo-
cacy stuff, groups such as 501(c)(4) organizations, 501(c)(5) labor
unions, 501(c)(6) trade associations and for profit corporations,
everybody is doing it.
And that is spending money on television ads without regulation,
without disclosure, perfectly unregulated as long as the ad does not
contain the words "vote for" or "vote against," which has been
supported by a series of court decisions going back to Buckley.
The courts have ruled consistently that you cannot regulate this
area of law unless there is a bright line, and the regulated commu-
nity knows whether it is being regulated. Not some fuzzy vague
line that regulators tend to like to keep the regulated community
guessing. But the problem with that is that vague line-drawing
chills First Amendment speech.
So the legislature is taking a crack at this and, as we heard from
Congressman Doolittle in the last session, the House passed legis-
lation, but they did it with the comfortable knowledge that Senator
McConnell on the Senate side said that the McCain-Feingold legis-
lation7 6 will pass the Senate over his dead body. So there was no
lack of clarity there as far as where the Senate's position was on the
McCain-Feingold legislation.
76. See supra note 20.
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And as a matter of fact, if you go back to when we had a Demo-
cratic Congress and a Republican president, the Democratic Con-
gress passed campaign finance reform knowing that Bush would
veto it, which he did, and then when there was a Democratic Con-
gress and a Democratic president, we wondered what was going to
happen.
And the Democrats realized that they were in danger of getting
what they were hoping for and suddenly those proposals for cam-
paign finance quickly changed and now we have a situation with a
Republican congress and a Democratic president and still the same
stalemate.
That is all in the wisdom of Congress and suggests where the
laws are right now. The trouble that I have is that the law abhors a
vacuum. And the vacuum is being filled by the Department of Jus-
tice and by the FEC by legislating through enforcement.
We have the Department of Justice with, I guess, still 130 federal
prosecutors over at the campaign finance task force, searching
around for violations of law, pursuing matters such as issue advo-
cacy, the provision that I talked about before. The regulators have
no business being in the criminal arena when it comes to cases and
issues such as that.
There is no question that there are certain cases that warrant
criminal pursuit if there is fraud or there is a concerted effort to
evade the disclosure of individuals with substantial amounts of
money.
But this area of issue advocacy is simply not susceptible to crimi-
nal enforcement, and it is disturbing to see it come up in a criminal
context when there are barely two lawyers in Washington who can
agree on the parameters of the law. So there needs to be a kind of
perspective on what is criminal and what is civil in this area of the
law. It was meant to be mostly a civil statute.
So my concern here continues to be that we should not legislate
through enforcement.
MR. NOBLE: Thank you, Nicole. Thank you for inviting me. I
am actually going to start off a little differently than I had planned
to. I first want to ask Ken, other than that, what do you like about
the system?
MR. GROSS: I did not even have time to get to the FEC.
MR. NOBLE: Rather than describe what the FEC does, I am
just going to say that it is a six-member body, made up of three
Republicans and three Democrats. I found today's debate about a
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nonpartisan versus a bipartisan commission:interesting. We are, in
theory, a nonpartisan commission. We never had anyone but a Re-
publican or a Democrat on the FEC. And everything the FEC
does it has to do by four votes. And you can do the math about
what happens in many cases.
Congress established the FEC with numerous safeguards for the
respondents, knowing that they would be the respondents in many
cases. We have small resources. Ken mentioned what the Depart-
ment of Justice has working on the campaign finance task force,
and they have more people working on the task force for the 1996
election than we have to cover all elections nationwide.
So I would say that the agency is not this behemoth out there
violating people's First Amendment rights, but rather struggling, I
think, and doing a very credible job given what it has to work with.
I do want to give you some late breaking news for those who
accuse us of being like the Chicago Cubs. Actually, I was going to
say like the Redskins, coming from Washington, which is no better
a feeling. There is a case going on now between the Republican
National Committee (the "RNC") and the Ohio Democratic party
(the "ODP") and the FEC, which is a direct challenge to our pres-
ent regulations on soft money.77
The case raises many of the issues Ken Gross just talked about
concerning the clarity of the rules, the clarity of the lines. Just fif-
teen minutes ago, I received a call that the court of appeals had
denied the RNC's and ODP's request for a preliminary injunction,
saying that they had not shown irreparable harm and that it was
not so clear they were likely to succeed on the merits.
So I would say the game is not yet over and that the battle con-
tinues. And I think there are many people who are rushing very
quickly to announce the death of campaign finance reform and the
present rules. But I think the courts have not gone quite as far as
those who would like to see the rules ended. And I would advise
you to stay tuned. Rather than go into great detail about what we
do, I want to give you some topics to think about for effective en-
forcement, because there are a number of different models for en-
forcement. You can argue for an odd number of commissioners,
you can argue for different ways of making appointments.
What I would suggest is that you really have to start a little bit
earlier on in the process. We first need clear laws with clear pur-
poses and everybody agreeing about what those laws are.
77. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 98-5263, 1998
WL 794896 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1998).
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I have no doubt that some who enacted the Federal Election
Campaign Act 78 were trying to create an illusion of enforcement.
Others had different ideas about what they wanted. Some felt dis-
closure was most important, others felt limitations and the prohibi-
tions were most important.
It is very hard to run an enforcement program unless you have a
clear idea of what it is you are trying to enforce and there is some
general consensus about what is important in the process.
In that regard, I would also say that the perfect is often the en-
emy of good. We are never going to have a perfect system, but at
least with some idea of what you are trying to do, we can move
towards a better system.
You have to have a willingness to enforce and this is a sub-part
of having a clear goal of what you are trying to do. Do not enact
enforcement laws unless you are serious about them, unless you
are going to give the agencies resources to do what they are sup-
posed to do, and unless you are going to reward enforcement.
What tends to happen, at least on the federal level, is that when
you do go about enforcing the laws, there is a lot of criticism for
your enforcement. I think the message often being sent is, we want
these laws in place, but we do not necessarily want them enforced.
It is important to recognize that no one likes to have laws en-
forced against them. A couple of years ago, I was returning from a
Wye River conference, not the Middle East one, though the Mid-
dle East may be easier to settle than the campaign finance reform
debate, and I got a speeding ticket on the way home.
I have to admit, I did not like the idea of getting a speeding
ticket. I also have to admit, I was speeding. And I also have to
admit that I had no right to say to the officer that "I am going to
cut your budget if you give me this ticket."
And sometimes I am hard pressed to understand why there is
not more acceptance of the fact that if you are going to pass an
enforcement law, you are going to enforce it, and you are going to
have people who are unhappy about enforcing it.
Finally, with regard to the structure of the board. I think it is
important to keep in mind that these boards should be in practice
and in law nonpartisan. I also think that the appointees have to
have a common goal and a common purpose.
I think it is very difficult when you get appointees on a board
who are going in all different directions because of what they feel
78. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
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about the law. And I think that means the appointing authority
has to have a common goal and a common purpose and an under-
standing of what it is trying to do.
And while I do not think it is absolutely necessary that you have
a man of the cloth on a board, though it obviously does not hurt, I
think there is a lot to be said for things that you cannot legislate.
The ideas and commitments the members hold cannot be written
into the law or if they could, you could not enforce them. But
those things are critical and go towards the type of people you ap-
point to the system. Thank you.
MR. POTTER: I would like to thank Nicole and the Board for
the opportunity to be here. This is not my first experience with the
Board. When I was at the FEC, I came up here because I had
heard that New York City was a model in a number of ways in
terms of how to run an agency and I wanted to find out how they
did it.
And having by that time met Father O'Hare, I have followed
with great interest his activities these last couple of years and those
of his fellow Board members, because it struck me that there were
aspects of the Board that differed significantly from what the FEC
faces.
And I might highlight a couple of those, just as a way of taking
off on what Larry said and then talking about the types of support
commissions receive and who is on them.
Here you have an intensely scrutinized environment. It may be
a large city, but it is really a small political world. And you have a
great deal of sunlight and a great deal of attention focused not just
on politics, but on the regulation of money and politics and on the
enforcement of the election laws.
The New York Times and other editorials here carry a lightning
bolt-like quality that perhaps dissipates as they travel further
afield. It is often said that the FEC has no real constituency, that
nobody is closely focused on what the FEC is doing or not and who
is being appointed or not, at least in terms of individuals who are
concerned that the law be adequately and fairly enforced.
I think that is not true in New York City, and from what I know,
it is not true in Los Angeles. So what that may say is that when
you have a greater community interest and a closer proximity to
the regulatory institution, you may get a better institution than
where there are only a few people who are intensely interested but
who tend to be those who are being regulated, and the rest of the
interest is diffused across the country.
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Also, I would note, and I think this is a commendation to New
York City, it actually has a sizable staff in comparison to the
amount of money being dispensed and in comparison to the
number of candidates with whom it is dealing, and I think that is
very helpful.
When I was at the FEC and came up here, we were just talking
about computerized disclosure and I asked Nicole how they were
doing it. She explained - it may have changed - but at that time,
candidates could actually come down, put their disks into the ma-
chines and sit down with a staffer and go through it to make sure
they got the report right before they filed it, which meant when it
went on the public record it was clean and easy for people to read.
It worked here, but again, I think that is something that would
not translate well. I went back to Washington and explained this
and they looked at me and said, "How many thousands of candi-
dates would we have to provide this service to and how would they
get here? They cannot just take the subway."
So I think there are some differences in scale. In terms of the
FEC itself, an important issue that I think is sometimes underesti-
mated is that there is now no real consensus on what law the FEC
ought to be enforcing.
We have come a long way in twenty-five years in terms of what
Congress would like to see. I think it is arguable that there is no
consensus in Congress today. There is a sort of fifty-fifty split in
what the law ought to be.
Should corporations and unions play a role in federal elections
or is that an abhorrent thought? We have a system now where the
law says absolutely not, but in practice, of course, we just call it
"issue advocacy."
Maybe we need to step back and look at whether or not we want
to have a prohibition because, as Larry says, if you are going to
have a prohibition, you will lose, I think, a great deal of public
credibility if you are not enforcing the prohibition.
And if what we are discovering is that we do not want to enforce
it because it brings too many problems, then we need to have a
rational discussion and make that decision, so that the FEC under-
stands what the consensus is and can enforce that consensus rather
than get caught in the middle between warring visions of what the
regulatory scheme ought to be.
Finally, it seems to me, once you have decided on that consensus,
you then need to have a clear penalty, one that needs to, in some
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way, affect the candidates and not just the poor person who is the
treasurer of the campaign.
The ability of a candidate to say, "That wasn't my violation, that
is somebody else's," and then pay what is referred to as the "traffic
ticket" for the violation, I think, does encourage people not to take
the rules seriously.
The British have a system where if you violate the rules, you lose
office, on the theory that you have got there by improper means
and therefore shouldn't be there. That may be draconian but that
certainly affects the candidates directly and I do not think anything
we do now, short of sending them to jail, which we prefer not to,
seems to be a real deterrent.
MS. GORDON: Bob, do you have some observations?
MR. STERN: Yes. I also want to thank Nicole. I have been up
here on the panel all day. I am very invigorated, actually, I am
ready to keep on going. But I won't spend a whole lot of your time
because I have had more of an opportunity than these people have.
The Day After Reform is a book put out by Michael J. Malbin.79
In the book, he reports that the average amount of money that the
enforcement staff or the administrative staff in the states has is
$354,000 to administer the campaign finance laws.
The average staff is eight persons. That is not the eight enforce-
ment persons, that is eight persons total, from the clerical people to
the administrative people to the attorneys, if there are any. So that
is not very much staff.
And I think one thing that we really need to be aware of is that
when we are talking about passing these laws, we need to do some-
thing about the administration of the laws.,
When we were willing to put up reform back in 1974, we gave
the state commission a guaranteed budget of $1 million plus the
cost-of-living. That is the only jurisdiction in the country that has
given an agency a guaranteed budget. They now have a budget of
about $3.5 million.
We said the legislature could increase it but could not decrease
it. I think that is the way we have to go, to give the agencies guar-
anteed budgets. Otherwise, there will be no "speeding tickets"
given out.
The second big problem that I see in the campaign finance area
is money laundering. Money laundering is going on everywhere in
the country. Becky talked about her investigation: she had a staff
79. See supra note 46.
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person looking through campaign statements and they saw that in
one day a flight attendant, a gardener and a student gave $500 con-
tributions to the same office holder.
That started the investigation. They found out that this
Taiwanese company had given $172,000 to state and local candi-
dates throughout California. They fined that company around
$890,000, along with the state Fair Political Practices Commission.
Recently somebody in Florida was convicted of money launder-
ing and is being sent to jail. I think money laundering is - what
we know about it - only the tip of iceberg.
Then the question is, what do you do when you find out that
there has been a violation? Do you just fine the person and let
them pay out of campaign funds? That is generally what happens.
In 1996, California passed an initiative saying that the Fair Polit-
ical Practices Commission could itself bring misdemeanor charges
against candidates,80 the theory being that if a candidate realized
they might have to go to jail for even a weekend, there would be
much more of a deterrent against violating the law.
The measure passed, but it has been declared invalid for other
reasons. It is still in court and we will see what happens. But I do
know that a lot of campaigns, a lot of treasurers, a lot of attorneys
were quite worried about that provision saying, "we are used to
paying a fine, we are not sure we want to pay through going to
jail."
Finally, I think that it may be important to look at the structure
of the commissions, and I found that the part-time commissions
work better than full-time commissions. I am not quite sure how it
would work at the FEC, but it would mean certainly fewer meet-
ings of the FEC, and maybe that would be the benefit.
MS. GORDON: Thank you, Bob. Since you referred to that
book, I do want to alert the audience, and maybe Becky will agree
with me, that one manner in which the book is incomplete is that it
does not deal with L.A. or New York City. Therefore, I think
when you read it you have to keep in mind that whatever averages
are in there do not reflect these two cities that are bigger than most
states.
Since the subject of the press came up a couple of times here, I
am wondering how much people on the panel think that publicity is
the bigger deterrent compared with fines or other penalties.
80. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91000(d) (West 1997) ("The Commission has concur-
rent jurisdiction in enforcing the criminal misdemeanor provision of this title.").
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MS. AVILA: I think there is a difference between elected offi-
cials or candidates and other violators. I think, for the elected offi-
cials and candidates, publicity is a big deterrent.
I think, for example, for the Evergreen Corporation, which was
the corporation we fined in the big laundering case, it meant one
day's worth of bad headlines and paying the fine, which is the cost
of doing business. We wished we could have done more in a case
with that kind of violation.8'
MR. GROSS: You know, it is funny. I was going to make the
same comment but from a different perspective. I was going to say
that I thought political committees that are regularly engaged in
the process endure adverse press much better than the part of the
regulated community, such as corporations, that have zero toler-
ance for adverse publicity.
They are in the business of making widgets, and if they have a
political action committee or they make a contribution, the last
thing they need is the most minor article in the newspaper about
their conduct. But if you have an aggressive political committee or
group out there, pro-life or pro-choice, that is in business to be in
the political process, then that adverse publicity is accepted in a
much better way.
But there is no question that adverse publicity is a deterrent,
although I am a little bit concerned that the FEC requires admis-
sions of violations in their conciliation agreements across the board
for all respondents. That has been an impediment to some quicker
resolution of cases. Because, you know, the resolution of a case
stands for itself anyhow. But it is kind of interesting from a differ-
ent perspective. It is really the same thought, but it came out the
opposite way because of the nature of the respondent that I tend to
be involved with.
MR. NOBLE: I will take the middle road. I think, actually, it is
important to both types of groups, but I think they are also con-
nected. I think the level of publicity you get also has to do with the
level of civil penalty that you get.
And with regard to Ken's comment about getting admissions of
violations, it is also true with the FEC, generally, that we require
an admission of violation. One of the things I have always thought
would be an interesting trade off, but we are not there yet, is to get
civil penalties high enough where the admission of violation be-
comes less important.
81. United States v. Bums, 162 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 1998).
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For example, I think it was a number of years ago when Ameri-
can Airlines agreed to a $4 million penalty with the FAA but said it
did nothing wrong. I think people generally understood that you
do not pay $4 million unless you did something wrong.
I would say it is one thing to have no admission with a thousand
dollar civil penalty or $1500 civil penalty where they can say hon-
estly from their perspective, "Look, it would cost me more to pay
Ken Gross for another day or two to argue this than it would to pay
the $1500, and I am not admitting a violation."
If, on the other hand, they are paying $10,000 or $50,000 in pen-
alties, then the admission of violation becomes less important and
the press will pick it up. I think the press is an integral part of this.
I think that unless the press picks up what is going on, unless they
are reported as violations, then there will be little interest in it.
I think it has a lot to do with what Trevor talked about in terms
of building a constituency for what is going on.
MR. POTTER: It sounds as if Ken and I should go back and
warn our clients that the general counsel is now looking for $4 mil-
lion in penalties that will -
MR. GROSS: But you do not have to admit to violations.
MR. POTTER: I think everyone has gotten very adept at spin-
ning the whole press game. It is pretty predictable that in the cam-
paign cycle the candidates will file FEC complaints against each
other and stand on the steps and say this is horrible and it is a
violation. They know that it may never be resolved or it may be
resolved two or three years later. But they get that initial press hit.
Somebody actually ends up admitting a violation either because
they are thankful they did not have to admit more, on the one
hand, or, on the other, because they have given up fighting and say,
"Oh, the heck with it, it costs too much to pursue this, I will admit
it."
In either of those cases, they are very good now at saying, "This
is just something that we are paying to get rid of. We think we had
a good case, but it really wasn't worth pursuing and it is a relatively
minor violation."
Those words just rolled off my tongue without knowing what the
violation was. I think part of the confusion out there is you see
television ads that say, "admitted violating the campaign finance
laws."
Well, was it a late report that the treasurer forgot to file, or was it
a serious case of impermissible foreign money being smuggled in?
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Those distinctions tend not to get made and so I think in some
cases the press is less useful than you might expect.
And it is very easy for someone to say, "Well, there is an expert
on this side and an expert on that side and they disagree, so who
knows what the law is?"
MS. GORDON: In the example you just cited, is the FEC in a
position to make that distinction for the press or is that something
the FEC just leaves for other people to judge?
MR. POTTER: I think it would be interesting to hear Larry's
views of why, because I think my answer is, no. The FEC tends to
say relatively little. It almost never holds a press conference to
explain something, and its policy is to say, "Here is the violation,"
and it will give you a string of statutory cites to glaze the press'
eyes over, and then "Here is the penalty."
I do not think they are in the business at all of rating the viola-
tion or saying "This is a really serious one," or "This is relatively
garden variety."
MR. STERN: I think it is important that the agency does hold
press conferences. I know that when the Ethics Commission fined
the Evergreen Corporation nearly $900,000, they did hold a press
conference and it was major, major news.
But I think the press is getting a little jaded to the fines and the
fines have to be ratcheted up before you can get the interest, and I
think there is only so much you can fine the officials.
So I think, in a sense, where there is not that much publicity, I
am not sure the fines mean that much because the fines are a cost
of doing business. They are not personal fines, so I think we have
to come up with some more creative ways. And Trevor has come
up with what is called the death penalty, which mandates that when
you commit a violation, you are out of office. That is a death pen-
alty; that is as bad as you get.
If you have something like that, a candidate is going to be much
more careful. As for the misdemeanor question, I think candidates
will be much more careful also if they think they are going to jail.
So I think, besides publicity and fines, we have to come up with
more creative ways of letting the candidates know that if they do
commit serious violations, as opposed to the ticky-tacky violations,
there are serious consequences.
MS. GORDON: Larry, I know you have had, or the FEC has
had, a lot of its own recommendations for improvements. Could
you describe what some of those are?
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MR. NOBLE: The FEC makes legislative recommendations
every year. And because of the nature of the FEC, the legislative
recommendations tend to be procedural in nature. They tend not
to be substantive recommendations because it would be hard to get
agreement on substantive recommendations. And the FEC's stan-
dard line is that we will enforce whatever Congress passes.
The procedural recommendations, though, generally, are pretty
much ignored by Congress. For a number of years, probably one
of the most substantive we ever made was when we recommended
getting rid of the state-by-state limits in presidential campaigns, be-
cause they were not working. They were a tremendous strain on
our resources, and we could see no purpose to them. This is where,
in the presidential primary campaigns, they have a state-by-state
limit on what they can spend.
We have actually done a lot to do away with them ourselves,
through the regulatory process.
MS. GORDON: Why?
MR. NOBLE: There are a lot of reasons and theories on why.
One reason is that some people like the state-by-state limits. It
tends to affect the nature of a campaign.
Another reason is that, basically, it has been considered that
anything dealing with campaign finance reform is death to bring
before any of the bodies of Congress, as you have seen. Because
all of a sudden, everybody starts tacking everything onto it, and
you do not get a bill passed. So I think this is one of the reasons
why.
I do have to give credit to Congress for one thing this past year,
which is that we did get more money. This year, Congress did give
us another $2.8 million than what we were expecting. It did
earmark some of it, though, for computers, which it has a tendency
to do, but that is a recommendation we have been making. The
last couple of years, we have been asking for more resources.
Other recommendations we have made have gone toward elec-
tronic filing, which everybody has agreed is a good idea but has not
been mandated and it will not happen in a widespread way unless it
is mandated. So those are the types of recommendations that we
can make that, generally, are not really considered seriously by
Congress.
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 143
As in Shays-Meehan and McCain-Feingold,82 there were some of
the recommendations we had made in the past, that did make their
ways into those bills, and we all saw how successful that was.
MS. GORDON: Then the FEC does not normally make sub-
stantive recommendations about changes in the law?
MR. NOBLE: No. It has not made substantive recommenda-
tions about changes in the law.
MS. GORDON: What about L.A.?
MS. AVILA: We do - it is sort of a routine part of what we do
to review the laws that are in existence and to make recommenda-
tions to the Council and the Mayor.
MS. GORDON: And how responsive has the legislature been to
the recommendations that you have made?
MS. AVILA: Well, in part, I think because of our local political
culture, there are a number of people in the Council who have
identified themselves as reformers. So there are people on the
Council who are invested in seeing some of these changes move
forward.
MS. GORDON: Whereas in Congress there is not much of that?
MR. NOBLE: There are people who are also reformers in Con-
gress who have tried to move some of these things, and we get calls
periodically asking, "What would you like to see in a bill?"
Again, the Commission is reluctant; not just reluctant, it will not
go forward, it will not take a position on whether there should be
public financing of congressional elections. You will never see the
FEC take a position on that.
In fact, it has even gotten to the point that we will, occasionally,
get the question, "All right, we are not asking you to take a posi-
tion on whether there should be public financing, but if there was
public financing, what would it cost the agency to do that?" And
the agency has split on what the cost of that would be. For that
reason, it has not been able to put forward a cost of public financ-
ing of Congressional elections.
MR. GROSS: I thought for a long time that the worst thing you
can do is go to Congress and talk about comprehensive campaign
finance reform.
It makes the hair stand up on the back of the members' necks,
and I think the only way we are ever going to get anywhere is
82. See supra note 20.
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through incremental reform. Some of the suggestions that I have
made in the enforcement procedure areas have been to try and
make the agency an adjudicative agency, which gives the respon-
dents a right to address the FEC directly. They do not have such a
procedure right now. Perhaps we need someone like an adminis-
trative law judge to oversee the progress of the enforcement pro-
cess because the time it takes to resolve cases is probably our
biggest criticism. It is one I am a little sensitive to because there
was one leveled at me when I was at the FEC.
I know how difficult it is to move a case quickly and cases age
more quickly in the election process than anywhere else. A com-
plaint gets filed two weeks before the election and everybody
wants to know why you are still working on the case two weeks
after the election.
So I am very sympathetic to some of those criticisms, but I do
believe that there are some structural changes in the direction of
making the agency more adjudicative that would be helpful to the
respondents, and perhaps give more definitive direction as to the
length of investigations in some of these cases.
MS. GORDON: Speaking of respondents, I think one challenge
we all face is that we, in some cases, are giving benefits like public
money to candidates. We are also auditing them and enforcing
laws against them and, at the same time, these are the very people
who are passing the budgets and the laws that we administer. An-
other item that came up a little earlier today that maybe hasn't
gotten enough treatment so far is the whole subject of large versus
small campaigns.
There are campaigns that have varying abilities to deal with the
laws and the complexity of them. Antagonism gets built up be-
tween an agency and the legislators, for example. I wonder
whether there are ways that, in the various agencies, people have
found to lower the ante and make the relationship better. Becky,
do you have any experience with that?
MS. AVILA: I think it is helpful that we have a staff that is dedi-
cated to assisting committees' compliance with the law. So there
are mandatory training sessions that everybody has to attend. We
have staff assigned to each campaign to assist it with setting up its
paperwork and filling out the report.
I think members of the regulated communities see us as both an
assistant, a way to help them get what they need to get done, as
well as a policing agency. And it is important to have both roles.
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MS. GORDON: Do you have different standards and different
procedures for large campaigns compared to small ones?
MS. AVILA: No.
MR. GROSS: And losing campaigns as opposed to winning
campaigns. I think one of the things we experience in this area of
the law is that regulating communities encompass a wide variety of
entities, like the SEC, you know, where they regulate public corpo-
rations. Here you have campaigns that are out of business, you
have Senator Glenn who is still paying off his campaign debts.
Maybe he can do a little better now that he has come back from
space.
These are sad situations, really, when someone runs for office
and really does not have the resources to handle some of the issues
that come before campaigns and the agencies are still going after a
lot of these entities.
MR. STERN: Nicole, when I was with the Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission, we did have a legislative program, and I thought,
in a sense, that helped us with the legislators because we were not
just going over there, guiding their hands. We were trying to go
over there and work with them on trying to make the laws better,
and I think they appreciated that.
So I think to some degree, although not to a great degree, that
was a way to build relationships with the legislators, as opposed to
actually having a formal legislative program.
MR. POTTER: Although, answering your question, Nicole,
from the perspective of having seen this on both sides of the FEC, I
think I could generalize and say that the vast majority of the candi-
date cases that the FEC sees and deals with involve challengers.
That is not to say that all challengers lose, because I think there are
a number of cases where the FEC ends up dealing with people who
become members of Congress and Senators.
But the source of violations that tend to occur - reporting viola-
tions, limit violations, misunderstanding or failure to pay attention
to attribution rules, designation rules and all these complexities -
tend to be by people who are either new to the political process or
starting off on a relatively small scale, who learn it later. And once
they become an incumbent, they have lawyers and accountants.
Incumbents have been through the process. They have lawyers
and accountants at their disposal, and they are less likely to make
those sorts of mistakes than a small campaign that suddenly be-
comes a big campaign without the infrastructure in place.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
That is a gross generalization, and Larry may have a different
view. But my sense of it is that even when members of Congress
who are upset about something the FEC has done, that arises from
a violation and an investigation connected with their first campaign
rather than their work as an incumbent.
MR. NOBLE: I do not know whether that is true or not; I have
never done a study of that. I will say, we have a number of cases
against long-time incumbents. We also have cases against political
parties that have been around for a long time where it is harder, I
think, for them to say that they did not know the rules.
We do take into account in our enforcement process how new
the campaign is and how serious a player it was: we take that into
account even with political parties. We are aware of the fact that
on a local level you often have a political party or a party organiza-
tion that changes every election cycle.
Still, when these people are playing in the field, I think they have
a certain responsibility to put the resources into compliance, put
the resources into finding out what the law is. And one of the
things you find in this area often is that people just, and I hate to
plug Trevor or Ken, but people just do not want to pay the lawyers,
do not want to pay the accountants to actually do it right.
The other thing we find that is interesting about incumbents is
that they will often get angry at us for dropping a case against
somebody who challenged them, even if the person was not neces-
sarily a serious challenger.
You may have somebody that only got ten or fifteen percent of
the vote and did not file a report, or did not file a couple of reports.
And the long-time incumbent won again, as they have been doing,
and during the campaign, filed a complaint against their challenger.
We are short of resources, and we have an enforcement prioritiza-
tion system whereby we drop a lot of our cases without actually
working on them. You look at that type of case and you would say,
this does not look like somebody who is very serious; it was a one-
time campaign, and you find that the incumbent gets very angry
because if it is their opponent that committed the violation, it is the
worst sin that ever happened in American politics.
But if you committed the violation, it was obviously an inadver-
tent oversight that we are being much too difficult about it. I think
that is a real problem that we face on a day-to-day basis.
MS. GORDON: Larry, you sound very reasonable, and we have
heard that the FEC is underfunded and that you lose practically
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every case you bring. I know from your press releases that you
dismiss whole sets of cases for various reasons, including lack of
resources. Trevor says you challenge challengers more than you do
incumbents. So why do they hate you so much? Why are they
trying to fire you from your job?
MR. NOBLE: Well, I would like to look at it as an institutional
issue. What this was about was that there was an attempt -
MS. GORDON: Actually, maybe you better explain what
happened.
MR. NOBLE: There was an attempt to put what was called a
term limit on the staff director and general counsel of the FEC.
And it had a couple of different forms at various times, but, basi-
cally, it would require the staff director and general counsel to
come up this January for a revote by the FEC.
It took four votes to hire us. Everything the FEC does, it does
by four votes. It takes four votes to hire us, and this would require
us to get four votes again this January with the idea being that any
three commissioners could remove the staff director or general
counsel, and, given the bipartisan make-up of the FEC, either side
could control who is the general counsel or staff director.
Putting aside the personal feelings I had about that, institution-
ally, my fear was that it would really tell the general counsel and
the staff director not to bring controversial cases, not to go after
anybody, because what happens is that either side can at any point
veto you.
There was a big fight about this in Congress and there were a
number of people who saw it as an institutional issue and who de-
fended the positions of the general counsel and staff director and,
ultimately, it did not pass this year.
I have been told a number of different things about why it hap-
pened. I think, generally, it was that my office was seen as being
too aggressive in certain types of cases it was bringing.
It is interesting. Years ago we were considered as much too
petty in that we were bringing up too many of these "traffic ticket"
type cases, too many non-filers, late filers. Now the complaint is
that we are going after too many of these big cases and too many of
these cases that deal with large organizations, and I will be up front
about it, there was a claim of bias in the cases that we brought:
"Anti-Republican bias."
It was interesting because all we do is make recommendations to
the FEC. It took four votes to bring any cases we brought, and, in
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fact, of every study done of the cases we brought, none of them
found that there was, in fact, any political bias in any of the cases
we brought.
MR. GROSS: This is a very unfair thing, I think, that Congress
is doing. They shouldn't be reaching into the bureaucracy trying to
remove a member of the staff because of a couple of lawsuits that
were brought against the Christian Coalition and some other enti-
ties that seemed to have raised the hackles of certain members of
Congress.
The FEC, first of all, had to vote to bring these cases notwith-
standing the general counsel's recommendation. So I just think it
is an effort that should stop, although I do not know that it will.
And secondly, it particularly irks me, because every time they try
and remove Larry, he gets another editorial in the New York
Times, extolling what a great guy he is, which he is, but I do not
have to read about it in the newspaper.
MR. NOBLE: Having somebody attack you for your job is great
for credibility.
MS. GORDON: I am now going to invite people who have
questions to come up to the microphone. If any panelists have any-
thing they want to say -
MR. POTTER: Nicole, just while the questioners are coming
up, I agree with Ken. I think there was a great deal of confusion on
the Hill about what was going on at the FEC and their real motiva-
tions about reaching into an agency.
At the same time, I think there are two other elements there.
One, ultimately, is that we want the general counsel to be some-
body who can be genuinely independent. The proposed new sys-
tem would have meant he needed four votes to stay and either
party could have knocked him out. The current reality is that the
general counsel only needs a base of either party to stay, so that it
becomes important not to irritate both parties, but to keep one at
least comfortable.
It seems to me there may be a point in favor of getting him out
of that box entirely and going to a truly independent term of office,
serving for a ten-year period or something like that, where you say,
"This is the job, you do it for ten years, and absent gross malfea-
sance, you cannot be removed," like the director of the FBI. But
at the same time, you, at the end of that, are not eligible for reap-
pointment. Because it seems to me that otherwise you are always
1999] LOCAL LESSONS FOR NATIONAL REFORM 149
going to have the issue of which commissioner is upset at which
point, which in the real world is -
MS. GORDON: The standard practice in any commission is that
you serve at the will of the majority of the commission.
MR. POTTER: But when you have a three-three commission it
makes that majority element much more political.
MS. GORDON: Would you favor it if the FEC has an odd
number of members?
MR. POTTER: I think that if the number of commissioners is
odd, the question is who has a majority, and one party is going to
mistrust the FEC. If it has two Democrats, two Republicans, and
two independents, then the question becomes, whose independents
are they and -
MR. STERN: As far as I know, the FEC is the only one that has
that problem. You look at state after state having these commis-
sions, New Jersey, New York, California, there has never been any
talk about partisan commissions.
Congress obviously wanted a very weak FEC. It got a very weak
FEC. Congress continues to make appointments to the FEC, in
essence, and I think an odd-numbered FEC would make sense. It
would also maybe get away from this whole idea of three-three
splits and make the FEC much more responsive, I think.
MR. NOBLE: I also think there is a cultural issue here, which is,
regardless of the system that you set up, if you reward people for
doing the job that you want them to do, they will tend to do that
job.
If you reappoint commissioners who enforce the law fairly and
evenly, then you will get commissioners who will enforce the law
fairly and evenly. If you tell commissioners who enforce a law
fairly and evenly that they are not going to be reappointed, then
the next person in there is not going to enforce the law.
Personally, I am against term limits for commissioners, as well as
for staff for a reason that I think people often overlook when they
consider term limits: with most jobs, you try to do a good job to
keep your job. If you tell someone that you are out no matter what
in four years, six years, ten years, then - and we have seen this in
certain instances - as the term starts winding down, her or his
interest goes somewhere else. And it is not that all of a sudden
they are not beholden to anybody necessarily. It is now they are
beholden to somebody else. Maybe it is somebody outside, and
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they now have to start worrying about who they are going to anger
on the outside if they are going to try to find a position after leav-
ing the FEC. So I do not think the term limit issue is such a simple
solution.
AUDIENCE: My name is Mike and I am a political science stu-
dent at Fordham University. My question goes to enforcement and
how it applies to federal elections in general. For those who did
serve on the FEC, do you think that in general, if we are able to
enforce every case where we do see a violation, the little cases as
well as the big cases, do you think that that would create a better
environment for elections in general, or do you think that going at
ticky-tack cases would hurt the process in general?
MR. POTTER: I think it is important to go back to the point I
made earlier that we find some way of differentiating between seri-
ous violations and less serious ones.
To answer your question by an example, I believe it to be the
case that every single publicly-funded presidential campaign since
the system began in 1976 has had some violations.
This means that the auditors have found some problems with the
way the money is spent. Some of those undoubtedly were very
minor; some were not. But as we establish this track record, you
end up with somebody saying when a violation is discovered,
"Well, every campaign has had a violation, that is just the way the
system works. It is not really a violation, it is just a technical
issue."
So I think the failure to differentiate makes it harder then to
focus on the areas that you would like to change. So when you
move on to the whole enforcement area, I favored the FEC's deci-
sion to prioritize cases and then say which cases are simply not
important enough to handle.
The argument against that was, "Do we want to send a signal
that filing a late report is not a problem and, therefore, you can get
away with it?" So I think it is a difficult balance. But if you pro-
ceed with equal strength against everything, I think the risk is that
you end up, in the real world, stuck in molasses, proceeding very
slowly and appearing to be ineffective.
MR. NOBLE: I would never advocate a system where you go
after everything. One of the theories, though, is that you want to
keep your hand in everything. Again, I do not think it is different
in any kind of law enforcement. You do not want to put all your
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resources into going after murderers because there are other
crimes being committed.
On the other hand, if you try to stop every burglary, write every
speeding ticket, you are not going to be able to handle the more
important ones. So you try to keep some sort of balance in it.
I think we are nowhere near yet the resources we need to keep
the balance, but I think that we have the traffic cops out there for
the late filers and the nonfilers but we also go after the big cases.
MS. GORDON: Becky, do you go after everything?
MS. AVILA: No. No, but it is the decision made by the staff
based on a variety of factors.
MS. GORDON: Larry, what are the resources that you think
you do need? What do you have now and what do you think you
need?
MR. NOBLE: Right now with what Congress just gave us, my
office will have about 110 people. We probably will have about
sixty lawyers. We just recently doubled our investigative staff, so
we have two investigators, and we are going to try to double it
again to get four investigators.
Yet that is inadequate. I have been asked the question of what
we need, and Senator Glenn asked me during one of the hearings
what we needed, and when I hesitated, he threw out a figure of $50
million and I said it sounded good as a start.
I would like to do it incrementally. First of all, if they dump $50
million on us immediately it would be very hard to get our staff up
there and do it in an orderly fashion. But I think that adding sev-
eral million dollars a year to the agency and staffing up, I think you
would probably get close to that level, $50 million.
Look at what we spend on law enforcement in other areas. The
FEC is the only agency that does this civilly nationwide. We have
no offices outside of Washington, and we are doing it now with a
staff smaller than, as I said before, what the Department of Justice
is putting into just the 1996 elections.
So I do not think we are close to what we need. Now I will have
to say, in all fairness to the commissioners, a number of them
disagree.
MR. STERN: Nicole, I was just amazed when Larry said he had
two investigators, three investigators - I mean, Becky has three
investigators with a staff of twenty. Something is wrong here when
have you a staff of 115 and you only have three investigators.
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But in response to your questions, it is very, very easy to go after
the simple cases; it is a snap. But those are the people who are
usually the minor candidates or the minor committees. It is very
difficult to go after the people who are well represented - it is
long and tedious and you alienate people and you often do not win.
But those are the important cases and you really have to go after
the big ones.
MR. POTTER: If I could just put one tiny point in and that is to
go back to what Larry was saying. Again, I cannot emphasize, in
my view, how important it is for there to be a consensus in Con-
gress and in the federal government about what these laws ought to
be and what sort of behavior is right and wrong. Because without
it you are going to end up where we are now.
The House of Representatives' leadership recommended a
smaller budget. It was overturned on the floor and largely by a
party line vote.
Larry now has $2.8 million more than he had before. If he uses
that portion that he can for new staff, he faces the fact that the new
budget cycle is already in place, that Congress will be voting this
spring on the size of his budget. If leadership did not like it last
year and does not like it this year, they will cut him off and he will
have to fire the new people in October that he has hired some time
in the spring, by the time he advertises and gets them aboard.
So we really need some consistency here, and I do not think you
can get that without a consensus of support in Washington.
MS. GORDON: We have time for one more question.
AUDIENCE: There have been some references to the Demo-
cratic and Republican make-up of the FEC. I just would like to
know whether or not you think it weakens the FEC, and if it does,
in the enforcement versus rule-making, how big a problem it is.
What measures could be taken that might politically rectify it?
MR. NOBLE: I think the general thinking now is that it is not
necessarily a good situation. I have to tell you that, up until very
recently, I was a strong advocate of that make-up and I will tell you
why.
When we brought a case like we have now against the Christian
Coalition, and the organization would claim that this was a partisan
attack. The answer is, no, it took four votes, at least one, in this
case, Republican and, therefore, it was not partisan.
I have stood before judges who, when given the argument that
this is just partisan, have asked me what the vote of the FEC was.
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And you tell them the vote of the FEC was four, five or six to
nothing. You can see their expression change, "yes, fine, this is not
partisan."
So there is something to be said for that. Also, keep in mind that
probably ninety percent of what we do is not split along party lines.
Most of the routine stuff goes through routinely. That is why you
call it routine stuff. But, as you would expect, it is some of the
bigger, sexier, more controversial issues that do split three-three.
So there are definitely benefits to having that type of make-up,
but it comes at a very high cost because you can have very strong
partisan splits. And it carries over from enforcement; you see it in
rule-makings also.
In rule-makings what you try to do is get to some type of com-
promise. So you are constantly looking for, in essence, the lowest
common denominator where you can finally bridge those gaps and
get the four votes that you need.
MR. GROSS: I have not advocated a change in the structure of
the FEC, as odd as it is. There is only one other agency in all of
Washington that is even-numbered, and that is the International
Trade Commission. It is a kind if strange thing just to have an
even-numbered FEC.
But I, actually, think it probably works as well as it is going to
work. Now, we have three new commissioners on the FEC and it is
kind of a new day because the FEC has not changed in a material
way for years.
So I think that we are going to see some changes because of the
new commissioners on the FEC and maybe there will be a shift
from making law through regulation as opposed to enforcement
actions that are, maybe, out there ahead of the law.
For example, there is a pending rule-making on issue advocacy.
I think maybe that is a better way to handle it, and a commission
which is bipartisan is better suited to that type of activity.
MS. GORDON: I am going to ask the panelists to wrap up, and I
do want to caution the audience on this subject as on the others.
There are lots of other resources out there. Our colleagues from
Connecticut, for example, are here and they have a very strong
enforcement record and they would be people whom you would
want to talk to on this particular subject.
And I think this entire conference is really a starting point rather
than a concluding point for the kind of inquiry we have been
conducting.
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Having said that, maybe we can just go down the line here. I
guess not everybody thinks that the local lessons on this subject are
suitable for federal treatment. But Becky, do you favor urging
Congress, assuming it could speak with one voice on the subject, to
go to a different structure of enforcement powers from what exists
now at the federal level?
MS. AVILA: Yes. I think something has to be done. I would
have to say that one of the things I do not hear a lot of talk about
- and I am not quite sure why - is that one answer is to
strengthen the role of the staff in the enforcement investigation
process. The need for Larry to have to go to his commission before
he initiates an audit or begins an investigation, to me, is just a tre-
mendous weakness, and I would like to see that change.
MR. GROSS: I am in favor of Father O'Hare moving to Wash-
ington if he's interested. And I would like Congress to address
campaign finance, as long a shot as it appears, but I really would
like to see it on an incremental basis rather than trying to take on
such huge looming issues that are surely going to raise constitu-
tional objections.
And for the FEC in these more difficult areas, such as issue ad-
vocacy, I would like to see it address them through rule-making
procedures rather than attempt to enforce the law in an area where
I do not think we have enough definition or clarity for the regu-
lated community.
MR. NOBLE: I think where I would like to see the focus is on
getting a consensus about what it is we are supposed to be doing.
I am less concerned about the structure the FEC has. As I said, I
have defended the structure of the FEC. I think there is a lot to be
said for it on the federal level.
But I think what we need is a culture that feels that these laws
are important, and a consensus about what the laws are, what we
want to do with them, and how they should be enforced, and then
let us go do the job.
But tell us what you want to do and then let us do it. The worst
possible situation is to set up an agency so that you can say you
have done something and pass laws so you can say you passed
them and then not be serious about enforcement, or give the
agency the resources to enforce it and then punish the agency when
it does enforce it.
MR. POT-TER: Since I have trouble believing we spent an en-
tire day in a series of panels talking about politics and no one has
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raised the subject of sex, I have to do it, and I will say that my
motto at this stage of this panel is "k.i.s.s.," which as you know is,
"keep it simple, stupid." It really strikes me that one of the
problems we have in this area is getting Congress to write laws that
are relatively simple and can be understood and followed then the
FEC able to write regulations that do not take on the complexity of
an ancient code.
It is a problem. And I think when Congress looks at campaign
finance reform, people who do not know anything about enforce-
ment agencies start creating these very complicated rules.
I wish, for once, that an important consideration of Congress as
it is looking at the federal election laws would be, "Is it going to be
enforceable?" And when Congress looks at the various bills for
change in the FEC, what normally tends to happen is that they cut
out the FEC section, saying that is too controversial.
They then talk about what the law ought to be, as opposed to
how in the world it is going to be enforced. I think that leads to a
real lack of credibility when inevitably you discover it is very com-
plicated and hard to enforce.
So something simple would be helpful.
MR. STERN: I find the FEC to be extremely unique in the
sense of how people regard the FEC versus the other agencies
throughout the states and cities. They do not have the respect of
the legislative body, and they do not seem to have the respect of
the media, because of the way Congress set it up, and because of
the way Congress really controls not only the appointments but
also tries to get rid of people.
So I am not quite sure how to change this tradition of twenty-
three years we have had at the FEC. I like the idea of term limits,
and I think that was a good step by Congress. I think we should
have an odd number of commissioners, and I think the FEC should
have administrative penalties so that they do not have to go to
court.
Possibly, the appointment authority should be returned to the
president, in fact, rather than leaving it the way it is right now,
where Congress is making appointments. But I am not too opti-
mistic about future changes in the FEC.
MS. GORDON: Thank you all. I want to thank all our panelists
for helping us discuss this very important subject.
CLOSING REMARKS:
THE BEST LOCALITIES HAVE To OFFER - How To
MAKE WASHINGTON LISTEN
MR. BEGUN: I found this conference remarkable. And I do
not know about most of you, but I learned a lot. And I want to
congratulate my colleagues, our chair, Father O'Hare, and former
Congressman Bill Green who was here before, and Nicole Gordon
and the entire staff. They have brought to this audience a remarka-
ble array of talented people, men and women, from all over the
country and they are to be congratulated. So before we adjourn, I
would like to give Nicole and the chair and the staff a round of
applause.
There is one issue that did strike me over and over again and we
kept skirting it. It was mentioned but never delved into. It is be-
coming, at least to me, increasingly clear that the standards and the
regulations for high level public positions may be very different
than for the local level. This is so in some measure because media
buys do not affect aldermen, selectmen and councilmembers,
although they do, to a limited extent, affect members of the House.
Elections for councilmembers, where big money does not play as
much of a role, will be tested in New York in another two years
because of term limits. The terms of forty-one of the fifty-one
members of the City Council will expire.
But the candidate for local office is measured on the same play-
ing field and on the same basis as somebody running for Congress
or U.S. Senate. I think therein lies the problem, because campaign
finance reform on the federal level seems to be inevitable. We are
down that road and we may not be speeding down the road, but we
are trotting towards that conclusion.
The gentleman is going to close out our session today is a re-
markable individual. He has been in the House of Representatives
since 1987. And he has a reputation. I am a part-time resident of
the State of Connecticut - not in his district, but way over on the
west side of the state - and I hear people talk about him with the
affection usually accorded to someone who has just left office.
He just won reelection, and deservedly so, in his district. He has
charted an independent course on certain important issues. He has
been a remarkably effective legislator in the House of Representa-
tives. And he has a piece of legislation that has borne his name
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with great pride, and I say, Congressman Christopher Shays, you
are a great credit to public life.
MR. SHAYS: Thank you very much. I am struck by the fact that
I am going down to Washington without the same euphoric feeling
I had four years ago. Four years ago we were set to begin the 104th
Congress and Republicans had taken over for the first time in forty
years. It had shocked and surprised a few people, but we were
prepared for it. We had a plan, and we set out to carry out that
plan.
The first bill we passed was a bill that I had been working on
with Joe Lieberman and Senator Grassley and also with another
colleague on the other side of the aisle. It was to get Congress
under the same laws that we imposed on the rest of the nation.
Because we had exempted ourselves from about eleven very im-
portant laws: equal pay, forty-hour work week, sexual harassment,
OSHA and our fire safety laws, in some cases. We were exempt.
And the first bill signed into law by the president was congressional
accountability, getting our Congress under the same laws that we
imposed on the rest of the nation.
Our founding fathers always thought that the public would be
protected from Congress because, of course, Congress would have
to abide by the laws that they imposed on the rest of the nation.
Little did they know that we, for a period of time, hadn't done that.
So that was the kind of feeling that we went in with, and after do-
ing that, Senator Feingold and Senator McCain got through lobby-
ing disclosure. We took it in the House and, to the surprise of
some of the Senators who were looking forward to having it come
back, we passed it and sent it directly to the president.
The Senate had a gift ban of fifty dollars; before, it could accept
$250 a year, and meals were not included. So it wasn't uncommon
for a member of Congress to meet a lobbyist in Paris and have a
nice meal costing hundreds and hundreds of dollars. The Senate
allowed the fifty dollars in gifts, including meals, and the House got
the bill and said, "no gifts."
We also banned proxy voting, which gave chairmen such ex-
traordinary power. Now they could not take names out of their
pockets and vote for the members who were not there. It gave the
minority more say because the majority had to make sure they
were there. And it took away some of the clout of chairmen, which
under the Democrats had just gotten to be a little obscene.
I do not say that in a partisan way. It took Democrats about
twenty years to get arrogant, and it took us only about two. But I
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say this because on a bipartisan basis we accomplished congres-
sional accountability, a gift ban, lobbying disclosure and getting
proxy voting out. And we have a last effort: campaign finance
reform.
I naively thought that if it did not happen in the first two years of
this new Republican Congress it would happen in the next term,
and I learned, very quickly, that that wasn't the case. But what I
also learned was that there is an inevitability to campaign finance
reform.
The problem is that it will become so obscene before Congress
acts, and then when it acts, in my judgment, it will be bipartisan
and almost unanimous.
I would like to make a few key points. One is, I do not think
there is any easy solution. I do not think there is any one right
answer, but I do believe that dirty money disclosed, all things being
equal, beats no money any day of the week.
Yes, dirty money disclosed, all things being equal, beats no
money any day of the week. Because that money, if used effec-
tively, can give an advantage to the person who has accepted this
tainted money. I am just going to say tainted - but it is not always
tainted money - I am just saying even if it was, its disclosure
won't change the impact of the positive effect money can have on
elections.
And if people then say, what about what happened with
D'Amato and Schumer, my contention is dirty money not spent
well does not beat no money, but if it is spent well it will.
And what I did not know when I started to really get involved in
this battle on campaign finance reform was how little of the law I
really understood even though it was a part of me, because I had to
live by it.
I did not know, for instance, that it was against the law since
1907 for corporate treasury money to be used in campaigns. How
could it be against the law since 1907 if corporate treasury money is
at almost every event I attend?
When I go to that major event there is wine at the table and so
on. I did not know it was illegal for union dues money to be used
in campaigns since 1947. I did not know that. It could not be ille-
gal because it is happening all the time. Then I began to realize the
impact of two things: soft money and sham issue ads.
Soft money is the unlimited sums contributed by individuals, cor-
porations, labor unions and other interest groups to the political
parties that get routed right back down to the candidates. And it is
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so obvious it just stares us in the face, and we act like it does not
happen.
I do not know why that is not illegal since it has been a total
abuse. It is not used in ways it is supposed to be used. And it is
happening because of sham issue ads. They are, in many cases,
great campaign ads. I do not mean they are sham ads, they are
sometimes very effective ads, but they are campaign ads. They do
not say "vote for," or "vote against," but they are basically encour-
aging you to do that because they say "someone is a slimeball and
tell him to stop being a slimeball." Call up his office and tell him to
stop being a slimeball.
Actually, I do not know what that word means. I hope it is not a
bad word. In this day and age, I use things that I hear and then
find out what they really mean. But the bottom line is, those two
things have made a mockery not of the 1974 law, but of the 1907
law and the 1947 law. And for me as a Republican, I think the
most difficult thing for me to accept was to hear my own Republi-
can leadership, the Speaker and the Majority Leader in the Senate,
talk about how McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan83 simply did
not address the abuse. And they would talk to my Republicans
and people that I turned to for support and say we totally ignored
the abuses of union dues money, because we did not have that pro-
vision called "pay check protection," where the union member had
to sign off on their money being used.
That is true. We do not have "pay check protection" in the bill.
But we do not allow for a union leader or a union member to have
their dues money used in campaigns. We do one thing better than
what my leadership accused us of not doing. We shut it down.
We shut down corporate treasury money and we shut down
union dues money from getting into the campaigns directly. Peo-
ple who work in corporations can contribute to PACs, and they can
contribute individually. Employees, workers or union members
who want to contribute to campaigns can contribute to political
action committees, and they can contribute individually. They are
very much a part of the political process, they have their voice.
But we shut down the corporate treasury money and union dues
money because we banned soft money and because we call those
sham issue ads, run sixty days before an election, what they truly
are: campaign ads. And they come under the campaign laws.
83. See supra note 20.
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Now, Mrs. Devos of Amway came up to me and said to me, "you
have no right to tell me how to spend my money, Chris." And I
said, "we do not." The law says you can limit what someone con-
tributes, but you cannot limit what they spend. McCain-Feingold
adheres to this.
And so if she chooses to spend whatever she wants on a cam-
paign, she can do it, with one little difference. Now it is called a
campaign expenditure, not a sham issue ad. And as a campaign
expenditure, she has to report what she spends and where she
spent it. It has to be disclosed. And a lot of the battle over this bill
in the House was by third parties who did not want to disclose even
though they said they were for something like Congressman Doo-
little wanted. It was because the party leaders did not want to get
rid of soft money.
My biggest argument to my own leadership was, you lose the
mantle of reform and legitimacy. I said it this way: you lose your
right to have a legitimate investigation of the president if you say
you are going to have this investigation to hold the president ac-
countable and you did not do the other part that is required of any
legislative body that investigates.
When you learn, you reform. And my side of the aisle said, if we
do that, it will imply that the president did not break the law, be-
cause then he will just say, "the law needed to be amended." Well,
he could say that, and he would be right. But he would also be
wrong if he said, "I have not done anything wrong."
When Democrats investigated Watergate, they investigated Pres-
ident Nixon, they held his administration accountable, and they re-
formed the system. And I would contend that reforming the
system gave them legitimacy to investigate and hold the president
accountable.
It is what made us realize it wasn't just about using their power
to get the president. And I weep that my own party did not get
that. Because had they, there would have been a lot more
credibility.
For instance, it is not against the law in my judgment for the vice
president to call from the White House and ask for soft money
contributions. Why? Because soft money is not deemed campaign
money. It is not illegal for us, in my judgment, to go overseas and
ask for money overseas, for soft money, because soft money is not
deemed campaign money.
I think you get the point. We've got to either ban it or call it
what it is, campaign money, and then you make it hard money.
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Now, what we did not do in this legislation, that we know we
have to do, is deal with the issue of the Supreme Court's ruling that
spending is freedom of speech,' and we are not going to change
that. But we have to enable someone who does not have resources
to deal with someone who has extraordinary resources.
So I went to the Speaker and I said, "you do not like our bill but
you have been concerned about Ross Perot and what he can do."
There is a solution. Even someone on my side of this argument
won't like it, but I will fight for it. That would be that if you run
against a wealthy person you can collect unlimited sums from
whomever and do the Doolittle disclosure up to what a wealthy
person spends. And the only thing you have to do is require them
to say up front what they are going to spend. That you can do
legally and then they are locked in.
Once you get to that point, you follow the individual require-
ments of limits. And the other thing we probably should have
done is, given that we banned soft money to political parties, we
probably should have increased hard money donations like the
freshman bill did.
That would have probably been a more balanced bill, but our
view was, if we got the first part done, both sides would come run-
ning to do the second. They would be more than willing to raise
the hard money contributions.
And I think they would be more than willing to deal with what to
do when you run against a wealthy person. I will conclude by just
saying that someone in the Seattle area came to me and was un-
happy that we did not deal with wealthy people. They said they
have a lot of twenty-eight year-olds retiring in the Seattle area. I
think you all know why and how. They are wondering what their
new profession is going to be, and some are concerned about that.
Why don't I throw it open for questions. Are there some ques-
tions here?
AUDIENCE: Since you were a Peace Corps volunteer, I won-
der if you have looked internationally for solutions to our
problem?
MR. SHAYS: The answer is no, but I probably should have. I
was in Fiji, and I do not know what they do. In Fiji, they had a
coup when they did not like the government.
84. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1974); Austin v. Michigan State Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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AUDIENCE: One of our speakers, Trevor, mentioned that in
England if you violate the election law, you are out. Would you be
in favor of that?
MR. SHAYS: I would not want to respond quickly to something
I have not thought about because that is pretty significant. The
answer is, I am willing to consider it. The problem is who says you
are out? That is the problem.
AUDIENCE: It sounded like a good idea to me to get some
teeth -
MR. SHAYS: Well, you want all of us out, that is the problem.
You probably would love that.
AUDIENCE: No. But I hope you will look internationally.
MR. SHAYS: Let me just say to you before we get to that part,
we happen to have a viable federal election commission. Besides
our banning soft money and calling sham issue ads, campaign ads
we strengthen the Federal Election Commission (the "FEC") en-
forcement and disclosure. The soft money that still could be used
by unions and corporations internally would be required to be
disclosed.
The problem with the FEC is that you basically have an impotent
Commission given that it is truly bipartisan, which really means
they both have the right to kill and not the right to move. And in
my judgment, you should have an equal number of Republicans
and Democrats who then have to select the next person to be the
deciding vote if necessary.
AUDIENCE: I should make the disclosure, I wrote the Peace
Corps legislation.
MR. SHAYS: Well, you are a hero to me.
AUDIENCE: Bill Gullin is the name.
MR. SHAYS: Bill, you are a hero. You must have been a very
young man, but being in the Peace Corps was a dream from eighth
grade on, and my wife now works in the Peace Corps.
MS. GORDON: I would like to know what your view is on why,
against all the odds, this past term the Shays-Meehan bill did pass.
Secondly, what your prognosis is in the next Congress for both
Houses to do something.
MR. SHAYS: I can only explain it biblically. God works in
strange and mysterious ways. What really happened was a whole
host of things. The public is not indifferent to this issue. They are
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just frustrated by it, and a lot of members know it. When members
say the public does not care, they really almost rant and rave in my
conference about how the public does not care, but they will never
do it publicly. So number one, I think the public does care.
The other thing is that I went to the Speaker early on and I said,
"I can tell you how to defeat campaign finance reform," and he did
not pay much attention. I said, "look at me, I can tell you how to
defeat campaign finance reform." And finally he says, "okay
Shays, tell me how."
I said, "just give us an honest vote." We do not have the votes.
Because I just wanted to start with a vote, I would have been grate-
ful to have a defeat by the vote. That notwithstanding, our leader-
ship did not take it up the whole year and Democrats then jumped
on en masse, and rightfully so, and I mean this with lots of respect.
This bill would not have moved forward had Democrats not held
together, but you would not have seen it held together if there
were not some very strong souls who believed in the presentation
on the Democrats' side of the aisle.
Usually the minority is for the bill and hopes the majority has
the bad sense to kill it. And we had the bad sense - my party had
the bad sense - to kill it in the Senate. But anyway, the Demo-
crats started the process that was provided by Republicans in terms
of having the ability to pull out a bill from committee. And a few
Republicans signed on.
We also had the Speaker promising us a vote in February and at
the latest March, and when we came to March they did not want to
bring up the bill. And then they had a very disingenuous process.
They had a process where they put it on a consent calendar, which
basically means you need a two-thirds vote, and you cannot amend
it, and you are limited to forty minutes, twenty minutes on a side.
Ultimately, on a Friday, they told us they were not going to bring
up the bill. This is important to answer the question. They an-
nounced after all the members had left on Friday, they were going
to bring up the bill on Monday before the members returned. And
there would be four bills and they all would be returned on the
consent calendar or the suspension calendar and they were going
to be four Republican bills.
It meant we could not amend it. I said to the Speaker, "if you
are going to do that, at least bring every bill up so every bill will be
debated." I think their concern was that Shays-Meehan might have
gotten a majority and had it done that, even though it would not
have passed, the press could have really jumped on it.
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But the bottom line is, to answer your question, the public paid
attention, the press was outstanding, the editorial board writers just
kept focusing in on it, and the more disingenuous my own side of
the aisle became, the more successful this process was. And in the
end we did something they did not do in the Senate.
In the Senate, they had a debate about constitutionality. This is
not a debate about constitutionality. That is a red herring. This
bill is not unconstitutional. If there is one part of it that would be
challenged in court, it would be the "reasonable person" issue ad
provision. That is, if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it
is a duck, therefore it is a campaign ad.
The Supreme Court maybe on that one would throw it out. But
the other parts will hold, and it is not about denying people the
right to speak, because we give them the right to speak, through
their PACs and their individual contributions.
So the Senate got into this big theoretical debate about constitu-
tionality and the House talked about reality.
AUDIENCE: I am Rachel Leon, I am the director of Common
Cause-New York. First of all -
MR. SHAYS: You are a hero.
AUDIENCE: You are the hero.
MR. SHAYS: New York City has done an extraordinary job.
AUDIENCE: We were really proud, first of all, because we had
nine out of thirteen Republicans in New York State in the House
vote for this, and we actually did have one of the best percentages
of any state.
MR. SHAYS: That is amazing.
AUDIENCE: I was wondering if you could tell us about your
experience in Connecticut, because you actually won in the state-
house a ban on soft money at the state level and we have been so
frustrated with that here in New York State: we got it passed in the
Assembly, but in the Senate they laughed at us. When we tried to
bring it up, we had Senator Leichter here who did a lot to try to
force it to the floor, but it is a real struggle here.
So I would like to hear how that worked at the state level?
MR. SHAYS: You want me to answer that question without of-
fending anyone from New York.
I think the honest answer would be, I do not know why it did not
happen in New York, but I do know why it ultimately happened in
Connecticut.
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Connecticut has a bicameral committee. We have the House and
the Senate sit together and they work on one bill together. And
quite often it means you might have a Republican House and a
Democratic Senate or vice-versa. And so there is a lot more inter-
action between the House and the Senate in Connecticut.
So when a bill gets out, it gets sent either to the House or the
Senate, but it is the same bill that then goes to the other chamber.
Too much mischief can happen when both chambers have their
own committee and they have to vote on their own bill and so on.
It forces some of the problems with the ego to be worked on
with the committee, and it is hard to play the games. I would imag-
ine that is why it happened. We have a pretty progressive state, but
I think New York has done some pretty progressive things as well.
AUDIENCE: Ed Davidson of Common Cause. You said you
were not looking forward to the next Congress as you were four
years ago.
MR. SHAYS: I am just older and wiser.
AUDIENCE: As a reformer, I just wonder what your predic-
tions are for reform in this Congress?
MR. SHAYS: Someone asked me if I was going to run for any
leadership position. I told them I would have an easier chance be-
ing elected President than I would to be a leader in my own
conference.
I think the Senator can describe it to you. When you push cam-
paign finance reform you make people angry, particularly in your
own party and some in the other. And it is an institutional kind of
issue. But I decided that while everyone is worried about leader-
ship, I am going to be worried about passing this bill with a whole
host of other people.
And I do not mean to imply that people shouldn't be concerned
about leaders, but there is a group of us on both sides of the aisle
that are meeting and talking now. It does not have to be McCain-
Feingold or Shays-Meehan. It can be something different, and it
does not have to include our names and all of that. But we are
going to be driving that as hard as we can, whether we are in the
very front of the line or in the middle.
I would not go so far as to say I would not run again if it does not
pass, but I have the conviction that I think that before the next two
years you will see a meaningful and good bill, provided one thing
happens. Provided the Democratic leadership and Mr. Gephardt
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are as straightforward and honest and as sincere as they were in the
past.
If the temptation is now that they may be the majority and they
may want to wait until they are in charge and so on, then we will
have a hard time.
Shall we call it quits? Thank you very much.
FATHER O'HARE: I think it has been a long day but a very
instructive day. I want to thank all those who participated: our
panelists, our three speakers, Congressman Shays, Ed Koch, Fritz
Schwarz and all those who have participated. It has been a won-
derfully engaged audience, and while we have perhaps not reached
that kind of crystal clear, limpid consensus we thought this morning
we would arrive at, I think we have made a few advances in mutual
understanding and appreciation of both the challenges and also the
possibilities of this very important area of election reform.
Once again, to echo what Martin Begun said, this would not
have taken place without the extraordinary dedication of the staff
of the New York City Campaign Finance Board, Nicole Gordon
and the very dedicated people whom you see around this room
who have worked very hard on this for a period of months. So in
my role as chairman, could I ask you to give our staff one last
round of applause. Thank you very much.
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DEAN HIMMELBERG: Good afternoon. I am Robert Him-
melberg, the Dean of Fordham's Graduate School of Arts & Sci-
ences. I welcome you to this symposium on the Future of New
York: 1898, 1998.
This is, of course, the centennial year of our great metropolis, the
centennial of the creation of New York as we know it today. The
"new" New York was created amidst great expectations for the fu-
ture, expectations of national leadership, of population expansion,
and of wealth. Today, on the verge of New York's second century,
expectations, after a time of troubles, are on the rise again. What
can the future bring? The question is as relevant today as it was in
1898, and we have today four of America's most distinguished ur-
ban scholars, to address this.
Professor Soyer, who planned this conference of Fordham's His-
tory Department, will say a few words about the speakers.
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PROF. SOYER: As Dean Himmelberg said, this symposium
was called in honor of the centennial of the consolidation of
Greater New York. What did the people expect and hope for from
this great city that they were creating one hundred years ago?
How did the city measure up to these expectations and hopes?
What is the outlook for New York today? How does New York's
past help it to determine its future? These are the questions that
you are going to be looking at today. As the Dean said, we have
assembled several of the most distinguished scholars who have
dealt with these questions in their writings from various
perspectives.
Before I introduce the speakers, I would like to thank the Ford-
ham University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences and especially
Dean Himmelberg for sponsoring this event, along with the De-
partment of History.
Our first speaker today is Professor David Hammack. He is the
Elbert Jay Benton Professor of History at Case Western Reserve
University. He is widely recognized as the foremost expert on the
politics of New York City's consolidation at the end of the nine-
teenth century. His book, Power Society: Greater New York at the
Turn of the Century,1 which was published in 1982, was nominated
for a Pulitzer Prize. It is a pleasure to introduce Professor
Hammack.
PROF. HAMMACK: Thank you very much. It is a real plea-
sure to be at Fordham today. I want to thank Daniel Soyer for
inviting me here. Coming here has given me a new perspective on
Greater New York in the 1890s and on what has happened since
then.
I thought it might make sense to look at the changes between
1898 and the present - well into the twentieth century. It would
make more sense to do that than to focus only on the vision of the
future at the time of the creation of Greater New York. I want to
start with the creation of Greater New York and what was hoped
for at the time, then I will discuss what changes have occurred
since. By looking at the future from this point in the past, we
might be able to better look at the future we now face.
Let me begin with a statement from Abram S. Hewitt's mayoral
address in 1886 that, in many ways, launched the movement to con-
solidate Manhattan with Brooklyn and, what became the other
boroughs that created Greater New York. Hewitt was by far the
1. DAVID C. HAMMACK, POWER AND SOCIETY: GREATER NEW YORK AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY (1982).
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least known candidate in this famous and highly contested mayoral
election; he beat Theodore Roosevelt and Henry George. The
Henry George campaign is often viewed as one of the high points
of organization on the left in the history of New York City. Hewitt
beat both George and Roosevelt by appealing to a vision of the
future for New York, a broadly inclusive vision that many voters at
that time accepted. Hewitt said in his speech:
The imagination can place no bounds to the future growth of
this city in business, wealth, and the blessings of civilization. Its
imperial destiny as the greatest city in the world is assured by
natural causes, which cannot be thwarted except by the folly and
neglect of its inhabitants.2
This, commercial vision, contained all the elements in favor of con-
solidating the outer boroughs with Manhattan and creating
Greater New York.
Casting this vision of Greater New York within a commercial
vision was fitting, considering New York City's excellent reputation
for financial management and fiscal probity was one of the key ele-
ments in making the consolidation intelligent and successful. By
the 1890s, New York was known internationally for careful man-
agement of its finances, honest administration, good collection of
taxes and punctiliously honoring its debts. Predictably, at the time
of consolidation, New York City's program for development was a
major reason for creating a successful, consolidated city.
Such prudence, of course, was not the case up until the early
1870s, when Samuel J. Tilden, one of Abram Hewitt's associates
and eventual competitors, unseated the famous Tweed ring and
took over control of the City of New York. For the next twenty
years, there was close work and cooperation between business
leaders, symbolized by Tilden, one of the great railroad lawyers,
and his partner Andrew Green on the one side, and the Demo-
cratic party, led by Honest John Kelly and Tammany Hall, on the
other. Throughout this period, these groups ensured city expenses
were kept to a minimum, that taxes were regularly collected, that
property owners were not needlessly burdened and that bondhold-
ers received interest and principle when they were due. As a re-
sult, New York City, armed with a reputation for fiscal
management and prudence, was a strong contender to go into the
credit markets and borrow money. This turn of events was quite
2. Abraham S. Hewitt, Mayoral Acceptance Speech (1886) (copy on file with the
speaker).
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fortunate because Greater New York in the 1890s needed to bor-
row a lot of money.
Brooklyn, by contrast, was a paradox. Brooklyn citizens and res-
idents were proud of their New England heritage. They were Prot-
estant, whereas New York had become diverse and polyglot. That
was a matter of pride. The leading church at the time was probably
the Congregationalist Plymouth Church. To be sure, residents did
not have the Catholic churches in mind when they spoke about
Brooklyn being the city of churches in the 1890s, at least not those
who styled themselves as the spokespeople for the City of
Brooklyn.
Brooklyn's finances, however, were another matter. Brooklyn
experienced rapid growth in the mid-1890s during a movement that
absorbed all of Kings County into it. The budgets, balance sheets
and financial arrangements of county towns, as they were called,
were not in very good shape. Brooklyn reached the state debt
limit; it could not borrow any more money. It was said in the mid-
1890s that no one would ever figure out what Brooklyn's finances
were.
To make matters worse, Brooklyn did not have an adequate sup-
ply of water for its population. Although Brooklyn used wells, the
wells rapidly became polluted because Brooklyn did not have an
adequate sewer system. In addition, most of the streets in Brook-
lyn were not paved. Despite these failings, people still tried to
move to Brooklyn from Manhattan and build small houses and get
themselves away from the crowds of lower Manhattan. They
moved into areas that had no paving, no water system and no
sewer system. It was not a healthy prospect to say the least.
Brooklyn had problems, fiscal and otherwise, and had no means
of addressing them. Manhattan's leaders had very good connec-
tions with national finance leaders. They had a lot of ideas about
how to finance the improvements that were widely accepted and
were necessary for Brooklyn, Manhattan and the entire region. As
a result, accompanying the consolidation was a program for im-
provement that was carried out. It is instructive just to list the ma-
jor improvements that were contemplated and were, in fact, carried
out within ten or twenty years of consolidation.
One of the main objectives of consolidation, as Hewitt sug-
gested, was the creation of a single municipal government to rule
over the entire New York harbor and all of the shoreline on the
New York side of the New York metropolitan region. It is because
there was such a focus on the harbor, which was essential to New
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York's position in international shipping, that the consolidation in-
cluded all the claims and extended beyond what is now Kennedy
Airport, going as far as the Whitestone Bridge on the north side of
Queens.
Secondly, consolidation was necessary in order to build a
number of internal improvements. Bridges across the East River
to supplement the Brooklyn Bridge, as well as bridges across the
Harlem River needed to be built. As a separate consideration, the
part of dictating consolidation also made it possible to extend the
rapid transit system. Initially, this system ran only within Manhat-
tan and up to the Bronx. As soon as consolidation occurred, a par-
allel rapid transit system for Brooklyn was developed. In addition
to Brooklyn's lack of appropriate water services, Queens too did
not have an adequate water supply or sewers. Brooklyn and
Queens needed the streets paved, fire and police stations to pro-
vide public order and safety, and provisions to maintain the quality
of those streets. That was the agenda that was widely discussed
regarding consolidation.
In thinking about where New York has come and where it might
go in the future, it is important to note what was not on the agenda
in the 1890s. The consolidation did not concern government provi-
sion for social services, education at any level, hospitals and health
matters. These issues were certainly important - at the center of
some very contentious political debates in the 1890s. For example,
during the election of 1894, which approved the consolidation of
the five boroughs, voters approved the new state constitution,
which contained two measures concerning these social issues. One
provision, remembered in infamy in the Catholic community,
stated that state money would not be used to support schools spon-
sored by religious communities. This constitution also provided
that New York State would, as the municipalities could, provide
funds to support welfare organizations maintained by religious
communities, most notably orphanages and foundling homes.3
Thus, while these issues were of great concern in the 1890s, the
consolidation effort did not concern them.
Politics in New York during the 1890s were tense with ethnic and
religious conflict. This attributed to failure of the consolidation,
and the new New York State Constitution, to address the issue of
social services. Just before the state constitutional convention in
1894, for example, the Union League Club, the chief social organi-
3. New York supported other kinds of social welfare agencies as well - a continu-
ation of a longstanding tradition that goes back to the 1790s in New York.
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zation that served the Republican Party in New York City,
blackballed the son of one of its founders because the founder was
Jewish. When the Union League Club was created at the outbreak
of the Civil War, there was no question raised about having Jewish
leaders join with Catholics and Protestants in creating the club. By
the 1890s, however, anti-Semitism had risen to such a point that
Jesse Seligman's son was not an acceptable candidate for member-
ship in the Union League Club.
This was a great scandal at the time, creating a great problem for
the Republican Party that consistently attracted many Jewish votes.
In fact, in the early 1890s, one of its candidates for mayor was Ed-
ward Einstein, who had run in the 1870s as a German and then ran
in the 1890s and was identified as Jewish. In response to the em-
barrassment of the Union League Club blackballing Seligman's
son, the state Republican Party named Edward Lauterbach as the
chairman of the Republican County Committee for Manhattan.
Lauterbach was a Jewish leader who was very much involved in
negotiations between the American-Jewish community and Euro-
pean governments over how to respond to the situation in Russia
at the time. In the state constitutional convention, Lauterbach
carefully arrived at a compromise between those who wanted state
aid for schools and the welfare institutions and those opposed to
state aid for any religious institution. As a result, the plan for the
future was to grant money to public education and to subsidize pri-
vate welfare institutions.
Looking forward, from the point of view of a New Yorker in
1898, the main focus of city government was on physical and eco-
nomic development for purposes of encouraging economic growth
of the region as a whole. Transportation and communications sys-
tems were of paramount importance, followed by improvements in
the labor force through investments in education. Providing safe
and healthy housing for the people who lived and worked in New
York also became a priority.
By considering the goals of New York at the time of consolida-
tion, one may look forward from that point, considering the hun-
dred years that followed, and then ask what can we learn about
New York's future today. First, however, we must define "New
York City." I think a historical perspective helps raise some ques-
tions about that.
One way to answer this question is to ask about the municipal-
ity's role in the region in terms of population and municipal func-
tions. In 1898, Greater New York City - Brooklyn, Manhattan,
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Staten Island, the Bronx and Queens - essentially included the
entire population of New York State within the metropolitan re-
gion. Greater New York included, in fact, almost all the territory
that underwent suburban development on the New York State side
of the Hudson River for the next fifty years.
Considering this development, it took very long-range thinking
to create a single arena in which economic and suburban develop-
ment would take place, all, remarkably, under a single government.
This plan to have a single municipality manage that development
largely succeeded. At least, New York retained that responsibility
and retains a great deal of responsibility down to the present. A
few new entities were, of course, developed to handle specific
problems, notably the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
to deal with the challenge of building bridges and tunnels across
the Hudson, and the Triborough Tunnel and Bridge Authority to
handle the financing of public works in the context of the fiscal
stresses of the Great Depression. New York is notable for the de-
gree to which its single municipal government has gained and re-
tained responsibilities and for its success in resisting the creation of
those special districts. Therefore, the idea of a comprehensive gov-
ernment for a very large area succeeded in preserving and main-
taining itself.
In 1898, New York also had perhaps the most fully developed set
of nonprofit organizations in the United States. These organiza-
tions were extravagantly praised in a 1900 Atlantic Monthly article
by Everett P. Wheeler, a leading Episcopalian, who took care in
that article to praise Catholic efforts as well as those of members of
the other religious communities.4 Wheeler noted, but did not em-
phasize, that these organizations received and continued to receive
much of their funds from city government. Those organizations
were also part of municipal New York as it was defined in the be-
ginning, and that pattern continued.6
By the 1940s, New York City had assumed the widest array of
service delivery responsibilities of any city in the United States. At
the same time, however, it had lost control over most of the great
regional transportation facilities that provided the original reason
for its creation. Moreover, while New York was created to manage
physical development, it had largely achieved what it set out to do
4. See Everett P. Wheeler, The Unofficial Government of Cities, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1990, at 370, 374.
5. See id. at 371.
6. See id. at 372.
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in that area by the 1940s and has not done a great deal to add to
that since.
In the 1970s, Greater New York might well have been described
as the twenty million people who lived within a three-state com-
muting region that nearly extended from Princeton to New Haven.
Municipal New York contained merely a third of that population,
including a very large share of its poorest members. Even with
New York City's remarkable auxiliary of nonprofit organizations,
now heavily funded by the federal government, New York City was
not positioned to play the dominant role in regional economic de-
velopment that it played throughout the nineteenth century and
the first decades of the twentieth century.
Put another way, the New York that was created in 1898 em-
braced essentially all of New York State population of the metro-
politan region. Thus, the leaders of that political entity, the
municipal government, were really planning for the economic de-
velopment of all the people within the entire New York metropoli-
tan area. By the 1970s, however, the City of New York developed
into a very great city, almost three times as large as it had been in
1900, and only accounted for a third of the regional population.
The region had integrated even more tightly than it did at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. As a result, there was no way
New York City could play a regional economic development role,
the kind that had been envisioned for it by Hewitt at the time of
planning for Greater New York.
We can consider New York City in terms of the composition of
the body politic as well. Women, remember, could not vote in
1898. In 1898, ethnically, the city was largely German and Irish,
but was already well on the way to containing nearly equal propor-
tions of Italians, Russian Jews, Jews from Austria and Hungary,
Catholics from Central Europe, as well as people of Irish and Ger-
man heritage. Proportions were changing very rapidly, and that
was the result of the many interesting consequences for planning
political careers and attempting to rise to leadership in the first
twenty years after consolidation.
Thus, one characteristic of New York, even in that period, was
very rapid change. One thing that is notable, if we think about
New York today, is that what had once been a somewhat signifi-
cant African-American population in the greater city constituted
only about one percent of the population in 1900. Again the
growth was more rapid after 1910, but the African-American popu-
lation in 1900 was very small.
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Some of the city leaders who pushed for the creation of Greater
New York in 1898 worked to exclude immigrants from the voting
booths. The Supreme Court had ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson,7 just
before consolidation, that black people could be excluded from
white facilities. That same Court was turning a blind eye to the
violent exclusion of black people from the southern electorate, an
exclusion that culminated in years of consolidation of the five bor-
oughs into Greater New York.
The "Dillon Rule"8 that interpreted municipal governments as
agents of property owners and prevented them from any action
that might redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor, was still in
effect at the time of the consolidation. In fact, John F. Dillon him-
self played a role in the creation of Greater New York. These are
points that I think are worth emphasizing in a talk at a law school.
All of this has changed over one hundred years. Women got the
vote in 1920; immigration and naturalization laws were greatly
tightened, then relaxed and tightened once more; and the civil
rights movement ended legal segregation. People from the Carib-
bean began to arrive in significant numbers in the 1940s and Asians
arrived throughout the 1970s. Since the 1960s, judges have been
ruling that even those convicted of crimes have extensive rights
that governments must spend money to satisfy. Today's New York
City contains a very different population and works under very dif-
ferent rules from those that prevailed one hundred years ago.
Many of these changes could not have been anticipated by those
who created Greater New York. New York City now has a very
changed electorate, working under very different rules, trying to
accomplish different purposes with the structure that was created
one hundred years ago for a much more limited set of purposes.
There are perhaps three trends you will notice here. One is a
steady expansion of individual rights, producing an increasingly di-
verse and demanding body politic. There is a notable shift in the
responsibilities of municipal government in the building and main-
taining of physical facilities safely to the provision of health care,
education and social services. Finally, there is a continuing growth
in development of the economy and population of the entire met-
ropolitan region.
7. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
8. JOHN F. DILLON,,COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(5th ed. 1911).
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It is worth emphasizing that while many New Yorkers worked
hard for all these developments, critical decisions were not always
made in New York nor solely by New Yorkers. They were made by
Presidents; members of Congress; Justices of the United States
Supreme Court; by the States of New Jersey, New York and Con-
necticut; and by economic factors, notably managers of business
firms - small as well as large; and also by individual renters and
homebuyers.
With city planning over the years, planners have often sought to
predict population and economic trends, but they have paid less
attention to changes in institutional arrangements - an almost al-
ways neglected trend in individual political and civil rights. It is my
impression that at present we are in a period of considering
whether the evolution of rights will continue, will stay where it is,
or will be reversed. Whatever the result, the consequences will be
important for the city.
Those are some thoughts on how we might think about how New
York City is moving from the perspective of 1898 and looking for-
ward. We will now turn to some questions about the relation of
local government to the global economy that raise another set of
questions that face New York today. In the future we might learn
something from looking at how this relationship played out in the
past.
New York in 1898 was enmeshed as much in a global economy as
New York is enmeshed in a global economy today. In 1898 the city
already faced decline in its share of the import trade, and it lagged
behind New Orleans and other ports in exports out of North
America. Like other east coast cities, New York had already lost
primacy in manufacturing, especially in the manufacturing of steel
and mechanical goods. Production in those areas had already
moved to the Great Lakes industrial places that were running from
Buffalo and Pittsburgh through Cleveland and Detroit to Chicago
and Milwaukee.
The major impetus for the creation of Greater New York was, in
fact, an effort to respond to these shifts in trade that were already
going on to mobilize municipal government in this region in such a
way as to take action that would retain the existing import trade
and support the manufacturing that was related to it. Europe's
economy already specialized in finance, in communication, and in
the light manufacturing in fields that drew their chief advantage
from access to current information and specialized information
about markets-not only in New York, but across the United
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States and, in fact, in much of the western hemisphere. New York
was, in the 1890s, the great business center of the United States.
Its thriving industries were in such fields as women's fashion and
clothing, women's coats and millinery, notions, furs, news gather-
ing and editing, and publishing-publishing of fiction as well as
nonfiction. Entertainment was also a thriving industry. Broadway
already was established as the place to make your reputation. New
York was the center for printing connected to its publishing indus-
try, and for interior decoration connected to the fashion industry
and also the financial and business services.
The 1890s were a very exciting period from the point of view of
the development of financial and business services. In 1890 it was
not possible to buy an industrial security on the New York Stock
Exchange. You could buy government bonds, you could buy rail-
road stocks and bonds, and that was the inventory of Wall Street.
It changed in the mid-1890s so that by 1896, the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average already existed, and by 1900 most of the firms in the
Fortune 500 were created with very substantial management if not
international headquarters in Manhattan.
New York was a financial center and a center of small manufac-
turing tied to information. The key point was access to informa-
tion. New York was where information arrived first from Europe,
where it was processed, where it was evaluated and where deci-
sions were taken on it. If you wanted to be in an industry that was
connected with fashion or to the latest information, you had to be
in New York. In the manufacturing industries you could take ad-
vantage of information, plus you were in New York, because so
many people wanted to be in New York and be close to informa-
tion. Prices of real estate were very high; and if you wanted to
make something that was heavy, or something made out of raw
materials that had to be moved with great effort, you went some-
where else.
So New York was already very much the center of the world
economy and was by no means isolated and was by no means com-
mander of its own economic destiny. In 1898, New York was also
home to a strong group of international merchants, and they also
needed to access information, as well as to the municipal invest-
ment in harbor facilities. In fact, they were the leaders in moving
toward the creation of Greater New York. Hewitt himself was an
iron importer and a competitor with American production of steel,
and he was looking to reduce the cost of moving goods through
New York harbor in the 1880s when he had that great imperial
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vision of what might be accomplished by an expansion of New
York's powers.
It was these merchants, Hewitt and his associate merchants and
bankers, who took the lead in pushing Greater New York, in devel-
oping transit and communication facilities in the city and support-
ing a massive expansion of the city's schools in the twenty or thirty
years after consolidation. All of these investments were in their
own interest. They persuaded others that they would serve their
interests as well.
Now Greater New York, the tri-state New York region as a
whole and private business firms have continued to make major
investments in New York's transportation and communications in-
frastructure. Greater New York has greatly increased its invest-
ment in public education from first grade through graduate school.
One hundred years of history might lead us to ask whether these
investments have been sufficient, whether other investments have
been well considered, and whether public discussion of alternative
economic policies have been sufficiently thoughtful.
Let me emphasize the increased investment in education with
the observation that as late as the 1950s, less than half of the chil-
dren who enrolled in public school actually finished high school.
So apart from the increasing numbers of students in school, simply
getting students all the way through required continuing expansion
of the schools and confrontation of additional challenges with a
much wider school population.
I have suggested some implications for the future in ways of
thinking about New York. Mostly, I would suggest implications for
the future ways of thinking about the relation of New York City to
the region's economy. Let me end by connecting some concerns
about economic development and service delivery to the institu-
tional structure of New York.
One of the points that I have emphasized, and I expect may
come up in later presentations this afternoon, is that New York
exceeds all other cities in the scope of activities for which its gov-
ernment takes responsibility. One of the interesting institutional
arrangements in New York is the fact that the city has continued to
rely to a very great extent on a remarkable, and probably still the
most fully developed, array of nonprofit organizations of any city
in the United States. I have recently become interested in the
whole question of the development of nonprofit organizations, and
it seems to me as I come back and look at New York that it makes
a lot of sense to think about nonprofit organizations as an integral
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part of the institutional structure through which New York is
governed.
There has been a lot of attention to the role of municipal unions
and municipal bureaucracies in limiting opportunities for change in
New York, but another element in the New York picture is cer-
tainly the existence of many nonprofit organizations that also have
claims on resources which have to be taken into account. They also
have political connections themselves. This perhaps emphasizes
what might be seen as the negative side. On the other hand, non-
profit organizations obviously have many virtues in delivering a va-
riety of services, tailoring services to particular populations, and
being able to solve problems that are difficult to solve through gov-
ernment entities. There has been great conflict in the last year over
exactly what responsibilities ought to be afforded to business im-
provement districts in the city, which illustrates the fact that they
are governing entities.
The business improvement districts in New York rely on tax
money, and the mayor has raised questions about their role and
responsibility and their powers since they do have tax money; and
since they have tax money, he seems entitled to raise that kind of
question. On the other hand, clearly, business improvement dis-
tricts have been able to accomplish a number of purposes.
The last thought I would leave is this: private associations, pri-
vate organizations, nonprofit business improvement districts all
clearly can be very effective in providing a variety of services, and
in tailoring of service to particular audiences, and that has been
their strength and the reason why they have been supported in
New York over the entire history of the city. On the other hand,
nonprofit organizations are dependent on governments and on
markets for resources. They cannot invent resources by them-
selves, and as a result they are sometimes not very effective instru-
ments in addressing questions of equality and comprehensiveness.
It is perhaps for that reason that the City of New York has ex-
panded municipal functions under the influence of changing con-
ceptions of citizenship and of individual citizen's rights. Exactly
how all of these pressures and concerns will be squared in the fu-
ture I am not sure. So I am glad to stop at this point and let others
take the question.
PROF. SOYER: The next speaker is Professor Fred Siegel. Pro-
fessor Siegel is Professor of History at Cooper Union for the Arts
& Sciences in New York and a Senior Fellow of the Progressive
Policy Institute. He is the author of, The Future Once Happened
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Here: New York, D.C., L.A., and The Fate of America's Big Cities.9
He has also written for the New Republic, New Atlantic, Public In-
terest, Washington Monthly, as well as numerous academic
publications.
PROF. SIEGEL: It doesn't pay to underestimate the resilience
of New York, no matter how many times we shoot ourselves in the
foot. You only have to look at the concentration of media empires
in and around a revived 42nd Street to feel optimistic.
If I were giving this talk at the start of the decade, at a time when
the talk about the end of cities was rampant, I would have quickly
pointed to at least four threats to our future: the collapse of the
rule of law, the challenge to Wall Street from Tokyo's surging
banks, the extraordinary mishandling of the last recession, and the
challenge of the telecommunications revolution to all centralized
institutions. Today, the first two of these problems are off the ta-
ble. The city's achievement in reducing crime is the single greatest
urban public policy success of the past three decades, while much
of the Japanese banking system is effectively bankrupt. We are
likely to do a better job of handling the third, while the fourth, the
telecommunications challenge, yields a far more ambiguous
answer.
Our current preparation for the possibility of an economic down-
turn shows that the city does have a learning curve even if it is
often flat.
The city did not immediately go into recession after the October
1987 Wall Street crash. We skated along on thin ice for a few years,
but when the national recession compounded our problems Mayor
Dinkins responded to declining private sector revenues as John
Lindsay had twenty years earlier with massive tax increases. The
economy hemorrhaged jobs only after the additional taxes drove
up costs and pushed both companies and middle class residents out
of the city.
What is not in immediate danger, reports Comptroller Alan
Hevesi, is the city's fiscal stability. Thanks to prudent fiscal man-
agement by the mayor, who has proceeded with both cautious rev-
enue estimates and a $600 million dollar rainy-day fund, the city
budget can hold up for the next year or two. But if, as is usually
the case, a recession in New York is the prelude to a national reces-
sion, the city will be at a fiscal crossroads.
9. FRED SIEGEL, THE FUTURE ONCE HAPPENED HERE: NEW YORK, D.C., L.A.,
AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S BIG CITIES (1997).
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After near bankruptcy in the 1970s, we learned to keep an hon-
est budget. The question now is whether, after the Dinkin's deba-
cle of the early 1990s when we regularly raised taxes in the face of
a recession, we've learned not to sacrifice the private sector to pub-
lic spending.
The challenge of the telecommunications revolution has played
out in complex and to some degree unexpected ways.
In the early 1990s cyberprophet George Gilder eagerly antici-
pated the death of the city.10 He argues that cities are nothing
more than the leftover baggage from the industrial era. Cities, he
and others argued, will be largely replaced by the telecosm, a
global communications network driving a world information
economy.
In what can only be described as the "eclipse of distance," we are
now almost able to communicate coast to coast by fiber optic cable
with the same speed that your hard drive communicates with your
CD-ROM player, and at comparable cost. The Federal Communi-
cations Commission recently noted that as a result of recent tech-
nological advances, the underlying costs of providing telephony are
becoming virtually distance insensitive. This telecommunications
speed means that people can be plugged in via expanding
bandwidth to a vast variety of cultural experiences, like viewing
great paintings that were once available only in the museums of
world cities. According to Gilder, the telecosm can destroy cities
because it can provide all the exuberant variety that can be found
in one's living room.a1
Gilder overstates his case but there is no doubt that the informa-
tion highway is reshaping the urban landscape. Consider what the
telephone did to earlier cities. Before the phone, explains Ithiel de
Sola Pool, businesses had to cluster together: Every city had a fur-
riers' neighborhood, a hatters' neighborhood, a fish market, an egg
market, a financial district, a shippers district and so on. The
phone allowed these districts to disperse but that deconcentration
was slowed by another innovation: the skyscrapers that provided
the most advanced telephone wiring and allowed businesses to
move up instead of away. Initially, the phone helped dissolve the
solid knot of traditional business neighborhoods and help create
the great new downtowns, but at a later stage, it helped disperse
those downtowns to new suburban developments.' 2
10. See generally GEORGE GILDER, MICROCOSM 12-13 (1989).
11. See generally GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION 25 (1990).
12. See id. at 33-34.
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Something similar to the first stage de Sola Pool described is oc-
curring today. The economy is decentralizing in part due to
telecom, but still Manhattan is holding its own, this time because
our skyscrapers are again ahead of the curve when it comes to ad-
vanced wiring.
New York State got in on telecom deregulation early. That pro-
vided an incentive for competing telecom companies to invest in
one of the few areas where the city has substantially upgraded its
infrastructure, the provision of fiber optic cables for high speed
data transmission. As part of the deregulation, Merrill Lynch,
Western Union and the Port Authority set up the Teleport Commu-
nications Group ("TCG") in 1985 to offer satellite uplinks for fi-
nancial institutions and broadcasters. TCG linked seventeen big
dishes on Staten Island by fiber optic cable to Manhattan. In 1997
alone, local phone companies invested $1 billion in the New York
metro area.
As Kenneth Phillips, Vice President of telecommunications pol-
icy for Citibank stated: "the turf on which this revolution has
taken place is largely from 59th Street, on the North, to Battery
Park on the South, and of course stretches clear across the island
from the Hudson to the East River. This comparatively small area
of land has over twice the telecom switching capacity of the aver-
age foreign country ... more word processors than all the countries
of Europe combined.' 13
PROF. SOYER: Our next speaker is Ester Fuchs. She is a Pro-
fessor of Political Science and Public Policy at Barnard College and
Columbia University and director of the Columbia Center for Ur-
ban Research and Policy. She is the author of Mayors and Money:
Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago.4
PROF. FUCHS: I want to thank you for being here today and
for including me on this panel with all these gentlemen whose
books I have read.
I am the only political scientist here today which puts me at a
great disadvantage among historians. So I am going to pretend for
the moment that I too have some capacity to examine the past in
explaining the present and predict the future. I will also try to take
into account of what my two colleagues have already said.
I think that New York City has always been characterized in the
past as exceptional, and this is part of what I want to talk about
13. Kenneth Phillips (remarks on file with the speaker).
14. ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN NEW YORK AND
CHICAGO (1992).
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today. What does that mean? Exceptional,means being different,
being too over the top. When you talk about New York, you talk
about New York as a global city. We have stopped comparing it to
other cities in the United States. Our comparisons are with Paris,
London or Tokyo if we want to understand what is going on in New
York rather than Los Angeles or Chicago.
We talk about New York as too liberal politically. We talk about
New York as a being too big. We talk about New York as having
too many people, and as having too much government, as Profes-
sor Hammack mentioned earlier. New York City is the largest mu-
nicipal government in this country. It has an economy and a
budget that are larger than those of most third world countries, let
alone cities around the world. When we talk about New York hav-
ing too much government that is considered a quality.
We also talk about New York's past policies as having been over
the top. In discussion of turn of the century local party organiza-
tions, New York City's political machine is characterized as one of
the most corrupt, but most effective machines - the best machine
at integrating new immigrants into the city and the best machine at
skimming off the dollars for the developers and people who did
business with the city. So even the negative aspects of New York
City's history can be twisted and viewed as positive attributes.
When we look at New York during the New Deal, the period
New York City government expanded, again it seems too much
and too big. New York created a system of free city universities,
and it created a hospital network that has expanded beyond any-
thing that exists anyplace else in the country. We created a system
of public schools that in fact worked. The city even floated bonds
for unemployment relief during the Depression. New York did not
trust the federal or state governments to take care of its unem-
ployed. It was going to do it itself. That is part of the explanation
for this over the top city.
In the 1950s and 1960s, New York did it bigger and better. But
did these policies work? Certainly in the post-urban renewal pe-
riod, New York wiped out more old low tenement housing than
any other city in the country. The city engaged in massive redevel-
opment projects, like Lincoln Center, and built more bridges and
tunnels than any other city. The city's declared war on poverty, it
embraced decentralization with a vengeance. I think much of this
did not work; but if we were going to give parents the opportunity
get involved in the school system, parents in every community all
over the city, would be given the opportunity.
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Of course on fiscal policy we certainly are over the top. We were
the ones who had the fiscal crisis in 1975, when the President of the
United States in that Daily News headline basically said "Drop
Dead, New York," essentially saying you are not part of this na-
tion, and we will not help you, and you will have to figure out how
to bail yourself out alone from the fiscal crisis. So even in crisis,
whether it was a crisis created by the Depression, whether it was a
crisis of racial unrest in the 1960s, or the fiscal crisis in 1975, New
York did its crises bigger, better or worse than anybody else. At
the same time, New York looked for solutions in a more construc-
tive way with greater gusto and with a great capacity to experiment
than most other cities.
The present state of the city is a little different than past. In the
present, we are trying to look more like other cities. Our Mayor
tells us that is what we should strive for. Our crime rate is going
down. Of course he would argue we are doing it better than every-
body else, and we are bringing it down at a greater rate; but in fact
it is to make us look more like the rest of America. We have got to
stop jaywalking to look more like the rest of America. We have
got to be polite to look more like the rest of America.
Of course, we have got to cut back the public sector to look
more like the rest of America, and we have got to increase our
tourism so that we can create an economy that looks like the rest of
the world. Other global cities around the world also depend on
tourism. We have got to cut back spending in the neighborhoods
because it is downtown and it is businesses that are important to
our economy. One of my professors when I was a graduate stu-
dent, Paul Peterson, wrote a book called City Limits.15 He argued
that cities were constrained in what they could do by their place in
the federal system and that in the end Mayors would have to re-
spond to the business community because the business community
provides the tax revenues that make cities run.
To be like everybody else, we in New York must respond first
and foremost to the business community, to the developers, the
real estate industry and to the financial services sector because
they too will save the City's future. They will provide the tax base,
they will provide the jobs, they will provide the health care, they
will tell the schools what they need to do and they will make sure
that mass transit is maintained. They will make sure that the tun-
nels that Fred holds so dear will get built. So while I agree with
15. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981).
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what Fred has proposed maybe our emphasis is different as to
where these changes will come from.
It is my view, that, in order for us to have a successful future, we
had better start charting the exceptional course again and not de-
pend upon making New York like the rest of America. There is
Times Square and lower crime rates, which are both wonderful.
But if we turn Times Square into Disneyland, there is a Disneyland
already. That is why Disney does it better. It is authenticity that
the tourist comes to New York for, not to see what is in the rest of
America.
So even our ace in the hole in tourism will decline and if we ruin
this, we ruin what has really been exceptional and unique about
New York. In the context of charting the exceptional course, we
will have to be innovative. We will have to innovate politically, and
I do not mean by creating a Charter Revision Commission to stop
a pro-Yankee Stadium referendum from appearing on the ballot.
That is not what I mean by political innovation.
What I mean by political innovation relates to the old-fashioned
function of cities in providing a crucible of democracy. We will
have to innovate and be more inclusive. We will have to innovate
in making sure that our new immigrant communities become citi-
zens and engage in politics. Professor Robert Putnam of Harvard
University discussed the problem of civic engagement in terms of
the decline in social capital in an article called Bowling Alone."6
For Putnam, the decline in social organization membership has
contributed to the decline in political involvement. 17 I do not see
that as a problem at all. I could care less if you want to bowl alone.
What I care about is if you are going to go to the polls and vote, if
you are going to become active in political organizations, if you are
going to be capable of being mobilized around issues that are im-
portant to you and your community. Involvement in bowling
leagues, soccer clubs or even churches does not necessarily trans-
late into political participation. I will argue that it is a decline in
the institutions of political incorporation that is dangerous right
now to the functioning of our democratic process.
I think we will have to innovate politically to become more inclu-
sive. Of course, we will have to innovate in the economy as my two
colleagues have pointed out. I agree completely with Fred. We
have to innovate in the area of manufacturing because of what
16. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995).
17. See id.
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some economists and sociologists call the growing mismatch be-
tween the skills of our urban population and the jobs that we have
in the city. We will also have to innovate so that small businesses
like Ridgewood Farms have the opportunity to grow and incubate,
whether in the manufacturing sector or in the retail sector or in
high technology. The city's economic development policy cannot
just be AT&T or Chase Manhattan, or the Stock Exchange threat-
ening to leave Manhattan and getting a wonderful package of tax
incentives to stay. While I believe that we must compete with New
Jersey's predatory practices, that is not enough.
Finally, the most important area we will have to innovate is edu-
cation. We will have to innovate in education whether the Board
of Education likes it or not, whether the teachers' union likes it or
not, whether the parents like it or not, whether the taxpayers like it
or not. If we do not innovate in education and bring about a first
rate, public school system, we will no longer be the shining light on
the Hudson, the city of the future, the city in which we all take
pride.
So what are our prospects for achieving these kinds of innova-
tions? What I would like to do is briefly go back and look at some
recent transformations both in politics and in fiscal policy. I think
that there is an important link between what you can do in the city,
the kinds of electoral coalitions that get formed and the kinds of
budget policies that are created.
When I look at elections and politics, I always look at electoral
coalitions, specifically at the race, ethnicity and gender of these
voters. While we have focused on race and ethnicity, gender is ac-
tually an increasingly important part of this analytic framework.
Some of you may have noticed that in every recent election there
has been a gender gap. Women also tend to make up fifty-two per-
cent of the electorate while men are forty-eight percent. Women
have significant political clout that has not really been exercised,
especially in local politics.
My interest in politics is not just about who votes and who does
not, but the question of how different voting coalitions affect the
issue agenda for the city, of what gets done and what does not get
done after the election. So I think two important parts of the puz-
zle are who does and does not vote; and the fiscal landscape of the
city. Some of you who know my work know I have emphatically
argued that fiscal policy should not be left to accountants and to
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the managers because, in fact, budgets are political documents.'8
The budget summarizes the political priorities of any city or any
nation.
There are obviously some important moral and social issues that
do not relate to budgets, but even something like abortion - and
forgive me for jumping into a hot issue - but even something like
that which we assume is a question of moral principles or ethical
choice has budgetary implications. If you cut back funding for pro-
tection of abortion clinics, there is a choice being made by the body
politic about what it values and what it does not value.
Consequently, I would argue that virtually everything in the
political arena has a budget line item associated with it in some
fundamental way, so budgets do reflect political priorities. The
budget needs to be understood both in terms of its expenditure and
its revenue side. Local governments raise revenue by taxation,
borrowing and transfers from other levels of government. Since
local tax revenue (especially property taxes) accounts for the larg-
est part of a city's total revenue, the fiscal condition of the city still
is very much dependent on the state of the local economy. When
the city's revenue base grows, there is generally more money avail-
able to spend on services. However, when it declines, the city
makes choices about which programs to cut or eliminate or which
taxes to increase. Therefore, all of these pieces are linked. The
fiscal condition of the city will very much determine what needs are
addressed by that city. What will be the policy in that city?
Let me present some data on the fiscal situation in New York
now, how it has changed since 1975 and what some analysts like the
Independent Budget Office and the Comptroller's office, think
about the prospects for the future. Right now things look pretty
good, but will the revenue surpluses continue over the long term?
I think it is a complex question.
I start my analysis of the fiscal prospects of New York by looking
at the 1975 fiscal crisis, which I think had its origin in other long-
term processes and historical events that Professor Hammack
talked about. When you look at the 1990s and try to understand
what is going on, it is important to understand that the 1975 fiscal
crisis affected New York City as well as virtually every other city in
the country, and I would suggest that this relates to a structural
problem in our federal system.
18. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 14, at 226-27.
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There have been several important political developments, since
1975 that will have an impact on what we can do from the stand-
point of the politics of the fiscal policy process. They include the
1980 taxpayer revolt, the decline of federal aid, and, of course,
term limits.
First, the rhetoric of fiscal crisis dominates the policy agenda in
every city in the country. The rhetoric of the fiscal crisis is very
simple. After New York's 1975 fiscal crisis, a great deal of public
attention was paid to the budget process. It is not that people re-
ally understand it a lot better now, but they know basically that you
cannot carry over deficits from one year to the next. Those in posi-
tions of authority have a much more difficult time hiding those def-
icits or rolling them over to the next fiscal year, or engaging in the
accounting gimmicks that were so prevalent among cities - not
just New York - before 1975. What the rhetoric of the fiscal crisis
has made clear is that it is a legal imperative for cities to balance
their budgets at the end of the fiscal year. When balanced budgets
are understood to be politically paramount, policy choices are
limited.
If the tax revenue coming in does not look like it can support
your existing expenditure, you have got three revenue choices.
One, you can go to the bond market and try to borrow more
money; two you can try to get money from other levels of govern-
ment - that is to say the state government or the federal govern-
ment; or three, you can levy taxes or increase user fees, going
directly to the people to try and raise the revenue. If none of these
revenue choices are made, you must cut spending.
The real surprise in the post-fiscal crisis period is how east it is to
balance the budget. All you really have to do is cut spending. Cut-
ting spending does not have anything to do with what the needs of
the city are. Cutting spending is a pretty simple exercise. First, you
determine how much of the budget is fixed costs, the amount the
city is legally required to spend.
Fixed costs include interest on debt. Interest on debt as a per-
centage of the budget has increased significantly. A fixed cost may
also be mandated by the state and the federal government,
although they usually do not money needed to fulfill the mandate.
We might accept that the mandate will produce "good" public pol-
icy, like the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, nevertheless we have
to raise money from local tax dollars to pay for it. Most mandates
come in the area of what we call redistributive policy, like Medi-
caid or welfare.
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If the fixed cost is not mandated and it is not debt, it might also
come from a contract with your municipal employees. At the point
that the contract expires one can renegotiate the contract; but, in
fact, it is quite difficult to get give-backs from municipal employee
unions in any way that actually improves the long term fiscal health
of the city.
When you look at New York City's budget - the Citizens
Budget Commission and other organizations vary on this - be-
tween seventy-five percent and eighty percent of the costs are
fixed. What amounts to be twenty percent of the $35 billion
budget is not an insignificant amount of money, but it is not likely
that dramatic changes that you might think can be made in the
budget from one fiscal year to the next. From a political point of
view, changes which require the state or federal government ap-
proval are the most difficult.
So even when you choose to cut spending, the choices that you
have are fairly predictable. You are going to usually look at the
place in the budget where you are spending the most money, and
you are going to cut spending in areas where the city has some
formal legal authority. You are going to cut spending, I would ar-
gue, from areas in the budget that affect the groups that have the
weakest political voice. This speaks clearly to the relationship be-
tween politics, the budget and political outcomes.
While there are all these other alternatives that you might have
to factor into your budget, the legacy of New York City's fiscal
crisis is essentially that we do not raise taxes anymore because if
you are a politician anywhere in this country who runs on a plat-
form that says, "I will raise your taxes," you do not have to be a
prophet to predict that that person is going to lose - not only lose,
but lose big.
The last politician who said he was going to raise taxes was Wal-
ter Mondale. Even Michael Dukakis was smart enough not to say,
"I am going to raise taxes." Walter Mondale said, "I have got to be
honest with you the American people," and that cost him the elec-
tion. We have not seen anybody run for mayor of New York since
1975 who said, "I am going raise taxes, I am going to restructure
the property tax rate or propose other tax-related changes that a
lot of good government associations call for." Sometimes govern-
ment hides changes so people do not realize they are really being
taxed at a higher rate. Some of you who live in single family homes
will probably notice that water rates have increased quite dramati-
cally. You might notice new user fees, but those are called revenue
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enhancements. They are not taxes that people generally detect,
like property tax, income tax or sales tax.
Raising taxes is no longer a realistic option in city politics; and
certainly if you go to the bond market when you think there is
about to be an imbalance in your budget, what happens is very
simple and it is another legacy of the fiscal crisis. They say, "Sure
we will lend you some money, but the interest on your debt will
increase as a result of your need." Of course the cost to the city of
borrowing becomes prohibitive, and you are responsible because
you are really trading off the future for the present need.
Next, you go to the state government or you go to the federal
government who tell you to, "Forget it." I do not even have to go
into the details of the transformation of intergovernmental rela-
tions since 1975. Actually, since 1978 there has been an enormous
decline in federal, intergovernmental transfers. State transfers are
more complicated, but in New York we still get a reasonable pro-
portion of money from the state. It is, however, targeted to partic-
ular programs with little flexibility associated with it.
Frankly, the notion that we are going to get money again from
the federal government in the age of less government is highly un-
likely. As a result, you are left with one option in times of eco-
nomic scarcity - reduce spending in order to balance your budget.
Moreover, you have to do it within one fiscal year without any
cushion for unpredictable dips in the economic cycle. The budget
generally reflects a one-year lag in revenues. You are spending in
anticipation of the next year's revenues, so there is a certain irra-
tionality built into the city budget process that makes it more diffi-
cult than it should be to keep budgets balanced without cutting
spending on services that people think are important.
As for the questions about which services are important, which
should be cut and what is the quality of our services, I will present
some data on that in a moment. In the past, we did a good job
cutting our budgets by postponing so many capital expenditures
that we have made it more costly to fix our deteriorating infrastruc-
ture. For example, deferred maintenance in the subway system has
increased the cost of repair significantly. We still have not come
close to affecting the infrastructure problem in the school system or
on our tunnels and bridges. My colleagues at Lamont-Doherty
Laboratory, which is a science campus at Columbia, who study nat-
ural hazards and disasters, have detailed maps showing likely envi-
ronmental impacts on our poorly maintained bridges and tunnels.
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The conditions are quite frightening if you actually understand
them. Fortunately for elected officials, the public does not know
about it and pays very little attention to these kinds of things. The
way the process is set up takes the costs of repairs and projects
which may be reasonable to do in the present to the point of future
crisis when they are prohibitively expensive.
In the 1980s, an upturn in the economy allowed us to increase
our spending. I will not go into those details, but instead will bring
us right up to the 1990s and our period of great economic prosper-
ity, in which we are talking about budget surplus.
I truly was amused during the last budget debate by the conver-
sation about how we will spend our budget surplus. The surplus
for the fiscal year 1998 budget was between $2 and $2.2 billion.
The surpluses that we expect for fiscal 1999 is somewhere between
$1.1 and $2.1 according to the Independent Budget Office.
At the same time, all of the financial oversight organizations talk
about budget gaps. Now we do not have to be accounting wizards
to raise our eyebrows and ask the question, "How can you have a
surplus and a budget gap at the same time?" While I do not bal-
ance my checkbook, I know that sounds wrong. They are project-
ing that in 1999 we will have a $1.4 billion budget gap. In the year
2001 we will have a $2.8 billion budget gap.
One thing wrong with this picture is that we are talking about
surpluses. We had a very brief budget conversation in June 1998.
It was probably the least covered budget by the media that I have
even seen. The media barely brought it up. Usually the newspaper
prints a table showing where the money is going and where it came
from. They barely broke it out in a graphic. Much of the coverage
was preoccupied with the Yankee Stadium issue and the Charter
revision issue that held up budget negotiations. For the first time,
under the new Charter, the City Council passed a different budget
than the mayor proposed, the Mayor vetoed it, and then the coun-
cil overrode the veto. The Mayor's predictable response was "I do
not care what you do, even if it is in the City Charter." He is very
good at ignoring the law when it suits his political purposes. It is
amazing to any of us who read the City Charter that the Mayor
would actually say that he does not have to follow the budget
passed by the City Council.
What I found interesting about the discussion of a budget surplus
was the issue of how we were going to spend it. The Council
speaker proposed fiscal responsibility, calling for putting some
money away in a rainy day fund. That had to be exciting for all the
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good government and good fiscal managers - that we might have
a little rainy day fund for when we actually do not have enough
money to balance our budget, when we do not have the surplus.
The speaker also spoke about retiring some municipal debt. This
is also important because the interest on debt is a portion of our
total spending has been increasing. Most of the fiscal oversight
agencies predict that we will be doing rather poorly on debt man-
agement in the year 2000. The Giuliani administration has refi-
nanced a considerable amount of debt, leaving us with more debt-
related costs today than we have had in the recent past. Buying
back some of the debt makes some sense from a fiscal point of
view.
There were also suggestions about how to spend the surplus we
had from the budget. I find that amusing. Elected officials talked
mostly about tax relief. Everybody thought about what kind of tax
cuts we could put into place. Would it be tax cuts for small busi-
ness, would it be property tax relief for homeowners and would we
reduce sales tax on clothing? All of this sounded good to those of
us who pay, yet the surplus conversation starts to unravel if we
think about the budget in simple terms. Before I consider revenue
as a surplus, an analogy to personal finances is instructive. I as-
sume that I have taken care of my family's basic needs like food,
clothing and shelter. After basic needs are accounted for, I might
think about the vacation in Disney World that the kids really want
to take. That is a surplus.
By any stretch of imagination, I do not think anybody, including
the Mayor, would argue that we have taken care of basic needs in
the City of New York. Our school system needs a significant infu-
sion of capital for infrastructure. Maybe buying some books for
the library, or providing computers and hooking some of them up
onto the Internet would be a good way to spend the so-called sur-
plus. Maybe cleaning some of the parks in the outer boroughs in-
stead of just in the Manhattan business district would be an
interesting way to spend the surplus. Or paving streets in neigh-
borhoods in Brooklyn and in Queens, or maybe putting money into
capital projects for the subway system.
We could sit here and think about social welfare and health
needs, part of the city's responsibility right now and a huge burden
on the budget. Welfare rolls are going down, which is good news,
but are we focusing sufficiently on the problem of poverty in the
city. While people may think it is sufficient to reduce welfare rolls,
some people think that the point is to reduce poverty. Talking
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about a surplus when our basic service delivery system needs a ma-
jor infusion of capital is a bad joke. We have not really considered
the long-term structural deficit in a serious way. The surplus dis-
cussion is simply an artifact that comes from the rhetoric of the
fiscal crisis.
If we are not talking about these issues during a point when we
are in a growing economy, what is going to happen when the econ-
omy turns down as my colleagues have explained to you is inevita-
ble? Wall Street cannot continue at this rate. We are in some ways
like a third world country economy, too dependent on one finan-
cial sector for our fiscal well being.
It is clear that we will have to create a balance in the economy.
After losing 320,000 private sector job between August 1998 and
May 1993, the employment statistics have turned around. Accord-
ing to the New York State Comptroller, during the first eight
months of 1998, average private employment in New York City in-
creased by 78,400 jobs, 2.7 percent as compared to the same period
in 1997. However, the business service sector registered the great-
est gain. Moreover, according to the Department of City Planning,
within every industry group from professional managers to
machine operators, occupations which require a higher level of
knowledge and skill account for a rising share of total employment.
Finally, all of the city's economic monitors predict that the city's
economic and fiscal fortunes will be determined by Wall Street for
the foreseeable future.
The labor force has changed in its complexion, with an increase
in the percentage of low-skilled, non-white workers. This will exac-
erbate the city's labor force "mismatch" problem. And then there
are the looming impending problems related to welfare. Federal
law has placed a five-year eligibility limit on Welfare. An individ-
ual who has not found a job or is not capable of caring for them-
selves will become reliant on city and state based social services
systems or the voluntary sector. In the year 2001, when the five-
year limit kicks-in, it is estimated that 350,000 single mothers with
small children who will have to find entry-level jobs in the private
sector, because they no longer will be eligible for Workfare or Wel-
fare. They will have to obtain low-skilled jobs because these are
mostly women who do not have high school diplomas.
This is a problem that nobody is talking about and no one wants
to look at, and that is really critical for understanding what the
future of New York could look like. We could wave a magic wand
and all these women are exempt from the five-year limit. At least
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something along those lines will have to happen because even the
current administration admits that we will not find 350,000 entry-
level jobs in the private sector at that point. People are projecting
a total of about 20,000 new jobs in the economy in the next two or
three years.
These policy decisions must be put into political perspective. I
will briefly give you some of the information that I find challenging
and interesting about the transformation of electoral politics in
New York City. Part of it relates to changes in the population. The
statistics have already been said about the increase in a nonwhite
population as compared to the white population. The Census
projects that within the Hispanic population, the greatest growth
will continue to be among Dominicans and not Puerto Ricans.
This population tends to be at the lower end of the income scale.
What is really fascinating to me is the extent to which we have
ignored these populations in the political process, particularly new
immigrants.
What I mean by ignored is that many of these immigrants who
could be citizens are not becoming citizens, those who do become
citizens are not registered to vote, and those who are registered to
vote are not voting. Right now we have about seventy percent of
our eligible voters registered to vote. That means there are 1.5 mil-
lion eligible voters who are not registered.
In a survey recently completed by the Center for Urban Re-
search and Policy at Columbia University, we found that only fifty-
one percent of Dominicans say they are registered to vote. This is
not surprising when forty-one percent of Dominican respondents
told us they were not citizens. Among those who are citizens, the
Dominicans are much less likely to vote than their Puerto Rican
counterparts. The Census projects that the greatest population
growth in the city will be among Dominicans.
If the trend among the populations reflect the current citizenship
and voter registration trends, we are going to have an extremely
small percentage of our population voting. Let me offer just a few
more statistics.
I have some data from the Census, the Voter Assistance Com-
mission and the Board of Elections. In the 1961 mayoral race, 74.8
percent of registered voters actually voted. The percent of the vot-
ing age population that was registered at this time was only 60.7
percent, and this has remained fairly constant over time. The per-
centage of the voting age population who voted was about 45.5
percent.
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The trend from 1961 shows a fairly steady decline. There is a
blip in 1985. If you remember Ed Koch ran against himself in the
mayoral race appearing on both the Democratic and Republic tick-
ets. So turnout was down for the 1985 race. The most interesting
statistic is the difference between the 1993 election and the 1997
election. In 1993, there was only a 54.4 percent turnout among reg-
istered voters. In 1997, only 39.3 percent of registered voters voted
in the Mayoral race. This is the race that was reported by the me-
dia to be a landslide victory and mandate for Mayor Giuliani. I
find it interesting how one can define a mandate when in fact only
thirty-nine percent of registered voters actually turned out. The
percentage of registered voters that actually voted for the Mayor,
not of eligible voters but registered voters, was about twenty-two
percent.
This trend in voter participation will be our biggest political chal-
lenge for the next millennium. How will we incorporate both the
immigrant and new immigrant populations into the electoral pro-
cess and into our political democracy. In the end we can talk about
the economy and we can talk about fiscal policy, but if we begin the
new century with a population of non-citizens and citizens who are
disaffected from the political process, we will not have a city that
functions effectively in either sphere.
PROF. SOYER: Our respondent is Kenneth T. Jackson, Jacques
Barzun Professor of History and the Social Sciences at Columbia
University. Prof. Jackson's book, Crabgrass Frontier: The
Suburbanization of the United States, 9 won both the Parkman and
Bancroft prizes, He is also the editor of the Encyclopedia of New
York City.20
PROF. JACKSON: I think we have the notion that the situation
is worse, at least in relevant terms, to where we were one hundred
years ago.
Poverty. Does anybody think there are more poor people than a
hundred years ago? Housing. Does anybody think housing is
worse now than it was one hundred years ago? What about trans-
portation? Look at pictures of the streets. They had not built the
subway yet. Then there was pollution, a hundred thousand more
horses on the street, each one of them leaving more than ten
pounds of manure on the streets every day. Civil rights - women
could not vote. Blacks might have been able to vote, but they were
19. KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1985).
20. KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY (1995).
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discriminated against in every other way. Homosexuals, no one
ever heard of that problem. Anti-Semitism was out in the open.
Think about public health, think about income inequality, and
think about public education. As mentioned, most people did not
go beyond grammar school.
It was not ideal one hundred years ago. We did have jobs, lots of
jobs, good jobs, and the port was the busiest in the world; but eve-
rybody was not wild about the city. Let me paraphrase several
commentators: New York has reached the climax of her commer-
cial supremacy. No city can maintain its control when its chief
claim is that it is the dearest place in the world to do business. The
cost of everything related to trade and commerce has increased
here beyond the point of profit.
What has happened? I think we can look back on the twentieth
century and say New York was the capital. We can say that New
York especially was the capital of capitalism probably since World
War I, when Great Britain shifted.
Let me just comment very quickly on a couple of comments that
have been made. I have just a couple of minor comments. Profes-
sor Hammack exaggerated a little bit when he said that the greater
city in 1898 incorporated virtually all of the population in the met-
ropolitan region until WWII. It very definitely did not include
New Jersey in the first place. Also places like Scarsdale, Bronx-
ville, White Plains, East Chester, Mount Vernon, New Rochelle all
almost stopped growing after World War II.
The industrial decline of New York City perhaps started a hun-
dred years ago but it did peak in industrial employment in 1954.
New York was the industrial center in the world in 1954, more than
Los Angeles, more than Chicago, more than anywhere in Ger-
many, more than anywhere else.
DEAN HIMMELBERG: Thank you for coming. You have cer-
tainly been a great audience.
SUBURBANIZATION AND MARKET FAILURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES
PROMOTING SUBURBAN GROWTH AND
ETHNIC ASSIMILATION
William E. Nelson*
Norman R. Williams**
The social history of America in the twentieth century is one of
suburbanization. At the turn of the century, most Americans lived
in large, dense urban centers. Single tenements often housed mul-
tiple generations, even several different families. Today, the tene-
ments remain, but where open pastures and forests once encircled
America's cities, single-family homes dot the landscape. It comes
as no surprise that by 1970 more Americans lived in suburbs than
in cities or rural areas. By 1980, Houston was the only one of the
nation's fifteen largest metropolitan areas in which the majority of
residents lived in the central city.'
A variety of factors contributed to this mass exodus from the
central cities - government action, on both the national and state
levels, foremost among them. Suburbanization was made possible
by government policies whose effect, if not avowed purpose, was to
encourage families to relocate from urban centers. For example,
generous mortgage guarantee programs administered by the Veter-
ans Administration and the Federal Home Administration en-
couraged returning World War II veterans and the rest of a
growing American middle-class to buy new homes in the suburbs
rather than continue to rent housing in the cities. Similarly, civil
rights legislation hastened suburbanization by ensuring that ethnic
* Joel and Anne Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University. A.B.,
Hamilton College, 1962; L.L.B., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1971. Helpful comments and criticisms were offered by the members of the
Legal History Colloquium at New York University, and the author is deeply grateful
and indebted for this valuable assistance. Research support was provided by the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York
University School of Law.
** J.D., summa cum laude, New York University School of Law, 1995; A.B.,
magna cum laude, Government, Harard, Universtiy, 1991. Mr. Williams is an associ-
ate in the New York office of Mayer, Brown & Platt.
1. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 283-84 (1985).
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minorities, notably Jews and Irish and Italian Catholics, would get
their chance to buy suburban homes.
Government policies, however, have not always favored
suburbanization. As early as the turn of the century, real estate
developers contemplated "suburbanization" and for several de-
cades worked towards that goal.2 At the same time, families living
in crowded urban tenements would have moved eagerly to the sub-
urbs for better housing, but paradoxically, despite the presence of
willing sellers and potentially eager buyers, suburbanization did
not occur on a large scale.3 Low wages, unfavorable mortgage loan
terms and ethnic and religious discrimination excluded potential
buyers from the market.4 In the aftermath of World War II, how-
ever, the government took an active role in the market.5 Once the
government removed market obstacles, such as high interest rates,
restrictive credit practices, and discrimination, land owners and
builders more easily sold their properties, middle and working class
Americans became suburban home owners, and the suburban
housing market operated more efficiently.6
This Article attempts to analyze the relationship between gov-
ernment policy and suburbanization by examining the growth of
Nassau County, New York, a paradigmatic suburban locale, be-
tween 1920 and 1980. Part I examines the suburban housing mar-
ket in Nassau from 1920 to 1940. This Part illustrates how high
mortgage foreclosure rates prevented land owners and builders
from selling properties at a profit, while at the same time, depriving
buyers of the chance of secure home ownership. Part I then turns
to the dramatically different post-World War II market's low mort-
gage foreclosure rates, which furthered the realization of
suburbanization in an efficient fashion, beneficial to both sellers
and buyers.
Part II focuses on Nassau County's transportation infrastructure,
documenting the negligible impact that the infrastructure had on
suburban growth. Parts III and IV develop a historical explanation
for the market failures of the 1920s and 1930s and for the success-
ful development of the suburban housing market in the postwar
era.
2. See id. at 144-46.
3. See id.
4. See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Cen-
tury Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 39-45 (1995).
5. See DAVID POPENOE, THE SUBURBAN ENVIRONMENT Vii (1977).
6. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that "suburbanization has been as
much a governmental as a natural process").
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The main goal of this article is to document the importance of
the role of government activity in the market's functioning. In pur-
suit of that goal, Part V concludes by refocusing attention on the
demand side of the market equation to, hopefully, encourage re-
newed interest in government subsidization of consumer demand.
Although this article may seem like an apologia for post-World
War II suburbanization, such an apologia is not the article's aim.
Noting the large body of scholarship that looks askance at the
forms suburbanization has taken over the course of the past half
century, 7 and conceding that many of the conclusions of this schol-
arship are sound, this Article does not incorporate this scholarship
because it does not address the Article's two main points.
The first point is that New York City tenement dwellers, most of
whom belonged to religious and ethnic minorities, wanted to move
to the suburbs.8 Whatever their faults, the suburbs offered materi-
ally better housing conditions than did the city.9 Moreover, the
process of suburbanization contributed to the incorporation of
Jews and ethnic Catholics into the American socio-economic main-
stream. 10 Even in retrospect, it seems clear that the Jewish and
Catholic tenement dwellers who moved to Nassau County in the
aftermath of World War II improved their well-being.
At the other end of the market, real estate developers through-
out the century were seeking to make profits. Although govern-
ment and the private market, as we shall see, subsidized them
beginning in the earliest decades of the century, they could not
make profits, but instead suffered significant losses in mortgage
foreclosures. They began to earn money only after the government
began subsidizing buyers." Perhaps some will urge that the con-
nection between subsidization of buyers and the earning of profits
by sellers is one of pure historical coincidence. The second and
7. See MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICA 206-09 (1986) (examining the problems of suburbs in the last
two decades, especially problems resulting from a rapid growth and industrialization
- without changes in people's values or the social structure); Scorr DONALDSON,
THE SUBURBAN MYTH 1-22 (1969) (defending the American suburb from "unjust and
irrational" criticism and "the tirade of critical abuse" to which it has been subjected);
ROBERT GOLDSTON, SUBURBIA: Civic DENIAL (1970); JACKSON, supra note 1, at
224-30, 272-82; JOHN R. STILGOE, BORDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUB-
URB, 1820-1939 at 4-5 (1988).
8. See DONALDSON, supra note 7, at 3-4.
9. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 219-30 (discussing the decline of housing in New
York City after World War II).
10. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 39-68.
11. See id.
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main lesson of this article, however, is that government subsidiza-
tion of and legal assistance to buyers served as a prerequisite to
efficient functioning of the Nassau County suburban real estate
market, because it brought to willing sellers buyers who were not
only eager, but also able to make the purchases they desired. 12
This lesson is more timely today, perhaps, than it has been at any
point since the Great Depression.
I. THE SUBURBAN HOUSING MARKET
In 1910, New York City was the most crowded urban center in
the United States.13 In New York City, 49% of all residents lived
on the island of Manhattan, which had a population density of 161
people per acre - a figure far above that for Brooklyn (32.5), the
Bronx (15.6), Queens (3.8), and the still predominantly rural Staten
Island (2.2).14 Population densities in the most crowded neighbor-
hoods of Manhattan such as the Lower East Side, exceeded 700
people per acre.15 The apartment buildings and tenements of Man-
hattan were literally overflowing with humanity. The extension of
the subway system to areas outside of Manhattan in the 1910s
prompted new development in the outer boroughs, thereby slightly
easing urban overcrowding. 16 Manhattan's population declined
20% during the next two decades, while New York City's popula-
tion as a whole increased 45%, with the result that by 1930, Man-
hattan's population density was an improved, if not sparse, 128.9
people per acre.17
Nevertheless, New York City, particularly Manhattan, remained
a densely populated urban center, where millions of individuals
hoped and clamored for more space. In contrast, the sylvan coun-
tryside of Nassau with its rolling fields awaiting development beck-
oned to the families trapped in the crowded tenements of New
12. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 26-28, 53-61 (discussing the development of legal
and economic assistance to ethnic and racial minority groups, enabling them to relo-
cate from cities to suburbs); see generally JACKSON, supra note 1, at 190-218 (address-
ing suburban development as a result of federal subsidies).
13. See Clifton Hood, Subways, Transit Politics, and Metropolitan Spatial Expan-
sion, in THE LANDSCAPE OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS ON NEW YORK CITY, 1900-1940 at
199 (David Ward & Olivier Zunz eds., 1992) (noting that "Manhattan was among the
most congested urban districts in the world").
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 203-04.
17. See id. at 204.
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York City.18 Attempts by real estate developers in the 1920s and
1930s to construct new housing in the county for these families,
however, largely failed. Although the suburban housing market in
Nassau County would explode in the wake of World War II, as
families by the hundreds of thousands relocated to its peaceful, un-
crowded villages, the housing market of the 1920s and 1930s re-
mained hugely inefficient.
A. Foreclosures as a Sign of Inefficiency
Mortgage foreclosure rates are a useful indicator of this ineffi-
ciency. By this measure, the market in Nassau prior to World War
II differed substantially from that after the war. Table One19
TABLE 1
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depicts the estimated annual number of mortgage foreclosure ac-
tions filed in New York State Supreme Court for Nassau County
during the 1920s and 1930s. The Table reveals two interesting facts
about the malfunctioning suburban housing market during those
two decades. First, it shows that, except for 1924, the total number
of foreclosures increased every year from 1920 to 1929, only to
level off for several years but then peak in 1935, at more than four-
18. In 1920, the population density of Nassau County was 460.3 individuals per
square mile, compared with 103,822.9 for New York County (Manhattan). BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1920. STATE COM-
PENDIUM: NEW YORK. STATISTICS OF POPULATION, OCCUPATION, AGRICULTURE,
MANUFACTURE AND MINES AND QUARRIES FOR THE STATE, COUNTIES, AND CIT-
IES 12 (Table 1) (1924) [hereinafter 1920 CENSUS]. By 1950, Nassau's population den-
sity had increased to 2,242.6 individuals per square mile, compared to New York
County's 89,095.5. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950. A RE-
PORT OF THE SEVENTEENTH DICENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (Table 5)
(1952) [hereinafter 1950 CENSUS]. In one decade, by 1960, Nassau's population den-
sity virtually doubled to 4333.9, while New York's declined further to 77,194.6. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, THE EIGHTEENTH DICENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960. VOL. I: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPU-
LATION. PART 34: NEW YORK 13 (Table 6) (1963) [hereinafter 1960 CENSUS].
19. The annual numbers in Table I are derived from a statistical sample of all civil
filings in Nassau County. They are not accurate at the standard 95% level of confi-
dence for every year, but the general pattern displayed in Table 1 would be replicated
by anyone doing a similar statistical sample.
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teen times the 1920 rate. Some slight improvement occurred there-
after, but foreclosures in 1939 were still more numerous than in
1928, the year before the Great Depression, and in 1940 were still
more than five times the 1920 figure.
Second, the Table suggests that the Nassau market collapsed
prior to the Great Depression.2 0 After remaining relatively steady
through 1926 at approximately 14% of all filings, foreclosure ac-
tions rose to 21% of filings in 1927 and thereafter exceeded 25 % in
every year until 1939, except for 1931 and 1932, when they still
exceeded the 1926 rate.
Of course, the population of Nassau County increased during the
1920s. According to census data, in 1920 there were 126,120 indi-
viduals living in the county.2 ' By 1930, the population had more
than doubled to 303,053.22 Even after adjusting for this population
growth, however, the number of foreclosures initiated in Nassau
County rose dramatically in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In fact,
the annual number of foreclosure actions filed per capita for 1927-
1939 was more than twice that for the period immediately preced-
ing, 1920-1926.
TABLE 2
~30-
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20. The urban real estate market also started to decline during this time period
prior to the Depression. In 1927 real estate in New York City appreciated 12%, but
property values increased only 9% in 1928, 8% in 1929, 6% in 1930, 3% in 1931, and
1% in 1932. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE
FALL OF NEW YORK 326 (1974).
21. See 1920 CENSUS, supra note 18, Table I (State Compendium: New York. Sta-
tistics of Population, Occupation, Agriculture, Manufacture and Mines and Quarries
for the State, Counties, and Cities).
22. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930.
POPULATION. VOL. III: REPORTS By STATES, SHOWING THE COMPOSITION AND
CHARAcTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION FOR COUNTIES, CITIES, AND TOWNSHIPS OR
OTHER MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS Table 11 (1932) [hereinafter 1930 CENSUS].
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As Table Two shows, 3 the period after World War II differed
even more dramatically from the 1927-1939 period. The Table
shows that the number of foreclosure actions as a percent of total
litigation in Nassau County was at or above 25% in every five-year
period during 1926-1940; after falling back to 11.4% for the 1941-
1945 period and 6.7% for 1946-1950, the percentage fell to 4.0%
for the next five-year period and never exceeded 5.0% thereafter.
Total foreclosure cases, which had been over 2,000 per year during
most of the 1930s fell to an average of 502 per year for 1941-1945
and to only 286 per year for 1946-1950. Of course, the population
of Nassau County underwent dramatic growth in the years follow-
ing World War II. In 1940, Nassau's population was 406,748.4 The
number rose to 672,765 by 195025 and to 1,300,171 by 1960.26
Thereafter, the population growth stabilized at 1,428,080 in 197027
and declined slightly in 1980 to 1,321,582.28 Despite this huge pop-
ulation increase, foreclosure cases did not rise to an average of
over 1000 annually - less than half the 1930s rate - until the sec-
ond-half of the 1970s, when the county had approximately four
times as many people and four times as much litigation as it had
had in 1930. These figures suggest a wholesale transformation in
the suburban housing market in Nassau County after World War
II.
The high rate of mortgage foreclosure actions prior to World
War II, as a total number, as a percent of total litigation, and as a
per capita rate, is indicative of an inefficient suburban housing
market, particularly when compared to the low number of foreclo-
sure actions after World War II. Large numbers of foreclosures
occur only when the market fails to clear at a price at which sellers
are willing to sell and buyers are able to buy, with the result that
buyers pay a higher price than they can afford, subsequently be-
23. Using standard statistical methods, it can be asserted at a 95% confidence
level that the difference between foreclosure rates prior to 1940 and after 1951 is
significant.
24. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940.
POPULATION. VOLUME II: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION. PART 5: NEW
YORK - OREGON 39 (Table 21) (1943) [hereinafter 1940 CENSUS].
25. 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at Table 5 (Vol. I: Number Of Inhabitants).
26. 1960 CENSUS, supra note 18, at Table 6 (Vol. I: Characteristics Of The Popula-
tion. Part 34: New York).
27. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION. VOLUME I: CHAR-
ACERISTICS OF THE POPULATION. PART 34: NEW YORK Table 9 (1973) [hereinafter
1970 CENSUS].
28. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING. CEN-
SUS TRACTs NASSAU-SuFFOLK, N.Y. Table P-1 (1983) [hereinafter 1980 CENSUS].
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come unable to pay their bills, and thereby lead themselves, and, at
times, sellers as well into economic ruin.
Consider, for example, a dwelling for which a seller seeks a down
payment of $2000 and ten subsequent annual payments, including
interest, of $1000 per year. If a buyer eager to own the dwelling is
in fact capable of making those payments, the market will clear at
the specified price, and both the buyer and the seller will be better
off. The sale, that is, will constitute a Pareto improvement, and the
real estate market can be said to function with Pareto efficiency.
The market will remain efficient even if a particular buyer subse-
quently proves unable to make the annual $1000 payments, as long
as some other buyer is able and willing to repay what the first
buyer has spent and to assume the first buyer's remaining obliga-
tions. In such circumstances, the second buyer will simply
purchase the interest of the first buyer. The original seller will be
no worse off, nor will the act of resale have made the first buyer
worse off. The resale will still be Pareto efficient, since the second
buyer will consider herself better off.
What happens, however, when high transaction costs or other
external economic impediments make willing buyers unable to pay
the price being sought? If a real estate developer or other initial
seller is lucky, he will learn quickly of his inability to sell at his
desired price and will either lower the price or merely hold onto
the property in its existing state until market conditions improve,
without making further improvements. Of course, some risk at-
taches to such a course of action: a developer who has financed an
acquisition of realty through borrowing may prove unable to pay
its loans if it cannot resell at an anticipated price and, if so, may
face foreclosure at the hand of its creditors. Indeed, developers
and other real estate companies were the defendants in 22.2% of
all foreclosure actions between 1920 and 1939 - a total, in all, of
6283 foreclosures.
B. Deficiencies in Foreclosure Sales as a Sign of Inefficiency
A developer or other seller can end up even worse off if an ini-
tial sale occurs and the buyer subsequently proves unable to make
required payments. Then, foreclosure will occur, and at least one
or possibly both of the parties will suffer a catastrophic loss. If a
foreclosure sale yields a price below the amount still owned on the
purchase, the buyer will lose the house and the amounts spent on
the down payment and any subsequent annual payments, and will
also find herself liable on a deficiency judgment for the difference
1999] SUB URBANIZATION AND MARKET FAILURE 205
between the auction price and the total of the payments still
owed.2 9 The seller will receive less than full payment plus the right
to collect on a deficiency judgment that will likely prove uncollecti-
ble. Both the buyer and the seller will thus be worse off than if the
original sale had never occurred.
C. Surpluses in Foreclosure Sales as a Sign of Inefficiencies
A second sort of inefficiency may also occur during foreclosure
cases, and in fact sometimes did occur in Nassau County during the
1920s and 1930s. In many of the foreclosure cases that proceeded
to final judgment during the two decades, the price obtained at an
auction sale exceeded the amount owed on the mortgage, resulting
in a distribution of a surplus to the owner of the mortgaged prop-
erty. In fact, foreclosure sales with surpluses constituted 4.3% of
foreclosure filings between 1920 and 1939. This data is strange be-
cause foreclosures, if they are conducted efficiently, should never
produce surpluses. In an instance in which a foreclosure auction
produces a surplus, a private sale should produce an even larger
surplus, since transaction costs in a private sale are much lower
than in a judicial foreclosure. If mortgaged property can be sold in
a private sale at an amount that will pay off the mortgage and pro-
duce a surplus, it is in everyone's interest that a private sale, rather
than a foreclosure sale take place. Foreclosures should occur only
when property cannot be sold at an amount sufficient to retire ex-
isting indebtedness. The only other time that foreclosures can oc-
cur so as to routinely produce surpluses is when the market is
operating so inefficiently that owners of mortgaged property can-
not estimate the price they can obtain by selling it.
Thus, the facts of frequent foreclosures against both home own-
ers and developers, of frequent deficiencies in foreclosure sales,
and of occasional surpluses, demonstrate that the suburban hous-
ing market in Nassau County operated in a highly inefficient man-
ner in the decades prior to World War II. Despite the existence of
thousands of families who wished to move from the crowded tene-
ments of the city to the open expanses of the suburbs and the ex-
isting homeowners and land developers who sought buyers, the
two parties - buyer and seller - often failed to come together in
the market to consummate a transaction. The high foreclosure
29. Buyers were liable for deficiency judgments in 36.4% of all foreclosure cases
between 1920 and 1939.
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rates testify to this market failure, as does the frequency with which
foreclosure sales produced either deficits or surpluses.
This same market, however, became much more efficient in the
years following the war, when hundreds of thousands of families
relocated from New York City to Nassau County. The puzzle is to
explain what altered the suburban landscape of the New York met-
ropolitan region during the first half of the 1940s. More specifi-
cally, the question is what transformed the suburban housing
market in Nassau County? The next several sections address this
question, beginning first with a factor of obvious importance - the
County's transportation infrastructure.
II. THE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
No place can become a bedroom community for a nearby city
until an infrastructure exists for transporting commuters between
their jobs and their homes. In much of the United States, no such
infrastructure existed prior to World War II. In Nassau County,
though, all the precursors to suburban development existed by that
time. By 1920, Nassau already possessed a well-developed trans-
portation infrastructure, and major investments in the 1920s and
early 1930s only made Nassau County even more accessible and
appealing to potential commuters. Transportation to and from the
urban business center of Manhattan was possible via either com-
muter rail or that newly emerging technological wonder, the
automobile.
A. The Long Island Railroad
By 1898, the Long Island Rail Road ("LIRR") 3° possessed an
extensive rail network with three main lines running the length of
the island. 31 Although the idea of extending the LIRR into Man-
hattan via bridge or tunnel circulated in the minds of the Railroad's
directors for several decades prior to the turn of the century, the
impetus for building rail tunnels underneath the East River did not
receive determined backing until the Pennsylvania Railroad ac-
quired the LIRR in 1900.32 In 1910, the East River Tunnels were
30. The LIRR was founded in 1834 to connect New York and Boston via Long
Island because it was thought impossible, due to the hills and rivers of Connecticut, to
build an overland route. Such an overland route was completed in 1848. See MIL-
DRED H. SMITH, EARLY HISTORY OF THE LONG ISLAND RAILROAD: 1834-1900 2
(1958).
31. See id. at 54.
32. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 54-55; 7 VINCENT F. SEYFRIED, THE LONG IS-
LAND RAIL ROAD: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY 76-79 (1984).
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completed and opened to passenger rail service, finally allowing
Long Island commuters to ride the rails from their suburban homes
nonstop to Pennsylvania Station in the heart of Manhattan.33 No
longer were commuters required to disembark in Queens or
Brooklyn and ride ferries across the river. The savings in time
were immense: express trains from Babylon in Suffolk County,
some six miles east of Nassau County, reached Pennsylvania Sta-
tion in sixty-three minutes.34
Though the opening of the East River tunnels was a landmark
event in New York's rail history, other improvements in rail service
also contributed to the shortening of the commuting time between
Nassau County and New York City. Grade crossings - the inter-
sections of rail lines and carriage roads - posed a threat to public
safety and required trains to slow down when approaching the
crossing. The death of five well-connected individuals in 1897 fi-
nally drew attention to the danger of grade crossings and com-
pelled the LIRR, with financial assistance from the state
legislature, to undertake a massive, long-term program to eliminate
dangerous intersections. By World War I most grade crossings in
Queens, the portion of Long Island between Manhattan and Nas-
sau, had been eliminated, thereby improving both the safety and
speed of rail service in the area.36
Electrification of the rail lines also increased the speed of rail
service. The development of the East River and Hudson River
Tunnels required electrification: steam locomotives were inoper-
able in the long tunnels.37 Electrification entailed an enormous in-
vestment by the LIRR, requiring the purchase of new trains, the
construction of an electrical generation plant and electrical substa-
tions, and the laying of the third rail. With the completion of the
electrical generation station in Long Island City in 1905, prepara-
tions were made to inaugurate electrical rail service, 8 which was
much faster than steam locomotives on short-distance, commuter
33. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 104-05; GEORGE H. BURGESS AND MILES C.
KENNEDY, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA, RAILROAD COMPANY:
1846-1946 524 (1949).
34. See First Passenger Train to Babylon Was Run Fifty Years Ago Today, BROOK-
LYN EAGLE, Oct. 28, 1917. According to the Long Island Railroad's November 1997
timetable, the fastest express trains between Babylon and Pennsylvania Station take
52 minutes.
35. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 20.
36. See id. at 21.
37. See id. at 53.
38. See id. at 56.
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runs.39 On July'18, 1905 the first electrical train pulled out of Man-
hattan Crossing in East New York bound for Rockaway Beach.4"
By the end of 1905, the LIRR had electrified its first line to Nassau
County. 41 Electrification of other lines proceeded apace, with elec-
tric train service reaching Hempstead in 190842 and Lynbrook by
1910, halving the commuting time from ninety to forty-five min-
utes.43 By 1925, the LIRR had invested $25 million in electrifica-
tion and had successfully electrified 115 of the 398 miles of rails on
Long Island.44 Not until the 1980s did the railroad begin the elec-
trification of additional trackage.
Residents of Nassau County warmly welcomed electrification,
often with village-wide celebrations the day electric rail service
commenced.45 In 1925, for example, when the LIRR inaugurated
electric train service to Babylon in Suffolk County, Lynbrook,
which was a station on the Babylon line, planned a "boisterously
appropriate" celebration to mark the day.46 Nor was the potential
impact of these improvements lost on railroad executives. Prior to
the turn of the century, the LIRR had relied primarily on summer
travel, weekend excursion, and freight hauling for its revenues.47
However, as affluent city residents began to construct summer cot-
tages, particularly along Nassau County's "Gold Coast," the rail-
road discovered a new source of revenue, one that would
eventually become the life-blood of the LIRR: the commuter.
The LIRR quickly sought to capitalize upon and expand this
emerging market by directly encouraging suburban relocation. Pro-
motional pamphlets published by the railroad extolled the virtues
of Nassau County, such as the "alluring characteristics of blue
water and umbrageous woodland" along the county's North
39. See id. at 69.
40. See id. at 69, 201.
.41. See id. at 73.
42. See Development of L.I., SOUTH SIDE MESSENGER, Feb. 21, 1911; Electrifica-
tion Plans Began to Form in 1905, NASSAU DAILY REVIEW, May 20, 1925.
43. 2 HENRY ISHAM HAZELTON, THE BOROUGHS OF BROOKLYN AND QUEENS;
COUNTIES OF NASSAU AND SUFFOLK: LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK: 1609-1924 870
(1925). According to the November 1995 timetable, the fastest train between Lyn-
brook and Pennsylvania Station now takes 32 minutes.
44. Electrification Plans Began to Form in 1905, supra note 42.
45. See, e.g., HAZELTON, supra note 43, at 870; Cheering Villages to Greet Special
Train Inaugurating Long Island Electrification, NASSAU DAILY REVIEW, May 19,
1925; Even Lynbrook Swings in Line to Celebrate Great Change in Transportation,
NASSAU DAILY REVIEW, May 20, 1925.
46. Even Lynbrook Swings in Line, supra note 45.
47. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 188.
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Shore.4 8 The 1903 pamphlet left less to the imagination and adver-
tised more bluntly that
The suburban places on Long Island offer to business men who
must needs be at their desks daily, the best opportunity to locate
their families where they have all the desirable advantages of
the country, and where they themselves may spend each night
without making the daily journey to and from the city a tiresome
feature of daily life.49
Not surprisingly, the directors of the LIRR were among the first
to recognize the opportunities for suburban development being
created by the railroad. The LIRR, beginning in 1902, purchased
through its own real estate subsidiary, the Stuyvesant Real Estate
Company, large tracts of land in Queens for railroad use.50 Simi-
larly, the directors of its parent company, the Pennsylvania Rail-
road, recognized that land near railroad lines would quickly
appreciate in value as the lines were electrified or otherwise made
more accessible to Manhattan. Having the benefit of knowing in
advance what lines would be so improved, the directors themselves
purchased large tracts of land in Queens and Nassau Counties. 1 In
1903, the LIRR counsel, William J. Kelly, incorporated the
Matawok Land Company.52 Recognizing the huge profits to be
made through real estate speculation, the Matawok Land Co.
bought substantial acreage as far east as Floral Park.53 Regardless
of whether it was from the hope of increased ridership or from
profits from real estate development or most likely from a combi-
nation of both, it was with less than altruistic motives that the
LIRR assured potential riders that Nassau County's variety of fea-
tures made it an ideal setting "for a vacation, a summer's rest, or
for the site of a permanent home. 5. 4
Other individuals also foresaw the financial gains to be made by
investing in the suburban real estate market. Individuals such as
William K. Vanderbilt and others engaged in a speculative real es-
tate boom that inflated the value of some rural acreage in Queens
.48. Long Island, published by the Passenger Department of the Long Island Rail-
road (1917), at 15.
49. Long Island Illustrated, published by the Passenger Department of the Long
Island Railroad (1903), at 10.
50. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 15.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Along the Sunrise Trails of Long Island, published by the General Passenger
Department of the Long Island Railroad (1923), at 3.
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ten-fold." The Cord Meyer Development Co., receiving assistance
from the Matawok Land Co., invested heavily in Forest Hills.56 By
1907, most of the available undeveloped land in Queens had been
purchased, and land speculation consequently waned in that
county. However, the rural acreage of Nassau County to the east
beckoned to savvy real estate developers,57 such as the Long Beach
Improvement Company, which in 1907 purchased acreage on Long
Beach to develop a suburban community and vacation resort com-
plete with a hotel and boardwalk.58 In 1912 the Amsterdam Devel-
opment and Sales Company purchased eight farms in Malverne, a
predominantly rural, farming community. 9 By 1920, Malverne, by
then an incorporated village, contained over one hundred homes,
along with a school and several churches. 6° The railroad's impor-
tance in the development of these suburban communities cannot
be overestimated. In 1928, William Gibson completed construction
on his 700-home development near Valley Stream.61 To ensure rail
service to his new community, Gibson constructed a railroad sta-
tion at his own expense and donated it to the LIRR.62
As more and more families relocated to Nassau County during
this first burst of suburbanization, ridership swelled during the
early part of the twentieth century. Total ridership more than
doubled from 14,520,218 in 1901 to 30,978,615 in 1910, exploding
thereafter to 72,743,820 in 1920 and exceeding 100 million in
1925.63 In response to the opening of the East River Tunnels, com-
muting traffic alone increased from 7,744,860 in 1909 to 11,534,562
in 1912.64 In fact, commuter traffic grew explosively during the
1910s and 1920s across the county.65 In 1927, the LIRR carried 112
million passengers - one eighth of the total railroad ridership in
the United States - of whom 63 million traveled into or out of
Manhattan.66 By 1930, more than 30,000 commuters made the
55. See id.
56. See id. at 16.
57. See Development of L.I., SOUTH SIDE MESSENGER (Feb. 21, 1911).
58. See EDWARD J. SMITS, NASSAU: SUBURBIA, U.S.A: THE FIRST SEVENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK: 1899 TO 1974, 161 (1974).
59. See id. at 161-62.
60. See id. at 162.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 191.
64. See id.
65. See SMITS, supra note 58, at 155. For example, Freeport, which had 475 com-
muters in 1911, had 2211 by 1923, and Rockville Centre witnessed its commuter traffic
grow from 589 in 1911 to over 3000 by 1929. See id.
66. See Long Island R. R. Reveals Rapid Growth, MAG. N.Y., Feb. 1929.
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daily journey aboard the LIRR from Nassau County to New York
City.67 The incredible improvements in rail service during the first
decade of the twentieth century - the East River Tunnels, the
elimination of grade crossings, and the electrification of the main
lines - had opened new communities to suburban development
with its concomitant reliance on commuter transportation. As the
LIRR noted itself in one of its less humble, though not entirely
inaccurate, moments, "[tihe popularity of Long Island as a place of
residence can be truthfully credited to its high type of transporta-
tion service (including many miles of electrified lines) which brings
all parts of this glorious land within easy reach of the center of New
York City (7th Avenue & 33rd Street)."68 Only as an afterthought
did the LIRR think to give some of the credit for Nassau County's
growth "to its healthful climate, to its unique geographical location
and its pleasant and tastefully designed houses and cottages. '69
Nor did community leaders, recognizing the potential financial
windfall, overlook the railroad's contribution to suburban develop-
ment in their hamlets. Babylon historian Benjamin P. Field noted:
What the railroad has done for Babylon, it has likewise done for
all the communities of the South Shore. It has brought them
nearer to New York, the greatest city in a country of one hun-
dred million population. It has made them convenient dwelling
places for hundreds of city workers who now form our army of
commuters and has opened an outlet for our young men and
women to the big business fields of New York.7"
B. The Automobile and Highways
The rapid emergence of the automobile during the 1910s and
1920s facilitated the development of an alternative, though gener-
ally slower, method for suburban residents of Nassau County to
commute to work in Manhattan. With the opening of the Brooklyn
Bridge in 1883, the Williamsburgh Bridge in 1903, and the Manhat-
tan and the Queensborough Bridges in 1909,71 it became feasible,
though time-consuming, 72 to drive from Long Island to Manhattan.
67. See SMITS, supra note 58, at 155-56.
68. Along the Sunrise Trails, supra note 54, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Veteran Long Island Men... First Locomotive..., BROOKLYN EAGLE, Nov. 4,
1917.
71. See SEYFRIED, supra note 32, at 214.
72. One 1931 study, for example, showed that the average, rush-hour motorist
spent 43 minutes crossing the Queensborough Bridge. See CARO, supra note 20, at
330.
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As automobile prices dropped due to Henry Ford's assembly-line
manufacturing process, they became an engine of suburban devel-
opment. For example, the number of registered automobiles in
Nassau County climbed from 8,766 in 1916 to approximately 40,000
in 1922 and exploded to 112,000 by 1930. 7'
The State constructed Nassau County's highway system to keep
pace with the spread of automobiles. Prior to the 1920s, the county
had lacked an extensive highway system capable of handling a
large of amount of automotive traffic. The main transportation ar-
teries, such as Merrick Road, Jericho Turnpike, Hempstead Turn-
pike and others, were poorly-surfaced, two lane roads in desperate
need of repair and widening. 4 The original post road, Merrick
Road, was often congested, particularly on weekends when resi-
dents of the city sought the recreational playgrounds of Nassau
County.75
The first major highway improvement occurred in 1914, when
William Vanderbilt completed construction of a private, toll road,
the Long Island Motor Parkway, which ran from the city limits
across Nassau to Suffolk County.76 The 1920s, in turn, witnessed
tremendous investment in Nassau County's highway infrastructure.
Existing roadways such as Merrick Road, Jericho Turnpike, Hemp-
stead Turnpike, and North Hempstead Turnpike were widened and
paved with concrete,77 and new highways were built where once
only farmland had existed. Legislation sponsored by New York
State Assemblyman Thomas McWhinney funded the construction
of the Sunrise Highway, and the first stretch of the Highway from
Brooklyn to Lynbrook opened in 1928.78 Nevertheless, it was the
Long Island State Park Commission, under the leadership of the
indomitable Robert Moses, that initiated the massive highway con-
struction program in the county. The Southern State Parkway,
running from the New York City line to Wantagh, opened in 1929,
and construction began on the Northern State Parkway.79 In 1931
73. See SMITS, supra note 58, at 152.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 151.
76. See id. at 153. Despite the hefty (and exclusionary) one dollar daily toll
charge, the Parkway never earned a profit. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 151.
79. See CARO, supra note 20, at 282, 308.
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the Southern State Parkway was extended from Wantagh to Massa-
pequa and, the year after that, to Amityville in Suffolk County.80
Although some villages had opposed the construction of new
highways out of fear of unleashing a tidal wave of "rabble" from
the city, 81 communities quickly began to perceive, much as they
had with the LIRR, the substantial financial benefits they would
gain from road construction near their villages.8 2
Within a year of the opening of the Southern State Parkway,
both the Nassau and Suffolk County Boards of Supervisors appro-
priated millions of dollars to condemn land for the right-of-way for
proposed highways. 83 Real estate developers so adored Robert
Moses for constructing new roadways, which they hoped would in-
crease land values, that the East Islip Community Association, for
example, presented Moses with a silver cup showing its
appreciation. 4
Despite the extensive transportation infrastructure existing in
Nassau County by the end, if not the beginning of the 1920s,
suburbanization did not occur, at least not on any scale resembling
the massive influx of residents after World War 11.85 Nassau
County prior to the war remained largely undeveloped.86 Even
with the large-scale improvements in rail and highway travel, and
even with the presence of real estate developers banking on
80. See id. at 313. Only one new highway, the Long Island Expressway, was built
after World War II.
81. See id. at 187, 204-05.
82. See id. at 206-07.
83. See id. at 312.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. According to census reports, prior to the turn of the century, only 6491 dwell-
ings were built in Nassau County. During the 1900s 7894 new houses were built and
12,132 more during the 1910s. See 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 317 (Table 22). The
1920s witnessed the first wave of suburbanization in the county as 54,465 new homes
were built during the decade. The Depression curtailed some development as only
38,905 new homes were built during the 1930s. Shortages caused by World War II
resulted in only 16,475 new homes being built in the first half of the 1940s, but the
beginning of the suburbanization boom led to the construction of 59,165 new homes
in the second half of the decade. See 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 38 (Table 20).
By 1950, 38% of the dwellings in Nassau County had been built less than ten years
earlier. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT, COUNTY
AND CITY DATA BOOK 1952 293 (Table 3) (1953) [hereinafter 1950 STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT]. This enormous suburban construction primarily produced only one type of
structure. In 1940, the vast majority of the houses (89.3%) were that most familiar
symbol of suburbia: the one-family, detached structure. See 1940 CENSUS, supra note
24, at 384 (Table 27). By 1950, the percentage of owner-occupied homes that were
one-family, detached dwellings increased to 92.5%. See 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18,
at 16 (Table 17).
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suburbanization, Nassau County's potential as a suburban home
for hundreds of thousands of families was a reality in the decades
before World War II only for tens of thousands. In contrast, popu-
lation growth after World War II was measured in the hundreds of
thousands.87 For instance, in one year, 1949, 75,595 people relo-
cated to Nassau County, more than 11% of the county's population
as a whole.88
With tenement dwellers eager to move, with real estate develop-
ers ready to sell, and with a transportation infrastructure capable of
bringing workers to their job, why did the market for suburban de-
velopment fail during the 1920s? Why, in turn, did it become effi-
cient two decades later? Something occurred during the early
1940s that transformed the suburban housing market and altered
forever the suburban landscape in the New York metropolitan
area. That something was the law.
Il. EQUALITY FOR HOME BUYERS
A. Nassau's Exclusion of Blacks, Catholics and Jews, 1920-1945
Part of the answer to the market failure of the 1920s and 1930s
lay in the demographics of the county. Prior to World War II, Nas-
sau County's population remained largely white, Anglo-Saxon, and
Protestant ("WASP"). 8 9 Jews and Catholics, particularly Catholics
from Ireland and Italy, were prevented from purchasing homes in
Nassau County by a variety of official and unofficial means. 90 Afri-
can-Americans were, of course, also unwelcome.91 Prior to World
War II, in short, Nassau County contained "restricted" communi-
ties, such as Garden City, in which only WASP's were welcome.92
Despite Buchanan v. Warley,93 municipal zoning laws may have
been used to exclude unwanted demographic groups from commu-
nities. The illegality of such a practice makes it difficult to trace,
and no cases outlawing exclusionary zoning arose during the pre-
war era. As we shall see, however, cases outlawing exclusionary
87. See CARO, supra note 20, at 898-99.
88. See 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 154 (Table 42).
89. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 28.
90. See id. at 28 n.122.
91. See id. at 33.
92. See Synagogue Loses L.I. Zoning Plea, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1956, at 33 ("Un-
til about five years ago, Garden City was in effect, a 'restricted' community, with few
Jewish families living here. But in the last few years the Jewish population has in-
creased, with the center now numbering 200 members.").
93. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that city zoning laws that discriminate on the basis
of color violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution).
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practices against Catholics and Jews did arise in New York after
the war, and the existence of the cases, which outlawed the prac-
tices, suggests that the practices were not new.94
Restrictive covenants were a second legal device for keeping
Jews, Catholics and Blacks out of communities, although there is
no direct evidence about the extent of their use in Nassau. One
case during the 1930s, however, upheld the enforcement of such a
covenant when an African-American sought to purchase a house in
suburban Westchester County, 95 and there is no question that the
use of racially restrictive covenants was widespread. 96 Nor is there
any doubt about the utilization of restrictive covenants to accom-
plish discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds.97
Besides legally sanctioned discrimination, unofficial means of ex-
cluding Jews, ethnic Catholics, and African-Americans also existed.
The Ku Klux Klan (the "KKK" or "Klan"), though still predomi-
nantly a Southern phenomenon, maintained a large, well-organized
presence on Long Island prior to World War 11.98 The KKK held
its first organizational meeting on Long Island in Freeport on Sep-
tember 7, 1922, which drew about 150 prospective members.99 The
Klan organizer, introduced only as Mr. Smith, railed against Jewish
control of anything from newspaper stands - he alleged that
25,000 of the 27,000 news stands in New York City were Jewish-
owned - to the motion picture industry. 100 Klan membership
grew quickly thereafter as Freeport became the center of Klan ac-
tivity in Nassau County.' In 1923, the New York Times estimated
that 200,000 persons belonged to the Klan statewide, and approxi-
mately 10% of the Klan's New York state membership came from
Long Island.10 2
The Klan was virulently anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic and anti-im-
migrant. Given the small population of blacks in Nassau County in
94. See Community Synagogue v. Bates, 136 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1956) (striking com-
munity efforts to prevent construction of a synagogue); Diocese of Rochester v. Plan-
ning Board, 136 N.E.2d 827 (N.Y. 1956) (striking down community efforts to prevent
construction of a Roman Catholic church and school).
95. See Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N.Y.S. 936 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1937).
96. See John P. Dean, Only Caucasian: A Study of Race Covenants, 23 J. LAND &
PUB. UTIL. ECON. 428 (1947).
97. See 50 AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK (5709) 1948-1949 768 (Harry Schneider-
man & Morris Fine eds., 1949).
98. See Long Island Sees Biggest Klan Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1923, at 1.
99. Klu Klux Klan Organized, THE DAILY REVIEW, Sept. 8, 1922, at 1.
100. See id.
101. See DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE
Ku KLUX KLAN 256 (1981).
102. See id. at 260.
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the 1920s, the Klan's concern primarily focused on the small but
growing population of Jews and Catholics, particularly those who
had immigrated from Eastern or Southern Europe. °3 The
Klansman's Creed, a virtually sacred pledge taken by all Klansmen
nationwide, expressly stated that "I believe in the limitation of for-
eign immigration. I am a native-born American citizen and I be-
lieve my rights in this country are superior to those of foreigners."
One letter sent by the KKK to Protestant pastors in the state ex-
horted them to form local Klans and vote for "Protestants only
who have no marriage affiliations with Catholics or Jews, or part-
ners with either."'0 4 The letter closed with "Save the county and
your State from Jews and Catholics."'10 5 At one Klan rally in Suf-
folk County organized.by the Suffolk, Nassau and Queens County
Klans, an unidentified minister addressed the 25,000 Klansmen in
attendance and warned that the Roman Catholic Church was a
political party in disguise and that Jews in America sought only
money and political influence - as if such ambition did not flour-
ish in WASP circles.1 0 6 When the Cure of Ars Catholic Church was
established in Merrick in 1926, the KKK burned a cross in its park-
ing lot,107 and when the Irish-American Catholic Al Smith ran for
President in 1928 on the Democratic Party ticket, flaming crosses
burned on the hills of Alabama and Mississippi, and by order of the
Suffolk County GOP - a Klan dominated organization at the time
- on the hills of Suffolk. 108 Although many religious leaders con-
demned the Klan, not all did.10 9 One Protestant pastor in Nassau
County, the Rev. C.I. Oswald, pastor of the Freeport Presbyterian
Church, delivered a vehement defense of the Klan in a sermon en-
103. See SMITS, supra note 58, at 147 (1974); see also CARO, supra note 20, at 148;
Laura Durkin, Illuminating Darker Side of LI's Past, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1982; Patricia
M. Roniger, The Women's Klan of L.I., Sisters of the Klansmen, LONG ISLAND HERI-
TAGE, May 1983, at 1.
104. Klan Urges Pastors to War on Catholics, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 1923, at 14.
105. Id.
106. See Long Island Sees Biggest Klan Crowd, supra note 98, at 1, 10.
107. See Transcript Of Interview Tapes of Miss Katherine Reif for the Merrick His-
torical Society 9 (1976) (on file with the authors).
108. See CARO, supra note 20, at 148.
109. See, e.g., Klan on Long Island, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1923, at B1. Some Protes-
tant pastors may have seen it in the best interest of the church not to antagonize the
Klan. Several Protestant churches in Nassau County received silk American flags and
purses of gold from local Klans. See K.K.K. Gives Church Flags and Purse, NASSAU
DAILY REVIEW, Mar. 9, 1925; Crowd Sees Klan Give Gold Purse and Flag, NASSAU
DAILY REVIEW, Jan. 12, 1925.
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titled "Has the Ku Klux Klan the Right to Organize in New York
State?"11 In Rev. Oswald's opinion, the answer was yes.
Cross-burnings and rallies drawing thousands reminded
Catholics and Jews alike that Nassau County was not open to them.
The Klan parade in Merrick contained a placard which read "No
Koons, Kikes, or Katolics!"'111 These Nassau County Klan rallies
and parades drew thousands of hooded members.1 1 2 At one rally
in Lindenhurst in 1927, 10,000 Klansmen watched as the Klan initi-
ated more than 1,000 new members.' 13 10,000 Klansmen paraded
in Oceanside in 1925,"' and the annual Klorero - the K.K.K. ver-
sion of a convention - in Mineola in 1926 drew 3,000.115 Although
reports of Klan-organized violence were rare, they were not un-
heard of in Nassau County. Cross-burnings occurred across the
county during the 1920s, scaring residents of Valley Stream,116
lighting the sky above Garden City,117 and frightening blacks in
Freeport." 8 The intimidating effect of cross-burnings cannot be
overestimated. As Klan historian William Randel noted, "the sym-
bolic power of the fiery cross. .. casts a shadow on many a neigh-
borhood to know that it harbors a potentially hostile element
which at any moment may disrupt the illusion of peace."11 9
For those relatively few Catholics and Jews who were not de-
terred from moving to Nassau County by the cross-burnings and
Klan Konventions, the Klan employed more direct means of intim-
idation. On August 14, 1924 eight men entered the Freeport phar-
macy owned by Ernest Louis, a Jew accused but cleared of child
molestation.1 2° They informed him that "[w]e don't want your type
around here. You have eight days to get out. This is a warning
110. Pastor Defends Klan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1923, at 17.
111. Transcript of Interview Tapes of Miss Katherine Reif, supra note 107, at 9.
112. See, e.g., Klansman Parade on Merrick Road, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 1925, at 4.
113. See Long Island Klan Initiates 1,000 at Holiday Fete, N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE,
Jul. 5, 1927.
114. See 10,000 Klansmen Burn Cross at Oceanside, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 1925, at
B16.
115. See Val Duncan, The Good Old, Bad Old Days on LI: The Arrival of the Hate
Groups, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1965, at 1.
116. Klan Celebration Scares Residents of Valley Stream, N.D. REVIEW, Feb. 23,
1928.
117. Fiery Klan Crosses Light Long Island, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1923, at 14.
118. 3 Flaming Crosses Fired by the Ku Klux To Frighten Negroes in Long Island
Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1923, at 1.
119. WILLIAM PEIRCE RANDEL, THE Ku KLUX KLAN: A CENTURY OF INFAMY
224 (1965).
120. Duncan, supra note 115, at 2.
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from the Ku Klux Klan. ' 121 Louis dismissed the threat as a joke,
but a few days later as he walked along Bayview Avenue with his
wife, a car approached and a group of men jumped out, forcing
Louis into the car.122 After driving around for a few hours, the
kidnappers deposited the dazed druggist in Hicksville. Within a
couple of weeks, Louis and his family moved from Nassau County
back to New York City.' 23 Although he denied that the threat or
kidnapping had anything to do with his decision, Louis remarked
that "I haven't money enough to stay here and fight, anyway, and I
have lost all my business on account of the whole thing."' 24
Though a search was conducted for the kidnappers, the likelihood
of their apprehension was remote: less than a week after the kid-
napping, 2,000 Klansmen paraded through Freeport led by the vil-
lage Police Chief John Hartman. 25
Within a few years of its establishment, the Long Island Klan
achieved an aura of legitimacy in communities increasingly worried
about the influx of Eastern and Southern European immigrants. In
1923, the Kamelia, the female auxiliary of the Klan, won the prize
for most popular organization in the county at the Lynbrook fire-
men's tournament, outpolling both the Republican and Demo-
cratic Clubs of Lynbrook. 26 One year later, provoking a small
controversy, the Klan donated a flagpole to the Freeport High
School, a gift graciously accepted by the local school board. 127 The
Klan became so embedded within the community that one county
historian proudly listed it, along with the Elks, the Knights of Co-
lumbus, and the Masons, as an example of the county's "fraternal
organizations. "1'28
In response to this rising activity by the Klan, New York State
Senator Jimmy Walker, the future Mayor of New York City, intro-
duced a bill that, while exempting labor and benevolent organiza-
tions, required private organizations to disclose membership
lists. 129 The bill passed by a narrow margin.130 In response to the
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Menaced by Klan, Druggist to Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 1924, at 36.
124. Id.
125. Heidi Fried, Early Jewish Settlement In Nassau County: The Communities,
The People, The Synagogues 3 (unpublished manuscript available at the Long Island
Studies Institute at Hofstra University).
126. Fiery Klan Crosses Light Long Island, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1923, at 14.
127. Flagpole Splits Town, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1924, at 20.
128. HAZELTON, supra note 43, at 892.
129. See CHALMERS, supra note 101, at 255.
130. See id.
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new law, the Klan unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate as a be-
nevolent organization under the name of Alpha Pi Sigma, Inc. Af-
ter that effort failed, the Klan challenged the constitutionality of
the legislation, but again the Klan lost.1 3 '
The law achieved its intended effect as Klan influence began to
wane in the 1930s. In 1933, the three-day "konklave" of the New
York and New Jersey Klans held in Freeport attracted only 150
members. 132 The last recorded Klan session occurred in Valley
Stream in 1937.133 Nonetheless, the demise of the Klan did not
mean the end of xenophobia in Long Island. The German-Ameri-
can Bund, a pro-Nazi organization led by Fritz Kuhn, infiltrated the
German-American Settlement League's camp near Yaphank,
renamed it Camp Siegfried, and named streets after Hitler, Goe-
ring, and Goebbels. Armbands with swastikas and Nazi flags were
prevalent on Camp grounds. The New York Times reported that
"[o]n Sunday afternoons in 1938, the Long Island Rail Road ran
special trains out to Camp Siegfried, in Yaphank, where as many as
50,000 people might gather to watch Nazi rituals and hear speeches
describing the region as an Aryan paradise."' 34 The rising tide of
anti-fascism, together with the fact that the Camp's ftihrer, Kuhn,
was jailed in 1939 for pilfering the Bund's accounts, presaged the
end of the Bund. 35 Even Adolf Hitler, attempting to keep the
United States neutral by denying reports of rising German milita-
rism and mistreatment of the Jews, contributed to the Bund's de-
mise by ordering all German nationals, who comprised 73% of the
Bund's membership, to resign or lose their German citizenship.
Still the demise of organized hate groups did not signal the end
of racial violence in Nassau County.1 36 Indeed, the Klan merely
reflected, albeit in a more virulent and organized form, the native
Long Islanders' distrust and fear of '"foreigners" - a term that in-
cluded Jews, Irishmen, Italians, and virtually any other Southern or
Eastern European immigrant.137 Even as late as 1949, someone
shot an arrow into the Freeport home of a Jewish couple with a
131. See People ex rel. Bryant v. Sheriff of Erie County, 206 N.Y.S. 533 (Sup. Ct.
1924), affd sub nom. People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 210 N.Y.S. 269 (App. Div.
1925), affd, 241 N.Y. 405 (1926), affd, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
132. Klan Meets at Freeport, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 3, 1933, at 4.
133. See Duncan, supra note 115, at 2.
134. Lem Coley, Bigotry on L.I. Then and Now..., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1979, at 26.
135. See Duncan, supra note 115, at 2.
136. See David Behrens, Long Island Our Stories: The KKK Flares Up on LI,
NEWSDAY, May 6, 1998.
137. See CARO, supra note 20, at 147-48.
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note attached to the arrow warning the couple against selling their
home to a Black family.'38 A week later, a home owned by a Black
family in Roosevelt was stoned. 39
Though crude, these means were effective. Despite the fact that
the overflowing tenements of the New York City contained
thousands of families willing and able to relocate to the suburbs,
the population of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe
remained small in Nassau County during the years prior to World
War II. In 1920, the foreign-born white population of Nassau
County was 25,998, or 20.6% of the total county population.140 By
1930, the foreign-born white population grew to 63,437, or 20.9%
of the county population. Interestingly, most of these immigrants
came from Northern Europe, not Central or Southern Europe.
German immigrants (11,588) outnumbered those from the United
Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) with
10,168, from Italy with 9145, and from Poland with 5923.141
Although the foreign-born white population had grown by 1940 to
64,733, this represented only 15.8% of the county's total popula-
tion.142 Meanwhile, Nassau's African-American population re-
mained minuscule. The Black population of the county, which had
grown from 2.4% of the population in 1920 to 3.3% in 1940, fell to
2.6% in 1950.143 Even more importantly, blacks were practically
excluded from owning real property in the county and thereby act-
ing as a force to prop up housing demand. In 1940, Blacks owned
only 432 of the 61,371 owner-occupied homes in Nassau County, a
mere 0.7%.
138. See Nassau Klan Rise Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1949, at 25.
139. See id.
140. See 1920 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 38 (Table 9). Immigrants from Italy consti-
tuted the largest proportion of this group with 4290, slightly outnumbering the 4073
German immigrants. Poles with 3644 and the Irish with 3499 followed. See id. at 53-
54 (Table 12).
141. See 1930 CENSUS, supra note 22, at 298-99 (Table 18). For a breakdown of the
second-generation, native white population by parents' country of origin in Nassau
County, see id. at 300-01 (Table 21).
142. See 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 39 (Table 21). Germans still constituted
the largest part of this group with 12,050. Immigrants from Italy (9973), the United
Kingdom (9458), and Ireland (5013) followed. See id. at 63 (Table 24).
143. See 1920 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 38 (Table 9); 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24,
at 39 (Table 21); 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 290 (Table 3).
144. See 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 317 (Table 22). In 1950 blacks owned 1056
of the 142,285 owner-occupied homes, an unchanged seven percent. See 1950 CEN-
sus, supra note 18, at 16 (Table 17).
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B. The Law's Proclamation of Equality, 1944-1956
Change began in 1945, when New York State became one of the
first states in the nation to enact a modern Civil Rights statute
prohibiting racial, ethnic or religious discrimination in a variety of
contexts. 14 5 Although the 1945 act did not deal explicitly with the
purchase or sale of real property, it nonetheless established a basic
principle of racial, ethnic and religious equality.1 46 A more impor-
tant development occurred in 1949, when the New York Court of
Appeals, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Shelly v. Kramer,47 invalidated the use of restrictive covenants, 48
thereby removing one of the principal means of excluding racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities from residential communities. 49
A third change in legal doctrine occurred more slowly, but it had
an undoubted impact on the ability of religious minorities, espe-
cially Jews, to settle in Nassau County. 5 ° It dealt with the ability
of municipalities to use their zoning powers to prevent construction
of minority religious facilities and thereby exclude religious indi-
viduals by denying them a convenient place to practice their
faith. 51 The leading case was Community Synagogue v. Bates,152 in
which the Village of Sands Point on Nassau's North Shore sought
to keep a Reform Jewish Congregation out of the community. In
1952, the Community Synagogue purchased a four-acre estate
upon which it wished to locate but several neighbors had fought
the sale in court, arguing that restrictive covenants in the deed pro-
hibited the use of the property for anything other than residential
use. In response, the congregation purchased an option to buy the
magnificent Holmes estate, the Chimneys, which had been used as
a home for French sailors, as a merchant marine rehabilitation
center, and as a U.S. Navy Officer's Club. Six days prior to the
sale, the Sands Point Village Board amended its zoning ordinance,
however, to require approval by the Village Board of Zoning Ap-
peals of individual religious organizations before they could locate
in the village. When the congregation applied for a permit, the
board imposed a series of strangling regulations that limited the
congregation's construction to only five percent of the property,
145. See 1945 N.Y. Laws 292.
146. See id. at 10.
147. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
148. See Kemp v. Rubin, 81 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1948).
149. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 43.
150. See id. at 49-50.
151. See id. at 45.
152. 136 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1956).
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required the building to be taller than fifty feet, mandated 150
square feet of paved parking for each seat in use, and prohibited all
"accessory uses" like religious education and board meetings. The
political support for the congregation, from individuals such as the
Democratic candidate for Governor and neighbor of the congrega-
tion, Averill Harriman, convinced the village to rescind the ordi-
nance. However, it still refused to issue a certificate of occupancy
to the congregation, claiming that the synagogue would pose a
threat to the character of the community and to the public's health,
safety, and welfare. The congregation filed suit, but both the
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the
village.' 53 Only when the New York Court of Appeals in 1956
overturned the lower courts' rulings did the congregation finally
find its way clear to locate its synagogue in Sands Point.
Other congregations, such as Temple Or-Elohim in Jericho and
the Garden City Jewish Center, also encountered hostility from
communities and local zoning boards in the 1950s,154 and, even as
late as the 1970s, zoning regulations prevented the Seaford Jewish
Center from renovating a building for a synagogue in the village.' 55
1516 157th la caeoteHowever, in these cases, as in others, the law came to the
153. 147 N.Y.S.2d 204 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955).
154. See TOBIE NEWMAN & SYLVIA LANDOW, "THAT I MAY DWELL AMONG
THEM:" A SYNAGOGUE HISTORY OF NASSAU COUNTY 44-45, 73 (1991).
155. By the 1970s and 1980s, opposition may have stemmed not so much from reli-
gious intolerance as from genuine apprehension about the effect of the new syna-
gogues on residential neighborhoods. In 1981, fears of increased traffic and noise
prompted Cederhurst village residents to oppose the construction of a synagogue by
Young Israel of Lawrence-Cedarhurst. Only after three years of court battles did the
congregation receive a permit to build a synagogue, though of a size much smaller
than originally planned. See id. at 29-30.
156. See Seaford Jewish Ctr., Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead, 368
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); In re Garden City Jewish Ctr., 155 N.Y.S.2d
523, 528 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.), also reported at 157 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.
1956).
157. See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated
Village of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976);
Mikveh of South Shore Congregation, Inc. v. Granito, 432 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1980); Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 948 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau Co. 1971); Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v. Downer, 302 N.Y.S.2d
923 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1969); Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 184 N.Y.S.2d
687 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1959); Five Towns YM & YWHA, Inc. v. Plaut, 178 N.Y.S.2d
190 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.), affd, 181 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1958); Temple
Israel of Lawrence v. Plaut, 170 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1957), rev'd on
other grounds, 177 N.Y.S.2d 660 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1958); Hoelzer v. Incorporated
Village of New Hyde Park, 150 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1956). See also
Unitarian Universalist Church of Cent. Nassau v. Shorten, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau Co. 1970); North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of Plandome, 109 N.Y.S.2d
803 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1951). But see Congregation Gates of Prayer v. Board of
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assistance of the congregations, and the Jewish synagogues were
permitted to move into town. The most telling sign of change came
in 1976 when Congregation Shaaray Tefila was able to resolve its
zoning difficulties without recourse to litigation by enlisting the
support of the Mayor of Lawrence, Martin Rosen.158
C. The Entry of Minorities into the Real Estate Market
As a result of these dramatic changes in legal doctrine, hundreds
of thousands of immigrants and their descendants obtained the op-
portunity, previously denied to tenement-dwelling city residents, to
relocate to suburban Nassau. By 1960 immigrants and their chil-
dren comprised 39% of the county's population.159 While Nassau
County had remained anti-immigrant prior to World War II, the
children of the excluded immigrants became increasingly able to
relocate to the county once the war ended.
This demographic trend is confirmed by comparing religious
populations before and after World War II. Unfortunately, census
data does not provide information about religion, but comparative
religious populations can be estimated by looking at the number of
religious institutions.
Examination of the number of Roman Catholic parishes in Nas-
sau suggests, for example, that the Catholic population, predomi-
nantly Irish and Italian, constituted a relatively small proportion of
the county population prior to World War 11.16° The Official Direc-
tory & Buyers Guide To Catholic Institutions catalogues the
number of parish churches founded decade-by-decade in the
county. 161 The first parish, St. Patrick's in Glen Cove, was estab-
lished in 1856, but only fourteen parishes existed by the turn of the
century. Although the Catholic population increased in the first
three decades of the twentieth century, the 1950s witnessed the
largest migration of Catholics into Nassau County with twelve new
parishes established. Thereafter, the relocation of Catholic fami-
lies into the county dropped off. Nevertheless, of the sixty-six par-
Appeals of Lawrence, 368 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); YMCA of Greater
New York v. Burns, 207 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1960).
158. See NEWMAN & LANDOW, supra note 154, at 82, 148.
159. See 1960 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 355 (Table 82).
160. This demographic reality is illustrated by using the establishment of Roman
Catholic parishes as a rough measure of Catholic migration into the county.
161. This information is compiled from 1992-93 BLUE BOOK: OFFICIAL DIREC-
TORY & BUYERS GUIDE To CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS 269-89 (The Tablet Publishing
Company, Inc., Brooklyn, 1992).
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ishes currently in existence, one third of them were founded after
1940.
Similarly, but to an even more significant extent, the Jewish pop-
ulation in Nassau County was virtually nonexistent in the years
prior to World War II but grew dramatically thereafter. 162 The first
synagogue, Congregation Tifereth Israel, was established in Glen
Cove in 1897.163 In the following four decades, only twenty-one
more synagogues were founded to serve the small Nassau Jewish
community. 164 At the end of World War II, of the 4,000 residents
of Old Westbury, there were still only twenty-five Jewish families
living in the village. 165 As a consequence, congregations possessed
small memberships with only a handful of families . 66 During the
1940s, however, fifteen synagogues were founded, and an astound-
ing 46 congregations were established in the 1950s. The Jewish
population county-wide doubled in the 1950s alone.' 67 In Great
Neck, the Jewish population more than doubled in the 1940s from
4,000 in 1940 to 10,000 in 1950 and then almost doubled again dur-
ing the 1950s to 18,000 by 1960.168 In 1960, there were an estimated
329,100 Jews residing in Nassau County, 25.3% of the county's to-
tal population of 1,300,171.169
162. Religious populations are difficult to estimate since the United States Census
does not ask residents to identify their religious affiliation. The establishment of syn-
agogues is a rough proxy for a more detailed study of the Nassau County Jewish
population. However, a significant percentage of Jews do not belong to a synagogue,
and individual congregations consist of varying numbers of families, particularly over
time. Moreover, membership information supplied by synagogues may overestimate
the number of Jews associated with the congregation. See Fried, supra note 125, at 1-
2; see also MAX I. DIMONT, THE JEWS IN AMERICA 9-10 (1978).
163. See ROBERT REED COLES & PETER LUYSTER VAN SANTVOORD, A HISTORY
OF GLEN COVE 26 (1967).
164. For the individual founding dates of virtually all Nassau County synagogues,
see NEWMAN & LANDOW, supra note 154. The decade by decade comparison here is
compiled from the information contained in this invaluable source.
Note, however, that the founding date does not necessarily reflect the date of for-
mal incorporation of the congregation since many congregations met and performed
services prior to filing incorporation papers. For those synagogues that were founded
outside of Nassau County but later relocated there, the date noted is that of
relocation.
,165. See id. at 128.
166. For instance, Temple Gates of Zion in Valley Stream, founded by 25 families in
1929, possessed a membership of only 40 families in 1932 and 80 in 1939. See id. at
156.
167. See id. at 13.
168. See Jay Schulman, The Jews of Great Neck: A Heritage Affirmed, in ETHNIC-
ITY IN SUBURBIA: THE LONG ISLAND EXPERIENCE 71 (Salvatore J. LaGumina ed.
1980).
169. See AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK 1961, Ta-
ble 1 at 59 (1961).
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Even more significantly, this influx of Jewish families outpaced
the overall population growth rate during this same period.'
When two housing developments were completed in Oceanside in
1951, for instance, almost all of the new residents were Jewish.17'
While the county population increased from 672,762 in 1950 to
1,300,171 in 1960 - a 93% increase - the number of congrega-
tions in the county grew from thirty-seven to eighty-three - a
125% increase. Established congregations also expanded in order
to accommodate this rapid population growth, 72 and, in contrast to
the early congregations, synagogues after World War II were com-
posed of hundreds of families.' 73 Population growth somewhat sta-
bilized as only sixteen synagogues were founded in the 1960s, ten
in the 1970s, and three in the 1980s. Nonetheless, a recent study
suggested that a half million Jews live in Nassau County, one
twelfth the entire American Jewish population.
174
Even the African-American population of Nassau County began
to grow slowly after 1950, when it constituted a mere 2.6% of the
county total.' 75 But, thereafter, the black population rose to 3.0%.
in 1960, 4.5% in 1970, and 6.8% in 1980.176 Even more impor-
tantly, black home ownership also increased. In 1940, as we have
already seen, blacks owned only 432 of the 61,371 owner-occupied
homes in Nassau County, a mere 0.7%.' 77 By 1970 the situation
had improved somewhat with black families owning 8,510 out of
the 324,069 homes in the county, an increase to 2.6%.178
In sum, when Nassau in the post-World War II era encouraged
Catholics, Jews, and even blacks to move into the county, the
number of eligible buyers in its real estate market increased dra-
matically, the demand for its housing rose, and the market began to
clear efficiently. An important transaction cost - discrimination
- had been eliminated. While the WASP sellers who had formerly
170. See Fried, supra note 125, at 21; see also Schulman, supra note 168, at 71.
171. See NEWMAN & LANDOW, supra note 154, at 119.
172. See id. at 13.
173. Temple Beth-El in Great Neck, one of the largest in the county, counts more
than 1500 families among its membership. See id. at 59.
174. See Fried, supra note 125, at 21.
175. See 1920 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 38 (Table 9); 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24,
at 39 (Table 21); 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 290 (Table 3).
176. See 1960 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 176 (Table 28); 1970 CENSUS, supra note
27, at 220 (Table 34); 1980 CENSUS, supra note 28, at Table P-7.
177. See 1940 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 317 (Table 22). In 1950 blacks owned 1056
of the 142,285 owner-occupied homes, an unchanged 0.7%. See 1950 CENSUS, supra
note 18, at 16 (Table 17).
178. See 1970 CENSUS, supra note 27 (Vol. I: Housing Characteristics for States,
Cities, and Counties. Part 34: New York, Tables 29, 30).
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sought to exclude racial, ethnic, and religious minorities from their
midst were themselves transformed into a minority, their transfor-
mation brought them increased sales prices, an end to mortgage
foreclosures, and an efficient and prosperous real estate market. In
an extraordinary Pareto improvement, the end of discrimination
made virtually everyone in Nassau better off.
IV. THE FINANCING OF SUBURBANIZATION
The massive suburbanization of Nassau County in the wake of
World War II, of course, did not result solely from action by the
government to rid suburban communities and their housing mar-
kets of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. Prohibiting dis-
crimination did little to help families living in overcrowded
tenements who could not afford to relocate to the suburbs. Fund-
ing the suburban housing market was at least as important as en-
suring that the market was open to all who could afford to enter it.
The residential mortgage, which is often the primary, if not the
sole, means for most families to finance the purchase of their own
home, is a key determinant of the affordability of suburban hous-
ing. Since residential construction is particularly dependent on
mortgage financing, the mortgage credit market directly influences
suburban development. 179 Not surprisingly, the rapid suburbaniza-
tion of Nassau County occurred at the same time that action by the
government, private lenders, and real estate developers lowered
the cost of mortgages and thereby made suburban housing ex-
tremely affordable, in certain instances even less expensive than
renting a crowded apartment in the city.
Prior to World War II, mortgage financing was difficult to secure,
particularly for working class families. Private financial institutions
such as banks and savings and loan associations maintained prohib-
itively strict lending rules, especially in regard to downpayment re-
quirements and maturity provisions - matters that respond to and
affect real estate markets even more than interest rates. 8 ° Prior to
World War II, most banks were compelled by law to require a forty
percent downpayment,' 8' with the result that families seeking to
purchase a home would need savings equivalent to a year or more
of their wages in order to enter the housing market. Of course, few
179. See JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLEY, HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY
AND FORECLOSURE 4 (1970).
180. See SAUL B. KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET 78
(Princeton University Press 1961).
181. See HERZOG & EARLEY, supra note 179, at 12.
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Americans possessed such savings. On the basis of limited data, it
appears moreover that the maximum length of conventional mort-
gages prior to the middle of the century was only fifteen years. 82
Finally, home mortgage interest rates between 1920 and 1934 fluc-
tuated only minimally - between 5.8 and 6.2% - and then de-
clined during the course of the late 1930s gradually and only to
5.0%.183
After World War II, mortgage financing became both more af-
fordable and easier to obtain as the federal government, in order to
stimulate residential housing construction, took an active role in
the mortgage credit market. As one author has observed, "The
postwar years brought about a revolution in the terms of home
mortgage loans in America. 1 84 Between the end of 1945 and 1956,
the amount of outstanding residential mortgage debt in the U.S.
rose from $23.3 billion to $112.1 billion, an increase of 381%.185
During these same years, government participation in the mort-
gage market increased dramatically. In 1944, Congress authorized
the Veterans Administration to guarantee residential mortgages
obtained by returning veterans. 86 One year after hostilities ended,
VA-guaranteed mortgages represented nine percent of all residen-
tial mortgage debt. A decade later, in 1956, the VA guaranteed
$28.4 billion worth of mortgages, or 25% of all outstanding resi-
dential mortgage debt.187 In 1945, the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration ("FHA") mortgage insurance program, created in 1934 to
combat the Depression, insured mortgages worth in aggregate $4.3
billion, or eighteen percent of all residential mortgage debt. 88 By
1956, the amount of FHA-insured mortgages rose 351% to $19.4
billion, though FHA-insured mortgages still constituted only sev-
enteen percent of the total outstanding mortgage debt. 8 9 Within a
decade, the federal government thus became a substantial, if not
dominant, player in the residential mortgage market.
Several factors account for this unprecedented government par-
ticipation in the financial markets in the decade following World
War II. Demand for new housing was high as more than 3 million
182. See id. at 7-9.
183. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 287.
184. HERZOG & EARLEY, supra note 179, at 12.
185. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 33.
186. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284
(1944).
187. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 33.
188. See id.
189. See id.
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married couples were forced to share living quarters with other
families. 190 Federal subsidization of construction of new rental
housing received additional support from a Congressionally-au-
thorized FHA program passed in 1949 that stimulated construction
of rental housing near military bases.191 Congress also postponed
the expiration of the liberal section 608 program until 1950.192
More than anything else, however, the federal government hoped
to stimulate suburban housing construction by creating a favorable
financial environment for families wishing to purchase a home of
their own. At the end of 1945, Congress amended the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944'1 to encourage the VA loan guar-
antee program.194  The amendment doubled the maximum
guarantee amount from $2,000 to $4,000 and extended the maxi-
mum maturity on mortgage loans to twenty-five years.195 More-
over, qualified lenders were authorized to grant VA-guaranteed
loans to eligible veterans without first receiving approval from the
VA. 196 Finally, the Veterans Administration gave mortgages with-
out requiring any downpayment in nearly half of all cases.'97
Similarly, the Housing Act of 1948 amended the terms of the
FHA mortgage insurance program to increase maximum insurable
loan amounts and the length of time for repayment, while also low-
ering required downpayments. a98 Additionally and perhaps most
importantly, the 1948 Act increased the ability of the Federal Na-
190. See id. at 50. To address this problem, the federal government for a short
period after the war under the Veterans Emergency Housing Program limited the
construction of nonresidential structures so as to free resources for suburban develop-
ment. See id. This program, initiated in May 1946, reimposed wartime construction
controls and extended the liberal wartime FHA mortgage insurance provisions. Most
of the program expired in mid-1947, but the emergency FHA insurance provisions,
which, among other things, raised the maximum insurable loan amount, were ex-
tended until 1948. Even then, the Housing Act of 1948 resurrected the emergency
FHA provisions, though only for construction of new rental properties. See id. at 53
& n.6.
191. See Act of Aug. 8, 1949, ch. 403, Pub. L. No. 211, 63 Stat. 570 (adding Title
VIII to the National Housing Act).
192. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 55 n.11.
193. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, supra note 186.
194. See Servicemen's Readjustment Act, ch. 268, sec. 500(a) (8), 59 Stat. 623
(1945).
195. See id. at 626-627.
196. See id. at 626.
197. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 158.
198. See id. at 53. See also FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, FIFTEENTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 1-4 (1948) [hereinafter FHA ANNUAL REPORT].
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tional Mortgage Association ("FNMA") to purchase federally-un-
derwritten home mortgages. 199
Chartered in 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association,
otherwise known as Fannie Mae, merits special attention since it
played such a substantial role in the development of the large resi-
dential mortgage market. By acquiring federally-backed loan obli-
gations on the secondary debt market, FNMA encouraged
additional lending by freeing private capital. In 1948, FNMA reor-
ganized under a new charter that permitted its purchase of VA as
well as FHA loans, °2 ° and expanded its secondary market opera-
tions by issuing advance commitments to acquire federally-backed
mortgage instruments.2 1  Although originally authorized only to
purchase one fourth of the federally-underwritten mortgage loans
originated by a particular lender, the Housing Act liberalized this
restriction to allow the purchase of one half of the loans, and a year
later FNMA received authorization to purchase all eligible VA
loans.202 In response to the liberalization of these regulations, the
mortgage portfolio of FNMA expanded at a rapid pace limited
only by the Congressionally-imposed ceiling on the amount of
mortgage debt it could acquire. Nevertheless, within a three year
period, Congress greatly increased the maximum permitted mort-
gage holdings from $1.5 billion to $3.75 billion by July, 1952.203 In
a very real sense, FNMA's secondary market operations repre-
sented a direct subsidy to the residential mortgage market, which
kept conventional mortgage interest rates under 5.0% between the
end of the war and 1953204 and close to the 4.0% VA rate and the
4.25 to 4.5% FHA rate during those years.20 5
199. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 53. See FHA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
198, at 1-4.
200. Under its original charter, FNMA was authorized only to purchase FHA loans
and its maximum borrowing authority was a relatively small $220 million. The 1948
reorganization increased the borrowing authority to $840 million. See Pub. L. No.
864, 80th Congress (Jul. 1, 1948). For a year from August 1946 until June 1947, the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Mortgage Company was authorized to purchase
VA loans. After the RFC's termination, no federal secondary market facility existed
for VA loans until the Housing Act expanded FNMA's authority to include them. See
KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 54 n.8.
201. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 54.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 287.
205. See id. at 285.
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Although not all federal action during this time period was ex-
pansionary,2 °6 the limited contractions in federal involvement
paled in comparison to the huge growth in federal subsidies to sub-
urban housing. Although the Housing Act of 1950207 rescinded
FNMA's authority to make advance commitments and withdrew
the VA's authority to guarantee second mortgages granted in con-
junction with FHA-insured first mortgages, this change constituted
a relatively trivial reduction in federal involvement in the home
mortgage market.2 °8 Meanwhile, the same act raised the ceiling on
the maximum insurable amount of VA loans from $4,000 to $7,500
and increased the guarantee from fifty to sixty percent. 20 9 Most
importantly, the Housing Act of 1950 authorized the 30-year mort-
gage for VA-guaranteed loans, the 30-year FHA loan was author-
ized in 1954, and 35-year mortgages were later authorized in some
cases. 210 In response to these liberalizing provisions in federal leg-
islation, the average maturity for a VA or FHA mortgage on a new
home increased roughly ten years during the period from 1946 to
1967.211 By 1965, the average maturity of a FHA mortgage was
206. The outbreak of the Korean hostilities, in particular, led to some retrenchment
as Congress backed away from its expansive subsidization of the suburban housing
market through mortgage incentives. Among other contractionary measures, down-
payments on FHA and VA loans were increased by five percent and the maximum
insurable amount on a FHA loans was reduced from $16,000 to $14,000. See id. at 57.
Various agencies such as the National Production Authority, Office of Price Stabiliza-
tion, and Wage Stabilization Board imposed restrictions on nonessential construction
in order to conserve wartime resources. See id. Between 1951 and 1953 FNMA re-
duced its involvement in the secondary mortgage debt market. See id. at 64-65. In
1950, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors promulgated Regulation X, which cre-
ated a comprehensive schedule of downpayment requirements, maximum maturities,
and loan-to-value ratios for VA and FHA loans. See id. at 58. Congress authorized
the President to impose real estate construction credit restrictions in the Defense Pro-
duction Act of 1950, and Executive Order No. 10161 delegated this authority to the
Board, provided that the Home Finance Administrator concurs in its decision. See id.
at 57-58. However, in 1952, the Board suspended Regulation X, and a year later FHA
and VA credit provisions were returned to their pre-war levels. See id. at 60. By the
end of 1953 the federal government resumed its expansionary policies.
207. 64 Stat. 48 (1950).
208. See KLAMAN, supra note 180, at 54-55, 55 n.10.
209. See id. at 55. The act also expanded the FHA's authority by creating two new,
liberal mortgage insurance programs, one for housing in rural communities and an-
other for cooperative housing projects. See id. In an especially intrusive involvement
in the residential mortgage market, Congress authorized the Veterans Administration
to directly participate in the private mortgage market by granting mortgage loans on
terms equal to those on its guaranteed loans in areas where private lenders refused to
grant VA loans. See id.
210. See HERZOG & EARLEY, supra note 179, at 7.
211. See id.
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31.7 years, compared with twenty-one years in 1946.12 VA mort-
gage maturities, which averaged 19.8 years in 1946, grew to 29.4
years in 1965.13 The loosening of government regulations regard-
ing maximum maturity length also encouraged conventional mort-
gage lenders to grant mortgages with longer payment schedules.
The average maturity of conventional loans for new homes in-
creased from 14.3 years in 1950 to 25.4 years in 1967, although con-
ventional mortgage maturities remained noticeably shorter than
that for government-backed mortgages in every year.214 This
lengthening in average maturity had a significant effect on mort-
gage affordability since mortgage payments decrease as the length
of the mortgage rises.
This high degree of government participation in the mortgage
market directly and indirectly influenced the affordability and
terms of private mortgages available to American families in the
wake of World War II. The VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured
mortgages became the primary method for working class American
families who otherwise would not have been able to secure mort-
gage financing from private lenders to escape the overcrowded cit-
ies and relocate to the suburban countryside. Testifying to this fact,
both the number and the percentage of homes with mortgages in
Nassau County increased in response to this growth in available
credit for the purchase of a suburban house. In 1920, of the 28,921
homes in Nassau County, only 14,807 were owner-occupied, and of
that figure, only 9529 (or sixty-four percent) had mortgages.215 In
comparison, by 1950, there were 137,934 owner-occupied dwell-
ings, of which 101,807, or 73.8%, had mortgages.216'
Perhaps even more important than these government-influenced
changes in the residential mortgage market, the federal income tax
code created a dramatic preference for home ownership over
rental housing. The deduction for mortgage interest payments, for
one, provided an incredibly lucrative subsidy to the suburban hous-
ing market by reducing the after-tax cost of purchasing a home.217
212. See id. at 8.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See 1920 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 85 (Table 24).
216. See 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 46 (Table 21).
217. To illustrate this, let's take an oversimplified example. Imagine a couple with
an annual income of $50,000, which places them in the twenty percent federal income
tax bracket (average, not marginal, tax rates are used here). They purchase a
$200,000 home by securing a mortgage loan with an annual interest rate of five per-
cent. Interest payments on the mortgage the first year equal $10,000. After deducting
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Although the mortgage deduction was part of the 1916 tax code
and still exists today in modified form,218 the importance of the
deduction increased when the average tax rate increased dramati-
cally during World War 11.219 Prior to the War, when even the
highest marginal, much less average, tax rates were comparatively
low, the deduction minimally favored home owners over renters.
In 1916, the highest marginal tax rate was only thirteen percent,
which itself only applied to the gross income earned over $2 mil-
lion.22° When federal income tax rates increased in the 1940s, how-
ever, to a top marginal rate of ninety-four percent on incomes in
excess of $200,000,221 the importance of the deduction grew and its
inherent preference for home ownership did likewise.
In addition to the mortgage interest deduction, homeowners re-
ceived a variety of other tax benefits, such as a deduction for state
and local property taxes and an exemption from including imputed
rent - the "market value of the housing services produced by
[their] property" - in taxable income, even though imputed rent
represents income in a very real sense.222 In contrast, rental pay-
ments for apartments have never been deductible and thus must be
paid in after-tax dollars. 2 3 Today, the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, along with other tax provisions such as the property tax de-
duction22 4 and the special treatment of capital gains resulting from
the interest payment, the taxable income of the couple is $40,000, of which $8000 is
paid in taxes, leaving the couple with an after-tax, after-mortgage income of $32,000.
Now imagine that the same couple does not purchase the house but instead rents
the house at an annual rental of $10,000. The couple pays $10,000 in taxes in addition
to the annual rent, thereby leaving them with an after-tax, after-rent income of only
$30,000. By purchasing the house with a mortgage, the couple has effectively received
$2000 in a direct subsidy from the federal government.
218. See An Act to Increase the Revenue, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 759 (1916) (codified
in modified form at 26 U.S.C. 163(h) (1994)). Some types of interest payments were
deductible as early as 1864, and by 1870 all interest payments became deductible. See
An Act to Reduce Internal Taxes, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256, 258 (1870).
219. To illustrate, return to the hypothetical couple. With $50,000 in annual in-
come, an average tax rate of ten percent, and a $200,000 mortgage with a five percent
interest rate, the couple has an after-tax, after-mortgage income of $36,000. Assum-
ing an annual rental price of $10,000, the couple receives $1000 in a homeowner
subsidy.
220. See An Act to Increase the Revenue, supra note 218.
221. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, 58 Stat. 231, 231-32 (1944).
222. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal
Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (1993) (quoting James R. Follain & David C.
Ling, The Federal Tax Subsidy to Housing and the Reduced Value of the Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 44 NAT. TAX J. 147, 148 (1991)).
223. See id. Rent payments were deductible at one time. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
ch. 74, sec. 11, 12 Stat. 713, 723 (1863).
224. See 26 U.S.C. § 164(a)(1) (1994).
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the sale of residential real estate, 25 costs the federal treasury ap-
proximately $80 billion annually.226 This figure represents an enor-
mous subsidy for those people who can afford to purchase real
estate.227
The net effect of all government activity was to make the cost of
owning a home comparable to the cost of renting an apartment for
the great mass of postwar Americans. With government activity,
monthly mortgage payments compared favorably to monthly rent
payments. Thus, at the end of the 1940s, when the median monthly
rent for an apartment in Manhattan was $42.16,228 the tax deducti-
ble monthly mortgage payment on a new house in Levittown,
which sold for $6990,229 was only $37.58 per month with no down-
payment.23 ° With such subsidies, city dwellers could not afford to
refuse a move to suburbia. Demand for housing in suburbs like
Nassau accordingly rose, sellers were able to obtain a fair price for
building lots and houses, foreclosures ceased, and everyone consid-
ered themselves better off.
V. THE POSTWAR HOUSING MARKET AS A MODEL OF
ECONOMIC JUSTICE
The decade following World War II witnessed a fundamental
change in American patterns of living. An intensely urban nation
prior to the war, the country redefined en masse its conception of
the good life. For thousands of returning veterans, the over-
crowded tenements of New York City, no longer seemed a place to
raise families. Instead, they chose the quiet hamlets of Nassau
County amid the rolling hills of Long Island. This scenic location
beckoned city residents, who were tired of the noise, filth, and
225. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 sec. 312(a) (1997).
226. See Salsich, supra note 222, at 1627-28. This figure is referred to by economists
as a "tax expenditure" since it represents the loss of tax revenue due to a deduction or
tax credit. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX -EXPENDITURES 3
(1985).
227. A study of 1988 tax receipts reported that over half of the tax savings from the
mortgage interest deduction are realized by individuals with incomes in the 92nd per-
centile or higher. See James Poterba, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New
Answers, 82 EMPIRICAL PUB. FIN. 237, 239 (1992).
228. See 1950 CENSUS, supra note 18, at 46 (Table 21). The median monthly rent
was $40.43 in Brooklyn, $42.61 in the Bronx, and $47.67 in Queens. See id.
229. See Dream Builder: William Levitt, 1907-1994, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, at 5,
40.
230. This monthly payment is based on a 30-year mortgage at a five percent rate of
interest. Of course, a homeowner also had to pay real estate taxes after making the
monthly mortgage payments.
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overcrowding of urban life, a sentiment with which, for the first
time in their history, the federal and state governments agreed.
Government facilitated the dreams of the urban poor in two
ways. First, it reversed deeply entrenched practices which had per-
mitted the WASP's of Nassau County to exclude the poor - the
"rabble" of the city as one had put it 231 - from descending upon
the unsuspecting villages of the county. Jews, ethnic Catholics, Af-
rican Americans - virtually anyone who did not fit the comforting
racial stereotype of the WASP - had been an unwelcome, indeed
threatening, presence in the communities. Finally, the state called
for an end to such exclusionary practices.232 The passage of fair
housing laws, the invalidation of restrictive real estate covenants,
the termination of exclusionary zoning practices, and the disinte-
gration of hate organizations such as the KKK opened Nassau
County to groups that previously could only dream about its invit-
ing bays and look longingly from afar upon its sylvan hills. By let-
ting the former outcasts buy in, however, government also
accomplished another objective in bringing prosperity to real es-
tate developers and saving them from foreclosure of the landed
wealth constituting a basis of their livelihood.
Suburbanization was the result, however, of more than just the
opening of suburban communities to new residents of various reli-
gions and nationalities. While state government opened the mar-
ket, the federal government fueled it as well. In the wake of World
War II the federal government, recognizing that the construction
industry held great potential for absorbing and employing the re-
turning veterans, undertook an audacious campaign to ensure that
virtually no family who wanted to buy a house in the suburbs
would be unable for lack of credit to do so. 233 For millions, VA and
FHA loans became the ticket to a life of backyard patios, automo-
bile garages, and lawns to mow every Saturday. Across the country
the subsidized monthly mortgage payment replaced the monthly
rent check as whole new communities of tract housing sprung up
virtually overnight.
The years following the massive migration to suburbia reflect a
gradual slowing in suburban development. Even Nassau County
lost population during the 1970s as residents moved further away
from the city to more distant suburbs or simply left the state in
search of a new life in the distant regions of the Sunbelt. New
231. See supra Part III.A.
232. See supra Part III.B.
233. See supra Part IV.
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housing construction has stagnated and for millions of Americans
the likelihood of owning their own home has again become a dis-
tant dream.
This need not be the case. Government, as this article has
shown, can play an active and legitimate role in the development
and efficient functioning of housing markets - indeed, of all mar-
kets. By ensuring that noxious discrimination does not artificially
close markets to willing buyers and by subsidizing buyers so as to
enhance their market capabilities, government can make them bet-
ter off while simultaneously improving the well-being of those who
have something to sell. The poor need not get poorer while the
rich strive to get richer; the poor can have their basic needs satis-
fied while the rich make a profit satisfying them.
But such a program entails a shift in the way government ap-
proaches the economy. For over a decade, supply-side economics
with its emphasis on tax and spending cuts has held an ideological
grip on the national leadership of both parties. Such thinking must
come to an end, and attention must refocus on the New Deal in-
sight that judicious use of government power - and nothing but
judicious use of that power - can make all citizens better off. Per-
haps, this article's sympathetic portrait of an extraordinary mo-
ment in the past, when government policies generated enormous
increases in wealth by pumping up demand, distributed those in-
creases to almost the entire community, and thereby incorporated
many of the downtrodden into the socio-economic mainstream
without expropriating the wealth of the elite, will help to bring the
refocusing about.
AS
THE POLITICS OF PERMITS:
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
GIULIANI ADMINISTRATION'S PARADE AND
RALLY PERMIT APPLICATION PROCEDURES
Michael L. Landsman*
INTRODUCTION
From the Boston Tea Party, to the Civil Rights marches during
the 1950s, to protests against the Persian Gulf War, acts of civil
disobedience1 and other nonviolent political acts have played a sig-
nificant and controversial role in shaping the course of American
history and defining the scope of protection provided by the First
Amendment against governmental interference.2 These political
acts are important because they provide people living in America,
regardless of their social, political or economic status, with a nonvi-
olent means of expressing their beliefs. Moreover, these acts (par-
ticularly when they are committed in large groups) increase the
potential effect that such beliefs may have on changing the govern-
ment's policies - and society.
The most significant difference between acts of civil disobedi-
ence and other nonviolent political acts is that acts of civil disobe-
dience are committed without the government's approval. This is
important for several reasons. For example, without such ap-
proval, those engaging in acts of civil disobedience ("disobedient
protestors") are subject to arrest and other disciplinary action.
Such approval also enables law enforcement officials to provide se-
curity, divert traffic and take other precautionary measures to pro-
tect the protestors, as well as society at large.3 Furthermore, the
failure to obtain such approval severely compromises the disobedi-
* J.D., New York Law School, 1998; B.A., New York University, 1994. Assistant
to Edward I. Koch at Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn and Berman LLP.
1. Civil disobedience is a term generally used to describe public, nonviolent polit-
ical acts committed with a desire to express disagreement with and ultimately influ-
ence the government's laws, policies, and procedures. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 364 (1971).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1008-1011 (1991) (citing Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)).
3. The riot following a march protesting hate crimes illustrates why such approval
is important. See Michael Cooper, 60 Arrested in Rally Against Bias Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at B3. In this case, rally organizers claimed that they did not
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ent protestors' ability to convey their message and damages public
opinion about their cause. This final reason is critical to protestors
who want to pressure political leaders to change their policies or
behavior.
It is well settled that the "First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter or its consent."4 The Supreme Court also
has determined that any permit restrictions must not be based on
the context of the message, but rather must be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and must leave open ample
alternatives for communication. 5
-Based on the strength and clarity of this and other Supreme
Court precedents, conventional wisdom suggests that government
officials should be knowledgeable about, and particularly sensitive
to, constitutionally permissible limitations on the freedom of
speech. Like most political organizations, the Giuliani Administra-
tion is densely populated with lawyers who are aware of the neces-
sity to provide an expedient, content-neutral permit application
procedure for nonviolent political acts. Notwithstanding this
knowledge, the Giuliani Administration has consistently denied or
delayed applications for parade and rally permits made by certain
groups. Because of the complications they encountered during the
application process, many of these groups have been forced to turn
to litigation.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise
percentage of the lawsuits filed against New York City that raise
significant questions concerning the First Amendment during the
Giuliani Administration. Based on statements made by legal ex-
perts and others intimately familiar with recent New York City his-
tory, however, it is clear that far fewer of these lawsuits were filed
against either the administration of former Mayors Edward I. Koch
or David Dinkins.6 For example, during an interview concerning
the Giuliani Administration's parade and rally permit application
procedures, the Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties
apply for a permit because the City had made it difficult for them to get permits. See
Murray Weiss et al., Gay-Slay Protest, N.Y. POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at 3.
4. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Amicus Curiae Brief
of the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Million Youth March v. Safir, 18
F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus Brief] (on file with the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
5. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
6. Susan Sachs, Giuliani's Goal of Civil Civility Runs Into First Amendment, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B1.
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Union ("NYCLU"), Norman Siegel, said "I've been here 13 years,
and my legal director has been here even longer, and we've never
filed as many cases involving one administration."
7
The controversy surrounding the Giuliani Administration's
parade and rally permit application procedures reached a critical
turning point on November 16, 1998, when Federal District Court
Judge Leonard B. Sand of the Southern District of New York held
that these procedures violate the First Amendment.8 This was the
third time in more than four months that a federal judge had ruled
against the Giuliani Administration in a case concerning the consti-
tutionality of these procedures.
The volume of litigation concerning parade and rally permit ap-
plications during the Giuliani Administration raises many ques-
tions. Perhaps the most intriguing question, however, is whether
there is a relationship between Mayor Giuliani's political achieve-
ments, reputation and aspirations, and the denial of parade and
rally permits.
Two of the major factors in Giuliani's victory over David
Dinkins in the 1993 mayoral election were that many New Yorkers
believed he could reduce crime and calm racial tensions in the
wake of the Crown Heights program in August of 1991. 9 More-
over, Giuliani made his name in New York City as a no-nonsense,
organized crime busting federal prosecutor. 10 Curiously, groups
that apply for parade and rally permits for protests or speeches
concerning either law enforcement or racism encounter the great-
est amount of bias. Based on the pattern of bias against these
groups, it would be useful to discuss two of the most controversial
demonstrations during the period of time leading up to Judge
Sand's ruling.
I. THE MILLION YouTH MARCH
The Million Youth March, Inc. ("March") filed its first applica-
tion for a permit with the New York City Department of Parks and
7. Id.
8. See Macdonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Alan
Finder, U.S. Judge Upsets New York Law on Granting Permits for Parades, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at B1.
9. See generally EDWARD I. KOCH, GIULIANI, NASTY MAN (forthcoming 1999).
This book is a compilation of Mr. Koch's newspaper columns about Mayor Giuliani.
These columns were published in either the New York Daily News or the New York
Post from January 1994 to February 1999. The Epilogue and Prologue of this book
contain material which supports the assertions in this sentence.
10. Id.
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Recreation ('Parks Department") in the middle of November
1997.11 According to its application, the applicants sought to con-
duct an "Educational - First Amendment" event in September of
1998 on Randall's Island, in Central Park, or on some unspecified
street.12 The event would feature "youth and adult speakers who
are concerned about improving the conditions of their people."' 3
Two months after filing this application on January 22, 1998, the
Parks Department denied the organizers' application for the Cen-
tral Park location, but granted it for the Randall Island location.'"
Four days after the Parks Department's decision, the March lead-
ers filed two additional applications.15 One application specified
Malcolm X Boulevard between 110th and 145th Street ("Malcolm
X Boulevard"). The other specified the Eastern Parkway, from
Flatbush to Utica Avenue in Brooklyn. Five weeks later, both ap-
plications were denied, and the organizers appealed to the Com-
munity Affairs Unit Commissioner. Throughout the appeal
process, there were several meetings held between New York City
officials and March organizers. As these meetings continued, press
coverage of the controversy began to escalate.
When questioned about this controversy on July 27, 1998, Mayor
Giuliani initially responded that the Million Youth March
("March") was only a hypothetical, and that he "never get[s] in-
volved with hypothetical discussions.' 1 6 Giuliani also stated that
the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") and the Corpo-
ration Counsel offered alternative locations, but that March or-
ganizers "rejected those alternatives.' 1 7 Approximately one week
later, Giuliani publicly lashed out at the March organizers. Giu-
liani first called the lead organizers' comments "race-baiting and
anti-Semitic" and said that "from [his] point of view, this is a hate
march.' 1 8  Giuliani then said that he "would not allow a
11. Million Youth March, Inc. v. Safir, 18 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
12. Id. According to the complaint filed in this action, the March calls for, inter
alia, the "elimination of police brutality and misconduct; and end to violence and
conflict in communities of color ... " Id. at 336.
13. Id. at 336.
14. Id. at 337.
15. Id.
16. Leonard Greene, Clash Brewing on Youth March, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1998, at
A19.
17. Id.
18. Amy Waldman, Giuliani Assails Organizers of Youth March, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 1998, at B4.
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hatemonger to take over our City in any substantial respect . . .
[t]hat just will not be permitted."19
Soon thereafter, negotiations between City officials and March
organizers broke down, and on August 20, Million Youth March,
Inc., filed a lawsuit against NYPD Commissioner Howard Safir and
Mayor Giuliani.20 As part of this action, the March leaders filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction ordering City officials to allow
them to hold a rally on September 5, 1998, on Malcolm X
Boulevard.21 On August 26, 1998, United States District Court
Judge Lewis Kaplan granted the preliminary injunction. Judge
Kaplan referred to the Giuliani Administration's application pro-
cedures as "breathtaking in their lack of standard," and that they
"provided a virtual prescription for unconstitutional decision
making. "22
One of the key figures organizing this event was Khalid Muham-
mad, who is a former leader in the Nation of Islam, and infamous
for his anti-Semitic and other offensive and extremely prejudicial
remarks. It is also true, however, that there were several other
March organizers who did not share Khalid Muhammad's extrem-
ist views. And even if they did, the Constitution protects speech on
a content-neutral basis, unless it is expressed in such a way that
violates one of the narrow exceptions.23
On September 1, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals mod-
ified Judge Kaplan's order to allow a four-hour event covering six
blocks, instead of a twelve-hour event on twenty-nine blocks.24 On
Saturday, September 5, 1998, the Million Youth March was finally
held. And, as many commentators expected, the views expressed
at the Million Youth March ranged from moderate to the extreme.
Some speakers urged conciliation, others hatred.25
Unfortunately, the demonstration ended with a dangerous
ruckus. As the event drew to a close, the NYPD decided to turn
off the generator providing electricity for the public address sys-
tem. In an effort to distract participants in the Million Youth
19. David Seifman, Mayor: I Won't Let "Hatemonger" Call the Shots on March,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, at 16.
20. See Million Youth March, Inc. v. Safir, 18 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
21. See id.
22. Nat Hentoff, Keep Your Eye On Malik Shabazz, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 29,
1998, at 32.
23. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
24. See Center for New York City Law, 4 CITY LAW 114, Sept.-Oct. 1998.
25. See Jeffrey Goldberg, "I'm Going to Kill You, Cracker," And Other Greetings
of the Day, THE FORWARD, Sept. 11, 1998, at 1.
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March from the officers attempting to cut the power, a NYPD heli-
copter swooped down over the march. A melee immediately
erupted. Several participants in the event and police officers were
injured. Subsequently, six protestors were indicted for attempted
assault and reckless endangerment.26 None of the event organizers
were indicted.27
The Giuliani Administration's initial refusal to grant March or-
ganizers a permit, and Giuliani's verbal attacks on Khalid Muham-
med gave Muhammed exactly what he wanted - to generate as
much publicity as possible about his racist, anti-Semitic views, and
discredit Mayor Giuliani, his Administration, and the NYPD. 28 Gi-
uliani's intolerance of Muhammed's intolerant views, exacerbated
rather than reduced racial tensions. If the Giuliani Administration
had granted the permit after the first request, and Mayor Giuliani
refrained from verbally attacking Khalid Muhammed in public, Gi-
uliani would have undermined Khalid's apparent desire to increase
racial tension.29 This argument is based on the psychological prin-
ciple that those whose liberties are protected by a constitution that
protects individual liberties will eventually acquire an allegiance to
the virtues of such a constitution.3" In other words, if society toler-
ates rather than suppresses the intolerant, then the intolerant will
eventually lose their intolerance. 3'
II. THE OCTOBER 22 COALmION PROTEST
On September 14, 1998, less than a week after the Million Youth
March, the October 22 Coalition To Stop Police Brutality, Repres-
sion and the Criminalization of a Generation ("Coalition") applied
for a permit to march down Broadway in lower Manhattan.32 The
Coalition was also organizing similar events in more than fifty cit-
ies throughout the United States. These events, as the name of the
organization suggests, were to take place simultaneously on Octo-
ber 22, 1998.
26. See David Rohde, Six are Indicted in Youth Rally Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1998, at B3.
27. Id.
28. See Edward I. Koch, Rudy Gave Hatemongers Just What They Want, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, at 5.
29. Id.
30. See generally RAWLS, supra note 1, at 219 et seq.
31. Id.
32. See MacDonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664, 672 (1998); see also Kit R. Roane,
Judge Rules For Police Brutality Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at B3.
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One month later, the City denied the Coalition's application, and
the Coalition immediately filed an appeal. On October 21, 1998,
Federal District Court Judge John S. Martin, Jr. granted the pre-
liminary injunction and directed the NYPD to issue a permit au-
thorizing it to organize a march from Union Square Park to City
Hall Park using one lane of traffic on Broadway.33
Judge Martin determined that the one-month delay between the
time the Coalition submitted its application and the day the City
notified the organization that its application was denied, had
prejudiced the plaintiffs' ability to organize their demonstration.34
Judge Martin also found that the facts of this case "give[ ] rise to an
inference that there was a motive related to the content of the
speech that these plaintiffs were attempting to exercise. 35
Giuliani immediately attacked Judge Martin's decision, and said
that "[t]he decision about the impact on public safety should be left
to the Police Department, not the imperial Federal Court. ' 36 Ac-
cording to Giuliani, the City would allow Coalition protestors to
march on the sidewalk, but not on the busy street.37 Despite his
disagreement with the ruling, Giuliani did say that the City would
"comply with the court order, but [his] reaction is that the court is
wrong and the federal court should stop trying to run the city."38
On Thursday, October 22, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the Giuliani Administration's attempt to stay Judge Mar-
tin's order, and permitted more than 1,000 people to march from
Union Square Park to City Hall Park in support of the Coalition.39
Significantly, no other City denied the Coalition a permit.40
Despite the fact that the Giuliani Administration had claimed
that the Coalition's march down Broadway would create chaos, the
next day Mayor Giuliani held a parade which attracted over three
million people for the New York Yankees down almost the same
33. See Deborah Pines, Permit Ordered For Protest March; City's Delay in Ruling
Held Biased, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1.
34. See October 22nd Coalition v. Safir, No. 98 Civ. 7333 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1998).
35. October 22nd Coalition v. Safir, 98 Civ. 7333, Transcript of Oral Arg., at 3. See
also Margaret Ramirez, Day of Outrage/7,000 Rally in Protest of Brutality, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1997, at A5.
36. Deborah Pines, Permit Ordered For Protest March; City's Delay in Ruling Held
Biased, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1. See also Ramirez, Day of Outrage, supra note
35.
37. See Kit R. Roane, Permitted by Court, 1,000 March Against Police Brutality,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at B3.
38. Patricia Hurtado, The March Goes On: Rudy Two-Time Loser on Cop Brutal-
ity Rally, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 1998, at A29.
39. See Roane, supra note 37.
40. Id.
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route requested by the Coalition. Giuliani also gave over 5,000
people access to the steps of City Hall and the plaza between 9:00
a.m. and 3:00 p.m. 41
Giuliani was uncharacteristically restrained when publicly com-
menting about the protest. Not withstanding Mayor Giuliani's ap-
parent indifference to the Coalition's victory in this case, there are
several reasons to believe that he was less than enthusiastic about
the Coalition's protest and the publicity it would generate.
First, the Coalition protest in Manhattan was organized by
Anthony Baez's mother, Iris Baez, and Abner Louima.42 Until the
tragic death of Amadou Diallo in February of 1999, the death of
Anthony Baez, who died as a result of an illegal choke-hold, and
the torture of Abner Louima, who was sodomized with a toilet
plunger,4 3 were the two of the more famous victims of police bru-
tality in New York City history. This protest clearly re-opened the
political wounds inflicted on Giuliani by these tragic events.
Second, crime reduction is one of Giuliani's most important
political achievements. Many people in the City (even before the
Diallo tragedy), however, believe that the "zero tolerance" philos-
ophy expounded by Giuliani fosters "a climate of bareknuckle po-
licing ' 44 and has taken too great a toll on civil rights.45 Recent
polls also indicate that an overwhelming majority of the members
of the Black and Hispanic communities believe that police officers
in New York City favor whites.46 Because the Coalition protest
was certainly going to bring attention to all of these politically sen-
sitive facts, and have a potentially negative impact on Giuliani's
popularity, it is easy to see why he would try to discourage it.
Finally, Giuliani has a history of denouncing protest against po-
lice brutality. For example, in August of 1997 Giuliani condemned
a rally convened to protest the brutal torture of Abner Louima that
41. See Housing Works, Inc. v. Safir, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19515, at *4
(S.D.N.Y.).
42. See Hurtado, supra note 38, at A29. See also David Gonzalez, Giuliani Loves
a Parade, If It's His Own Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1998, at B1.
43. Officer Justin Volpe pled guilty to these charges on May 26, 1999. See David
Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima's Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1999. Subsequently, a jury found another officer guilty, but acquitted three others.
See Joseph P. Fried & Blaine Harden, Officer is Found Guilty in Torture of Louima,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1999, at Al.
44. John Marzulli and Richard Sisk, Halt Cop Brutality, Bill Told, DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 26, 1999, at 8.
45. Kevin Flynn, Two Polar Views of Police and Race at U.S. Hearing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1999, at B3.
46. Dan Barry & Marjorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police
Are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
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was attended by former Mayor David Dinkins, and other promi-
nent black and civil rights leaders as "a free-for-all police bashing
rally."47
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Mayor Giuliani
and his Administration have engaged in a pattern of discrimination
against groups applying for parade and rally permits who criticize
one of Mayor Giuliani's most important political achievements -
the reduction of crime.
In the wake of the Diallo tragedy and various public hearings
and investigations about police brutality, racism and other
problems in the NYPD,a8 Mayor Giuliani has dramatically cur-
tailed his public statements concerning police misconduct, and
those who criticize it. For example, the Giuliani Administration
did not force groups organizing tens of thousands of people who
protested the shooting of Amadou Diallo to resort to litigation. a9
However, the Giuliani Administration's apparent tolerance for
these protests was probably not due to any dramatic shift in policy,
but rather the enormous political pressure placed on the Mayor by
a substantial drop in the polls,50 and the adverse court decisions it
received in the Million Youth March, and Coalition litigations.
As Giuliani's second and final term draws to a close and he starts
to look ahead to running for his next political office,51 it will be
47. Ramirez, supra note 35. See also David Gonzalez, About New York; Giuliani
Loves a Parade, If It's His Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1998, at B1.
48. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Safir Defends Frisking Policy Before a Panel of
Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at B4; Benjamin Weiser, Stop-and-Frisk Policy
Faces U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at B1; Eleanor Randolph, A Long
Day of Venting About the City's Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A25.
49. Although the City permitted most of these protests to occur without unreason-
able restraints, 1,175 protestors were arrested in the Amadou Diallo rallies. See
Laura Italiano et al., 1,175 Busted in Protest Hoping DA Will OK Deal, N.Y. POST,
Mar. 30, 1999, at 16.
50. As briefly mentioned above, in February 1999, four New York City police of-
ficers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed immigrant. The Diallo tragedy
quickly became a major political liability for the Mayor, and his approval rating
plunged 21 percent in five months. See Dan Barry, Giuliani Says Diallo Shooting
Coverage Skewed Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at B3.
51. In the spring of 1999, Rudy Giuliani created "Friends of Giuliani," a Federal
fundraising committee, to raise money for a potential Senate campaign. One of the
tools employed by this committee to raise money for Giuliani's campaign is a website
entitled Hillaryno.com. Although neither Hillary Rodham Clinton nor Mayor Giu-
liani have formally declared their candidacies for the Senate in New York State at the
date of publication, both have formed exploratory committees. See Dan Berry,
Message of "Hillaryno.com" is Yes to Giuliani, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at B2; Hil-
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interesting to see what effect his administration's record of violat-
ing constitutional rights will have on his career. It will be equally
interesting to observe Mayor Giuliani's attempt to position himself
as someone who is both "tough on crime" and sensitive to the con-
cerns of those who suffer the brunt of police misconduct, i.e., mem-
bers of the City's minority communities. Mayor Giuliani's ability
to continue to contain crime in New York City, and become a
leader who can heal the wounds caused by racial tension and the
police brutality that occurred during his tenure as Mayor may well
be the key to his political future.
lary Clinton Confirms Plans for Exploratory Committee (CNN television broadcast,
June 4, 1999).
HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF: THE
(D)EVOLUTION OF RECENT BRITISH AND
AMERICAN ANTITERRORIST LEGISLATION
Gregory C. Clark*
Still the gunman rules and widows pay
A scarlet coat now a black beret
They thought that blood and sacrifice
Could out of death bring forth a life'
INTRODUCTION
The beast of international terrorism rears its horrible head far
too often in modern America. Denizens of major cities cower at
the mention of anthrax or nerve gas. Federal facilities went to a
"maximum state of alert," during the recent strike against Iraq
while Defense Secretary William Cohen stated that, "It is our an-
ticipation that attempts will be made .... [A terrorist attack] could
happen at any time."2 Oklahoma City residents have yet to fully
recover from the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Build-
ing.3 The United States vehemently opposes terrorist action: "Ter-
ror is not a legitimate form of political expression or a
manifestation of religious faith. It is murder. And those who per-
petrate it, finance it or otherwise support it must be opposed."4
Immediately following most major terrorist incidents, legisla-
tures pass tougher anti-terrorism laws in a frenzy of activity. "One
of the memorable phrases that was coined during the troubles in
Northern Ireland in the past twenty-five years is 'the politics of the
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1997. Tremendous thanks to Sonia Bhatnager for her "constructive"
criticism, Bob Schumacher for his push towards perfection and Vivian Encarnacion
for her tireless mediation. I would also like to thank my parents for their love and
honesty, without which none of this would be possible.
1. U2, Van Diemen's Land, on RATTLE AND HUM (Island Records Ltd. 1988).
2. Phil Kuntz & Hugh Pope, U.S. Officials Close Embassies in Parts of Africa,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1998, at A10.
3. See Thomas C. Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 201-02 (1996). A van exploded outside the Al-
fred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. See id. The
explosion killed 167 people, including nineteen children under the age of six. See id.
4. Madeleine K. Albright, We Will Not Be Intimidated, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24,
1998, at 33.
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last atrocity.' It refers ,to people taking advantage of the last atroc-
ity to push a political agenda or to score political points."5 Follow-
ing the Oklahoma City bombing, a fiercely resolved administration
passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"): 6
Our goal is to make the United States fully a no-support-for-
terrorism zone. Our message to anyone who comes into our
country intending to raise money for a terrorist organization is,
you risk going to jail. And our message to anyone who is a part
of a terrorist organization and who wants to enter the United
States is, you are not welcome here.7
Likewise, in response to the Omaglh bombing,8 British politicians
enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1998
("EPA"), 9 and the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy)
Act of 1998 ("TCA"). 1°
This Note compares current antiterrorism legislation in the
United Kingdom and the United States through the lens of histori-
cal development. Part I of the Note traces both the history of Brit-
ish measures to combat terrorism in the context of Northern
Ireland, and the corresponding American legislation, including a
discussion of the many civil rights violations accompanying the re-
spective laws. Part II explores the provisions of the EPA, TCA and
AEDPA. Part III of the Note argues that the traditional counter-
terrorist strategies do not sufficiently deal with the complexity of
terrorism and that the British antiterrorism model, which the
AEDPA resembles, is rife with inequities. Accordingly, the Note
concludes that American lawmakers should understand the failings
of past British legislation in shaping prospective American law.
5. Counterterrorism Legislation: Hearings on S. 390 and S. 735 Before the U.S.
Senate Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, 104th
Cong. 61 (1995) (testimony of Fr. Sean McManus, President, Irish National Caucus).
6. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
7. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks on Designation of Terror-
ist Organizations (Oct. 8, 1997) (transcript available at <http://secretary.state.gov/
www/statements/971008.html>).
8. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
9. Ch. 9 (1998) (Eng.). The current version of the EPA extends the steps taken
to control Northern Ireland first enacted in 1973. See infra Part I.A.2.
10. Ch. 40 (1998) (Eng.). The TCA permanently codifies the "temporary provi-
sions" of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act initially passed in
1974 to give law enforcement greater tools to combat native insurgence in Northern
Ireland. See infra Part I.A.2, II.A.
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I. BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO TERRORISM
A. History of Terrorism Legislation in Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland's distinct situation defines Great Britain's ap-
proach towards terrorism. 1 While circumstantially dissimilar to
the position of the United States, the British legislature enacted
antiterrorist laws dealing with the same type of problems that
plague America.1 2 The historical development of the "troubles" of
Northern Ireland provides a framework for how and why Britain
has reached its current legislative position. The problems associ-
ated with Ireland and Northern Ireland did not begin with the par-
tition of the island by the British government in 1920.13 Celtic
tribes likely had their own problems for centuries prior to any Brit-
ish presence in Ireland and, while perhaps relevant to another in-
quiry, it was the Protestant migration into Ireland that lies at the
heart of current British antiterrorism legislation.14 The resulting
social and political climate of Northern Ireland has manifested it-
self in British legislation. The power struggles between Irish
Catholics and British Protestants bred animosity and fear leading
to a schism that made citizens foreigners in their own land and ulti-
mately escalated into mindless violence. 5
1. The Colonization and Partition of Northern Ireland
Celtic tribes originally settled Ireland and were converted to Ca-
tholicism by Saint Patrick around 450 A.D.'6 Since that time, the
majority of the Irish have followed the Church in Rome. 7 British
presence in Ireland began with the Anglo-Norman invasion of
116918 and, finally, King Henry II's capture of Dublin in 1171.19
King James I encouraged Scottish Presbyterians and English Epis-
copalians to settle in the northern counties in 1610 in order to help
quell Catholic unrest and establish some regional loyalty to the
11. See discussion infra Part I.A.1-2.
12. See discussion infra Parts I.A.2, II.A.
13. See James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 321 (1992).
14. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
16. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 320.
17. See id.
18. See Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United
Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COmp. L. 1, 16 (1990).
19. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 320.
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crown.2 0 Although Protestants ultimately made up the bulk of the
population in the northern counties of Ulster,2" British conquest of
the Emerald Isle was never absolute. 2
Unrest in the North increased in direct proportion to the grow-
ing divide between the supplanted natives and the upstart Protes-
tant colonists. Protestants, with their roots in England and
Scotland, felt insecure about their place on an island predomi-
nantly populated by Catholics and responded by tightening their
grip over the areas already under their control.2 3 By 1703, the
Protestant minority owned almost all of the land throughout Ire-
land, not just that in the north.24 A type of landed aristocracy
formed in Ireland that pushed the Catholic peasantry further from
the power structure.2 5 The Anglican minority, hopelessly outnum-
bered by Catholic natives, 6 maintained their position of dominion
through political suppression and, when necessary, brute force.2 7
The seventeenth and eighteenth-century Protestant Parliament
in Dublin instituted a number of harsh regulations to keep
Catholics from rising out of the dirt.2 8 These laws prohibited
Catholics from, among other things, voting, holding elected or ap-
pointed office, joining the bar, teaching at or attending a university
and owning land worth more than five pounds.29 In addition, the
Parliament exiled all upper level church officials upon punishment
of death.30 Hoping to break the back of native disquiet, this con-
tainment agenda only served to heighten social and religious ten-
sions. When Catholics became further incensed, Protestants
imposed greater restrictions upon their social and political free-
20. See id.; see also Myers, supra note 18, at 16 ("Native hostilities were especially
strong in the North, so England concentrated its seventeenth century plantation of
Protestant settlers in Ulster, hoping to solve its Irish problem by uprooting the
Catholics." (footnote omitted)).
21. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 321 n.8. The northern nine counties of Ireland
traditionally comprise the ancient province of "Ulster," although modem mention of
Ulster refers to the six counties of partitioned Northern Ireland. See id.
22. See id. at 320.
23. See id.
24. See Myers, supra note 18, at 17 ("[N]ative Catholics owned less than 14% of
all of Ireland, and in eight of Ulster's nine counties, Protestants owned 95% of the
land. The eighteenth century Irish were no longer citizens in their own country. So it
would remain ... for the next 200 years." (footnote omitted)).
25. See id. at 17-22.
26. See id. at 16 (indicating that the Protestant minority "never constituted more
than one-tenth of the island's population").
27. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
28. See Myers, supra note 18, at 17-18.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 18.
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doms, generating greater native anger in a dangerous self-perpetu-
ating cycle that would become all too familiar to the Ulster
counties.31
England formally incorporated Ireland, along with all of its
problems, into its kingdom with the Act of Union in 1801.32 Prot-
estant dominion continued limiting Catholics' access to education,
employment and other opportunities for advancement, and native
discontent likewise continued to increase.33 Then, as in the past
and up into the present, "disputes in Ulster have not focused on
points of religious doctrine, but on the use and abuse of political
power. ''34  Irish nationalists campaigned for limited self-rule in
1886, 1893 and finally, successfully, in 1912.35 Protestant unionists
threatened civil war at each suggestion of ceding any degree of sov-
ereignty or independence to Ireland, and only demurred condition-
ally upon the exclusion of the northern counties from any such
legislation.36
Real movement towards Irish independence began when Irish
nationalists, unsatisfied with the largely ignored and impotent
home-rule provisions, voiced their dissatisfaction in the brief and
ineffective Easter Rising of 1916.3 7 Temporarily put on hiatus by
World War I, the Irish struggle for self-determination resumed in
1919 as the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") 38 waged a fierce guer-
rilla war against the British.39 The IRA's efforts "led the United
31. See id. at 15 ("'It was a vicious circle. English consciousness of [Irish resent-
ment] produced a feeling of insecurity.., the need for security produced strong meas-
ures, thus intensifying the Irish feelings at the root of the original feeling of insecurity,
and creating the need for still further strong measures."' (alteration in original) (quot-
ing MAIRE O'BRIEN & CONOR O'BRIEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF IRELAND 61 (3d ed.
rev. 1985)).
32. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 320.
33. See Myers, supra note 18, at 19-20 ("In Northern Ireland, being born Catholic
or Protestant has historically dictated much more than religious affiliation. To a large
degree religious affiliation still dictates origin and culture, class standing, the access -
or, more accurately ... the inaccess - to employment and political control." (foot-
notes omitted)).
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 320-21.
36. See id. at 321.
37. See id. The British swiftly crushed the Easter Rising, the first modern Irish
revolt against foreign rule in Northern Ireland. See id.
38. The Irish Republican Army is a paramilitary, guerilla organization determined
to free all of Ireland fr6m British rule. See Myers, supra note 18, at 7.
39. See Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The
Case of Northern Ireland, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 93 (1994); Kelly, supra note 13, at
321.
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Kingdom Parliament to conclude that autonomy for Ireland was in
Great Britain's best interest.
40
In 1920, with the Government of Ireland Act, Britain formally
divided Ireland, establishing separate, subordinate parliaments in
Belfast and Dublin.4' This step in the process towards Irish inde-
pendence lasted no longer than the self-rule legislation, giving way
to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed in 1921.42 Conditioned upon the
retention of the six counties of Ulster by Great Britain, as de-
manded by the northern Protestants, 43 this treaty bequeathed do-
minion status upon the remaining twenty-six counties of Ireland,
establishing the Irish Free State."
Despite a short civil war spurred by the Irish Free State's opposi-
tion to the island's partition, a 1925 boundary agreement between
the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland and Great Britain formally
recognized the division of Ireland and was subsequently filed with
the League of Nations.45 After leaving the British Commonwealth,
the Irish Free State declared itself the Republic of Ireland in 1949,
and the United Kingdom recognized Ireland's independence with
the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949.46
2. The "Troubles" and the Provisions
A piece of paper simply does not have the power to erase resent-
ment and discord. While the establishment of an independent Ire-
land may seem to be the goal sought by Irish nationalists, a
comparison of the Constitution of the Irish Free State and the Re-
public of Ireland Act of 1949 reveals that a freedom that did not
encompass all of Ireland would prove unsatisfactory.47 In 1967, the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association briefly lobbied for dem-
40. Flaherty, supra note 39, at 93.
41. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 321.
42. See id. at 322.
43. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 1353, 1353-54 (1996) ("This partition was precipitated by Northern Ireland's
Protestant majority, who were militarily and ideologically opposed to being subsumed
into the new Irish Catholic state then emerging from a colonial war of independence
with Britain.").
44. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 322.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 322-23.
47. See id.
[A]rticles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution... proclaim sovereignty over the
whole of Ireland. In addition, the Irish Constitution regards every person
born in Ireland, north and south as an Irish citizen .... Britain recognized
[Ireland's] independence through the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949, but
cautioned that "in no event [would] Northern Ireland or any part thereof
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ocratic social and political reform through a non-violent protest
campaign modeled upon the American civil rights movement.48
Northern Ireland's governing body, Stormont,49 largely ignored
these calls for reform, just as the Protestant security force largely
ignored the violence inflicted upon protesters by elements of the
Protestant majority.5" The Irish quickly abandoned the tenets of
nonviolence, and in August of 1969 Stormont requested the assist-
ance of the British military to control the streets. 1 On January 30,
1972, the infamous "Bloody Sunday," British paratroopers killed
thirteen unarmed protesters during a civil rights march and gave
new life to the IRA,52 which had effectively remained silent since a
brief surge of activity following the Republic of Ireland Act.53 Ire-
land erupted in violence54 and Britain suspended Stormont
indefinitely. 5
Although initiated with the Special Powers Act,5 6 Britain's re-
sponse to the chaos in Northern Ireland consisted of two sets of
legislation: the EPA,57 which repealed and replaced the Special
Powers Act and applies only to Northern Ireland, and the Preven-
cease to be part.., of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Par-
liament of Northern Ireland."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting the Republic of Ireland Act of 1949).
48. See Myers, supra note 18, at 22-23.
49. See Flaherty, supra note 39, at 93. Stormont was the name of the Parliament
of Northern Ireland, which controlled the province from its foundation in 1922 until
its suspension by the British Parliament in 1972. See id. at 93-94.
50. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 323.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 324 n.19.
54. See Myers, supra note 18, at 25-26 ("As one Belfast woman lamented, 'The
IRA have been waiting for this for years[.] Till all this happened no one listened to
them. ... Paisley and his crowd have played right into their hands.... [T]he IRA will
get more support than it knows what to do with."' (alteration in original) (quoting J.
HOLLAND, Too LONG A SACRIFICE: LIFE AND DEATH IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE
1969 39-40 (1981)).
55. See Kelly, supra note 13, at 323-25. Stormont has never since reconvened, and
Britain has directly controlled Northern Ireland from March 1972 to the present. See
id. at 325.
56. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo.
5, ch. 5 (Eng.); see also Kelly, supra note 13, at 323 (stating that the Special Powers
Act introduced internment to Northern Ireland).
57. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 9 (Eng.); Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22 (Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24 (Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act, 1987, ch. 30 (Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5
(Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1975, ch. 62
(Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53 (Eng.).
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tion of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act ("PTA"), 58 which
operates throughout Great Britain. The British government in-
tended these "emergency powers" laws to last for the brief period
it took to reestablish order in Northern Ireland.5 9 That brief period
has yet to expire.6"
The emergency powers grant extremely broad discretion to both
the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC")6 1 and the British military
in investigations of suspected terrorist activity in Northern Ire-
land.62 Police may stop an individual on the street and question
her regarding her identity and recent movements.63 The provisions
permit the RUC or military to search a premises and seize any pos-
sessions based upon the low threshold "reasonable suspicion" of
terrorist activity.64 Constables can further confiscate anything
found during their warrantless searches if they believe that the
item is somehow connected to a crime.65
The PTA authorizes the arrest and detention of suspects for
questioning without trial.66 The RUC can arrest and detain an in-
dividual for an initial period of forty-eight hours, which then can be
extended to an additional five days upon approval of Northern Ire-
land's Secretary of State, all without formal charges or an appear-
58. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4 (Eng.); Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, ch. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, ch. 56 (Eng.).
59. See Elizabeth Kondonijakos, The Reasonable Suspicion Test of Northern Ire-
land's Emergency Legislation: A Violation of the European Convention of Human
Rights, 3 BuFf. J. INT'L L. 99, 104 (1996).
60. The EPA and PTA have been continually and consistently renewed every few
years. See statutes cited supra notes 57-58. "[T]he possibility of special anti-terrorism
provisions is in principle acceptable, provided the agenda of the power elite in charge
of national security is not, for example, the maintenance of their power but the reas-
sertion of individual rights and other constitutional values." Clive Walker, Constitu-
tional Governance and Special Powers against Terrorism: Lessons from the United
Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (1997).
However, "[tihe use of successive Prevention of Terrorism Acts has often constituted
the terror of prevention." Id. at 3 (quoting PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY
262 (1993)).
61. The RUC is the British-backed, Protestant-run police force in Northern Ire-
land. See Myers, supra note 18, at 6.
62. Although not discussed here, police riot control tactics included the use of
theoretically non-lethal plastic bullets that have killed seventeen people, including
eight children, through mid-1989. See Myers, supra note 18, at 37.
63. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1354 n.6 (citing Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24, §§ 16, 17, 22, 23 (Eng.)).
64. See Kondonijakos, supra note 59, at 105.
65. See id. at 105-06.
66. See Walker, supra note 60, at 3.
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ance before a magistrate.67 The Ulster police release the majority
of those detained without charging them.6 8 Although condemned
by the European Commission of Human Rights in 1976,69 police
subjected IRA suspects to "deep interrogation. ' 70 The "five tech-
niques"'7 1 used during these detention periods included: wall-stand-
ing, hooding, bread and water diet, noise and deprivation of
sleep.7z While these "techniques" may not seem grossly inhuman,
one example may illustrate otherwise:
The non-physical torture reportedly consisted of hooded men
being placed in an operating helicopter for a period of time,
then being pushed out; since the helicopter was on or nearly on
the ground, the men suffered only minor bruises when they fell,
but since the men were hooded, they were terrorized, believing
they were being pushed out of the helicopter to die.73
On the other end of the spectrum, the police often used detention
as a means to chat with various individuals in the community about
politics and the peace process. 4
In a July 1995 report,75 the United Nations called for the closing
of Castlereagh, one of the centers used for detentions of the former
variety, citing the lack of natural daylight, clean cells, clocks, re-
sources for exercise and access to radios or reading material.76 The
British government also detains seventeen and eighteen year-olds
67. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1361.
68. See id. at 1362.
69. "[T]he European Commission of Human Rights unanimously found Britain to
be guilty of torture, as well as inhuman and degrading treatment, of republican de-
tainees in Northern Ireland, in violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights." Myers, supra note 18, at 27 (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 512, 794 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.)).
70. See Walker, supra note 60, at 60.
71. See Myers, supra note 18, at 27-29.
72. See id. at 28 n.110.
73. Id.
74. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1363. Detainees report that questions regarding
specific offenses often did not surface during interrogations: "One states '[a]ll they
(the RUC) were interested in was the peace process and what I felt about it.' An-
other detainee reported, '[the RUC] mentioned it [the charges] about 3 times and
then its just a discussion on the Peace Process and Gerry Adams jet setting around the
World."' Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting BRITISH IRISH
RIGHTS WATCH, CONDITIONS IN DETENTION IN CASTLEREAGH: PHYSICAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES AND ABUSE OF THEIR LAWYERS, App.
B Case 157, 161 (1995) (submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee)
(on file with the Albany Law Review)).
75. See United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland, P 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.55 (1995).
76. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1363-64.
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in the "hellish" Crumlin Road Jail, built in 1854, alongside hard-
ened adult offenders.77 Arresting a person without a warrant and
subjecting her to seven days' interrogation 78 is inconsistent with
honoring that person's basic civil rights.
The EPA and PTA designate specific "scheduled ' 79 offenses for
prosecution under their specialized procedures. Included in those
offenses is the membership in, or financial or practical support of, a
proscribed8" organization.81 Commission of a scheduled offense
avails a defendant of the Diplock courts, created specially for ter-
rorist offenders, which allow for trial without a jury and conviction
based upon uncorroborated confessions gained through lengthy in-
terrogation sessions. 82 A person who wishes to challenge a confes-
sion, according to the 1991 Amendments to the EPA, must
establish prima facie evidence that not only was the confession in-
voluntary, but that it resulted from torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or violence or threats of violence. 83 The British elimi-
nated a defendant's right to silence in 1988, allowing negative infer-
ences to be drawn from a suspect's failure to answer a police
officer's question" or volunteer information "material to the of-
fence and which he could reasonably be expected to mention."8 "
The combined effect of uncorroborated confessions and the abro-
gation of the right to silence create a Catch-22 that could ensure
the conviction of a defendant whether she confesses to an offense
or not, all without the practical reasoning of a panel of her peers.
77. See MaryAnn Dadisman, The Irish Question: Into the Lion's Den; Britain
Grilled on the Human Rights Issues of Northern Ireland, HUM. RTS. Q., Summer 1994,
at 14, 17.
78. Terrorist suspects do have the right to consult with counsel under the EPA and
PTA, but not until after the initial forty-eight hour detention period ends. See Fla-
herty, supra note 39, at 112. After that point, the suspect may confer briefly and
sporadically with counsel, but at no time does the suspect have the right to have a
solicitor present during questioning. See id.
79. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, sched. 1
(Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 9, § 2 (Eng.); Aolain,
supra note 43, at 1378.
80. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
81. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, §§ 29-30
(Eng.).
82. See Myers, supra note 18, at 44-45.
83. See Flaherty, supra note 39, at 109 (quoting Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24, § 11(2)(b) (Eng.)).
84. See Myers, supra note 18, at 47; Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order,
20 N. Ir. Stat., No. 1987 (1988).
85. Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, ch. 40, § 2(4)(a)
(Eng.).
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The emergency powers extend the government's powers of regu-
lation to the associations and physical residence of Northern Ire-
land's inhabitants. The PTA allows the British government to
forbid certain organizations and mete out punishment for member-
ship in those organizations.86 The PTA additionally permits the is-
suance of exclusion orders, removing any individuals if the
Secretary of State "is satisfied that [the] person has been con-
cerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of ter-
rorism. "87 Although review of exclusion decisions is available on
the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety,88
such appeals rarely meet with success, ultimately resulting in a
form of internal exile.89
Exclusion orders may result from the consideration of secret evi-
dence from any of a variety of sources, relegating the accused to a
position of helplessness, never discovering the nature and content
of the allegations made against her.90 The British government gen-
erally resorts to the limited remedy of exclusion when there is in-
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction against terrorist
suspects. 91 Ironically, some higher profile exclusion cases have
prevented the likes of Gerry Adams 92 from entering Britain to
speak at a conference in the London Parliament.93
86. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1354 n.6 (citing Prevention of Terrorism (Tempo-
rary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4, §§ 1-8, 14 (Eng.)). The proscribed organizations are:
the Irish Republican Army, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hEireann, the Red Hand
Commando, Saor Eire, the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the
Irish National Liberation Army, the Irish People's Liberation Organisation and the
Ulster Defence Association. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996,
ch. 22, sched. 2 (Eng.).
87. Ch. 56, § 5(1)(a) (1974) (Eng.), cited in Walker, supra note 60, at 11.
88. See Walker, supra note 60, at 20 n.107.
89. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1384. Compare Walker, supra note 60, at 44
("[E]xclusion was essentially a preventative security measure rather than a condem-
natory judgment."), with Aolain, supra note 43, at 1385 ("[Tjhe notion that persons
are considered dangerous in one part of the territory, but not in another, defies com-
mon sense, particularly given any understanding of the geography of the Northern
Ireland conflict.").
90. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1384.
91. See Walker, supra note 60, at 17.
92. Gerry Adams is the President of Sinn Fein, the political branch of the Irish
Republican Army, and sat in the House of Commons from 1983-1992. See id. at 34.
An exclusion order was entered against him in 1982. See id.
93. See id.
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B. History of Terrorism Legislation in the
United States of America
Political threats against the government and people of the
United States have long held a prominent place in the national
consciousness. Legislative attempts to control the "terrorist
threat" 94 date back to the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in
1798.95 In the twentieth century, the assassination of President
William McKinley by anarchist Leon Czolgosz awakened modern
America to the fear that foreign political violence would intrude
upon domestic shores.96 While the Alien and Sedition Acts grew
out of the tempestuous political climate of a newborn nation, the
assassination was a concrete action that prompted Theodore
Roosevelt and Congress to create the Immigration Act of 1903.97
The Immigration Act enabled the administration to exclude aliens
based upon their belief or practice of anarchist principles,98 a clear
precursor to certain provisions of the AEDPA.99 The legacy of the
ideological exclusions espoused by the Immigration Act'00 grew
with its re-enactment in 1907, adding polygamy to the list of forbid-
den beliefs. 1 1 Both sets of legislation, however, dealt with the in-
creasingly complex role that the United States played in world
94. See Martin, supra note 3, at 207-08. The government did not enact the Alien
and Sedition Acts primarily to deal with terrorism, but to "persecute detractors of the
political party in power," which could be analogized to modem domestic insurgents
and, to some degree, international terrorists. Id.
95. Alien Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800); Alien Act of July 6,
1798, 1 Stat. 577; The Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). The
Alien and Sedition Acts targeted:
persons [who] shall unlawfully combine or conspire together, with intent to
oppose any measure or measures of the government of the United States,
which are or shall be directed by proper authority, or to impede the opera-
tion of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person
holding a place or office in or under the government of the United States
from undertaking, performing or executing his trust or duty ....
Sedition Act § 1, cited in Martin, supra note 3, at 207 n.30.
96. See Keisha A. Gary, Note, Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Associ-
ation: An Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 230 (1994).
97. Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
98. See Gary, supra note 96, at 230-31; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904) (upholding deportation of British national for dec-
laration of anarchist affiliations).
99. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 301-302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1246-50 (1996) (allowing Sec-
retary of State to designate certain organizations as 'terrorist,' and prohibiting all fun-
draising on their behalf); id. §§ 401-413 (establishing exclusion and/or removal of
alien members in terrorist organizations as designated by the Secretary of State); see
also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
100. Pub. L. No. 162, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
101. See Gary, supra note 96, at 231.
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affairs and the new challenges to the authority and stability of the
federal government, opening the door for further evolution in the
American response to terrorism.
Congress endeavored to protect national security while guarding
the civil liberties of the Bill of Rights with the enactment of the
Espionage Act in 1917.102 Spawned by the complex international
environment surrounding World War 1,103 the Espionage Act
broadened its view beyond participation in a conspiracy10 4 to en-
compass violent interference with foreign commerce 1 5 and coun-
terfeiting. 10 6 The Espionage Act was amended with the Sedition
Act of 1918 to additionally criminalize any activity that threatened
the administration in power. 10 7
In 1940, Congress instituted the Smith Act,0 s a revisitation of
the "guilt by association" doctrine espoused in the Immigration
Act of 1903, to discourage membership in certain unpopular polit-
ical groups. 10 9 Garbed in language calling to protect the American
people from anarchy and Civil chaos,110 the Smith Act enabled
frightened isolationists to persecute members of the Communist
Party and other similarly-situated individuals who held views un-
popular with politicians."1 Any individual involved in the writing,
publishing or distribution of questionable material risked deporta-
tion or exclusion, with no consideration for the First Amendment
102. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
103. See Martin, supra note 3, at 208-09.
104. Espionage Act tit. 1, § 4.
105. Id. tit. 4, § 1.
106. Id. tit. 5, § 2.
107. Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 150, § 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553-54 (repealed 1921).
108. Alien Registration (Smith) Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
109. See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 697
(1998) (stating that the Smith Act allowed deportation based upon "past beliefs, ad-
vocacy, or membership in an organization that advocated forcible overthrow of the
government. The key provision made... membership in any such organization illegal
with a penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment." (footnote omitted)).
110. See John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the
Academy, and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1494 ("The notion that
communism was a fundamentally alien ideology, staffed by agents who took their
orders from Moscow and directed inevitably toward subversion, world revolution, and
the destruction of all democratic institutions.., was deeply ingrained in the American
psyche.").
111. See id.; see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming the
conviction of the top eleven U.S. Communist party leaders under provisions of the
Smith Act).
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right to free expression that has historically commanded considera-
ble protection. 112
With the Korean conflict and the beginnings of the Cold War
looming in the minds of Americans, a frenzied "Red Fear" blos-
somed into the Internal Security Act of 1950113 and, over President
Truman's veto, 114 the more renowned McCarran-Walter Act. 115
Despite imposing a number of arduous obligations upon aliens," 6
especially Communist party members, 117 the McCarran-Walter Act
survived the constitutional scrutiny of the Supreme Court. 1 8 This
Act, although following the progressive pattern of past legislation,
went further than any preceding laws in the scope of its exclusion-
ary powers." 9 While it appears that Congress did not pass the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act to guard against what the modern world
conceives as "terrorism," it arose out of a steadily tightening tradi-
tion of removing and monitoring individuals labeled as dangerous
by an increasingly anxious majority.
112. See Gary, supra note 96, at 232. But cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
275 n.8 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he lovers of freedom cannot afford to
sacrifice their moral superiority by adopting totalitarian methods in order to create a
self-deluding sense of security. Suppression, once accepted as a way of life, is likely to
spread.").
113. Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950). The Internal Security Act expressly targeted
Communists and Fascists for exclusion. See Gary, supra note 96, at 232.
114. See Gary, supra note 96, at 232 ("President Truman, a staunch proponent of
liberalizing immigration laws, vetoed McCarran-Walter, stating, '[s]eldom has a bill
exhibited the distrust evidenced here for citizens and aliens alike .... .' (footnotes
omitted) (quoting President's Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 441, 444 (June 25, 1952)).
115. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
(1984).
116. See Gary, supra note 96, at 235 ("In short, McCarran-Walter gave government
officials wide, unchecked discretion to exclude persons on ideological grounds,
presuming aliens automatically guilty of being a threat to the United States because of
their beliefs and associations.").
117. See Beall, supra note 109, at 698 ("The McCarran Act required the registration
of all Communist Party members, prohibited any Party member from working in a
defense facility, holding office with a labor organization, or, among other things, ob-
taining a passport, and sometimes required the deportation of past or present Party
members.").
118. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 103, 114 (1961) (refusing to declare McCarran-Walter Act unconstitu-
tional despite First Amendment right of association and due process challenges).
119. See Gary, supra note 96, at 233. President Truman stated that "[t]o punish
undefined activities departs from traditional American insistence on established stan-
dards of guilt. To punish an undefined purpose is thought control." President's
Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952-53 PUB. PA-
PERS 441, 445 (June 25, 1952) (internal quotations omitted).
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Government activity finally reached the Bill of Rights' resistance
point when some anti-Vietnam protest groups gained the attention
of intelligence officials in the late 1960s, garnering surveillance sta-
tus in the early 1970s.120 The FBI's Counterintelligence Program
("COINTELPRO") and the CIA's Operation Chaos compiled lists
of thousands of questionable individuals that participated in anti-
Vietnam protesting and other "subversive" activities.2 1 The in-
tense surveillance of American citizens suspected of anti-govern-
ment and, later, terrorist action threatened American civil liberties
and became much too intrusive, arousing the attention of the Sen-
ate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re-
gard to Intelligence.122 This Committee concluded that "the
government and intelligence community had overstepped their au-
thority and threatened Americans' civil liberties (i.e., privacy, free
speech and freedom of association).' 2 3 Congress rejected the in-
tense scrutiny authorized against Communists and foreigners called
for by the Smith Act'24 and McCarran-Walter Act 12 5 when directed
instead at American citizens. Congress' reaction briefly halted the
march towards "tougher" and more unconstitutional antiterrorist
measures.
The stark reality of international terrorism became an impetus
for expansion of American terrorist legislation in the eighties. On
October 7, 1985, terrorists allegedly affiliated with the Palestinian
Liberation Organization ("PLO") hijacked the Achille Lauro
cruise liner as it traveled through international waters in the Medi-
terranean Sea. 126 In the course of the hijacking the terrorists mur-
dered Leon Klinghoffer, a physically-challenged American
citizen. 127 The ensuing public fallout to the Achille Lauro incident
resulted in innovations to antiterrorist legislation.
120. See Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The
United States Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-
terrorism Law and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 249, 259
(1997).
121. See id. (stating that COINTELPRO opened over five hundred thousand do-
mestic intelligence files and Operation Chaos, in a six year period, "collected thirteen
thousand files and other materials including the names of three hundred thousand
people and organizations").
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Alien Registration (Smith) Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
125. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
126. See Smith, supra note 120, at 254 n.35 (citing Judith Miller, Hijackers Yield
Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 are Safe; U.S. Assails Deal with Captors, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al).
127. See id.
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The United States extended its jurisdiction to foreign nationals
involved in acts that harmed American citizens with the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.128 This Act
allowed United States officials to prosecute any individual found
on American soil who had committed a terrorist act anywhere in
the world against an American citizen.129 The Anti-Terrorism Act
of 1987130 attempted to deal directly with the perceived terrorist
threat posed by the PLO.1 3 This Act explicitly prohibited all fun-
draising on behalf of the PLO, 32 and provided criminal punish-
ment for anyone who attempted to further the interests of the
PLO. 33
Under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987,'13 the Department of Jus-
tice attempted to shut down the PLO's Permanent Observer Mis-
sion to the United Nations that the Headquarters Agreement135
expressly authorized. 36 The PLO resisted the Department of Jus-
tice's action in United States v. Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion, 37 and the New York Southern District Court kept the
Permanent Observer Mission open.138 The same court, however,
upheld the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987139 when sixty-five American
citizens challenged it on First Amendment free speech and free-
128. Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 855 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.; most recently amended by Pub. L. No. 1,03-415 (1994)).
129. See Smith, supra note 120, at 256-57.
130. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1987).
131. See Smith, supra note 120, at 257.
132. See Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Congress
aimed the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 solely at the PLO, as "the PLO is 'a threat to
the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law and should not
benefit from operating in the United States."' Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 5201(b)).
133. See id. (stating that the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 rendered illegal the behav-
ior of any person who, "with the purpose of furthering the interest of the PLO: (1)
[received] 'anything of value except informational material from the PLO'; (2) [ex-
pended] funds from the PLO; or (3) [established] or [maintained] an office" at the
direction of the PLO (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 5202)).
134. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203.
135. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America
Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, done June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416,
11 U.N.T.S. 11.
136. See Smith, supra note 120, at 258 n.67 ("The Headquarters Agreement prohib-
its the United States from restricting access of invitees to the U.N. regardless of the
relationship between the United States and the invitee.").
137. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the PLO Observer Mission to
the United Nations, lawfully established under the Headquarters Agreement treaty,
cannot be shut down pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, especially absent an
explicit Congressional statutory instruction).
138. See id. at 1465.
139. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1994).
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dom of association grounds in Mendelsohn v. Meese. 4 ' The Men-
delsohn court held that the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 may
constitutionally "put a halt to the operations of the PLO in the
United States apart from the Mission to the United Nations, 141
but does not prohibit an information office "which accepts no
money from the PLO and in no sense purports to act in any kind of
official capacity for the PLO. '142 In essence, the court's ruling in
Mendelsohn extended the constitutionally permissible control of
suspect organizations within the United States from the exclusion
powers of the McCarran-Walter Act. 143 Although Congress' reac-
tion to COINTELPRO and Operation Chaos in the early seven-
ties 144 indicated that the government could not list and scrutinize
suspicious individuals and groups, Mendelsohn allowed the govern-
ment to legislate the permissible behavior of individuals claiming
membership in designated groups. 145
With no immediate threat of terror, enlightened drafting and en-
forcement of antiterrorism legislation appeared with the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1990.146 This Act temporarily
derogated the untethered exclusionary principles of the McCarran-
Walter Act to the annals of history. 147 Congress repealed all of
those ideological grounds for exclusion, citing "actual participation
in a terrorist act' ' 148 as a guideline for exclusion based upon na-
tional security. 149 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1990, mere membership in the PLO was no longer sufficient
grounds for exclusion, barring active involvement in an effort of
140. 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Sixty-five plaintiffs brought varied
claims that the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 "violates their rights to receive informa-
tion and to engage in face to face dialogue." Id. at 1477. Regardless of First Amend-
ment violation allegations, the court held that the Act "may permissibly put a halt to
the operations of the PLO in the United States[,] apart from the Mission to the
United Nations . . . ." Id. at 1490.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994).
144. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
145. 695 F. Supp. at 1474.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1994).
147. See Gary, supra note 96, at 240 ("With the repeal of the McCarran-Walter's
ideological exclusions, Congress finally refuted guilt by association as a guiding force
in United States immigration law.").
148. Id.
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(3)(iii) (stating that an alien may be excluded for "any
activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the
Government of the United States by force, violence, or unlawful means").
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political violence.150 Unfortunately, the progressive changes of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 were short-lived.' 5'
II. CURRENT TERRORISM LEGISLATION
A. The Northern Ireland Provisions in 1998
With Ireland on the verge of peace, a brief eruption of violence
in August, 1998152 set British antiterrorism legislation back onto its
old course. The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 53 which passed
in July of 1998, provided for the possibility of declaring the IRA a
legal organization and freeing 402 convicted terrorists within two
years. 54 Moreover, Home Secretary Jack Straw spoke of repealing
the internment provisions of the EPA155 and allowing the exclusion
powers to lapse. 56 In the aftermath of the Omagh bombing how-
ever, the British Parliament rushed 157 to enact the TCA. 158 Work-
150. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(3)(iii), with Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C.
§ 5202 (differing in that only a violent, terrorist acts by the PLO would warrant prose-
cution under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, while the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1987 condemns all activity furthering the PLO's interests).
151. See discussion infra Part II.B.
152. See House of Commons Hansard Debates, Sept. 2, 1998, at col. 693, available
in <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/
cm980902/debindx/80902-x.htm> [hereinafter Hansard Debates] (statement of Tony
Blair) (indicating that a 200 to 300 pound car bomb exploded on Market Street in
Omagh on August 15, 1998, killing twenty-eight people and injuring over 200, the
largest death toll from any one terrorist incident in Northern Ireland).
153. Ch. 35 (1998) (Eng.).
154. See John Mullin, Bill Will Free Terrorists in Two Years, GUARDIAN (London),
June 6, 1998, at 11.
155. See British to Enact Permanent Anti-Terrorism Legislation, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 30, 1997 ("Straw also confirmed he would abandon the controversial pol-
icy of interning terrorist suspects without trial."); see also Minister Wants Review of
Powers, IR. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at 8.
156. See Home Office: Government Announces Plans for Permanent Counter Ter-
rorism Legislation, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 31, 1997.
The powers to exclude are draconian.... In the light of the recent develop-
ments in Northern Ireland, I have come to the conclusion that, at the present
time, the exercise of these powers is no longer expedient to prevent acts of
terrorism in relation to each of the 12 cases in question. I have therefore
today revoked the last 12 orders.
Id.
157. The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act pushed through the
House of Commons and the House of Lords in two days during an emergency recall
of Parliament. See George Jones, Lib-Dem Conference: Leadership Is Attacked Over
Anti-Terrorist Laws 'Passed in Panic,' DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 24, 1998, at
16. Accusations even flew about alleging that politicians used the Queen to speed the
process: "'The Queen signed a blank bit of paper. She didn't know what the Bill
would be by the time it was finished. To allow that influence to be used during debate
is comparable to Charles II entering the House of Commons."' Queen Was Manipu-
HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF
ing in tandem with the newly amended and reenacted Emergency
Provisions Act, 15 9 the Criminal Justice Act presents fresh ammuni-
tion for the war against terrorism in Northern Ireland.
Parliament's 1998 amendment of the EPA moved the expiration
of the Act's temporary provisions to June 15, 1999,160 and the expi-
ration of the Act itself to August 24, 2000.161 The new EPA also
repeals all prior provisions regarding the internment of suspected
terrorists.1 62 Most importantly, however, section 5 of the 1998
Emergency Provisions Act requires that police officers "make a
code of practice" of audio recording interrogations of individuals
suspected of violating scheduled offenses. 163 Not only will this
"practice" create hard incontrovertible evidence of the content of a
suspect's statement or confession to the police, but the recording of
interrogations will yield the residual benefit of dissuading officers
from engaging in techniques that violate a suspect's civil rights. An
audio tape can retain incriminating evidence against an overzeal-
ous member of the RUC just as easily as it can against a hardened
criminal.
After years of renewing the PTA, British policymakers decided
that the time had come for permanent anti-terrorism legislation,' 64
embodied in the TCA.165 The TCA retains most of the PTA's pro-
visions,166 but without the inherent restrictions of temporary legis-
lation that require continual renewal and revision. While exclusion
lated, Claims Benn, BIRMINGHAM POST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 2 (quoting former Labour
Cabinet Minister Tony Benn).
158. Ch. 40 (1998) (Eng.).
159. Ch. 9 (1998) (Eng.).
160. The EPA set its own expiration date at June 15, 1999, and Parliament has not
yet passed a formal extension of the Act, although Northern Ireland Secretary Mo
Mowlam has stated that she intends to further extend the Act's duration. See Politics:
Mo Holds on to Anti-Terror Laws, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, May 14, 1999, at 8.
161. See ch. 9, § 1(3) (1998) (Eng.).
162. See id. sched. 2 There is no mention of section 14 of the 1989 PTA, the provi-
sion that grants authority for seven-day interrogations without charge discussed in
Part I.A.2, anywhere in the 1998 EPA. The TCA gives only cursory reference to those
provisions. See ch. 40, § 3 (1998) (Eng.).
163. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 40, § 5 (Eng.); cf
Hansard Debates, supra note 152, at col. 867 (statement of Home Secretary Jack
Straw) ("There are other safeguards. Since January, there has been a mandatory re-
gime for silent video recording of all interrogations in Northern Ireland.").
164. See Home Office: Government Announces Plans for Permanent Counter Ter-
rorism Legislation, supra note 156 ("The ceasefire in Northern Ireland and the possi-
bility of achieving lasting peace there does not mean that we no longer need special
legislation to investigate, to disrupt and to counter terrorism.").
165. Ch. 40 (1998) (Eng.).
166. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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and internment have fallen to the cutting room floor, the police's
broad investigatory powers, a defendant's denial of the right to in-
ference-free silence and the scheduled offenses remain as strong as
ever.
167
Parliament added a disturbing new twist to these already plenary
powers by allowing into evidence the opinion testimony of police
officers.168 The TCA in part provides that "if a police officer of or
above the rank of superintendent states in oral evidence that in his
opinion the accused - belongs to an organisation which is speci-
fied, or belonged at a particular time to an organisation which was
then specified... the statement shall be admissible as evidence."' 6 9
Just as with the provisions abrogating the right to silence, 7 ° the
police opinion section of the TCA states that an individual may not
be convicted solely on the basis of such opinions,'17 1 but makes no
mention of whether a negative inference drawn from silence pro-
vides sufficient corroborating evidence to secure a conviction. The
admissibility and impact of police opinions do not decrease be-
cause of an absence of evidence to back it up.1 72
The TCA's standards extend from the borders of Northern Ire-
land to international "terrorist" organizations. 73 The government
may enforce the Act with equal vigor against groups based in Eng-
land that operate abroad. 74 The TCA could render illegal protest
demonstrations against the Soviet presence in Estonia, 75 as well as
support of the work of Nelson Mandela and the African National
167. See ch. 40, §§ 1-3 & scheds. 1-2 (1998) (Eng.). But see Rachel Donnelly, IRT
Home News: Ruling Could Make PTA Convictions Unsafe, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 31,
1999, at 8 ("The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, said Section 16 of the PTA under-
mined a defendant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. It reversed
the burden of proof by requiring a defendant to establish that alleged terrorist items
in his or her possession were for innocent purposes.").
168. See ch. 40, sec. 1, §§ 2A(2)-(3) & sec. 2, §§ 30A(2)-(3) (1998) (Eng.).
169. Id. sec. 2, §§ 30A(2)-(3)(a).
170. See id. sec. 2, § 30A(6)(b).
171. See id. sec. 2, § 30A(3)(b).
172. See id. sec. 1, §§ 2A(2)-(3) & sec. 2, §§ 30A(2)-(3). But cf Donald Findlay,
Cut Crime, Not Corners, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, Sept. 6, 1998, at 15
Why should we accept the opinion of a policeman? The duty of the police is
to collect the evidence, not pass a judgement upon it .... Frankly, if the
police are not able or prepared to produce that evidence, it seems to me that
the mere statement is worth nothing and the innocent may be wrongly
convicted.
Id.
173. See ch. 40, §§ 5-7 (1998) (Eng.)
174. See id.
175. See Sarah Schaefer, Liberal Democrat Conference: Northern Ireland - Anti-
Terror Measures 'Shocking,' INDEP. (London), Sept. 24, 1998, at 10.
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Congress against apartheid in South Africa,176 and even the French
Resistance during World War 11.177 Although many MP's 178 voiced
concern regarding the broad international sections of the TCA, 179
it still passed the House of Commons by a vote of 220 to 24.180
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
The AEDPA arose in the wake of the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing.181 Upon signing the AEDPA into law, President Clinton
stated, "So let us honor those who lost their lives by resolving to
hold fast against the forces of violence and division, by never al-
lowing them to shake our resolve or break our spirit, to frighten us
into sacrificing our sacred freedoms or surrendering a drop of pre-
cious American liberty."'18 2 Unfortunately, some provisions of the
AEDPA attempt to restrict terrorist activity at the expense of ex-
actly those "sacred freedoms" America holds so dear.'83
1. Specific Provisions of the AEDPA
A large portion of the AEDPA provides new tools with which
law enforcement and administrative agencies may combat terror-
ism. 184 Before many of these provisions can go into effect, the Sec-
retary of State must first designate a group as a foreign terrorist
organization. 85 On October 2, 1997, Secretary of State, Madeline
176. See Jones, supra note 157, at 16 (statement of David Howarth).
177. See id.
178. "MP" is a common British abbreviation for a member of Parliament. See T. R.
Reid, Redefining the U.K.; Scotland and Wales Elect First Local Parliaments Today,
WASH. POST, May 6, 1999, at A21.
179. See Peter Kellner, Why We May Live to Regret This Rash New Terror Law,
EVENING STANDARD (London), Sept. 3, 1998, at 4.
180. See Hansard Debates, supra note 152, at col. 930. The Republic of Ireland is
ironically moving towards its own legislation that somewhat mirrors the EPA and
TCA. See Una Bradley, Crackdown on Terror throughout Island, BELFAST TELE-
GRAPH, Aug. 20, 1999.
181. See Martin, supra note 3, at 201-02.
182. Remarks on signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 717 (Apr. 29, 1996).
183. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
184. Some of these tools, beyond the scope of this discussion, include the use of
taggants in plastic explosives, greater cooperation between the CIA and FBI and in-
creased funding for law enforcement. Taking the foreign jurisdictional extensions of
the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 even further, the
AEDPA grants civil standing to the aggrieved families of terrorist victims to sue ter-
rorist-sponsoring states. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241.
The AEDPA also includes a section devoted to habeas corpus reform. See id. tit. I.
185. See 8 U.S.C. 1181 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 302, § 219(a)(1). See gener-
ally U.S. Dep't of State: Daily Press Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 9, 1997 (statement
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Albright designated thirty groups as foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.186 Surprisingly absent from the list was the IRA, and the
many other groups involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland.
187
These designations expire, unless renewed, after two years.
188
Although the courts may review and overturn designations, 8 9
some fear that this review power is illusory, and ultimately the
political tide will determine which groups end up on the adminis-
tration's hit list.190
Extending the principle of guilt by association that was aban-
doned with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990,'9' as well
as raising First Amendment questions of free speech and freedom
of association, 192 the AEDPA criminalizes the giving of support to
of Press Secretary Jamie Rubin) ("[A] terrorist organization targets innocent civilians
to make their political point.").
186. See Terrorist Organizations, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Nov. 26, 1997, at B6;
USIA: Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 9, 1997
(listing the designated organizations: Abu Nidal Organization, Abu Sayyaf Group,
Armed Islamic Group, Aum Shinrikyo, Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine - Hawatmeh Faction, HAMAS, Harakat ul-Ansar,
Hizballah, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Japanese Red Army, al-Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai,
Khmer Rouge, Kurdistan Workers' Party, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Manuel
Rodriquez Patriotic Front Dissidents, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, National Lib-
eration Army, Palestine Islamic Jihad - Shaqaqi Faction, Palestine Liberation Front -
Abu Abbas Faction, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, Revolutionary People's Libera-
tion Party/Front, Revolutionary People's Struggle, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement).
187. See Brian Rohan, IRA Omitted from Clinton's Terror List: Move Criticized by
Unionists, Sen. Diane Feinstein, IRISH VOICE, Oct. 21, 1997, at 7 ("'The IRA is one of
the oldest, most violent and indiscriminate of terrorist organizations in modern his-
tory .... Their omission may well be misread as an invitation to their membership to
conduct fundraising and other activities in the [United States] ..... (quoting Sen.
Diane Feinstein)).
188. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 186.
189. See People's Mojahedin Org. v. United States, No. 97-1648, 1999 WL 420471,
at *5-6 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 1999) (holding that a court may review the Secretary of
State's determinations that an organization is foreign and engages in terrorist activity,
but not her determination that the organization's activities threaten national security).
190. See Counterterrorism Legislation Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Tech., and Gov't Info.... on S. 390 and S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Cole
Testimony] ("[T]he statutory definition of 'terrorist organization' is so open-ended -
encompassing literally tens of thousands of potential organizations, and hundreds of
thousands of affiliated organizations and persons - that it effectively gives the Presi-
dent carte blanche to blacklist groups and attach criminal consequences to the
designation." (testimony of David Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center)).
191. 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(3)(iii) (1994).
192. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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designated terrorist organizations. 93 Congressional leaders hoped
to weaken the strength of terrorist organizations by cutting off ac-
cess to support systems, for "terrorism is not a self-sustaining en-
terprise. It needs money and supplies to succeed."' 94 As current
legislation already prohibits fundraising and contributions to a
group's terrorist actions, 95 this ban extends to the humanitarian
activities of organizations deemed terrorist.196 Congress decided to
enact this extension of criminal liability in support of the peaceful
and legal branches of designated groups because "foreign organiza-
tions that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their crimi-
nal conduct that any contribution-to such an organization facilitates
that conduct.' '1 97
Immigrants' status in the United States became more tenuous
with the passing of the AEDPA. The Act provides for the exclu-
sion of foreigners and deportation of resident aliens who violate
certain criteria. 98 Foreigners affiliated with a designated terrorist
group will have a hard time gaining any kind of visa or entry into
the United States.' 99 In addition to the penal sanctions risked by
ordinary citizens associated with terrorist groups, legal resident
aliens easily could face deportation, as can those immigrants who
have engaged in certain criminal activity.20 The AEDPA has
broadened the latter category of deportable aliens by removing
some exceptions previously available to those who had committed
particular crimes,2"' and who had lived legally in the United States
for at least seven years.20 2 The logic behind this latest form of
American exclusion is that "immigrants allowed to live in the
1 193. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-
132, §§ 303, 321-330, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250-58.
194. Albright, supra note 7.
195. See Cole Testimony, supra note 190 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A).
196. See Beall, supra note 109, at 699; Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 1176, 1204-5 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction of plaintiffs
who wish to provide humanitarian support to the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan
Workers' Party).
197. § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1247; see also U.S. Dep't of State: Daily Press Briefing,
supra note 185 ("[Wlhen it comes to taking down the infrastructure, our rule of rea-
son is [that] that infrastructure provides assistance to the military wing. (state-
ment of Press Secretary Jamie Rubin)).
198. See tit. IV, 110 Stat. 1258-81.
199. See Smith, supra note 120, at 269.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 271 (listing examples of deportable offenses including: "aggravated
felony, controlled substance violation, firearm offenses, and two or more crimes in-
volving moral turpitude").
202. See id.
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United States should not be committing crimes, and criminal
aliens should not even get past the border.
To facilitate the deportation process, the AEDPA established
special removal courts.0 4 In a similar vein as the Diplock courts,2°5
the removal courts' procedures eliminate due process protections,
effectively streamlining the deportation action. 0 6 The AEDPA
discards the Federal Rules of Evidence in deportation hearings,20 7
allowing the use of unlawfully obtained evidence by the govern-
ment.z°8 Invoking the questionable doctrine of national security,
Congress also allows the government to use secret evidence against
individuals in removal hearings. 0 9
While United States v. Reynolds210 permits the protection of se-
cret information, "[ilt is ... the firmly held main rule that a court
may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in
camera submissions."'211 Reynolds, however, only prevented the
discovery of secret government documents in the context of civil
claims.2 12 The Reynolds Court explained that such privilege has no
place in a criminal context because, "the Government which prose-
cutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then in-
voke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything
which might be material to his defense. 2 13 Although a deporta-
tion hearing is not a criminal prosecution, they bear a closer resem-
blance than a deportation hearing and a civil trial.2 14  The
203. Id.
204. See id. at 268-69.
205. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
206. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
207. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401, 110 Stat. 1214, 1260 (amending the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1534(h) (1999)).
208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B). ("[A]n alien subject to removal under this sub-
chapter shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was unlawfully
obtained ....").
209. See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A).
210. 345 U.S. 1 (1952) (holding that the head of a governmental department, in this
case the Secretary of the Air Force, may assert privilege protecting military secrets to
prevent discovery of an airplane crash report by plaintiff widows of deceased
servicemen).
211. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1
(1987).
212. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
213. Id.
214. Compare Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936,
947 (1999) ("While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are
not imposed as a punishment."), with id. at 950 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("As this
court has long recognized '[t]hat deportation is a penalty - at times a most serious
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permissible use of secret evidence creates an environment for dan-
gerous and unjust decisions, such as the situation that befell Ellen
Knauff in 1950 when the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") denied her entry into the country based upon frivolous
secret evidence provided by a jilted former lover of her husband.215
While Congress "may prescribe conditions for [a lawful resident
alien's] expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel
him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard. '216 The
removal provisions of the AEDPA tread precariously near this
line.
2. Response to and Ramifications of the AEDPA
Aside from the increased police powers,217 the AEDPA raises a
number of controversial issues. Challenges to the AEDPA's fun-
draising ban on First Amendment free speech and association
218
grounds are currently pending. 219 The AEDPA gave the President
the power to condemn individuals for their affinity to the political
ideals of designated terrorist groups. 220 The AEDPA goes even
one - cannot be doubted."' (alteration in original) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 137, 154 (1945)), and id. at 956 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Souter voiced the concern that
The interest in avoiding selective enforcement of the criminal law... is that
prosecutorial discretion not be exercised to violate constitutionally pre-
scribed guaranties of equality or liberty. This interest applies to the like de-
gree in immigration litigation, and is not attenuated because the deportation
is not a penalty for a criminal act ....
Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
215. See Counterterrorism Legislation Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Tech., and Gov't Info.... on S. 390 and S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of
Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (citing EL-
LEN KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY XV-XVi (1952)).
216. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597-98 (1953); see also Rafeedie v.
INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming preliminary injunction against an INS
attempt to use secret information to exclude permanent resident alien); Rafeedie v.
INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding government's attempt to use secret evi-
dence to exclude alien unconstitutional).
217. See James Ledbetter, Press Clips: Hello Ollie!, VILLAGE VOICE, June 4, 1996,
at 22. A passage in the legislative findings of the AEDPA says, "'the President should
use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, disman-
tle, and destroy international infrastructure used by international terrorists, including
overseas terrorist training facilities and safe havens."' Id. (quoting AEDPA
§ 324(4)). "'What Reagan and Oliver North did illegally, any President now has the
legal authority to do."' Id. (quoting former Gov. Jerry Brown).
218. See Beall, supra note 109, at 700; Cole Testimony, supra note 190.
219. See ADL Brief Urges Court to Uphold Anti-Terrorism Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 15, 1998 (indicating that Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno awaits decision on
constitutionality of fundraising ban in appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
220. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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further to forbid individuals from providing humanitarian aid to
such groups, many of whom provide food, shelter and education to
an otherwise oppressed people. 221  Although the United States
Supreme Court has yet to directly rule on the constitutionality of
the AEDPA's fundraising provisions, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
Reno 222 that "targeting individuals because of activities such as
fundraising is impermissible unless the government can show that
group members had the specific intent to pursue illegal group
goals.122
3
The deportation components of the AEDPA may remove un-
wanted aliens from American shores, but overzealous enforce-
ment2 2 4 has had unanticipated results. Many legal alien residents
have been deported for reasons unrelated to terrorism, raising
questions regarding the validity of the AEDPA. Hundreds of long-
term residents have gone abroad on vacation to be met by arresting
officers upon their return.2 5 Lorraine Paris provides one such ex-
ample: INS officials detained Ms. Paris upon her return to New
York from her honeymoon because of a late 1970's marijuana con-
viction.2 6 Additionally, once the government ejects these "crimi-
221. Compare Plaintiffs Seek Right to Aid Groups on U.S. Terror List, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 1998, at A22 (referring to lawsuit arguing that plaintiffs should be able to
donate food, clothing and other items to orphanages and refugee centers run by the
Tamil Tigers), and Ben Barber, Controversy Dogs People's Mojahedin: State Lists
Hill's Heroes as Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1998, at A15 (indicating that "224
members of Congress had signed a statement urging the United States to support the
[People's Mojahedin]. . . . 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter' "(quoting Rep. Gary L. Ackerman)), with ADL Brief Urges Court to Uphold
Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 219 ("[G]roups like Hamas use the schools, mosques
and clubs they fund 'to recruit individuals to serve as suicide bombers,' and then pro-
vide support for their families 'once the attack has been carried out."' (quoting ADL
brief)).
222. 119 F.3d 1367 (1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999) (refusing to resolve First
Amendment issue as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act deprives the court jurisdiction over claim). But see 119 S. Ct. at 948 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("[I]nterlocutory intervention in Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) proceedings would be in order, notwithstanding a statutory bar, if the INS acts
in bad faith, lawlessly, or in patent violation of constitutional rights.").
223. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 F.3d at 1376.
224. See James Ridgeway & Jean Jean-Pierre, Crime Story: The U.S. Exports Its
Bad Boys Back to Haiti, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 22, 1996, at 31 ("According to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service 33,159 aliens have been deported so far this
fiscal year, up from 32,347 a year ago. 'I am very confident that we will meet and
exceed our goal of 62,000 total removals (final deportations) for this year."' (quoting
David Martin, general counsel, INS)).
225. See Antonio C. Campo, New Anti-Terrorism Law Harsh to Immigrants, FILI.
PINO REP., Aug. 8, 1996, at 20.
226. See id.
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nal" aliens from the United States, they return to their native
countries, bringing their problems with them. Newly deported
Haitian-born criminals have increased the size of existing zen-
glendo gangs and now risk overrunning the already unstable na-
tion.227 While it may not be a major concern of the United States if
Haiti becomes a criminal playland, American foreign policy offi-
cials would not like to see the military intervention that returned
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's administration to power go to waste.228
The broad powers and discretion granted by the AEDPA invite
inconsistent, unexpected and sometimes catastrophic effects.
Ill. NEw DAY RISING?
Governments have historically implemented a number of failed
antiterrorist policies. 229 In order to properly form legislation to
prevent terrorism, however, one must first understand the roots
and goals of terrorist action. "[T]errorist violence is aimed specifi-
cally at influencing not so much government decision makers or
leaders of governments, but civilian populations: to have a psycho-
logical effect on that audience in the hopes that they will pressure
government into either submitting or overreacting. '' 230 The United
States, paralleled by Great Britain, has consistently refused to
buckle to terrorist action, instead leaning towards the latter ex-
treme of over-legislating. It is such overreaction that undermines
the foundation of civilized society and yields the very results
sought by terrorists.231
One unfortunately typical response to terrorism focuses on elim-
inating the threat by relocating or isolating it.232 Exclusion orders
in Britain and deportation in America both attempt to remove
dangerous factors from society. This strategy can never succeed
227. Compare Ridgeway, supra note 224, at 31, with Walker, supra note 60, at 17
("After all, removal to Northern Ireland, the heartland of paramilitary activity against
the British state, seems to increase rather than decrease the opportunity for military
engagement.").
228. See Ridgeway, supra note 224, at 31 ("The gangs, swollen by recent U.S. de-
portees, are pushing the country further and further back into just the sort of chaos
the U.S. Army rescued it from . . ").
229. See Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: How Democracies Respond
to Terrorism, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1997, at 153, 156.
230. Id. at 154.
231. See Tam Dalyell, Obituary: Roger Slott, INDEP. (London), Aug. 10, 1999, at 6
(stating that long-time Labour MP Roger Slott believed that "the powers in the
Emergency Provisions Act weakened the core principles on which a civilised society is
based. That in itself was of assistance to terrorists in their evil campaign [of]
violence").
232. See Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 157.
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because moving a volatile element does not defuse its destructive
power, but merely transplants it.233 Exclusion of a suspect between
states, or from a country entirely, arbitrarily deprives liberty, free
travel, access to family and nothing else.234 Further, partial action
towards individuals loosely associated with terrorist groups often
tends to tighten their binds to the organization, forcing people un-
derground and "increas[ing] recruitment into the deeply clandes-
tine armed groups, which exacerbate[s] terrorism. ' 235 By excluding
or deporting a suspected terrorist, a nation often pushes an individ-
ual out of its bed and into the arms of her devoted terrorist breth-
ren. The United States would be better advised to zealously
prosecute the people with clear and unequivocal ties to the violent
activities of a terrorist enclave.
Improving security measures in hopes of preventing terrorist
strikes produces some reasonable results in the short term. 36 The
fatal flaw with this approach remains that terrorists have increasing
access to newer and more powerful technologies to evade such se-
curity procedures. Terrorists rarely identify with individual spon-
sor-states, now instead favoring mobile, transnational structures.237
No matter what precautions a country takes, "'[tierrorists have an
inherent advantage .... They can attack anywhere, any time. And
you cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time."' 2 38 Na-
tions can proportionally increase their fortifications in response to
each new technological breakthrough, but at what point does this
Pyrrhic war resolve anything? Right now in America, "'[t]he tech-
nology exists for imposing an Orwellian state with unprecedented
degrees of control.' 1 39 While temporarily complicating attacks
and providing some peace of mind, improving security measures
ultimately will not end terrorism, it is merely a delaying tactic.
233. Cf. Walker, supra note 60, at 17 ("[C]riminal charges are preferable if suffi-
cient evidence is available to sustain them, for imprisonment is a more effective
method of prevention.").
234. See Aolain, supra note 43, at 1384.
235. Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 157.
236. See id. at 158.
237. See Carla Anne Robbins & John J. Fialka, A Step Behind: Despite Tough
Words, Antiterrorism Effort in U.S. Is Still Flawed, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1996, at Al
("It's impossible to know where to send a Tomahawk missile to punish these guys
.... .(quoting a senior State Department official)).
238. Id. (quoting Brian Jenkins, deputy chairman, Kroll Associates).
239. Id. (quoting Brian Jenkins, deputy chairman, Kroll Associates); see also Wil-
liam Greider, The Cyberscare of '99, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 19, 1999, at 51 (exploring
the Clinton administration's fear of terrorist strikes at American utilities and eco-
nomic centers over the internet and government plans for cyber-countermeasures).
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The most extreme, and obvious, response to terrorism lies with
military force. However, this approach often causes more harm as
increased terrorist casualties augment the terrorist motive for re-
venge, feeding the perception that their terrorist campaign is really
a "holy war" against unjust oppression.24 ° "The IRA admits it can-
not overthrow British rule through military might; its goal is to sim-
ply outlast the British."' 241 England has made much more progress
towards lasting peace by sitting down at a table with republican
leaders than America has by refusing to negotiate with terrorists.
Military intervention generally results in greater bloodshed on
both sides of the gun, as evidenced by the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 in retaliation to America's raid on Libya.242
While some believe that terrorists cannot be understood nor rea-
soned with,243 the situation in Northern Ireland illuminates the
assistance a working knowledge of a movement's past can impart.
In analyzing British history and legislation, the "failure of policy
and implementation led the authors of one comprehensive study to
conclude that '[t]he [United Kingdom] is not 'above' the [Northern
Irish] problem, it is an integral part of that problem.'" 244 The re-
strictive policies implemented by the British have reinforced the
historical feelings of oppression at the core of Northern Ireland's
"Troubles" and, in so doing, magnified them. American politicians
must learn from their British counterparts. Neither reviving the
exclusionary principles of the McCarran-Walter Act, embracing the
McCarthy-ist paranoia of foreign foes, nor following the English
restrictions on due process, will end the long struggle against ter-
rorism. This rash of antiterrorist law charting the "politics of the
last atrocity" does not attack the root of terrorism. Political reality
must not define constitutional reality. The American colonists
threw off the yoke of British rule for a reason: they did not like
Britain's laws and policies.
The primary distinction between the terrorist threats to Britain
and those to America lies in the fact that Britain's problems pri-
marily come from within, while America's are primarily external.
240. See Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 159.
241. Myers, supra note 18, at 32.
242. See Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 159.
243. See Steven Emerson, Stop Aid and Comfort for Agents of Terror, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at A18 ("An effective counterterrorism policy must begin with the un-
derstanding that terrorism is the product of an extremist ideological culture, and it
can only be fought using a complete moral, political and military arsenal.").
244. Myers, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting LIAM O'DowD ET AL., NORTHERN IRE-
LAND: BETWEEN CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WAR 208 (1980)).
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The same discord lies within both countries' "enemies," however.
Opposed to the old days of isolationism, 45 the United States now
plays a hyperactive role in world affairs, yet seems reluctant to
truly immerse itself in the global environment. The recent negotia-
tions with Republican paramilitaries and Middle-Eastern funda-
mentalists have brought all concerned parties closer to resolution
than the EPA, TCA and AEDPA. True bilateral discourse engen-
ders equality and understanding, two of the United States' found-
ing virtues. The designation provisions of the AEDPA2 46 only
distance the United States further from the rest of the world and
should therefore be repealed. Police agencies pursue groups that
actively embrace violence, and there is no need then to further
blacklist any other organizations that appear threatening. The
same principles that gave birth to America must inform its ap-
proach towards legislation, encouraging a complete shedding of
traditional egoism and the genesis of an interactive, organic world-
view.
Terrorism must be recognized for what it is: just another form of
organized crime.2 17 Future legislation should de-emphasize indi-
vidual military action and instead reorient the American criminal
justice system towards an international scale. The State Depart-
ment must establish closer ties and stronger lines of communica-
tion with foreign states. Cooperation and coordination with
foreign law enforcement agencies can efficiently and effectively
achieve both national and international security goals.
Punishment of terrorists and individuals who support terrorist vi-
olence is laudable, but revisiting well-documented historical calam-
ities is hardly a wise decision. Disciplining the exercise of the
Constitutional rights of free speech and association and exiling in-
dividuals who hold unpopular views cannot be justified by the vain
hope that such precautions will dissuade extremist paramilitaries
from attacking the next Alfred P. Murrah building. The provisions
of the AEDPA prohibiting charitable contributions to "desig-
nated" organizations248 serve only to further alienate American
245. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
246. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (1996).
247. See Albright, supra note 4, at 33 ("Terrorism is not a legitimate form of polit-
ical expression or a manifestation of religious faith. It is murder."); cf Marilyn Man-
son, Columbine: Whose Fault Is It?, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 1999, at 23, 77 ("Isn't
killing just killing, regardless if it's in Vietnam or Jonesboro, Arkansas? Why do wejustify one, just because it seems to be for the right reasons? Should there ever be a
right reason?").
248. See § 303, 110 Stat. at 1250.
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and foreign citizens, many of whom only wish to help in what they
perceive as an honorable cause. The State Department should
never tolerate aid given to groups that wage campaigns of violence,
but lines of allegiance among charitable organizations are some-
times admittedly difficult to discern. The uncertainty involved in
such designations and the real chance of hasty or misguided certifi-
cation serve as further reasons to stop forcing government officials
from forging black and white out of a myriad shades of gray.249
The similar mutation of due process in deportation hearings fosters
further paranoia and injustice. For fear of arbitrary persecution,
law enforcement should only pursue an alleged terrorist group and
its members/benefactors after gathering evidence sufficient for sub-
stantive action, and a "conviction" should only be supported by
evidence that would stand up in court.
The AEDPA will not aid American efforts to combat interna-
tional terrorism, and should be repealed. A comprehensive re-
alignment of United States foreign policy towards international
cooperation, grass-roots reform, meaningful dialogue and effective
criminal legislation can break the cycle of fury.
CONCLUSION
America likes to think of itself as a nation founded upon princi-
ples of liberty and equality. Lest our policymakers forget, the
founding fathers disavowed British imperialism through the Decla-
ration of Independence, rejecting oppression and government in-
trusion into the lives of everyday citizens. Despite the United
States' close ties with Great Britain, there is no reason to follow in
the mistaken footsteps of British antiterrorist legislation that tram-
ples the civil rights held so dear by those who claim America as
their home, and by those who hope to partake of the rights some
politicians seem either to take for granted or to ignore. Immi-
grants of all races and creeds founded America, and the exclusion
and removal elements of the AEDPA deny the diversity and lib-
erty that built the United States. British laws dealing with North-
ern Ireland fail exactly because they do overlook this vital and
basic need of all peoples to be free from persecution and secure in
their individual sovereignty. Legislation plays an important role in
America's anti-terrorism scheme, but "[u]nless it is carefully
crafted - with an abundance of checks and balances against the
249. Some could view the economic support of certain mainstream politicians as a
threat to national security.
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possibility of overzealous enforcement - we may one day look
back and wonder whether the terrorists actually achieved their goal
of undermining American society. '25 ° The Anti-Terrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is not a salvation from terrorism
but a step into the past.
250. The Second Wakeup Calk Coping with Terrorism in the Nineties: Hearings on
S. 390 and S. 735 Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Gov't Info., 104th
Cong. (1995) (testimony of Robert Kupperman, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic
and International Studies).
